The growing proportion of elderly people in society, together with recent advances in robotics, makes the use of robots in elder care increasingly likely. We outline developments in the areas of robot applications for assisting the elderly and their carers, for monitoring their health and safety, and for providing them with companionship. Despite the possible benefits, we raise and discuss six main ethical concerns associated with: (1) the potential reduction in the amount of human contact; (2) an increase in the (...) feelings of objectification and loss of control; (3) a loss of privacy; (4) a loss of personal liberty; (5) deception and infantilisation; (6) the circumstances in which elderly people should be allowed to control robots. We conclude by balancing the care benefits against the ethical costs. If introduced with foresight and careful guidelines, robots and robotic technology could improve the lives of the elderly, reducing their dependence, and creating more opportunities for social interaction. (shrink)

As the cognitive revolution was slow to come to the study of animal behavior, the vast majority of what we know about primate cognition has been discovered in the last 30 years. Building on the recognition that the physical and social worlds of humans and their living primate relatives pose many of the same evolutionary challenges, programs of research have established that the most basic cognitive skills and mental representations that humans use to navigate those worlds are already possessed by (...) other primates. There may be differences between humans and other primates, however, in more complex cognitive skills, such as reasoning about relations, causality, time, and other minds. Of special importance, the human primate seems to possess a species-unique set of adaptations for “cultural intelligence,” which are broad reaching in their effects on human cognition. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim to show that the framework of embedded, distributed, or extended cognition offers new perspectives on social cognition by applying it to one specific domain: the psychology of memory. In making our case, first we specify some key social dimensions of cognitive distribution and some basic distinctions between memory cases, and then describe stronger and weaker versions of distributed remembering in the general distributed cognition framework. Next, we examine studies of social influences on memory in cognitive (...) psychology, and identify the valuable concepts and methods to be extended and embedded in our framework; we focus in particular on three related paradigms: transactive memory, collaborative recall, and social contagion. Finally, we sketch our own early studies of individual and group memory developed within our framework of distributed cognition, on social contagion of autobiographical memories, collaborative flashbulb memories, and memories of high school at a high school reunion. We see two reciprocal benefits of this conceptual and empirical framework to social memory phenomena: that ideas about distributed cognition can be honed against and tested with the help of sophisticated methods in the social cognitive psychology of memory; and conversely, that a range of social memory phenomena that are as yet poorly understood can be approached afresh with theoretically motivated extensions of existing empirical paradigms. (shrink)

This paper assesses the potential of organisational culture as a means for improving ethics in organisations. Organisational culture is recognised as one determinant of how people behave, more or less ethically, in organisations. It is also incresingly understood as an attribute that management can and should influence to improve organisational performance. When things go wrong in organisations, managers look to the culture as both the source of problems and the basis for solutions. Two models of organisational culture and ethical behaviour (...) are evaluated. They rest on different understandings of organisational culture and the processes by which ethics are enhanced. Firstly, the prevailing approach holds that creating a unitary cohesive culture around core moral values is the solution to enhancing ethical behaviour. Both the feasibility and desirability of this approach, in terms of ethical outcomes, is questioned. The second model queries the existence of organisational culture at all, arguing that organisations are nothing more than shifting coalitions of subcultures. In this second model, the very porousness of the subcultures provides a catalyst for the scrutiny and critique of norms and practices. Such diversity and debate is construed as potentially a better safeguard for ethical behaviour than the uniformity promised by the unitary, strong culture model. (shrink)

Concerns over medical paternalism are especially salient when there exists a conflict of values between patient and clinician. This is particularly relevant for psychiatry, the field of medicine for which the phenomenon of conflicting values is most present and for which the specter of medical paternalism looms large. Few cases are as glaring as that of anorexia nervosa (AN), a disorder that is considered to be egosyntonic (meaning its symptoms are reflectively endorsed by the patient) and maintained by the presence (...) of pathological values. One might think, given this, that an approach to medicine that foregrounds the role of values in clinical encounters would be particularly well suited to address the problem of medical paternalism in treating AN. As it happens, this is precisely the goal of values-based medicine, an approach to medicine that prioritizes the integration of patients’ unique values into the aims of treatment and that has been touted as being particularly applicable to psychiatric conditions such as AN. Although this strategy may initially appear promising, in this paper I will argue that the directive to incorporate patient values (as dictated by values-based medicine) cannot do the work of mitigating medical paternalism in the treatment of egosyntonic disorders such as AN. Rather than chalking this up as a failure due to AN being a particularly challenging case, I will instead conclude that the failure of values-based medicine in this context cuts to the heart of the limitations of rectifying medical paternalism within psychiatry as it currently exists. (shrink)

How do the ways we argue represent a practical philosophy or a way of life? Are concepts of character and ethos pertinent to our understanding of academic debate? In this book, Amanda Anderson analyzes arguments in literary, cultural, and political theory, with special attention to the ways in which theorists understand ideals of critical distance, forms of subjective experience, and the determinants of belief and practice. Drawing on the resources of the liberal and rationalist tradition, Anderson interrogates the limits (...) of identity politics and poststructuralism while holding to the importance of theory as a form of life. Considering high-profile trends as well as less noted patterns of argument, The Way We Argue Now addresses work in feminism, new historicism, queer theory, postcolonialism, cosmopolitanism, pragmatism, and proceduralism. The essays brought together here--lucid, precise, rigorously argued--combine pointed critique with an appreciative assessment of the productive internal contests and creative developments across these influential bodies of thought. Ultimately, The Way We Argue Now promotes a revitalized culture of argument through a richer understanding of the ways critical reason is practiced at the individual, collective, and institutional levels. Bringing to the fore the complexities of academic debate while shifting the terms by which we assess the continued influence of theory, it will appeal to readers interested in political theory, literary studies, cultural studies, gender studies, and the place of academic culture in society and politics. (shrink)

This is a preprint draft. Please cite published version (DOI: 10.1111/mila.12385). The aim of this paper is to provide a novel analysis of anorexia nervosa (AN) in the context of the sense of agency literature. I first show that two accounts of anorexia nervosa that we ought to take seriously— i.e., the first personal reports of those who have experienced it firsthand as well as the research that seeks to explain anorexic behavior from an empirical perspective— appear to be thoroughly (...) in tension with one another in their descriptions of anorexic actions. Rather than proceeding at this point by way of disregarding anorexic testimony as meaningless or insincere, I instead offer a positive account of the sense of agency in anorexia nervosa that renders these two depictions compatible. The resultant picture of anorexic behavior is one that accommodates current empirical findings while also providing valuable insight into how it is that anorexics can sincerely report feeling fully in control over their food restriction. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between dignity and robot care for older people. It highlights the disquiet that is often expressed about failures to maintain the dignity of vulnerable older people, but points out some of the contradictory uses of the word ‘dignity’. Certain authors have resolved these contradictions by identifying different senses of dignity; contrasting the inviolable dignity inherent in human life to other forms of dignity which can be present to varying degrees. The Capability Approach (CA) is introduced (...) as a different but tangible account of what it means to live a life worthy of human dignity. It is used here as a framework for the assessment of the possible effects of eldercare robots on human dignity. The CA enables the identification of circumstances in which robots could enhance dignity by expanding the set of capabilities that are accessible to frail older people. At the same time, it is also possible within its framework to identify ways in which robots could have a negative impact, by impeding the access of older people to essential capabilities. It is concluded that the CA has some advantages over other accounts of dignity, but that further work and empirical study is needed in order to adapt it to the particular circumstances and concerns of those in the latter part of their lives. (shrink)

As robots are deployed in a widening range of situations, it is necessary to develop a clearer position about whether or not they can be trusted to make good moral decisions. In this paper, we take a realistic look at recent attempts to program and to train robots to develop some form of moral competence. Examples of implemented robot behaviours that have been described as 'ethical', or 'minimally ethical' are considered, although they are found to only operate in quite constrained (...) and limited application domains. There is a general recognition that current robots cannot be described as full moral agents, but it is less clear whether will always be the case. Concerns are raised about the insufficiently justified use of terms such as 'moral' and 'ethical' to describe the behaviours of robots that are often more related to safety considerations than to moral ones. Given the current state of the art, two possible responses are identified. The first involves continued efforts to develop robots that are capable of ethical behaviour. The second is to argue against, and to attempt to avoid, placing robots in situations that demand moral competence and an understanding of the surrounding social situation. There is something to be gained from both responses, but it is argued here that the second is the more responsible choice. (shrink)

This paper aims to better motivate the naturalization of metaphysics by identifying and criticizing a class of theories I call ’free range metaphysics’. I argue that free range metaphysics is epistemically inadequate because the constraints on its content—consistency, simplicity, intuitive plausibility, and explanatory power—are insufficiently robust and justificatory. However, since free range metaphysics yields clarity-conducive techniques, incubates science, and produces conceptual and formal tools useful for scientifically engaged philosophy, I do not recommend its discontinuation. I do recommend, however, ending the (...) discipline’s bad faith. That is, I urge that free range metaphysics not be taken to have fully satisfactory epistemic credentials over and above its pragmatic ones. (shrink)

This article discusses the key existential stakes of implementing biometrics in human lifeworlds. In this pursuit, we offer a problematization and reinvention of central values often taken for granted within the “ethical turn” of AI development and discourse, such as autonomy, agency, privacy and integrity, as we revisit basic questions about what it means to be human and embodied. Within a framework of existential media studies, we introduce an existential ethics of care—through a conversation between existentialism, virtue ethics, a feminist (...) ethics of care and post-humanist ethics—aiming to deepen and nuance our understanding of the human behind “human-centered” AI directives. The key argument is that biometrics implicates humans through unprecedented forms of objectification, through which the existential body—the relational, intimate and frail human being—is at risk. We interrogate these risks as they become visible at three sites where embodied humans are challenged by biometrics, and thus where the existential body is challenged by the biometric body. This occurs through reductionism (biometric passports nailing bodies to identities, removing human judgment and compromising agency at the AI border), enforced transparency (smart home assistants surveying human intimacies and invading intimate spaces in the bedroom) and the breaching of bodily integrity (chipping bodies to capture sensory data, challenging the very concept of bodily integrity through self-invasive biohacking). Our existential ethics of care is importantly not a solutionist list of principles or suggestions, but a manifesto for a way of thinking about the ethical challenges of living with biometrics in today’s world, by raising the right questions. We argue that a revitalized discussion of the basic existential stakes within human lived experience is needed and should serve as the foundation on which comprehensive frameworks can be built to address the complexities and prospects for ethical machines, responsible biometrics and AI. (shrink)

Karen L. Baird, Beyond reproduction: Women’s health, activism, and public policy, Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2009, reviewed by Amanda R. Clarke.

A recent article from Archives of Disease in Childhood outlined problems with the act of gaining child assent for research participation. However the arguments used in the article are incomplete or misguided. Rather than being harmful, assent should be seen as an ethically-appropriate way in which we can engage with the child about his participation in research. While additional clarification of the concept of assent is needed, the child's family context can provide us with a valuable guide to the way (...) we involve him in the decision-making process. (shrink)

"In The Ethics of Earth Art, Amanda Boetzkes analyzes the development of the earth art movement, arguing that such diverse artists as Robert Smithson, Ana Mendieta, James Turrell, Jackie Brookner, Olafur Eliasson, Basia Irland, and Ichi ...

Current uses of robots in classrooms are reviewed and used to characterise four scenarios: Robot as Classroom Teacher; Robot as Companion and Peer; Robot as Care-eliciting Companion; and Telepresence Robot Teacher. The main ethical concerns associated with robot teachers are identified as: privacy; attachment, deception, and loss of human contact; and control and accountability. These are discussed in terms of the four identified scenarios. It is argued that classroom robots are likely to impact children’s’ privacy, especially when they masquerade as (...) their friends and companions, when sensors are used to measure children’s responses, and when records are kept. Social robots designed to appear as if they understand and care for humans necessarily involve some deception, and could increase the risk of reduced human contact. Children could form attachments to robot companions, or robot teachers and this could have a deleterious effect on their social development. There are also concerns about the ability, and use of robots to control or make decisions about children’s behaviour in the classroom. It is concluded that there are good reasons not to welcome fully fledged robot teachers, and that robot companions should be given a cautious welcome at best. The limited circumstances in which robots could be used in the classroom to improve the human condition by offering otherwise unavailable educational experiences are discussed. (shrink)

This article draws on the work of the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas to offer a fresh insight into the law’s response to the issue of whistleblowing. In order to achieve this we briefly outline the main themes of his philosophy of otherness which insists that the very essence of ethics springs from the subjection (a succumbing) of the Subject to the ethical call of the Other. We provide a short description of the UK law on whistleblowing before undertaking a Levinasian reading (...) of a particular case in order to consider the dilemma that confronts the judge in framing an ethical response to the whistleblower as Other. (shrink)

This article argues that Augustine’s understanding of the internal dynamics of number, order, and weight as they pertain to corporeal creatures supplies the basis for an analogy which characterizes the process of the soul’s reformation. In other words, Augustine understands the soul’s simplicity in an analogous manner to the simplicity of corporeal creatures, and the simplicity of corporeal creatures is determined by the relations between number, order, and weight. This analogy shows that Augustine conceives of the soul as a composite (...) entity with different loves as its constituent parts. In the process of reformation, the soul acquires an ordered disposition as those loves become more like one another. By virtue of this ordered disposition, the soul also acquires a greater degree of integration or number because the likeness of weight among its constituent parts allows the soul to move as a unity toward God as its final end. (shrink)

Stigma is a factor of diseases of craniofacial disfigurement, associated with negative health outcomes. Psychosocial interventions can improve the “illness” experience. The law can improve care by framing patients' rights, defining physicians' obligations to make psychological referrals, and fostering an activist orientation among patients.

Este artículo tiene el propósito de defender que las razones personales en sentido amplio son una postura compatible con la defensa del largoplacismo. Para ello, en primer lugar, explicaré en qué se basa el largoplacismo, esto es, la posición según la cual debemos preocuparnos principalmente por el impacto que nuestras acciones tendrán en el futuro lejano. En segundo lugar, describiré y compararé las distintas posiciones que existen en ética de poblaciones. A continuación, señalaré la problematicidad de las razones personales en (...) sentido estrecho. Finalmente, evaluaré las razones personales en sentido amplio en relación con el largoplacismo y concluiré que pueden constituir una posición no sólo válida, sino útil, para quienes se preocupan por el futuro lejano. (shrink)

O artigo investiga as nuances dos discursos sobre Brasília presentes nos textos de pareceres de censores que atuaram durante a ditadura militar. Os filmes que sofreram censura prévia escolhidos para a construção do artigo foram ‘‘Vestibular 70’’, ‘‘Brasília Ano 10’’ e ‘‘Samba em Brasília’’. Os dois primeiros foram produzidos na capital e o último no Rio de Janeiro, no ano de 1960. Diante disso, foi importante refletir sobre a historicidade de como se apresentava o discurso dos pareceristas nos documentos. Para (...) tal, os pareceres foram examinados à luz da Análise do Discurso de Michel Pêcheux e Althusser, bem como outras reflexões dentro deste campo teórico-metodológico. A historiografia sobre Brasília foi de extrema importância para o entendimento da conjuntura na qual a linguagem dos pareceres está inserida. A pretensão desta análise foi identificar o papel do cinema candango na construção do imaginário da cidade e sua relação com o Estado, por meio dos pareceres. This article investigates the nuances of the discourses about Brasília in the texts of the censor’s opinion on who acted in the military dictatorship in Brazil. The movies that suffered previous censorship were ‘‘Vestibular 70’’, ‘‘Brasília Ano 10’’ and ‘‘Samba em Brasília’’. The first two were produced in the capital and the last one in Rio de Janeiro, in 1960. With that being said, it was important to reflect on the historicity of how the discourse was presented in those documents. For that, the opinions were examed in the light of the Speech Analysis of Michel Pêcheux and Althusser, alongside other reflections inside this theoretical-methodological field. The histography about Brasília was also of extreme importance for the understanding of the conjecture in which the language of the opinions is inserted. The aspiration of this analysis was to identify the role of the candango cinema in the construction of the city’s imaginary and its relation to the State, through the opinions of censorship. (shrink)

In this paper I defend Max Weber's concept of political legitimacy as a standard for the moral evaluation of states. On this view, a state is legitimate when its subjects regard it as having a valid claim to exercise power and authority. Weber’s analysis of legitimacy is often assumed to be merely descriptive, but I argue that Weberian legitimacy has moral significance because it indicates that political stability has been secured on the basis of civic alignment. Stability on this basis (...) enables all the goods of peaceful cooperation with minimal state violence and intimidation, thereby guarding against alienation and tyranny. Furthermore, I argue, since Weberian legitimacy is empirically measurable in terms that avoid controversial value judgments, its adoption would bridge a longstanding divide between philosophers and social scientists. (shrink)

I introduce the symposium on Anjan Chakravartty’s Scientific Ontology by summarizing the book’s main claims. In my commentary, I first challenge Chakravartty’s claim that naturalized metaphysics cannot be indexed to science simpliciter. Second, I argue that there are objective truths regarding what conduces to particular epistemic aims, and that Chakravartty is therefore too permissive regarding epistemic stances and their resultant ontologies. Third, I argue that it is unclear what stops epistemic stances from having unlimited influence. Finally, I argue that Chakravartty’s (...) epistemic stance voluntarism is inadequately motivated and lacks empirical support for its psychological content. (shrink)

There is a robust body of research that examines problems women with criminal‐legal system involvement face, the support they need, how they get it, from whom, and how they use it. Rarely do we pause to consider what resources such women already have, the support they give, or what those experiences teach us about how to support them. In this study, my purpose was to reflect on the phenomenon of giving as experienced by women who have few material resources and (...) whose lives have been disrupted by repeat incarcerations. I analyzed four lived experience descriptions of giving from interviews conducted in 2016–2017 with 10 women who had significant histories of criminal‐legal system involvement, unstable housing, and little or no income. Using concepts from hermeneutic phenomenology and the practice of phenomenological study described by Max Van Manen, I analyzed giving wholistically, selectively, and in detail. I discerned that the women's experience of giving was relationally structured as exchange, with both past and future aspects. In selective and detailed analysis, themes of “taking in” and “being there” and a gem or essential feature of automaticity/personhood presented themselves. Women found meaning, value, and a sense of belonging in giving to others even when they struggled to meet their own needs. The findings suggest potential directions for nursing practice, research, and advocacy, including work to recognize, build on, and remunerate women's affiliative care‐giving and support—while also putting pressure on community health and social services delivery systems to better serve those in need. (shrink)

The present study investigated relations between personality and values on the one hand and compensation preferences on the other. We hypothesized that HEXACO Honesty-Humility and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values predict preference for higher relative compensation level and that HEXACO Openness to Experience and openness to change versus conservation values predict preference for compensation variability. Furthermore, we expected perceived utility of money and risk aversion to mediate the respective relations. The hypotheses were tested using a sample of 2,210 employees from a (...) large international organization. The results provided support for the direct and mediated relations between personality and values on the one hand and preferences for compensation variability and level on the other. (shrink)

PRIVATIZAÇÃO DAS ÁGUAS: UMA ANÁLISE NA PERSPECTIVA LATINO AMERICANA A PARTIR DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS FUNDAMENTAIS.

Claims of progress in our ethical or moral beliefs and practices—as well as claims to ethical or moral regression—are commonplace in American social and political conversation. Often, such commentary involves a lamenting of the decline of “traditional” values in contemporary society or alternatively a rejoicing in the ways that we appear to have overcome prior prejudicial values. In this dissertation, I am concerned with the notions of progress and improvement that underlie such commonsense judgments. At a minimum, ethical progress requires (...) the idea that some values or practices are better than others and hence that replacing some beliefs or practices with others can be a genuine improvement. Taking inspiration from the ethical works of John Dewey, I sketch an account of evaluative progress that conceives of this sort of improvement in ethical beliefs or practices in terms of problem-resolving. On my view, resolving a problem involves both offering an adequate conception of the problem and finding a problem-solution which lives up to the world and to the values we reflectively endorse. On my account, resolving problems is not simply a matter of finding the best means to a fixed end; rather, I conceive of problem-resolving as a dynamic process in which ends themselves are typically in flux. The sort of “dynamic deliberation” I have in mind, then, goes beyond mere instrumental reasoning, by not only allowing us to recognize conflicts between ends or means to ends, but in also providing a way to rationally revise or reject ends. Finally, in order for this sort of problem-resolving to make good on the idea of genuine improvement or progress, the process of solving problems must involve some sense of objectivity. I offer a procedural account of objectivity that emphasizes the role of the world in constraining our inquiry, involves a naturalization of ethical epistemology, and allows for objective inquiry to be undertaken by an individual or a community. (shrink)

This article examines the development, activities and effectiveness of women’s NGOs in 10 Central and Eastern European countries. It begins by examining the establishment of women’s organizations post-1989, identifying their structure, funding difficulties and the issues on which they focus. It also addresses the tension between the work of NGOs and the wider development of civil society. The article goes on to explore how negative perceptions of feminism have hindered efforts to develop a unified and coherent agenda among women’s NGOs. (...) Finally, it analyses how public attitudes have affected relations between women’s organizations and women politicians as well as how competition and fragmentation have complicated relationships between NGOs. (shrink)

Affects have often been characterised as a hindrance to the rational thinker. In this paper I reconsider the role of affects in philosophical inquiry in the light of recent work on the emotions which suggests that affects play a role in framing the ways in which we experience the world. I explore affects as motivators and curtailers of philosophical inquiry drawing on work by Hookway. I suggest that although Hookway is correct in identifying the motivating role of affects, his account (...) is too sparse and does not take account of the wider role which affects play in philosophical inquiry. Drawing on phenomenological psychiatry I argue that affects play a pre-reflective role which enables successful ‘explicit’ reasoning to begin. Building on this I use accounts by de Sousa on emotions as salience providers and William James on the role of temperament in philosophical inquiry to supplement and fill the gaps left by Hookway’s account. Here I draw a distinction between sporadic and sustained affects, claiming that a full account of the role of affects in philosophy ought to take account of both. This paper ultimately provides an examination of how the recent work on emotions affects the way we may view philosophical inquiry. (shrink)