Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...) a house burns to the ground and becomes ashes, or when someone dies. Armed with these distinctions, Aristotle would then say that, in the case of accidental changes, (1) and (2) are both false—a changing thing can really change one of its “accidental properties” and yet literally remain one and the same thing before and after the change. (shrink)

Moral reasoning typically informs environmental decision-making by measuring the possible outcomes of policies or actions in light of a preferred ethical theory. This method is subject to many problems. Environmental pragmatism tries to overcome them, but it suffers also from some pitfalls. This paper proposes a new method of environmental pragmatism that avoids the problems of both the traditional method of environmental moral reasoning and of the general versions of environmental pragmatism. We call it ‘justificatory moral pluralism’ – it develops (...) the intuition that normative ethical theories need not be mutually exclusive. This leaves room for important forms of pluralist environmental ethics that do not require a once-and-for-all prior commitment to an ethical theory when deciding about policies or courses of action related to the protection of the environment. Justificatory moral pluralism offers a viable solution to the recurrent conflicts between efficient environmental decisions and the need for moral reasoning. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

The Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence (ABC)-analysis is a tool for analyzing behavior and stems from the field of psychology where it is used as a tool for the understanding of behavior in general and organizational behavior in particular. In this paper the ABC-analysis is implemented as a tool to understand why people behave ethically in organizations, through the identification of key environmental factors that cause such behavior. This analysis can be the first step to recognizing the complexity of circumstances determining ethical behavior, as (...) well as trigger for changing that behavior. This will be elaborated in the implementation process of an ethical code. The working of the ABC-analysis will be illustrated with an example derived from field research concerning the reorganization of a department of a chemical company. (shrink)

This paper shows Socratic elenchus as an efficient and effective way of modeling rational knowledge seeking. Like ordinary conversations, the elenctic exchanges in the dialogues presuppose a degree of autonomy on the part of its participants. Socrates’ line of questioning often seems pertinent to a particular interlocutor because he is well aware of the fact that the interlocutor has goals and ambitions or is reputed to be an expert at something. In turn, Socrates’ line ofquestioning reflects his own goals and (...) ambitions. In Alcibiades Major Socrates is trying to turn Alcibiades towards a greater awareness of his limitations. Plato’s dialogues also force readers to consider their own solutions to the topics introduced in them. Consequently, the autonomy of a dialogue’s participants requires that interpreters not exaggerate one aspect of a dialogue’s structural features at the expense of other aspects. (shrink)

This year marks the 60th year anniversary of the publication of Niko Tinbergen’s “On aims and methods of ethology” which remains influential among today’s biologists and social scientists for its introduction of four questions for a complete explanation for animal behaviors. In this paper we argue that a large part of the lasting appeal to Tinbergen’s four questions was (and still is) the methodological commitment to treating organisms as objects as opposed to purposive agents. Tinbergen’s approach reinvigorated the discipline of (...) ethology, allowing it to shed its teleological and anthropomorphic associations and to better cohere with a philosophy of science that favors inductive procedures, causal and mechanistic analytic techniques, and an emphasis on Darwinian explanations. While Tinbergen’s approach is still prized among today’s biological social scientists, it ignores an important feature of many social organisms, that they are not merely objects, they are also purposive agents. We explore the implications that a shift from treating organisms as objects to treating them as agents has on both how we should interpret and answer Tinbergen’s four questions. Updating Tinbergen’s four questions with agency in mind not only makes them more applicable to the biological investigation of animal behavior, but also strengthens the value and applicability of biology-oriented research programs in the social sciences. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é interpretar de modo heterodoxo algumas polêmicas afirmações de Nietzsche no segundo ensaio de sua obra Para a genealogia da moral, mais precisamente, aquelas que fazem enfática apologia aos fenômenos da crueldade e violência humanas enquanto pilares de toda cultura superior. Por heterodoxo, eu entendo aqui um modo de proceder estético no trato desses fenômenos, algo que é disseminado também em outras obras.

La Logique de Hegel, science de la pensee pure, veut porter a son accomplissement le projet traditionnel de la metaphysique ou philosophie speculative. De la metaphysique, Aristote avait en partie determine le concept d'une maniere qui devait etre decisive, notamment en degageant l'idee de ce qu'on a pu nommer plus tard ontologie. La logique de Hegel, developpement integral de ce que donne a penser le mot etre, est bien a sa maniere une ontologie, mais une ontologie profondement renovee, avec notamment (...) ceci de paradoxal qu'elle abaisse l'etre au sens strict, l'opposant a la vitalite de l'esprit; la Logique conduit ainsi de l'etre a la verite de l'etre, qui consiste ultimement en la subjectivite de l'absolu se concevant soi-meme, que Hegel nomme aussi idee. Dans ce parcours, la Logique retrouve les concepts qu'avait elabores la tradition philosophique des Presocratiques a Kant; elle resout a sa maniere les problemes, explicites ou implicites, dont ces concepts etaient charges. Au-dela de la fausse alternative de la permanence et de la rupture, l'attention portee au rapport de Hegel a la tradition anime ici une explication de l'ensemble de la Logique. Explication qui, en suivant de pres le mouvement du texte, se garde de meconnaitre que le principe de la Logique est, lui-aussi, problematique: n'est-il pas lui-meme issu de cette tradition qu'il donne la force de repenser? (shrink)

Around a hundred years ago there was a tiny Jewish community in Hämeenlinna, a small provincial capital in Finland. The dissolution of the Hämeenlinna Jewish community has become shrouded in mystery. Some amateur historians have even suggested that the last members of the Jewish community were shot by Russian soldiers in 1914. What happened to the last Jews of Hämeenlinna, and what were the reasons behind the historical process that led to the dissolution of the community? This article examines the (...) turns of fate that prompted the leading Jewish families, the Rosenbergs and the Krapiffskys, to leave the town. The involvement of the local governor, the hardline antisemite Rafael Spåre, turned out to be instrumental in the case of the Krapiffsky family, who were the last remaining members of the community. (shrink)

I consider backtracking reasoning: that is, reasoning from backtracking counterfactuals such as if Hitler had won the war, he would have invaded Russia six weeks earlier. Backtracking counterfactuals often strike us as true. Despite that, reasoning from them just as often strikes us as illegitimate. A number of diagnoses have been offered of the illegitimacy of such backtracking reasoning which invoke the fixity of the past, or the direction of causation. I argue against such diagnoses, and in favor of one (...) that invokes a principle I call the fixity of reasons. Backtracking reasoning violates the fixity of reasons. But, the fixity of reasons is a principle that must be observed in order to engage in practical reasoning at all. (shrink)

Malicious programs have been the main actors in complex, sophisticated attacks against nations, governments, diplomatic agencies, private institutions and people. Knowledge about malicious program...

Cybervetting has become common practice in personnel decision-making processes of organizations. While it represents a quick and inexpensive way of obtaining additional information on employees and applicants, it gives rise to a variety of legal and ethical concerns. To limit companies’ access to personal information, a _right to be forgotten_ has been introduced by the European jurisprudence. By discussing the notion of forgetting from the perspective of French hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur, the present article demonstrates that both, companies and employees, (...) would be harmed if access to online information on applicants and current employees would be denied. Consistent with a Humanistic Management approach that promotes human dignity and flourishing in the workplace, this article proposes guidance for the responsible handling of unpleasant online memories in personnel decision-making processes, thereby following Ricoeur’s notion of forgetting as “kept in reserve”. Enabling applicants and employees to take a qualified stand on their past is more beneficial to both sides than a right to be forgotten that is questionable in several respects. (shrink)

In Appendix B of Russell's The Principles of Mathematics occurs a paradox, the paradox of propositions, which a simple theory of types is unable to resolve. This fact is frequently taken to be one of the principal reasons for calling ramification onto the Russellian stage. The paper presents a detaiFled exposition of the paradox and its discussion in the correspondence between Frege and Russell. It is argued that Russell finally adopted a very simple solution to the paradox. This solution had (...) nothing to do with ramified types but marked an important shift in his theory of propositions. (shrink)

The usual action integral of classical electrodynamics is derived starting from Lanczos’s electrodynamics – a pure field theory in which charged particles are identified with singularities of the homogeneous Maxwell’s equations interpreted as a generalization of the Cauchy–Riemann regularity conditions from complex to biquaternion functions of four complex variables. It is shown that contrary to the usual theory based on the inhomogeneous Maxwell’s equations, in which charged particles are identified with the sources, there is no divergence in the self-interaction so (...) that the mass is finite, and that the only approximations made in the derivation are the usual conditions required for the internal consistency of classical electrodynamics. Moreover, it is found that the radius of the boundary surface enclosing a singularity interpreted as an electron is on the same order as that of the hypothetical “bag” confining the quarks in a hadron, so that Lanczos’s electrodynamics is engaging the reconsideration of many fundamental concepts related to the nature of elementary particles. (shrink)

“This title, I chose it because I don’t understand Hebrew and because it was very short, because it was opaque and a little unbreakable, like an atomic nucleus. For the first screening of the film at the Empire Theater, George Cravenne asked me: ‘What is the title of the film?’ ‘Shoah.’ ‘What does it mean?’ ‘I don’t know.’ ‘But how, you must translate it! No one will understand!’ And I said: ‘It’s what I want, that no one understands.’”1The common denominator (...) of any translation is delay: this delay is a matter of time and space, a temporal displacement, a delay that exacerbates the ontological differentiation process between sign and meaning.2 Between the moment.. (shrink)

Suárez, talvez o principal expoente da Escolástica do século XVI, em suas Disputationes metaphysicae, trabalha, entre outros temas, o do conceito objetivo. Atendo-se principalmente à disputação 2, secção n• 1, procura-se mostrar a fecundidade de tal noção, desenvolvendo, para tanto, os temas: o conceito formal enquanto ato mental e enquanto imago, a doutrina da denominação extrínseca: a denominação extrínseca e os entia rationis, a denominação extrínseca e os possíveis.

Le concept logico-métaphysique d¿éminence trouve une abondante illustration dans l¿oeuvre de Descartes. On se doit de l¿interpréter au travers des usages qui en furent connus de l¿auteur des Méditations, que ce soit selon les perspectives créationnistes de Suarez de Salamanca ou de Grégoire de Valencia, que ce soit selon celle, dans l¿acte interne divin, qu¿expose Gibieuf. Les conséquences pour l¿étude du concept de ¿cause de soi¿ en sont considérables aussi bien en métaphysique qu¿en physique.

Zunächst werden Gemeinsamkeit und Unterschiede zu Malebranche hinsichtlich der Frage der Verbindung von größtmöglicher Einfachheit der Wege bzw. Gesetze und größtmöglicher Vielfalt der Erscheinungen erörtert. Im zweiten Teil wird die Erzählung von Sextus in der Théodicée behandelt. Insbesondere wird dargelegt, warum Leibniz diese Erzählung nicht, wie ursprünglich geplant, in der Mitte, sondern am Schluss der Théodicée einfügte.

Este texto examina, com brevidade, o sentido definição de democracia no capítulo 16 do Tratado Teológico-Político. Num primeiro momento, faço uma pequena história dos estudos, no século passado, acerca da forma do discurso político do TTP. Em seguida, passo à interrogação do sentido da definição de democracia e da lógica geométrica que estrutura o discurso político de Espinosa. Com fundamento no décimo sexto capítulo, podemos dizer que a essência da democracia é anterior tanto ontológica como históricamente às essências dos outros (...) regimes e que esta anterioridade, no caso do exame da história hebraica, também é cronológica. Isso pode significar que, desde o Tratado TeológicoPolítico, toda a política de Espinosa está fundamentada na definição da essência da democracia. (shrink)

Particle physics intertwines theory and experiments, and this text demonstrates and develops the interplay between the two, following the author's detailed and original approach. This complete and comprehensive treatise, written for a two-semester Master's or graduate course, covers all aspects of modern particle physics. Richly illustrated with more than 450 figures, this text guides students through all the intricacies of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in an intuitive manner that few books achieve. Featuring rigorous step-by-step derivations and more than (...) 100 end-of-chapter problems for additional practice, it ensures that students will not only understand the material but also be able to apply their knowledge. Containing up-to-date experimental material, including the discovery of the Higgs boson at CERN and of neutrino oscillations, this monumental volume also serves as a one-stop reference for particle physics researchers of all levels and specialties. (shrink)

This paper addresses longstanding debates around changing patterns of farm ownership and structure on the North American plains. Over the last 150 years, the agrifood system has been transformed by a process of capitalist penetration through which non-farm capital has appropriated key links in the ‘food chain’. Today, large, often transnational corporations dominate in the provision of farm inputs, as well as in food processing, distribution, and retailing. The paradox for food system scholars has been that primary food production (i.e., (...) farming) has generally remained in the hands of independent, family-based operations, especially in the grains sector. This paradox has generated a substantial literature on the barriers to capitalist penetration in agriculture. I revisit these debates in light of two recent trends. First, I highlight the emergence of a class of farm family entrepreneurs comprised of very large, albeit family-owned, grain farming operations, in Saskatchewan. I provide a case study of a vertically integrated, family-based mega-farm to illustrate. Second, I discuss the implications of the launch of One Earth Farms, a corporate farming entity embodying altogether new strategies of land use, labor, and ownership. Structured as a partnership between a Toronto-based investment firm and nine First Nations bands, One Earth Farms brings together the interests of private investors who increasingly view agriculture as a profitable resource sector, and aboriginal communities hoping to redress the historical marginalization of First Nations farming. I interpret the significance of these new avenues of corporatization for “family farms” and prairie agricultural development. (shrink)

André Padoux offers the first English translation of the Yoginihrdaya, a seminal Hindu tantric text dating back to the 10th or 11th century CE.

Why is it that forgetting moral knowledge, unlike other paradigmatic examples of knowledge, seems so deeply absurd? Previous authors have given accounts whereby moral forgetting in itself either is uniformly absurd and impossible (Gilbert Ryle, Adam Bugeja) or is possible and only the speech act is absurd (Sarah McGrath). Considering findings in moral psychology and the experimental philosophy of personal identity, I argue that the knowledge of some moral truths—especially those that are emotional, widely held, subjectively important, and contribute to (...) social relationships—cannot be forgotten because they’re too tightly tied to one’s true self. Moral knowledge at the level of individual propositions, when it does not have these attributes and so is not so tied to the agent’s identity, can sometimes be forgotten. I identify two such cases: (1) where the moral knowledge results partly from an emotional trigger that has been forgotten, and (2) where the moral knowledge results partly from a process of reflection that has been forgotten. (shrink)