Social constructionists maintain that we invent the properties of the world rather than discover them. Is reality constructed by our own activity? Do we collectively invent the world rather than discover it? André Kukla presents a comprehensive discussion of the philosophical issues that arise out of this debate, analysing the various strengths and weaknesses of a range of constructivist arguments and arguing that current philosophical objections to constructivism are inconclusive. However, Kukla offers and develops new objections to constructivism, distinguishing (...) between the social causes of scientific beliefs and the view that all ascertainable facts are constructed. (shrink)

This paper advances the conception of social entrepreneurs as caring entrepreneurs. We argue that the care ethics of social entrepreneurs, implying the pursuit of caring goals through caring processes, can be challenged when they engage in the process of scaling up their ventures. We propose that social entrepreneurs can sustain their care ethics as the essential dimension of their venture only if they are able to build a caring enterprise. Organizational care designates the set of organizing principles that facilitate the (...) embedding of care ethics at an organizational level, beyond the imprinting induced by social entrepreneurs’ personal ethics. (shrink)

Moral reasoning typically informs environmental decision-making by measuring the possible outcomes of policies or actions in light of a preferred ethical theory. This method is subject to many problems. Environmental pragmatism tries to overcome them, but it suffers also from some pitfalls. This paper proposes a new method of environmental pragmatism that avoids the problems of both the traditional method of environmental moral reasoning and of the general versions of environmental pragmatism. We call it ‘justificatory moral pluralism’ – it develops (...) the intuition that normative ethical theories need not be mutually exclusive. This leaves room for important forms of pluralist environmental ethics that do not require a once-and-for-all prior commitment to an ethical theory when deciding about policies or courses of action related to the protection of the environment. Justificatory moral pluralism offers a viable solution to the recurrent conflicts between efficient environmental decisions and the need for moral reasoning. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

Andre Breton discusses the meaning, aims, and political position of the Surrealist movement.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

Two ways of describing a group are considered. 1. A group is finite-automaton presentable if its elements can be represented by strings over a finite alphabet, in such a way that the set of representing strings and the group operation can be recognized by finite automata. 2. An infinite f.g. group is quasi-finitely axiomatizable if there is a description consisting of a single first-order sentence, together with the information that the group is finitely generated. In the first part of the (...) paper we survey examples of FA-presentable groups, but also discuss theorems restricting this class. In the second part, we give examples of quasi-finitely axiomatizable groups, consider the algebraic content of the notion, and compare it to the notion of a group which is a prime model. We also show that if a structure is bi-interpretable in parameters with the ring of integers, then it is prime and quasi-finitely axiomatizable. (shrink)

A questão dos letramentos e da inovação demonstram-se fundamentais em períodos históricos como o atual, onde as práticas de ensino-aprendizagem tornam-se cada vez mais complexas, que requerem novas abordagens teóricas para compreendermos possibilidades alternativas de ensino. Tendo estas questões em mente, este artigo visa indicar relações possíveis entre o antifundacionismo, o pensamento de Paul Feyerabend e os letramentos científicos. Em um primeiro momento indicaremos questões relativas ao antifundacionismo, e em seguida verificaremos como tal questão se efetiva no pensamento de Feyerabend. (...) Finalizaremos avaliando como esta abordagem pode fundamentar novas práticas educacionais. (shrink)

This paper shows Socratic elenchus as an efficient and effective way of modeling rational knowledge seeking. Like ordinary conversations, the elenctic exchanges in the dialogues presuppose a degree of autonomy on the part of its participants. Socrates’ line of questioning often seems pertinent to a particular interlocutor because he is well aware of the fact that the interlocutor has goals and ambitions or is reputed to be an expert at something. In turn, Socrates’ line ofquestioning reflects his own goals and (...) ambitions. In Alcibiades Major Socrates is trying to turn Alcibiades towards a greater awareness of his limitations. Plato’s dialogues also force readers to consider their own solutions to the topics introduced in them. Consequently, the autonomy of a dialogue’s participants requires that interpreters not exaggerate one aspect of a dialogue’s structural features at the expense of other aspects. (shrink)

This year marks the 60th year anniversary of the publication of Niko Tinbergen’s “On aims and methods of ethology” which remains influential among today’s biologists and social scientists for its introduction of four questions for a complete explanation for animal behaviors. In this paper we argue that a large part of the lasting appeal to Tinbergen’s four questions was (and still is) the methodological commitment to treating organisms as objects as opposed to purposive agents. Tinbergen’s approach reinvigorated the discipline of (...) ethology, allowing it to shed its teleological and anthropomorphic associations and to better cohere with a philosophy of science that favors inductive procedures, causal and mechanistic analytic techniques, and an emphasis on Darwinian explanations. While Tinbergen’s approach is still prized among today’s biological social scientists, it ignores an important feature of many social organisms, that they are not merely objects, they are also purposive agents. We explore the implications that a shift from treating organisms as objects to treating them as agents has on both how we should interpret and answer Tinbergen’s four questions. Updating Tinbergen’s four questions with agency in mind not only makes them more applicable to the biological investigation of animal behavior, but also strengthens the value and applicability of biology-oriented research programs in the social sciences. (shrink)

Several philosophers of science have advanced an instrumentalist thesis about the use of probabilities in evolutionary biology. I investigate the consequences of instrumentalism on evolutionary explanations. I take issue with Barbara Horan's (1994) argument that probabilities are unnecessary to explain evolutionary change given the underlying deterministic character of evolutionary processes. First, I question Horan's deterministic assumption. Then, I attempt to undermine her Laplacian argument by demonstrating that whether probabilities are necessary depends upon the sort of questions one is asking.

Around a hundred years ago there was a tiny Jewish community in Hämeenlinna, a small provincial capital in Finland. The dissolution of the Hämeenlinna Jewish community has become shrouded in mystery. Some amateur historians have even suggested that the last members of the Jewish community were shot by Russian soldiers in 1914. What happened to the last Jews of Hämeenlinna, and what were the reasons behind the historical process that led to the dissolution of the community? This article examines the (...) turns of fate that prompted the leading Jewish families, the Rosenbergs and the Krapiffskys, to leave the town. The involvement of the local governor, the hardline antisemite Rafael Spåre, turned out to be instrumental in the case of the Krapiffsky family, who were the last remaining members of the community. (shrink)

La Logique de Hegel, science de la pensee pure, veut porter a son accomplissement le projet traditionnel de la metaphysique ou philosophie speculative. De la metaphysique, Aristote avait en partie determine le concept d'une maniere qui devait etre decisive, notamment en degageant l'idee de ce qu'on a pu nommer plus tard ontologie. La logique de Hegel, developpement integral de ce que donne a penser le mot etre, est bien a sa maniere une ontologie, mais une ontologie profondement renovee, avec notamment (...) ceci de paradoxal qu'elle abaisse l'etre au sens strict, l'opposant a la vitalite de l'esprit; la Logique conduit ainsi de l'etre a la verite de l'etre, qui consiste ultimement en la subjectivite de l'absolu se concevant soi-meme, que Hegel nomme aussi idee. Dans ce parcours, la Logique retrouve les concepts qu'avait elabores la tradition philosophique des Presocratiques a Kant; elle resout a sa maniere les problemes, explicites ou implicites, dont ces concepts etaient charges. Au-dela de la fausse alternative de la permanence et de la rupture, l'attention portee au rapport de Hegel a la tradition anime ici une explication de l'ensemble de la Logique. Explication qui, en suivant de pres le mouvement du texte, se garde de meconnaitre que le principe de la Logique est, lui-aussi, problematique: n'est-il pas lui-meme issu de cette tradition qu'il donne la force de repenser? (shrink)

Malicious programs have been the main actors in complex, sophisticated attacks against nations, governments, diplomatic agencies, private institutions and people. Knowledge about malicious program...

Cybervetting has become common practice in personnel decision-making processes of organizations. While it represents a quick and inexpensive way of obtaining additional information on employees and applicants, it gives rise to a variety of legal and ethical concerns. To limit companies’ access to personal information, a _right to be forgotten_ has been introduced by the European jurisprudence. By discussing the notion of forgetting from the perspective of French hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur, the present article demonstrates that both, companies and employees, (...) would be harmed if access to online information on applicants and current employees would be denied. Consistent with a Humanistic Management approach that promotes human dignity and flourishing in the workplace, this article proposes guidance for the responsible handling of unpleasant online memories in personnel decision-making processes, thereby following Ricoeur’s notion of forgetting as “kept in reserve”. Enabling applicants and employees to take a qualified stand on their past is more beneficial to both sides than a right to be forgotten that is questionable in several respects. (shrink)

Unparalled in its poetry, richness, and religious and historical significance, the Hebrew Bible has been the site and center of countless commentaries, perhaps none as unique as Thinking Biblically. This remarkable collaboration sets the words of a distinguished biblical scholar, André LaCocque, and those of a leading philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, in dialogue around six crucial passages from the Old Testament: the story of Adam and Eve; the commandment "thou shalt not kill"; the valley of dry bones passage from Ezekiel; (...) Psalm 22; the Song of Songs; and the naming of God in Exodus 3:14. Commenting on these texts, LaCocque and Ricoeur provide a wealth of new insights into the meaning of the different genres of the Old Testament as these made their way into and were transformed by the New Testament. LaCocque's commentaries employ a historical-critical method that takes into account archaeological, philological, and historical research. LaCocque includes in his essays historical information about the dynamic tradition of reading scripture, opening his exegesis to developments and enrichments subsequent to the production of the original literary text. Ricoeur also takes into account the relation between the texts and the historical communities that read and interpreted them, but he broadens his scope to include philosophical speculation. His commentaries highlight the metaphorical structure of the passages and how they have served as catalysts for philosophical thinking from the Greeks to the modern age. This extraordinary literary and historical venture reads the Bible through two different but complementary lenses, revealing the familiar texts as vibrant, philosophically consequential, and unceasingly absorbing. (shrink)

In Appendix B of Russell's The Principles of Mathematics occurs a paradox, the paradox of propositions, which a simple theory of types is unable to resolve. This fact is frequently taken to be one of the principal reasons for calling ramification onto the Russellian stage. The paper presents a detaiFled exposition of the paradox and its discussion in the correspondence between Frege and Russell. It is argued that Russell finally adopted a very simple solution to the paradox. This solution had (...) nothing to do with ramified types but marked an important shift in his theory of propositions. (shrink)

“This title, I chose it because I don’t understand Hebrew and because it was very short, because it was opaque and a little unbreakable, like an atomic nucleus. For the first screening of the film at the Empire Theater, George Cravenne asked me: ‘What is the title of the film?’ ‘Shoah.’ ‘What does it mean?’ ‘I don’t know.’ ‘But how, you must translate it! No one will understand!’ And I said: ‘It’s what I want, that no one understands.’”1The common denominator (...) of any translation is delay: this delay is a matter of time and space, a temporal displacement, a delay that exacerbates the ontological differentiation process between sign and meaning.2 Between the moment.. (shrink)

Suárez, talvez o principal expoente da Escolástica do século XVI, em suas Disputationes metaphysicae, trabalha, entre outros temas, o do conceito objetivo. Atendo-se principalmente à disputação 2, secção n• 1, procura-se mostrar a fecundidade de tal noção, desenvolvendo, para tanto, os temas: o conceito formal enquanto ato mental e enquanto imago, a doutrina da denominação extrínseca: a denominação extrínseca e os entia rationis, a denominação extrínseca e os possíveis.

Le concept logico-métaphysique d¿éminence trouve une abondante illustration dans l¿oeuvre de Descartes. On se doit de l¿interpréter au travers des usages qui en furent connus de l¿auteur des Méditations, que ce soit selon les perspectives créationnistes de Suarez de Salamanca ou de Grégoire de Valencia, que ce soit selon celle, dans l¿acte interne divin, qu¿expose Gibieuf. Les conséquences pour l¿étude du concept de ¿cause de soi¿ en sont considérables aussi bien en métaphysique qu¿en physique.

Zunächst werden Gemeinsamkeit und Unterschiede zu Malebranche hinsichtlich der Frage der Verbindung von größtmöglicher Einfachheit der Wege bzw. Gesetze und größtmöglicher Vielfalt der Erscheinungen erörtert. Im zweiten Teil wird die Erzählung von Sextus in der Théodicée behandelt. Insbesondere wird dargelegt, warum Leibniz diese Erzählung nicht, wie ursprünglich geplant, in der Mitte, sondern am Schluss der Théodicée einfügte.

Este texto examina, com brevidade, o sentido definição de democracia no capítulo 16 do Tratado Teológico-Político. Num primeiro momento, faço uma pequena história dos estudos, no século passado, acerca da forma do discurso político do TTP. Em seguida, passo à interrogação do sentido da definição de democracia e da lógica geométrica que estrutura o discurso político de Espinosa. Com fundamento no décimo sexto capítulo, podemos dizer que a essência da democracia é anterior tanto ontológica como históricamente às essências dos outros (...) regimes e que esta anterioridade, no caso do exame da história hebraica, também é cronológica. Isso pode significar que, desde o Tratado TeológicoPolítico, toda a política de Espinosa está fundamentada na definição da essência da democracia. (shrink)

Particle physics intertwines theory and experiments, and this text demonstrates and develops the interplay between the two, following the author's detailed and original approach. This complete and comprehensive treatise, written for a two-semester Master's or graduate course, covers all aspects of modern particle physics. Richly illustrated with more than 450 figures, this text guides students through all the intricacies of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in an intuitive manner that few books achieve. Featuring rigorous step-by-step derivations and more than (...) 100 end-of-chapter problems for additional practice, it ensures that students will not only understand the material but also be able to apply their knowledge. Containing up-to-date experimental material, including the discovery of the Higgs boson at CERN and of neutrino oscillations, this monumental volume also serves as a one-stop reference for particle physics researchers of all levels and specialties. (shrink)

In multicultural situations it is common for people to feel that their usual modes of coping are insufficient. They experience what is here called diversity stress. Today diversity stress is widely experienced in part because key management assumptions involving moral judgments are changing. Understanding diversity stress as a type of morality stress suggests particular patterns of causation, and of productive and counterproductive reactions on the part of individuals and organizations. – Deciding whom to appoint to a challenging new position in (...) Europe, a manager passes over an Asian employee and gives the job to a white male. He worries that there may be some prejudice in his own Judgment. – Because she wants to see more minorities in visible positions, a manager promotes a slightly less qualified minority candidate over a majority candidate, all the while feeling guilty. – A male manager hesitates to hug a longtime employee who has just lost her mother. (shrink)

In Chapter Five of The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, Jerry Fodor argues that since it is likely that human minds evolved quickly as saltations rather than gradually as the product of an accumulation of small mutations, evolutionary psychologists are wrong to think that human minds are adaptations. I argue that Fodor’s requirement that adaptationism entails gradualism is wrongheaded. So, while evolutionary psychologists may be wrong to endorse gradualism—and I argue that they are wrong—it does not follow that they are (...) wrong to endorse an adaptationist explanation for how the human mind evolved. (shrink)