No poco se habrá meditado acerca del poema “Todtnauberg” de Paul Celan (1967), publicado en Lichtzwang (1970). Poco o casi nada, en cambio, acerca de su “respuesta poética” (si cabe la expresión) por parte de Martin Heidegger: “Vorwort” (1971). En lo que sigue nos limitamos a puntear algunas de las circunstancias tal vez más marcantes de esta suerte de “correspondencia” heideggeriana y eventual “familiar” (y tal vez inmortal) micro-bolero. Palabras clave: Todtnauberg - Paul Celan - Vorwort - Martin Heidegger - (...) grotesco. (shrink)

Colexification refers to the phenomenon of multiple meanings sharing one word in a language. Cross‐linguistic lexification patterns have been shown to be largely predictable, as similar concepts are often colexified. We test a recent claim that, beyond this general tendency, communicative needs play an important role in shaping colexification patterns. We approach this question by means of a series of human experiments, using an artificial language communication game paradigm. Our results across four experiments match the previous cross‐linguistic findings: all other (...) things being equal, speakers do prefer to colexify similar concepts. However, we also find evidence supporting the communicative need hypothesis: when faced with a frequent need to distinguish similar pairs of meanings, speakadjust their colexification preferences to maintain communicative efficiency and avoid colexifying those similar meanings which need to be distinguished in communication. This research provides further evidence to support the argument that languages are shaped by the needs and preferences of their speakers. (shrink)

Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We (...) argue, using these cases, but focusing particularly on the multiply polysemous word ‘school’, that the senses involved in co-predication form especially robust activation packages, which allow hearers and readers to access all the different senses in interpretation. (shrink)

Large cardinals arising from the existence of arbitrarily long end elementary extension chains over models of set theory are studied here. In particular, we show that the large cardinals obtained in this fashion (`unfoldable cardinals') lie in the boundary of the propositions consistent with `V = L' and the existence of 0 ♯ . We also provide an `embedding characterisation' of the unfoldable cardinals and study their preservation and destruction by various forcing constructions.

The following is a paper presented for the Course Rahner and Lonergan at the University of Toronto (Winter, 2014), revised and edited Winter, 2018. Our purpose is to defend the possibility of “perceptualism,” that is to say, the position maintaining that the intelligible content of consciousness is given in perception and not posited by the activity of the subject. Assisted by the insights of Cornelio Fabro, this defense contrasts perceptualism with Bernard Lonergan’s “critical realism”. This paper focuses on the notion (...) of experience, seemingly the basis of the opposition between perceptualism and critical realism. (shrink)

One of the strongest defences of free speech holds that autonomy requires the protection of speech. In this paper I examine five conditions that autonomy must satisfy. I survey recent research in social psychology regarding automatic behaviour, and a challenge to autonomy is articulated. I argue that a plausible strategy for neutralising some of the autonomy-threatening automatic responses consists in avoiding the exposure to the environmental features that trigger them. If this is so, we can good autonomy-based pro tanto reasons (...) for controlling exposure to certain forms of speech. (shrink)

In the natural and social sciences, it is common to use toy models—extremely simple and highly idealized representations—to understand complex phenomena. Some of the simple surrogate models used to understand opaque machine learning (ML) models, such as rule lists and sparse decision trees, bear some resemblance to scientific toy models. They allow non-experts to understand how an opaque ML model works globally via a much simpler model that highlights the most relevant features of the input space and their effect on (...) the output. The obvious difference is that the common target of a toy and a full-scale model in the sciences is some phenomenon in the world, while the target of a surrogate model is another model. This essential difference makes toy surrogate models (TSMs) a new object of study for theories of understanding, one that is not easily accommodated under current analyses. This paper provides an account of what it means to understand an opaque ML model globally with the aid of such simple models. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene el propósito, en un primer momento, de dilucidar la noción de religión y mito en Friedrich Hölderlin, contrastándolo con el concepto de religión racional de Kant. En un segundo momento, se comparará la concepción de este poeta con algunos estudiosos del tema religioso posteriores a él. Además, se sostiene que la reflexión sobre la religión que realiza Hölderlin es vigente, pese a su poca influencia en los análisis actuales del fenómeno.

In this article I criticize Hannah Arendt's concept of natality as unable to confront the ways in which racial capitalism links the biopolitical cultivation of natality to the necropolitical natal alienation that is structural to modern slavery. I base this argument in an understanding of social death as the production of racial capitalism, one that gives slavery an aftermath, post-abolition, which continues to dispossess Black and brown people of their capacity to begin something anew via their inclusion into juridical personhood. (...) I conclude this article with an articulation of the political impossibility of Black and brown people to begin something anew under a polis that remains structured by racial capitalism in Ralph Ellison's phenomenological description of the invisible man's misrecognized new beginnings with the Brotherhood. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will (...) lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature. (shrink)

Morally progressive social changes seem to have taken place with the onset of democratic governance, the abolition of slavery, the rise of gender equality, and other developments. This essay attempts to demonstrate that natural and objective moral facts are a plausible cause of some morally progressive social changes. Since this hypothesis is a version of naturalistic moral realism, I call it the Naturalist-Realist Hypothesis. To support the NRH, I argue that objective moral facts are natural facts pertaining to the impartial (...) promotion of well-being within a population of agents facing a social dilemma. I then describe a mechanism to explain how natural and objective moral facts so construed may cause some morally progressive social changes. I suggest that the NRH is a credible hypothesis because it is compatible with empirical findings from research on the evolution of moral cognition and on the sociology of mass political movements. (shrink)

El imaginario de superioridad expresado a lo largo de tres siglos de colonia perdura pasados dos siglos de independencia de las naciones americanas en el ideario religioso y cultural. La idea de la superioridad de la religión católica o la protestante, cristiana en definitiva, gestado desde los preludios de una temprana modernidad por los conquistadores occidentales y refrendada por filósofos modernos de tendencia protestante como Hegel (en sus Lecciones sobre filosofía de la religión o en la Enciclopedia de las ciencias (...) filosóficas) dejaron espinosos rasgos poscoloniales que perduran arraigados en los horizontes de comprensión de la actividad filosófica y cultural hispanoamericana, latinoamericana, europea y americana en general; mucho más cuando estos rasgos de superioridad cultural permanecen, inclusive, en algunos críticos de la religión y de occidente como en su momento lo fueron Marx y Engels (en Materiales para la historia de América Latina se recopilan sus pensamientos dispersos a propósito de América). El tema es complejo, quienes con antelación han criticado las concepciones de culturas superiores son numerosos y de antaño, algunos de estos críticos lo son desde la perspectiva decolonial otros desde de estudios subalternos y otros más desde el ámbito filosófico. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a hermeneutics of the judicial text based on Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy. For this purpose, the paper will propose, firstly, how to approach the judicial decision as text; secondly, the paper will argue from Paul Ricoeur’s notion of “Hermeneutic Arc,” how explanation and understanding as a hermeneutic method are given in the judicial decision. The final purpose is to show how in some cases the comprehension of ourselves could go through the hermeneutics made (...) to the judicial text. (shrink)

Research on the use of smartphone apps with the aim of developing self-regulated learning and increasing academic performance of university students in virtual mode, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, is recent and scarce. The present article shows the results of a study that analyzed the effect of using the 4Planning app with an intra-curricular approach on SRL and on the academic performance of 119 1st-year psychology students in virtual mode, at a Chilean university. The research was conducted with (...) quantitative methodology and a quasi-experimental design, with pre- and posttest measurements of an experimental group and comparisons with three control groups. The results show that students who used the app during 10 weeks of the first academic semester 2021: increased SRL self-report, increased academic self-efficacy, and obtained higher academic performance, compared to those who did not use it. The above occurs because the 4Planning app activates functions of the self-regulatory system of goal-directed behavior, which allows exercising the capacity of self-direction and self-influence on this type of behavior in the particular context of academic performance, which produces SRL. It is concluded that the 4Planning app is effective in developing self-regulation and improving the academic performance of 1st-year university students, in virtual learning mode. (shrink)

RESUMEN La teleosemántica es el intento de naturalizar el contenido mental mediante el recurso al concepto de función biológica. En el presente artículo se argumenta que la teleosemántica carece de los recursos necesarios para hacer frente a tres problemas: la indeterminación del contenido, el carácter abstracto de este y la inutilidad biológica de algunas de las representaciones que pueden albergar organismos como los humanos. ABSTRACT Teleosemantics is the attempt to naturalize mental content by resorting to the concept of biological function. (...) The article argues that teleosemantics lacks the necessary resources to solve three problems: the indeterminacy of content, its abstract nature, and the biological uselessness of some of the representations of certain organisms such as human beings. (shrink)

El presente artículo examina los argumentos aristotélicos en favor de la teleología para poner de manifiesto su estructura argumentativa que, a juicio del autor, es una inferencia a la mejor explicación. Finalmente se intenta relacionar la estrategia aristotélica con el tratamiento actual que se ha hecho de la finalidad desde la Filosofía de la Ciencia.

RESUMENEl presente artículo analiza las diferentes teorías que sobre el concepto de función se han vertido en los últimos cuarenta años y sus problemas. Respecto de los dos grandes enfoques (histórico-etiológico y sistémico) se sostiene que el primero, pese a su hegemonía histórica, presenta considerables dificultades y que la reflexión actual se centra cada vez más en la perspectiva sistémica. Esta última puede enfrentarse mejor a los diversos problemas que genera el concepto de función biológica y es siempre preferible.PALABRAS CLAVEFUNCIÓN (...) BIOLÓGICA, FUNCIÓN SISTéMICA, EXPLICACIÓN FUNCIONAL, EXPLICACIÓN BASADA EN MECANISMOS, TELEOLOGíAABSTRACTThis paper analyzes the different theories on biological function and the problems they brought up over the last forty years. Concerning the two most important points of view on functions (aetiological theory and systemic theory) I hold that the aetiological theory, despite its historical hegemony, presents substantial difficulties and that the present philosophical thinking is centred on systemic theories. Systemic theories are capable of solving the various problems generated by the biological function concept which is preferable.KEYWORDSBIOLOGICAL FUNCTION, SySTEMIC FUNCTION, FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION, MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION TELEOLOGY. (shrink)

El trabajo insiste en la necesidad de flexibilizar el concepto general de experiencia, acudiendo a una "razón ampliada" . La idea de creación, por su parte, acentuando la diferencia en la continuidad, muestra que, junto a la dificultad, se da también una peculiar posibilidad de la experiencia religiosa, y posibilita su verificabilidad en una lógica concreta, atenta a su dación específica. Eso transforma el concepto de revelación, que se hace "ofrecimiento mayéutico" y abre la posibilidad del dialogo, tanto con la (...) cultura como de las religiones entre sí. (shrink)

This article intends to analyse the Hobbesian version of the Christian dogma of the Trinity as it is observed in the corresponding sections of Leviathan , De Cive and Heresy , and alluded to in other texts (controversy with Bramhall). It shall be important to specify: (a) As a starting point, the exact place of such concept within the general problem expressed by the difference between "political theology" and "theologico-political problem" (C. Altini); (b) The main items of the philosopher's Trinitarian (...) exposition as well as his intention while writing it, according to the "secularist", "theistic" and "Divine Omnipotence" interpretations. (J. Overhoff, A. Martinich, P. Springborg, L. Foisneau, F. Lessay, G. Wright); (c) His relationship with the contemporary orthodox currents (Trinitarian) and heterodox currents (antitrinitarian), as well as with the elements from ancient antitrinitarian heresies (subordinationism, modalism, sabellianism). (shrink)

En la filosofía de Aristóteles, enérgeia aparece como fundamento de mimesis, analogía y semejanza. Desde este ángulo es posible apreciar una suerte de corriente continua que permite superar la escisión radical entre ciencias prácticas, factivas y teóricas. Superada la escisión cabe visualizar el vínculo de unión entre la existencia humana y la divina. Esto no puede darse mediante una "nivelación desde abajo", como ocurre con la antropomorfización. En cambio, esa aspiración que cada ser manifiesta por aproximarse, en la medida de (...) lo posible, a lo que 'es', en su perfección última y acabada, tiene la vida propia de la divinidad por expresión arquetípica. Aristóteles intenta un nuevo rumbo para explicar la relación entre el hombre y Dios. El ser es aquello que la mente ama, y el ser es para todos objeto de amor. En la substancia primera, ser y mente (Noús) se identifican, haciendo de Dios un ser nobilísimo y continuamente amado por el universo. El amor humano, el gozo de pensar que pensamos y que estamos vivos, nos permite contemplar al Primer Principio. Su separación, por tanto, no es una mera abstracción, sino la distancia reverente que impone la belleza, perfección y bondad, de la única substancia que es pensamiento de pensamiento y vida. Los entes, por su parte, participan (koinonei) (cf. Met. 1075 a, 24-25) todos para el todo. Se trata, pues, de una afirmación que nos remite indirectamente a Platón y la idea de methexis. El hombre, al poseer un lugar privilegiado en la naturaleza, está llamado a contemplar incluso aquellas cosas que parecieran estar sobre su capacidad (hyperanthropon) y, para lograrlo, debe esforzarse por hacerse semejante (homóioma) a lo divino, en lo que respecta a su actividad. Sólo en el desarrollo permanente de la virtud, considerada como enérgeia, puede llegar a ser el más amado por los dioses ( cf. E.N. 11 79 a,25-30). (shrink)

In this paper I examine the notion of ‘artifact’ and related notions in the dominant version of extended cognition theory grounded on extended functionalism. Although the term is ubiquitous in the literature, it is far from clear what ECT means by it. How are artifacts conceptualized in ECT? Is ‘artifact’ a meaningful and useful category for ECT? If the answer to the previous question is negative, should we worry? Is it important for ECT to have a coherent theory of artifacts? (...) And what are the demands and constraints that ECT imposes on this theory? I distinguish between two aspects of ECT, one narrow, aligned with extended functionalism ; and one broad or pluralistic, in which EF is combined with other theoretical resources in the context of diverse research programs. I begin by determining the problems in conceptualizing artifacts from EF. Then I address the question of why a concept of artifact may be relevant to ECT. Next, I examine the efforts of Richard Heersmink to combine ECT with dominant theories of artifacts in the philosophy of technology. I argue that both approaches fail to yield a meaningful notion of artifact, let alone one of ‘cognitive’ artifact. Finally, I argue that narrow ECT places rather strong constraints on a theory of artifacts, since it locates the specificity of ‘artifact’ in material aspects of realization that are, by definition, outside its theoretical purview. I examine, then discard, the possibility that a materialist and objectivist theory of artifacts may be of help. And finally I briefly explore some ways in which a broad, pluralistic ECT may address some of these shortcomings. (shrink)

I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular counterpart and (...) upholds reasonable standards of acceptability. The standards I will be discussing come from Humberstone (1997), who claims that definitions cannot be informative as long as they are inferentially circular. (shrink)

Dos instituciones, la Sociedad Española de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia y la Sociedad de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España contribuyeron, la primera, al inicio de la consolidación de la filosofía de la ciencia en español, y la segunda a su consolidación definitiva. El objeto de este trabajo es mostrar la imagen de la filosofía hispánica de la ciencia, centrada preferentemente en España, en los cuarenta años que median entre ambas sociedades, y que distingo en tres (...) periodos: cimentación, desarrollo y consolidación, en consonancia con su entorno internacional. He reunido la máxima información que he podido, a fin de reflejar la robustez académica de la filosofía actual de la ciencia en aquellos tiempos entre nosotros, y espero haber hecho justicia a quienes precediéndonos la levantaron, mantuvieron y consolidaron. (shrink)

This paper deals with meta-statistical questions concerning frequentist statistics. In Sections 2 to 4 I analyse the dispute between Fisher and Neyman on the so called logic of statistical inference, a polemic that has been concomitant of the development of mathematical statistics. My conclusion is that, whenever mathematical statistics makes it possible to draw inferences, it only uses deductive reasoning. Therefore I reject Fisher's inductive approach to the statistical estimation theory and adhere to Neyman's deductive one. On the other hand, (...) I assert that Neyman-Pearson's testing theory, as well as Fisher's tests of significance, properly belong to decision theory, not to logic, neither deductive nor inductive. I then also disagree with Costantini's view of Fisher's testing model as a theory of hypothetico-deductive inferences.In Section 5 I disapprove Hacking1's evidentialists criticisms of the Neyman-Pearson's theory of statistics (NPT), as well as Hacking2's interpretation of NPT as a theory of probable inference. In both cases Hacking misses the point. I conclude, by claiming that Mayo's conception of the Neyman-Pearson's testing theory, as a model of learning from experience, does not purport any advantages over Neyman's behavioristic model. (shrink)

Incommensurability has been for about forty years one of the most discussed topics on the contemporary philosophy of science. In order to tackle this issue I assume Howard Sankey’s characterization of incommensurability as “the thesis that the content of some alternative scientific theories is incomparable due to translation failure between the vocabulary the theories employ”. This kind of incomparability should pre- vent for instance the derivation of Newtonian mechanics from relativity theory, as Thomas Kuhn maintains. Since I have myself been (...) concerned with the comparison of Newtonian and Einsteinian mass concepts in Rivadulla, I focus in this short paper on the comparability of theories of contemporary theoretical physics.Thus, instead of dealing with the question of whether the theories of contemporary physics are definitely incommensurable with each other, the main aim of this paper is to provide an answer to the question of whether it makes any sense to think about the in- commensurability between contemporary physical theories, due to their obvious comparability. (shrink)

Contrary to the view maintained by many philosophers that science employs the deductive testing of hypotheses, observational natural sciences such as paleoanthropology and the earth sciences apply a scientific methodology consisting in the proposal of hypotheses which are best fitted to the available empirical data, i.e. which best explain the data. Observational natural sciences are predominantly empirical. They are grounded in observation, and they do not implement any Popperian deductive testing of hypotheses. Theoretical natural sciences such as mathematical physics also (...) apply inference to the best explanation for the introduction of significant concepts and hypotheses. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that in contemporary science, the use of abductive reasoning continues to be as effective as ever. (shrink)

Examines in more detail his main arguments for justifying political authority and obligation, namely the existence of society, the legal enforcement of morality, the role played by political activity in human well-being, and the need for coordination. Special consideration is then given to Aristotle’s apparent commitment to the challenging view that not only imperfect agents but even fully rational and moral people would still be in need of political authority.

Since it implies a reduction in the quality and the quantity of the natural resources, environmental degradation is a present day problem that requires immediate solutions. This situation is driving firms to undertake an environmental transformation process with the purpose of reducing the negative externalities that come from their economic activities. Within this context, environmental marketing is an emerging business philosophy by which organizations can address sustainability issues. Moreover, environmental marketing and orientation are seen as valuable strategies to improve a (...) firm's competitiveness. However, the literature that has analyzed the link between environmental strategies and firms' results has been inconclusive and contradictory. In this study, we propose and test a model that analyses how the implementation of ecological issues within a firm's marketing strategy and orientation influences organizational results. Data were obtained through a survey sent to Spanish manufacturing firms. The results show that environmental marketing positively affects firms' operational and commercial performance and this improvement will influence their economic results. Moreover, environmental marketing is revealed as an excellent strategy to obtain competitive advantages in costs and in product differentiation. Thus, this study agrees with the researchers who affirm that environmental strategies positively affect firm's competitiveness while reducing environmental impact. (shrink)

The idea of inclusive collective decision-making is important in establishing democratic legitimacy, but it fails when citizens are excluded. Stated-preference methods of valuation, which are commonly used in economics, have been criticised because the principle of willingness to pay may exclude low-income earners who do not have the capacity to pay. Deliberative valuation has been advocated as a way to overcome this problem, but deliberation may also be exclusive. In this review, two deliberative valuation frameworks are compared. The first is (...) grounded on the idea of rational discourse that emphasises argument at the expense of other communicative strategies. It seeks to secure inclusion through procedural rules and prerequisites, but fails to address the underlying democratic limitation of argumentation. The second does not rely on the distinction between rational and rhetorical speech, and therefore admits alternative forms of communication. This approach recognises differences in the communicative capacities and practices of those who take part in deliberation, and so is better equipped to improve, though not to guarantee, inclusion. (shrink)

El presente artículo examina las diferentes teorías del contenido mental de Dretske y su relación con sus consideraciones epistemológicas para concluir que el hecho de conceptualizar o albergar un determinado contenido es ya un tipo de conocimiento, a saber, conocimiento animal. A continuación el autor discute dicho enfoque sosteniendo, a diferencia de Dretske, que mantener la dicotomía entre conocimiento animal y conocimiento reflexivo resulta virtuosa pues mantiene tanto aquello que puede ser naturalizado apelando a la Historia natural como da razón (...) de las practicas justificatorias que intervienen en el denominado conocimiento reflexivo y que a su juicio es irrenunciable e irreductible. (shrink)

Some versions of moral naturalism are faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that several defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that, necessarily, if anyone morally ought to do something, then s/he has a categorical reason to do (...) it. Versions of moral naturalism that deny this claim would, if widely believed, disable some crucial practical uses of moral concepts. In particular, if the existence of normative reasons for action is taken to be dependent on agents’ desires, it would breed profound skepticism about the legitimacy of evaluating others’ actions from a moral point of view. Also, it would raise doubts about whether people ought to correct their own behavior in light of moral considerations. Following Richard Joyce, I take these consequences to indicate that the concept of a categorical reason is a “non-negotiable” part of moral concepts. (shrink)

In the natural and social sciences, it is common to use toy models—extremely simple and highly idealized representations—to understand complex phenomena. Some of the simple surrogate models used to understand opaque machine learning (ML) models, such as rule lists and sparse decision trees, bear some resemblance to scientific toy models. They allow non-experts to understand how an opaque ML model works globally via a much simpler model that highlights the most relevant features of the input space and their effect on (...) the output. The obvious difference is that the common target of a toy and a full-scale model in the sciences is some phenomenon in the world, while the target of a surrogate model is another model. This essential difference makes toy surrogate models (TSMs) a new object of study for theories of understanding, one that is not easily accommodated under current analyses. This paper provides an account of what it means to understand an opaque ML model globally with the aid of such simple models. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the forays into metaphysics of The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program (henceforth, DNP). I argue that the work of DNP is a valuable contribution to the epistemology of certain aspects of artifact design and use, but that it fails to advance a persuasive metaphysic. A central problem is that DNP approaches ontology from within a functionalist framework that is mainly concerned with ascriptions and justified beliefs. Thus, the materiality of artifacts emerges only as the external (...) conditions of realizability of function ascription. The work of DNP has a strong programmatic aspect and much of its foray into metaphysics is tentative, so the intent of my argument is partly synthetic: to sum up these issues as they are presented in the literature and highlight some recognized problems. But I also go beyond that, suggesting that these problems are foundational, arising from the very way in which DNP poses the question of artifact metaphysics. Although it sets out to incorporate objective aspects of technology, DNP places a strong focus on the intentional side of the purported matter-mind duality, bracketing off materiality in an irretrievable manner. Thus, some of the advantages of dualism are lost. I claim that DNP is dualistic, not merely based on “duality”, but that its version of dualism does not appropriately account for the material “nature” of artifacts. The paper ends by suggesting some correctives and alternatives to Dual Nature theory. (shrink)

In this article I respond to Yuk Hui by revisiting the crossroads in the philosophy of technology as represented by the philosophies of Stiegler and Ihde. Whereas Hui proposes the concept of cosmotechnics as an integrating perspective, I conceive of the crossroads in other terms, namely from the perspective of substantivism. I characterize our present situation, what a philosophy of technology should address and then examine Hui’s notion of cosmotechnics from this alternative perspective. My main concern is to show future (...) paths of development for cosmotechnical thought. (shrink)

Explanation and understanding are intimately connected notions, but the nature of that connection has generally not been considered a topic worthy of serious philosophical investigation. Most authors have avoided making reference to the notion of understanding in their accounts of explanation because they fear that any mention of the epistemic states of the individuals involved compromises the objectivity of explanation. Understanding is a pragmatic notion, they argue, and pragmatics should be kept at a safe distance from the universal features of (...) explanation. My main contention in this dissertation is that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize this notion it is necessary to formulate an account of objective explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. ;My account of explanation is based on the belief-doubt model of inquiry first proposed by Peirce. Using the tools provided by decision theory, and the models of belief revision developed by Isaac Levi and by Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson, I analyze the objective and pragmatic conditions that a piece of information must fulfill to be both explanatory and epistemically useful to an inquiring agent. The objective basis for an explanation is provided by the relation of probabilistic relevance that the fact described by the explanans bares to the fact described by the explanandum. But an explanation is much more than its foundation. As an epistemological notion, a potential explanation can only be a bona fide explanation if it becomes part of inquiry, that is, if an agent or a group of agents can see any value in it for their cognitive purposes. I provide a way to evaluate an explanation in terms of its credibility, its content, and its explanatory value. I argue that although an objective measure of the credibility and content of an explanation can be established, in many cases a complete determination of its explanatory value will ultimately depend on the interests and goals of the individual inquirers. (shrink)

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. (...) The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objetivo retomar la teoría de Byung Chul Han sobre la sociedad del logro (Leistungsgesellschaft), tomando específicamente lo expuesto por él sobre el dogma de la transparencia que surge en la lógica neoliberal-digital contemporánea, para ser completado con la teoría freudiana de lo Unerkante -no reconocible-. Para esto el trabajo se divide en tres momentos: el primero tiene por objetivo exponer lo que se entiende por dogma de la transparencia y cómo se relaciona con el Homo œconomicus; (...) seguidamente, se presenta el concepto de lo Unerkante de Freud para plantear una nueva topología de lo no-reconocible en el plano subjetivo, proponiendo el concepto del ombligo de la subjetividad; y, finalmente, se expone cómo ese ombligo empalma con la teoría de Han frente a la transparencia, de modo que se puedan generar nuevas interpretaciones de lo que sería una salida a la sociedad del logro. (shrink)