No poco se habrá meditado acerca del poema “Todtnauberg” de Paul Celan (1967), publicado en Lichtzwang (1970). Poco o casi nada, en cambio, acerca de su “respuesta poética” (si cabe la expresión) por parte de Martin Heidegger: “Vorwort” (1971). En lo que sigue nos limitamos a puntear algunas de las circunstancias tal vez más marcantes de esta suerte de “correspondencia” heideggeriana y eventual “familiar” (y tal vez inmortal) micro-bolero. Palabras clave: Todtnauberg - Paul Celan - Vorwort - Martin Heidegger - (...) grotesco. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the forays into metaphysics of The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program (henceforth, DNP). I argue that the work of DNP is a valuable contribution to the epistemology of certain aspects of artifact design and use, but that it fails to advance a persuasive metaphysic. A central problem is that DNP approaches ontology from within a functionalist framework that is mainly concerned with ascriptions and justified beliefs. Thus, the materiality of artifacts emerges only as the external (...) conditions of realizability of function ascription. The work of DNP has a strong programmatic aspect and much of its foray into metaphysics is tentative, so the intent of my argument is partly synthetic: to sum up these issues as they are presented in the literature and highlight some recognized problems. But I also go beyond that, suggesting that these problems are foundational, arising from the very way in which DNP poses the question of artifact metaphysics. Although it sets out to incorporate objective aspects of technology, DNP places a strong focus on the intentional side of the purported matter-mind duality, bracketing off materiality in an irretrievable manner. Thus, some of the advantages of dualism are lost. I claim that DNP is dualistic, not merely based on “duality”, but that its version of dualism does not appropriately account for the material “nature” of artifacts. The paper ends by suggesting some correctives and alternatives to Dual Nature theory. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will (...) lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature. (shrink)

Transcendental epistemology of physics Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9507-z Authors Andrés Rivadulla, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University, 28040 Madrid, Spain Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

If the bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA holds and ω 1 = ${\mathrm{\omega }}_{1}^{\mathrm{L}}$ , then there is a lightface ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{1}$ well-ordering of the reals. The argument combines a well-ordering due to Caicedo-Veličković with an absoluteness result for models of MA in the spirit of "David's trick." We also present a general coding scheme that allows us to show that BPFA is equiconsistent with R being lightface ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{4}^{1}$ , for many "consistently locally certified" relations R on $\mathrm{\mathbb{R}}$ . (...) This is accomplished through a use of David's trick and a coding through the ∑ 2 stable ordinals of L. (shrink)

Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We (...) argue, using these cases, but focusing particularly on the multiply polysemous word ‘school’, that the senses involved in co-predication form especially robust activation packages, which allow hearers and readers to access all the different senses in interpretation. (shrink)

Explanation and understanding are intimately connected notions, but the nature of that connection has generally not been considered a topic worthy of serious philosophical investigation. Most authors have avoided making reference to the notion of understanding in their accounts of explanation because they fear that any mention of the epistemic states of the individuals involved compromises the objectivity of explanation. Understanding is a pragmatic notion, they argue, and pragmatics should be kept at a safe distance from the universal features of (...) explanation. My main contention in this dissertation is that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize this notion it is necessary to formulate an account of objective explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. ;My account of explanation is based on the belief-doubt model of inquiry first proposed by Peirce. Using the tools provided by decision theory, and the models of belief revision developed by Isaac Levi and by Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson, I analyze the objective and pragmatic conditions that a piece of information must fulfill to be both explanatory and epistemically useful to an inquiring agent. The objective basis for an explanation is provided by the relation of probabilistic relevance that the fact described by the explanans bares to the fact described by the explanandum. But an explanation is much more than its foundation. As an epistemological notion, a potential explanation can only be a bona fide explanation if it becomes part of inquiry, that is, if an agent or a group of agents can see any value in it for their cognitive purposes. I provide a way to evaluate an explanation in terms of its credibility, its content, and its explanatory value. I argue that although an objective measure of the credibility and content of an explanation can be established, in many cases a complete determination of its explanatory value will ultimately depend on the interests and goals of the individual inquirers. (shrink)

Very few—if any—will doubt Hobbes's aversion to the state of nature and sympathy for civil society. On the other hand, it is not quite news that it would be inaccurate to claim that Hobbes rejected the state of nature entirely. Indeed, he embraced or at the very least tolerated the state of nature at the international level in order to escape from the individual state of nature. Hobbes's recommended exchange of an individual state of nature for an international one does (...) seem to have a smack of contradiction, arguably first noted by Rousseau. There is yet another charge of contradiction lurking around Hobbes's account of the state of nature. Hobbes's political thought would still reflect an ambivalent attitude towards a third instantiation of the state of nature, i.e. civil war. This is one of the main reasons why the political allegiance of Thomas Hobbes has been an issue ever since the publication of De Cive at the very least. This paper deals with Hobbes's differential treatment of the original and the international states of nature and discusses the source of Hobbes's somewhat ambivalent attitude towards civil war. It is here argued that Hobbes can fairly hold his ground vis-à-vis Rousseau's criticism, in spite of the normative resemblance between the international state of nature and the initial state of nature, and that Hobbes ambivalent attitude of attraction and repulsion towards civil war is actually due not so much to opportunism on his part as to the normative autonomy he has granted to the state of nature. (shrink)

In the absence of Woodin cardinals, fine structural inner models for mild large cardinal hypotheses admit forcing extensions where bounded forcing axioms hold and yet the reals are projectively well-ordered.

In the natural and social sciences, it is common to use toy models—extremely simple and highly idealized representations—to understand complex phenomena. Some of the simple surrogate models used to understand opaque machine learning (ML) models, such as rule lists and sparse decision trees, bear some resemblance to scientific toy models. They allow non-experts to understand how an opaque ML model works globally via a much simpler model that highlights the most relevant features of the input space and their effect on (...) the output. The obvious difference is that the common target of a toy and a full-scale model in the sciences is some phenomenon in the world, while the target of a surrogate model is another model. This essential difference makes toy surrogate models (TSMs) a new object of study for theories of understanding, one that is not easily accommodated under current analyses. This paper provides an account of what it means to understand an opaque ML model globally with the aid of such simple models. (shrink)

Large cardinals arising from the existence of arbitrarily long end elementary extension chains over models of set theory are studied here. In particular, we show that the large cardinals obtained in this fashion (`unfoldable cardinals') lie in the boundary of the propositions consistent with `V = L' and the existence of 0 ♯ . We also provide an `embedding characterisation' of the unfoldable cardinals and study their preservation and destruction by various forcing constructions.

One of the strongest defences of free speech holds that autonomy requires the protection of speech. In this paper I examine five conditions that autonomy must satisfy. I survey recent research in social psychology regarding automatic behaviour, and a challenge to autonomy is articulated. I argue that a plausible strategy for neutralising some of the autonomy-threatening automatic responses consists in avoiding the exposure to the environmental features that trigger them. If this is so, we can good autonomy-based pro tanto reasons (...) for controlling exposure to certain forms of speech. (shrink)

I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular counterpart and (...) upholds reasonable standards of acceptability. The standards I will be discussing come from Humberstone (1997), who claims that definitions cannot be informative as long as they are inferentially circular. (shrink)

Some versions of moral naturalism are faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that several defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that, necessarily, if anyone morally ought to do something, then s/he has a categorical reason to do (...) it. Versions of moral naturalism that deny this claim would, if widely believed, disable some crucial practical uses of moral concepts. In particular, if the existence of normative reasons for action is taken to be dependent on agents’ desires, it would breed profound skepticism about the legitimacy of evaluating others’ actions from a moral point of view. Also, it would raise doubts about whether people ought to correct their own behavior in light of moral considerations. Following Richard Joyce, I take these consequences to indicate that the concept of a categorical reason is a “non-negotiable” part of moral concepts. (shrink)

Dos instituciones, la Sociedad Española de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia y la Sociedad de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España contribuyeron, la primera, al inicio de la consolidación de la filosofía de la ciencia en español, y la segunda a su consolidación definitiva. El objeto de este trabajo es mostrar la imagen de la filosofía hispánica de la ciencia, centrada preferentemente en España, en los cuarenta años que median entre ambas sociedades, y que distingo en tres (...) periodos: cimentación, desarrollo y consolidación, en consonancia con su entorno internacional. He reunido la máxima información que he podido, a fin de reflejar la robustez académica de la filosofía actual de la ciencia en aquellos tiempos entre nosotros, y espero haber hecho justicia a quienes precediéndonos la levantaron, mantuvieron y consolidaron. (shrink)

This paper deals with meta-statistical questions concerning frequentist statistics. In Sections 2 to 4 I analyse the dispute between Fisher and Neyman on the so called logic of statistical inference, a polemic that has been concomitant of the development of mathematical statistics. My conclusion is that, whenever mathematical statistics makes it possible to draw inferences, it only uses deductive reasoning. Therefore I reject Fisher's inductive approach to the statistical estimation theory and adhere to Neyman's deductive one. On the other hand, (...) I assert that Neyman-Pearson's testing theory, as well as Fisher's tests of significance, properly belong to decision theory, not to logic, neither deductive nor inductive. I then also disagree with Costantini's view of Fisher's testing model as a theory of hypothetico-deductive inferences.In Section 5 I disapprove Hacking1's evidentialists criticisms of the Neyman-Pearson's theory of statistics (NPT), as well as Hacking2's interpretation of NPT as a theory of probable inference. In both cases Hacking misses the point. I conclude, by claiming that Mayo's conception of the Neyman-Pearson's testing theory, as a model of learning from experience, does not purport any advantages over Neyman's behavioristic model. (shrink)

Incommensurability has been for about forty years one of the most discussed topics on the contemporary philosophy of science. In order to tackle this issue I assume Howard Sankey’s characterization of incommensurability as “the thesis that the content of some alternative scientific theories is incomparable due to translation failure between the vocabulary the theories employ”. This kind of incomparability should pre- vent for instance the derivation of Newtonian mechanics from relativity theory, as Thomas Kuhn maintains. Since I have myself been (...) concerned with the comparison of Newtonian and Einsteinian mass concepts in Rivadulla, I focus in this short paper on the comparability of theories of contemporary theoretical physics.Thus, instead of dealing with the question of whether the theories of contemporary physics are definitely incommensurable with each other, the main aim of this paper is to provide an answer to the question of whether it makes any sense to think about the in- commensurability between contemporary physical theories, due to their obvious comparability. (shrink)

Contrary to the view maintained by many philosophers that science employs the deductive testing of hypotheses, observational natural sciences such as paleoanthropology and the earth sciences apply a scientific methodology consisting in the proposal of hypotheses which are best fitted to the available empirical data, i.e. which best explain the data. Observational natural sciences are predominantly empirical. They are grounded in observation, and they do not implement any Popperian deductive testing of hypotheses. Theoretical natural sciences such as mathematical physics also (...) apply inference to the best explanation for the introduction of significant concepts and hypotheses. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that in contemporary science, the use of abductive reasoning continues to be as effective as ever. (shrink)

Examines in more detail his main arguments for justifying political authority and obligation, namely the existence of society, the legal enforcement of morality, the role played by political activity in human well-being, and the need for coordination. Special consideration is then given to Aristotle’s apparent commitment to the challenging view that not only imperfect agents but even fully rational and moral people would still be in need of political authority.

El presente artículo examina las diferentes teorías del contenido mental de Dretske y su relación con sus consideraciones epistemológicas para concluir que el hecho de conceptualizar o albergar un determinado contenido es ya un tipo de conocimiento, a saber, conocimiento animal. A continuación el autor discute dicho enfoque sosteniendo, a diferencia de Dretske, que mantener la dicotomía entre conocimiento animal y conocimiento reflexivo resulta virtuosa pues mantiene tanto aquello que puede ser naturalizado apelando a la Historia natural como da razón (...) de las practicas justificatorias que intervienen en el denominado conocimiento reflexivo y que a su juicio es irrenunciable e irreductible. (shrink)

Since it implies a reduction in the quality and the quantity of the natural resources, environmental degradation is a present day problem that requires immediate solutions. This situation is driving firms to undertake an environmental transformation process with the purpose of reducing the negative externalities that come from their economic activities. Within this context, environmental marketing is an emerging business philosophy by which organizations can address sustainability issues. Moreover, environmental marketing and orientation are seen as valuable strategies to improve a (...) firm's competitiveness. However, the literature that has analyzed the link between environmental strategies and firms' results has been inconclusive and contradictory. In this study, we propose and test a model that analyses how the implementation of ecological issues within a firm's marketing strategy and orientation influences organizational results. Data were obtained through a survey sent to Spanish manufacturing firms. The results show that environmental marketing positively affects firms' operational and commercial performance and this improvement will influence their economic results. Moreover, environmental marketing is revealed as an excellent strategy to obtain competitive advantages in costs and in product differentiation. Thus, this study agrees with the researchers who affirm that environmental strategies positively affect firm's competitiveness while reducing environmental impact. (shrink)

In this article I argue that anti-perfectionist liberals can accept nudging in certain areas: in particular, they can accept nudges aimed at helping people to discharge their nonenforceable duties, and to secure personal autonomy. I claim that nudging is not disrespectful since it does not involve a comparative negative judgment on people’s ability to pursue their plans, and that the judgments that motivate nudging are compatible with treating citizens as free and equal. I also claim that despite being sometimes manipulative, (...) nudging is easy to resist and so it can be employed to pursue legitimate goals. (shrink)

In the natural and social sciences, it is common to use toy models—extremely simple and highly idealized representations—to understand complex phenomena. Some of the simple surrogate models used to understand opaque machine learning (ML) models, such as rule lists and sparse decision trees, bear some resemblance to scientific toy models. They allow non-experts to understand how an opaque ML model works globally via a much simpler model that highlights the most relevant features of the input space and their effect on (...) the output. The obvious difference is that the common target of a toy and a full-scale model in the sciences is some phenomenon in the world, while the target of a surrogate model is another model. This essential difference makes toy surrogate models (TSMs) a new object of study for theories of understanding, one that is not easily accommodated under current analyses. This paper provides an account of what it means to understand an opaque ML model globally with the aid of such simple models. (shrink)

Morally progressive social changes seem to have taken place with the onset of democratic governance, the abolition of slavery, the rise of gender equality, and other developments. This essay attempts to demonstrate that natural and objective moral facts are a plausible cause of some morally progressive social changes. Since this hypothesis is a version of naturalistic moral realism, I call it the Naturalist-Realist Hypothesis. To support the NRH, I argue that objective moral facts are natural facts pertaining to the impartial (...) promotion of well-being within a population of agents facing a social dilemma. I then describe a mechanism to explain how natural and objective moral facts so construed may cause some morally progressive social changes. I suggest that the NRH is a credible hypothesis because it is compatible with empirical findings from research on the evolution of moral cognition and on the sociology of mass political movements. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objetivo retomar la teoría de Byung Chul Han sobre la sociedad del logro (Leistungsgesellschaft), tomando específicamente lo expuesto por él sobre el dogma de la transparencia que surge en la lógica neoliberal-digital contemporánea, para ser completado con la teoría freudiana de lo Unerkante -no reconocible-. Para esto el trabajo se divide en tres momentos: el primero tiene por objetivo exponer lo que se entiende por dogma de la transparencia y cómo se relaciona con el Homo œconomicus; (...) seguidamente, se presenta el concepto de lo Unerkante de Freud para plantear una nueva topología de lo no-reconocible en el plano subjetivo, proponiendo el concepto del ombligo de la subjetividad; y, finalmente, se expone cómo ese ombligo empalma con la teoría de Han frente a la transparencia, de modo que se puedan generar nuevas interpretaciones de lo que sería una salida a la sociedad del logro. (shrink)

The Militant Intellect reconceptualizes critical theory as a field tasked with cultivating the analytical skills of the general intellect to work towards the intersectional and structural death of the colonist and the materialization of that feminist decolonial communist queer marronage world that constitutes its horizon.

The global economy is going through a period of drastic changes. One of the main initiatives is the Green Deal, seeking a modern, resource-efficient competitive economy by 2050.However, transformation implies collaboration by all, not just in Europe but globally. Educate future generations from an ecological perspective, re-qualifying employees within sectors prone to change and modifying or eliminating some jobs in “brown” sectors are some of the causes and consequences of change.Higher Education institutions (HEIs) will be required globally, to provide solutions (...) to the market, providing new professionals able to tackle the New Green Challenge. (shrink)

In this book chapter, we study the preventive rule, raised in Ley 1333 de 2009, and the way that environmental law has been building its own rules; escaping from the administrative law and creating their own dogmatic, necessary to achieve its independence as a legal autonomous area. We also see that is possible to see how the preventive rule was designed out of the general theory of administrative act, because it has characteristics that make it unique in the Colombian legal (...) system. -/- En este capítulo se estudia la figura de la 'facultad a prevención' contenida en la Ley 1333 de 2009, para analizar la forma en la que el derecho ambiental ha venido construyendo una dogmática y reglas propias, escapando de la tradición del derecho administrativo, así como creando la dogmática propia necesaria para lograr su independencia y consolidación como un área autónoma de la disciplina jurídica. Al respecto, en este ejercicio de reflexión es posible ver cómo la figura aparte de estar diseñada por fuera de la teoría general del acto administrativo, también posee particularidades que la hacen única dentro del ordenamiento jurídico colombiano. (shrink)

There are several approaches to the way in which standards of proof in law should be understood. In the central article in this issue, Rodrigo Coloma suggests that they should be conceived either as thresholds either as prototypes. He also offers a taxonomy of the different uses of standards of proof, which transcends their function as error distributors. In their comments on the paper, Raymundo Gama and Claudio Agüero clarify and challenge this way of understanding standards of proof. Some of (...) their criticisms are right on target, but many others are directed more at Coloma’s theoretical presuppositions than at his substantial contributions. In this paper I offer a wider context to evaluate their disagreements. (shrink)

El capitalismo histórico ha experimentado, en la escala mundial que hoy le corresponde, profundos cambios que han modificado sustancialmente su componente de acumulación, pero también, de forma significativa, el de regulación, perturbando críticamente su forma de gestionar las inequidades, desigualdades y doxas que él mismo produce. Actualmente, la expansión de un capitalismo autoritario premunido del paradigma mercantil, promueve una cultura individual que ha calado duramente en los sujetos ..

El punto central del artículo lo constituyen las diferencias entre el análisis marxista clásico o “sistémico” y sus nuevas vertientes “abiertas” o “autonomistas”. Se crítican ciertos discursos testimoniales y rebeldes de la resistencia anticapitalista (John Holloway), las que no darían cuenta del legado teórico de las modalidades clásicas del antagonismo Capital/Trabajo, surgidas de la experiencia sociohistórica de las luchas sociales. Por el contrario, el texto aboga por un análisis más profundo de la nueva fase del capitalismo mundializado y por el (...) rescate de formas organizativas de resistencia que den cuenta del nuevo contexto global. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the notion of ‘artifact’ and related notions in the dominant version of extended cognition theory grounded on extended functionalism. Although the term is ubiquitous in the literature, it is far from clear what ECT means by it. How are artifacts conceptualized in ECT? Is ‘artifact’ a meaningful and useful category for ECT? If the answer to the previous question is negative, should we worry? Is it important for ECT to have a coherent theory of artifacts? (...) And what are the demands and constraints that ECT imposes on this theory? I distinguish between two aspects of ECT, one narrow, aligned with extended functionalism ; and one broad or pluralistic, in which EF is combined with other theoretical resources in the context of diverse research programs. I begin by determining the problems in conceptualizing artifacts from EF. Then I address the question of why a concept of artifact may be relevant to ECT. Next, I examine the efforts of Richard Heersmink to combine ECT with dominant theories of artifacts in the philosophy of technology. I argue that both approaches fail to yield a meaningful notion of artifact, let alone one of ‘cognitive’ artifact. Finally, I argue that narrow ECT places rather strong constraints on a theory of artifacts, since it locates the specificity of ‘artifact’ in material aspects of realization that are, by definition, outside its theoretical purview. I examine, then discard, the possibility that a materialist and objectivist theory of artifacts may be of help. And finally I briefly explore some ways in which a broad, pluralistic ECT may address some of these shortcomings. (shrink)