The relationship between law and morality is a topic which receives special importance and attention, especially in "liberal democracies" in which the law is supposed to regulate highly pluralized and fragmented societies. Under conditions of plurality of values, many social forces and legal theories require a certain kind of neutrality from the legal system, a means of compatibility of the many "world views" and "moral systems" that are present within the same social space. Such a conciliating commitment sounds particularly relevant (...) in times of the doctrinal ubiquity of ideas such as "peace based on human rights". This was the title of the 28th World Congress of the IVR in Lisbon, with the special workshop "Law and Morals" on which this book is based. It is divided into four parts: "Law and Practical Reason", "Conceptual Approaches on Law and Morals", "Legal versus Moral Normativity", and "Morals and Legal Positivism". (shrink)

But what are functions? Here, 15 leading scholars of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of biology present new essays on functions.

Occasions of Identity is an exploration of timeless philosophical issues about persistence, change, time, and sameness. Andre Gallois offers a critical survey of various rival views about the nature of identity and change, and puts forward his own original theory. He supports the idea of occasional identities, arguing that it is coherent and helpful to suppose that things can be identical at one time but distinct at another. Gallois defends this view, demonstrating how it can solve puzzles about persistence (...) dating back to the Ancient Greeks, and investigates the metaphysical consequences of rejecting the necessity and eternity of identities. (shrink)

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. (...) His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. (shrink)

The central point of this essay is to demonstrate the incommensurability of ‘Darwinian fitness’ with the numeric values associated with reproductive rates used in population genetics. While sometimes both are called ‘fitness’, they are distinct concepts coming from distinct explanatory schemes. Further, we try to outline a possible answer to the following question: from the natural properties of organisms and a knowledge of their environment, can we construct an algorithm for a particular kind of organismic life-history pattern that itself will (...) allow us to predict whether a type in the population will increase or decrease relative to other types? Introduction Darwinian fitness Reproductive fitness and genetical models of evolution The models of reproductive fitness 4.1 The Standard Viability Model 4.2 Frequency-dependent selection 4.3 Fertility models 4.4 Overlapping generations Fitness as outcome 5.1 Fitness as actual increase in type 5.2 Fitness as expected increase in type 5.2.1 Expected increase within a generation 5.2.2 Expected increase between generations 5.2.3 Postponed reproductive fitness effects The book-keeping problem Conclusion. (shrink)

The AGM theory of belief contraction is extended tomultiple contraction, i.e. to contraction by a set of sentences rather than by a single sentence. There are two major variants: Inpackage contraction all the sentences must be removed from the belief set, whereas inchoice contraction it is sufficient that at least one of them is removed. Constructions of both types of multiple contraction are offered and axiomatically characterized. Neither package nor choice contraction can in general be reduced to contractions by single (...) sentences; in the finite case choice contraction allows for reduction. (shrink)

The instrumentalist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data runs as follows: (1) every theory has empirically equivalent rivals; (2) the only warrant for believing one theory over another is its possession of a greater measure of empirical virtue; (3) therefore belief in any theory is arbitrary. In this paper, I examine the status of the first premise. Several arguments against the universal availability of empirically equivalent theoretical rivals are criticized, and four algorithms for producing empirically equivalent rivals are (...) defended. I conclude that the case for the first premise of the argument from underdetermination is very strong. The disposition of the argument itself depends on the fate of the second premise. (shrink)

It's been 41 years since the publication of Ernst Mayr's Cause and Effect in Biology wherein Mayr most clearly develops his version of the influential distinction between ultimate and proximate causes in biology. In critically assessing Mayr's essay I uncover false statements and red-herrings about biological explanation. Nevertheless, I argue to uphold an analogue of the ultimate/proximate distinction as it refers to two different kinds of explanations, one dynamical the other statistical.

IN the last decade deliberative democracy has developed rapidly from a “theoretical statement” into a “working theory.”1 Scholars and practitioners have launched numerous initiatives designed to put deliberative democracy into practice, ranging from deliberative polling to citizen summits.2 Some even advocate deliberation as a new “revolutionary now.”3 Deliberative democracy has also experienced the beginning of an empirical turn, making significant gains as an empirical (or positive) political science. This includes a small, but growing body of literature tackling the connection between (...) the normative standards of deliberation, how well they are met, and the empirical consequences of meeting them.4 This trend has, for instance, included the use of methods and frameworks borrowed from other fields, such as political and social psychology. Such studies suggest that cases approaching ideal deliberation are rare, but that group interaction sometimes works surprisingly well according to such ideals.5. (shrink)

More and more organisations formulate a code of conduct in order to stimulate responsible behaviour among their members. Much time and energy is usually spent fixing the content of the code but many organisations get stuck in the challenge of implementing and maintaining the code. The code then turns into nothing else than the notorious "paper in the drawer", without achieving its aims. The challenge of implementation is to utilize the dynamics which have emerged from the formulation of the code. (...) This will support a continuous process of reflection on the central values and standards contained in the code. This paper presents an assessment method, based on the EFQM model, which intends to support this implementation process. (shrink)

Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...) a house burns to the ground and becomes ashes, or when someone dies. Armed with these distinctions, Aristotle would then say that, in the case of accidental changes, (1) and (2) are both false—a changing thing can really change one of its “accidental properties” and yet literally remain one and the same thing before and after the change. (shrink)

In my article "berkeley's master argument" I attempt to show that an argument berkeley uses in the 'dialogues' and 'principles' to support his contention that whatever is perceivable is perceived can be seen as an illuminating attempt to relate conceptualizing, Imaging and perceiving. In consequence it cannot be dismissed as resting on an elementary fallacy, But reflects on the conditions for the self ascription of experience.

Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of them is right, and that, in fact, all scientific practices are compatible with (...) both realism and instrumentalism. I also repudiate van Fraassen's argument to the effect that the instrumentalist account of scientific practice is logically weaker, hence better, than the realist account. In the end, there are no scientific practice arguments on the table that support either side of the debate. It is also noted that the deficiencies of van Fraassen's argument are recapitulated in Putnam's miracle argument for realism. My pessimistic assessment of the state of the debate is reminiscent of Arthur Fine's. However, Fine's argument for the ‘natural ontological attitude’ once again repeats the problems of van Fraassen's and Putnam's arguments. (shrink)

Semantics are given for modal extensions of relevant logics based on the kind of frames introduced in [7]. By means of a simple recipe we may obtain from a class FRM (L) of unreduced frames characterising a (non-modal) logic L, frame-classes FRM (L.M) characterising conjunctively regular modal extensions L.M of L. By displaying an incompleteness phenomenon, it is shown how the recipe fails when reduced frames are under consideration.

Entre les actions judiciaires intentées contre l’inertie des États ou des grandes entreprises, les mouvements sociaux qui revendiquent une transition plus équitable et les sommets climatiques internationaux où elle est sans cesse invoquée pour négocier des accords, la justice climatique s’est installée comme un sujet politique majeur. En complément des analyses juridiques, politiques, sociologiques et économiques, une réflexion éthique est indispensable pour en saisir toute la portée. -/- Comment justifier l’objectif de limiter le réchauffement planétaire à 2 ou 1,5 °C (...) d’ici la fin du siècle ? Selon quels principes distribuer les droits d’émission et l’effort de lutte contre le changement climatique à l’échelle mondiale ? Seuls les États ou bien aussi les individus ont-ils des responsabilités ? Pierre André et Axel Gosseries exposent les concepts, principes et arguments qui structurent aujourd’hui la question de la justice climatique. (shrink)

The problem of scientific disregard is the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property of theoreticity. This solution also supports their repudiation of the thesis of underdetermination. I argue that the attempt to provide criteria (...) of theoreticity fails, that there is a Bayesian solution to the problem of scientific disregard that fares better, and that this successful solution supports a distinctively Bayesian version of the underdetermination thesis. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to explain Peter John Olivi’s technical notion of “aspectus.” More specifically, I distinguish different uses of this notion by Olivi, not all of which have been made clear in the secondary literature, in order to help resolve a prima facie tension in the way Olivi puts together his active theory of cognition and his direct account of cognition (or “direct realism”). In brief, the issue is that Olivi builds his active theory of cognition out of (...) the commitment that the body cannot, strictly speaking, act as an efficient cause to produce an act of cognition in the spiritual soul; so, in order to account for soul-body interaction, Olivi will often speak of the soul having a seemingly one-way aspectus or orientation towards the body so that the soul can respond appropriately to changes in the body. However, given Olivi’s commitment to direct realism, the aspectus of cognition should go directly to the external object when, e.g., perceiving a present object. So, I take it Olivi must have some sort of distinction in mind between types of aspectūs in order to avoid contrariety. In short, my view is that by distinguishing between conscious/cognitive and non conscious/non-cognitive sorts of aspectūs in Olivi, one can understand how an aspectus towards inner corporeal changes can still contribute to direct cognition of external objects. Moreover, I take it that Olivi’s discussion of another technical notion, the mode of connection or “colligantia” between soul and body, provides further evidence for my interpretation. (shrink)

The work of Joseph Delb??uf (1831‐1896), a philosopher, psychologist, and mathematician, provides fresh insights on the relationship between agency, consciousness, and evolution. Without agency, Delb??uf argued, the distinction between the self and the external world would be impossible, the function of feelings such as pain and pleasure would be incomprehensible, and consciousness would not have evolved. Delb??uf also posited a psychological stage of evolution, preceding that of natural selection, whereby sentient organisms influence the selection of their own traits through the (...) decisions they make during their reproductive lives. In relating these ideas and others, I show how Delb??uf’s work is relevant to current scholarship on the nature and evolution of consciousness. (shrink)

Teleology in biology is making headline news in the United States. Conservative Christians are utilizing a teleological argument for the existence of a supremely intelligent designer to justify legislation calling for the teaching of "intelligent design" (ID) in public schools. Teleological arguments of one form or another have been around since Antiquity. The contemporary argument from intelligent design varies little from William Paley's argument written in 1802. Both argue that nature exhibits too much complexity to be explained by 'mindless' natural (...) forces alone. We need to postulate the existence of an intelligent designer, a creator with forethought and purpose. The inference to an intelligent creator harkens back to Plato’s teleological argument for the order of the cosmos. Plato’s demiurge is a creator that imposes order on the cosmos. Yet, as we shall see when we analyze the distinctly biological form of the more contemporary teleological arguments we will find remanants of Aristotle’s distinctive argument from functional arrangement, but without his distinctive form of telos which is unconscious and immanent rather than intelligent and creative from on high. The aim of this article is to survey various teleological arguments since Antiquity. Since a variant on Paley's argument—ID—is getting so much recent press I will start with a discussion on the nature of Paley’s teleology. (shrink)

Forster and Sober present a solution to the curve-fitting problem based on Akaike's Theorem. Their analysis shows that the curve with the best epistemic credentials need not always be the curve that most closely fits the data. However, their solution does not, without further argument, avoid the two difficulties that are traditionally associated with the curve-fitting problem: that there are infinitely many equally good candidate-curves relative to any given set of data, and that these best candidates include curves with indefinitely (...) many bumps. (shrink)

Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) contains two main arguments for toleration, one theological, the other political. In light of the latter, the capacity for judging is embedded in each individual’s power and cannot be overcome or dismissed. The individual, not the state, is the subject par excellence of judgment concerning the true and the good. In the Political Treatise (TP), however, multiplicity takes centre stage. The multitude, a concept that Spinoza had seldom used until then, appears to emphasise that the more (...) powerful individuals become with others, the more likely they are to avoid error in judgment. Does this contrast mean that the TP’s argument from multiplicity undermines the TTP’s political argument for toleration? In this paper, I demonstrate that the strain under which the political argument for toleration seems to be due to the TP’s emphasis on the epistemic competencies of the many is only apparent. To achieve this, I show that Spinoza, under Machiavelli’s influence, endorses a particular form of epistemic democracy, which in turn requires both multiplicity and diversity. The upshot is that we find a third argument for toleration in the TP embedded in the argument from epistemic democracy. (shrink)

Los gestos curativos realizados por Jesús de Nazaret durante su ministerio público dieron lugar a numerosos abordajes en el período patrístico, especialmente en el campo de la soteriología. En el siglo IV encontramos la figura de Ambrosio de Milán quien, en varios de sus escritos, presentó la dinámica histórico-salvífica a la luz de diversos elementos tomados de la práctica de la medicina. Sus ricas metáforas proporcionan un reflejo multifacético de la manera en que Cristo obra la salvación entre los hombres. (...) En este sentido, este artículo abordará la medicina divina en el pensamiento ambrosiano desde tres vertientes. En primer lugar veremos la figura de Cristo Doctor, que manifiesta su bondad a favor de los seres humanos enfermos a causa del pecado. En el segundo momento veremos cómo Ambrosio explica los remedios espirituales, más concretamente la Palabra de Dios, la Eucaristía y la Penitencia. Finalmente, el artículo presentará al paciente frente al médico y los remedios espirituales, cuyas actitudes implican consecuencias para la recuperación o no de la salud. De esta manera, la tríada “médico-medicina-enfermo” examinada en los escritos ambrosianos permite una visión más amplia de la realidad soteriológica a la luz de la medicina espiritual, que, en definitiva, presenta al Cristo Doctor que descendió de los cielos trayendo la medicina de salvación a la humanidad herida por el pecado. (shrink)

This paper intersects the literature on the democratic boundary problem with the literature on the constructivist turn in political representation to show that the boundary problem broadly construed involves a distinction between ‘the problem of inclusion’ (into pre-existing demoi and their decision-making procedures) and ‘the problem of constituting the demos’ (which involves criteria for partaking in constituent power). This distinction is consistently neglected by democratic theorists. However, it has serious implications for representative democracies because the standard answers to the boundary (...) problem – the all-affected-interests principle, the all-subjected principle, and the substantive-demos principle – do not apply to the problem of constituting the demos. A new principle aimed at the latter problem is here proposed: the constructivist-representative principle. In the end, it should be clear that ascertaining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision requires the adoption of different principles depending on the specific demos in question and on the type of decision-making procedure involved (e.g., constitution-making-or-changing, lawmaking, policymaking, etc.). (shrink)

In the epigraph, Fisher is blaming two generations of theoretical biologists, from Darwin on, for ignoring Quetelet's statistical techniques and hence harboring confusions about evolution and natural selection. He is right to imply that Darwin and his contemporaries were aware of the core of Quetelet's work. Quetelet's seminal monograph, Sur L'homme, was widely discussed in Darwin's academic circles. We know that Darwin owned a copy (Schweber 1977). More importantly, we have in Darwin's notebooks two entries referring to Quetelet's work on (...) the cause of a large-scale global phenomenon where each year more boys were born than girls. The first entry is written sometime between April and July 1838. Darwin writes "Find out from the Statistical Society—where M. Quetelet has published his laws about sexes relative to age of Marriages" (C 268, Barrett et al., 1987, p. 324). The second is written sometime after October 16, 1838: "In the Atheneum Numbers 406, 407, 409, Quetelet papers are given, & I think facts there mentioned about proportion of sexes, at birth & causes" (Ibid, p. 379). So, even if Darwin did not read Sur L'homme directly it is likely (though not certain) that he read its review in the Atheneum. There is no doubt that Darwin eventually became familiar with Quetelet's work in statistics. The smoking gun is an essay that Darwin writes in 1874, entitled, "On the Males and Complemental Males of Certain Cirripedes, and on Rudimentary Structures" where he discusses Quetelet's laws of variation. (shrink)

Este artigo propõe considerações sobre o conceito de experiência [Erfahrung] a partir do texto Experiência e Pobreza, de Walter Benjamin, publicado em 1933, no qual o intelectual alemão desenvolve argumentos relacionados à experiência e à cultura observando o desenvolvimento tecnológico a partir da modernidade do século XIX, e sugere que haveria um “empobrecimento da experiência”, fazendo referência ao que chama de “cultura de vidro”. Articula-se essa leitura ao que tem sido chamado de “cultura de telas” - momento em que a (...) tecnologia exige contato permanente com as telas dos dispositivos eletrônicos que se tornam, cada vez mais, extensões do corpo e da mente humanos. Ao final, fornece observações que permitem propor novas perspectivas sobre um suposto “empobrecimento” ou surgimento de novas formas de experiência a partir do uso desses dispositivos. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: The text addresses Foucault’s critical understanding of neoliberalism as a new contemporary governmentality strategy for the conduction of people’s lives. A major aspect of Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism relies on his understanding of the neoliberal homo oeconomicus as dependent on subjectivation processes related to self-assumed values and standards oriented by the competitive economic market. Our hypothesis is that governmentality, critique and subjectivation are the core notions that shaped Foucault’s understanding of neoliberalism and form the legacy of his seminal analysis. (...) Contrary to critics who affirm that Foucault flirted or even became fascinated with neoliberalism, we argue that he offered critical tools for its understanding in a critique that is not to be confused with denunciation, however. Accordingly, we discuss Foucault’s conception of critique and relate his analysis of neoliberalism to his notions of governmentality and subjectivation. Finally, we briefly point out how some contemporary critics of the neoliberal order have appropriated and developed Foucault’s conceptual tools in their own understanding of it. We conclude that although Foucault did not propose a comprehensive theory of neoliberalism, he offered important critical insights for the understanding of it in our times. (shrink)

This paper is a translation to Portuguese of the ninth chapter of Alvin Plantinga’s 1974 book The Nature of Necessity, in which the famous freewill defense for the problem of evil is presented in its most complete form. By making use of the theory of possible worlds developed in the previous chapters of the book, Plantinga engages in a recognizably successful attempt to show that the existence of evil is not inconsistent with the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient (...) being. In addition to the translation, we provide a brief introduction to Plantinga’s free-will defense and to the debate about God and evil in the analytic philosophy of religion. Key words: problem of evil, free-will defense, possible worlds, analytic philosophy of religion. (shrink)

O presente texto versa sobre as utilizações políticas que a conversão dos grupos indígenas suscitou na fronteira amazônica. A fronteira a que aludimos aqui diz respeito aos rios Marañon, Solimões e Negro, onde os limites das colônias europeias se encontravam. Se por um lado havia o caráter espiritual, em reduzir os indígenas a fé católica, por outro, as conversões foram amplamente utilizadas pelos estados ibéricos para garantir sua zona de influência, além de garantir a supremacia econômica no vale amazônico. E (...) além dos ibéricos, a conversão foi uma política na qual os indígenas se aproveitaram para tirar vantagens da condição de “vassalo do rei”, que o fato de se tornar católico expressava. Desse modo, o presente trabalho dialoga com os estudos de fronteira, sobretudo, com a noção de Missão como instituição de fronteira, além do Protagonismo Indígena, em demonstrar a perspectiva dos grupos nativos, frente ao processo de conversão. (shrink)

Volume 29, Issue 7-8, November - December 2024.

In Chapter Five of The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, Jerry Fodor argues that since it is likely that human minds evolved quickly as saltations rather than gradually as the product of an accumulation of small mutations, evolutionary psychologists are wrong to think that human minds are adaptations. I argue that Fodor’s requirement that adaptationism entails gradualism is wrongheaded. So, while evolutionary psychologists may be wrong to endorse gradualism—and I argue that they are wrong—it does not follow that they are (...) wrong to endorse an adaptationist explanation for how the human mind evolved. (shrink)

O que é a justiça? O presente ensaio apresenta um panorama sumário das mais influentes abordagens filosóficas à justiça, privilegiando as predominantes no estado da arte no primeiro quartel do século XXI e a relevância, para quem tenciona entrar pela primeira vez nos estudos filosóficos sobre o tema, da arrumação (sobretudo, teórica e conceptual) do que se tem falado sobre justiça em filosofia política, moral e do direito. ----- What is justice? This essay presents an overview of the most influential (...) philosophical approaches to justice, privileging those most predominant in the first quarter of the 21st century. Its primary objective is to arrange (both theoretically and conceptually) what has been said about justice in political, moral and legal philosophy in a way that helps those who intend to enter philosophical studies on this subject for the first time. (shrink)

Traditional institutions are often considered inadequate to govern for the long term as their politicians promote short-term thinking which can harm the future. This book proposes a novel theory of social time perception to address the short-term thinking of traditional institutions which threaten to stifle liberal democracies. The semi-future reconfigures liberal democracies’ franchises, representative instruments, deliberative practices, accountability mechanisms, and policymaking to include in the demos all citizens, regardless of age, and holders of representable objective interests in the future. The (...) result is not only a way to legitimise long-term governance but also to improve the quality of current democracies. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar como o conceito de antinatalismo – isto é, uma visão filosófica que defende a ideia de que é melhor que os humanos parem de trazer novas vidas ao mundo, ou que teria sido melhor não termos sido trazidos à existência – e, mais especificamente, o antinatalismo de David Benatar, se alinham à vertente metafísica do pessimismo schopenhaueriano, presente no Tomo I de O Mundo como Vontade e Representação e também nos Suplementos. Ao fazer (...) isto, não será intenção deste trabalho a pressuposição de que as vertentes do pessimismo de Schopenhauer sejam, necessariamente, antinatalistas. Antes, tem-se como motivação demonstrar o que há do pessimismo metafísico schopenhaueriano no antinatalismo de Benatar que, por ser diferente de outras visões antinatalistas, é aqui adjetivado como “benatariano”, e, por conseguinte, o que há na posição do filósofo sul-africano que pode ser justificado pela metafísica de Schopenhauer. (shrink)