This review presents a state of the art in artificial intelligence applied to urban planning and particularly to land-use predictions. In this review, different articles after the year 2016 are analyzed mostly focusing on those that are not mentioned in earlier publications. Most of the articles analyzed used a combination of Markov chains and cellular automata to predict the growth of urban areas and metropolitan regions. We noticed that most of these simulations were applied in various areas of China. An (...) analysis of the publication of articles in the area over time is included. (shrink)

La siguiente reseña explora el libro más reciente del historiador Tomás Pérez Vejo, el cual se adentra en un relato de nación construido a partir de los acervos pictóricos. El imaginario visual que se construye desde las exposiciones y críticas de pintura marca un ciclo crístico de nacimientos, tormentos, liberaciones y resurrecciones, cuyo interés primordial es su poderosa impronta en la historia oficial nacional y en cómo esta permea aún el presente.

This paper presents some difficulties for Timothy Williamson's epistemicist view of vagueness and for an argument he gives in its defense. First, I claim that the argument, which uses the notion of an "omniscient speaker", is question-begging. Next, I argue that some presumably true scientific hypotheses, which postulate certain relations between everyday vague predicates and scientific predicates, make the central theses of epistemicism highly implausible. Finally, I show that the "margin for error principles" used by Williamson to explain away the (...) kind of ignorance conjectured by epistemicism lead to new sorites-like arguments with unacceptable conclusions. (shrink)

Nos proponemos analizar el pensamiento de Álvaro García Linera, uno de los intelectuales más interesantes en lengua española, y que mayor difusión está teniendo en los últimos tiempos. Para ello, tomaremos como punto de referencia cuatro de las ideas centrales dentro de la filosofía del boliviano: proyecto político, estado, hegemonía y dominación (analizando las dos últimas de manera conjunta). Comenzaremos exponiendo las influencias de García Linera, así como las peculiaridades de sus planteamientos, para centrarnos posteriormente en la etapa de su (...) producción intelectual más reciente, y acabar con una conclusión que mencionará también algunas de las críticas más importantes que se han vertido hacia el antiguo vicepresidente. (shrink)

This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress (...) the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden. (shrink)

The article proposes a theory on which quotations are unstructured, context-insensitive devices that get their referents fixed by a conventional wholesale reference-fixing rule. First, it criticizes recent theories for postulating eccentric or anomalous facts concerning the contribution of noun phrases to truth conditions, the semantics of demonstratives or general syntax. Second, it notes that the proposed theory is not subject to some familiar objections to classical theories, nor to eccentricity or anomalousness complaints. Third, it shows that recent arguments that quotations (...) must be structured or equivalent with demonstrative phrases, or that they cannot get semantic referents via linguistic conventions, are mistaken. It is noted that semantic unstructuredness, non-demonstrativeness, and conventional wholesale reference-fixing exploiting pre-referential term-referent relations are combined in some naturally occurring classes of terms. (shrink)

This paper examines from a historical perspective Tarski's 1936 essay, "On the concept of logical consequence." I focus on two main aims. The primary aim is to show how Tarski's definition of logical consequence satisfies two desiderata he himself sets forth for it: (1) it must declare logically correct certain formalizations of the -rule and (2) it must allow for variation of the individual domain in the test for logical consequence. My arguments provide a refutation of some interpreters of Tarski, (...) and notably John Etchemendy, who have claimed that his definition does not satisfy those desiderata. A secondary aim of the paper is to offer some basic elements for an understanding of Tarski's definition in the historical logico-philosophical context in which it was proposed. Such historical understanding provides useful insights on Tarski's informal ideas on logical consequence and their internal cohesion. (shrink)

There have been several different and even opposed conceptions of the problem of logical constants, i.e. of the requirements that a good theory of logical constants ought to satisfy. This paper is in the first place a survey of these conceptions and a critique of the theories they have given rise to. A second aim of the paper is to sketch some ideas about what a good theory would look like. A third aim is to draw from these ideas and (...) from the preceding survey the conclusion that most conceptions of the problem of logical constants involve requirements of a philosophically demanding nature which are probably not satisfiable by any minimally adequate theory. (shrink)

According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.

This article examines the relation between the dialectical program established in Plato’s Republic and the practice of dialectic in other dialogues, such as the Parmenides and the Theaetetus. The author argues against those scholars who have sustained a sharp distinction between an intuitive conception of knowledge and the discursive practices characteristic of Plato’s concept of dialectic. In his view, Plato has been overinterpreted from the modern perspective of the distinction between intuitive and discursive forms of knowledge. As a consequence, this (...) article also examines the relation between the dialectical practices displayed in the Parmenides and the Theaetetus and the anhypothetical condition that Plato attributes to “the principle of everything” in the Republic. (shrink)

I offer a new objectivist theory of the contents of color language and color experience, intended especially as an account of what normal intersubjective variation in color perception and classification shows about those contents. First I explain an abstract account of the contents of color and other gradable adjectives; on the account, these contents are certain objective properties constituted in part by contextually intended standards of application, which are in turn values in the dimensions of variation associated with the adjectives. (...) Then I propose an explanation of normal variations in linguistic color classification; these are postulated to be effects of differences in intended standards for the color adjectives appearing in the classifying predicates. Next, I consider a potential objection to this explanation, based on the suggestion that contextual content should be more accessible than the explanation predicts. In reply, I point out that contextual content is occasionally opaque to unsophisticated reflection. Finally, I present a companion account of the contents of color experiences on which these represent an object as lying on certain salient intervals in the chromatic dimensions, and I show how the account accommodates intersubjective variation in color perception. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson’s potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so-called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. A certain fallacy of equivocation seems to (...) underlie his justification for both kinds of principles. Besides, the margin for error principles of the first kind can be used in the derivation of unacceptable consequences, while the margin for error principles of the second kind can be shown to be compatible with the falsity of epistemicism, under a number of assumptions acceptable to the epistemicist. (shrink)

In this article, I claim that the treatise known as περὶ πνεύματος/De spiritu (481a-486b Bekker) was written by Theophrastus. My overall argument unfolds in three stages: first, I briefly summarize the arguments against De spiritu’s authenticity in Aristotle’s corpus. This summary will lead to my first argument which uses the very same reasons that prove the non-Aristotelian authorship to claim the Theophrastean one, in particular linguistic aspects of the text (§2). Next, I will focus on chronology, by discussing the mention (...) of one Aristogenes to show that Aristotle could not have known this individual (§3). Third and last, I will examine various aspects of the work that demonstrate stylistic and argumentative connections (§4), as well as doctrinal affinities with the works of Theophrastus, although some have attributed it to Strato (§5). On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that the weight of the evidence makes On Breath a work by Theophrastus (or his circle) rather than one composed by Aristotle. (shrink)

Many issues in ethics arise in relation to the contexts in which psychologists work. However, most ethical decision-making models reproduce the way in which psychologists tend to approach ethics by focusing on ethical dilemmas and proposing a step-by-step response to deal with them. Although these models might be useful, their emphasis on reactive approaches and their lack of contextualization constitute significant limitations on their applicability. In this article, an approach to ethical decision making that highlights the importance of the context (...) in developing proactive strategies to solve ethical issues is proposed. This approach is further explained through its application to medical and rural settings. The implications of these suggestions to the training in ethics are finally discussed. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski‘s paper ’On the concept of logical consequence’ and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further claims that the argument he attributes to Tarski is fallacious. Some (...) of Etchemendy’s critics have granted him that Tarski did give an argument purporting to show that the defined notion possesses certain modal properties ; but they have claimed that Tarski’s argument was not a fallacious one. I will show that both Etchemendy and his critics are wrong; in the relevant passages, Tarski did not offer (nor did he intend to offer) an argument that the defined notion of logical consequence possesses any modal properties. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to point out that Davidsonian and Fregean theories of quotation do not accommodate certain facts about disquotation. A second aim is to dispel some errors of interpretation in a common Davidsonian reading of Tarski's claims about quotation. This allows a correct exegesis of Tarski's view, which is then seen not to be affected by the arguments usually adduced against the view wrongly attributed to Tarski. Finally, a Tarskian view is proposed of some problems (...) about quotation not addressed by Tarski. (shrink)

Since Darwin, Biology has been framed on the idea of evolution by natural selection, which has profoundly influenced the scientific and philosophical comprehension of biological phenomena and of our place in Nature. This book argues that contemporary biology should progress towards and revolve around an even more fundamental idea, that of autonomy. Biological autonomy describes living organisms as organised systems, which are able to self-produce and self-maintain as integrated entities, to establish their own goals and norms, and to promote the (...) conditions of their existence through their interactions with the environment. Topics covered in this book include organisation and biological emergence, organisms, agency, levels of autonomy, cognition, and a look at the historical dimension of autonomy. The current development of scientific investigations on autonomous organisation calls for a theoretical and philosophical analysis. This can contribute to the elaboration of an original understanding of life - including human life - on Earth, opening new perspectives and enabling fecund interactions with other existing theories and approaches. This book takes up the challenge. (shrink)

Is there a theoretically interesting notion that is a natural extension of the concept of rigidity to general terms? Such a notion ought to satisfy two Kripkean conditions. First, it must apply to typical general terms for natural kinds, stuffs, and phenomena, and fail to apply to most other general terms. Second, true 'identification sentences' (such as 'Cats are animals') containing general terms that the notion applies to must be necessary. I explore a natural extension of the notion of rigidity (...) to general terms, the notion of an essentialist predicate. I argue that, under natural assumptions, this notion satisfies the two Kripkean conditions. (shrink)

Contrary to what often seems to be the implicit belief, Tarski's 1933 version of the theorem on the indefinability of truth did not mention semantic notions, either defined or intuitive. I state this version in a somewhat modernized form and explain briefly the self-imposed mathematico-philosophical constraints that led Tarski to formulate it as he did. I also point out that close attention to its content suggests a refined view of the exact contrast between Tarski's achievement and Gödel's achievement in his (...) earlier discovery of another version of the result. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present the origins of the marxian criticism of politics. Finding its place between the years of 1842 and 1843, this criticism emerges from within a review of the hegelian philosophy and takes is first form as a philosophical criticism of politics. The criticism of politics developed by Marx was, thus, rigorously a philosophical undertaking, yet of a philosophy that took the world as its object and flowed outwardly, manifesting itself externally as a criticism (...) of the society of that time and a negation of the existing politics.O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar as origens da crítica marxiana da política. Encontrando seu lugar entre os anos de 1842 e 1843 essa crítica nasce no interior de uma revisão da filosofia hegeliana e assume uma primeira forma como crítica filosófica da política. A crítica da política desenvolvida por Marx era, assim, rigorosamente, um empreendimento filosófico, mas de uma filosofia que assumia o mundo como seu objeto e se vertia para fora de si própria manifestando-se externamente como uma crítica da sociedade da época e como uma negação da política existente. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to Marcus William Hunt’s argument that vegan parents have pro tanto reasons for not raising their children on a vegan diet because such a diet is potentially harmful to children’s physical and social well-being. In my rebuttal, first I show that in practice all vegan diets, with the exception of wacky diets, are beneficial to children’s well-being ; and that all animal-based diets are potentially unhealthful. Second, I show that vegan children are no more socially (...) outcast than any other group. In other words, veganism does not harm the lives of children. Having considered several studies, I show that the moral reasons that vegan parents may have for raising their children on a vegan diet significantly outweigh the reasons for raising their children on an animal-based diet. Thus, I conclude that parents have a moral obligation to raise their children on a vegan diet. (shrink)

Para elaborar sua filosofia civil, Thomas Hobbes preliminarmente se dedicou ao exame daquilo que constitui a república: o homem. Em sua análise da dinâmica afetivo-cognitiva humana, tecida a partir dos conceitos de sensação, imagem, linguagem e paixão, o conceito de imaginação é apresentado como um resíduo da experiência sensível no corpo. Como tal, uma imagem estará sujeita a se eclipsar sob a luz de imagens mais fortes ou mais recentes, que podem apagá-la da mente tomando o seu lugar. O ato (...) ou faculdade de imaginar, a imaginação — para Hobbes “sensação em declínio” —, é memória, que exprime no presente a sensação passada. Lançada ao futuro, a imagem mantém-se na expressão do medo ou da esperança, paixões que impelem aos homens serem credores de certo esquema de poder. A imaginação dá a forma da expectativa, que projeta passado e presente ao futuro, como uma profecia autorrealizável, garantido a estabilidade do poder e da riqueza. (shrink)

I argue that recent defenses of the view that in 1936 Tarski required all interpretations of a language to share one same domain of quantification are based on misinterpretations of Tarski’s texts. In particular, I rebut some criticisms of my earlier attack on the fixed-domain exegesis and I offer a more detailed report of the textual evidence on the issue than in my earlier work. I also offer new considerations on subsisting issues of interpretation concerning Tarski’s views on the logical (...) correctness of certain omega-arguments, on the Tarskian proof that Etchemendy took to be modal and fallacious, and on Tarski’s appeals to the “common concept of consequence”. (shrink)

Ethical veganism is the view that raising animals for food is an immoral practice that must be stopped because of the harm it causes to the animals, the environment, and our health. Carlo Alvaro argues the only way to stop that harm is to acquire the virtues that enable us to act justly and benevolently toward animals.

I postulate that the extension of a degree adjective is fixed by implicitly accepted non-analytic reference-fixing principles (“preconceptions”) that combine appeals to paradigmatic cases with generic principles designed to expand the extension of the adjective beyond the paradigmatic range. In regular occasions of use, the paradigm and generic preconceptions are jointly satisfied and determine the existence of an extension/anti-extension pair dividing the adjective’s comparison class into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses. Sorites paradoxical occasions of use are irregular occasions (...) of use in which the paradigm and generic preconceptions are not jointly satisfied. In them, the relevant degree adjective lacks an extension, and utterances of sentences containing it appearing in sorites arguments do not have truth conditions. I also postulate a probable psychology of paradigm intuitions, used in a psychological explanation of the preference for solutions of the sorites paradox on which paradigm preconceptions retain their intuitive truth-values. (shrink)

Some arguments against David Lewis’s modal realism seek to exploit apparent inconsistencies between it and anthropic reasoning. A recent argument, in particular, seeks to exploit an inconsistency between modal realism and typicality anthropic premises, premises common in the literature on physical multiverses, to the effect that observers who are like human observers in certain respects must be typical in the relevant multiverse. Here I argue that typicality premises are not applicable to the description of Lewis’s metaphysical multiverse, where the proportions (...) of metaphysically possible observers possessing the pertinent properties can be independently established by metaphysical reasoning. However, other kinds of reasonable anthropic premises can be seen to be consistent with and usable within modal realism. (shrink)

Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truthpreserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truthpreserving. But he did not offer the proof. The question arises (...) whether the usual modeltheoretic sense of validity and Tarski's 1936 sense are the same. I argue in this paper that they probably are not, and that the proof Tarski had in mind, although unusable to prove that model-theoretically valid arguments are truth-preserving, can be used to prove that arguments valid in Tarski's 1936 sense are truth-preserving. (shrink)

Nat Hansen builds a new argument for subjectivism about the semantics of color language, based on a potential kind of intersubjective disagreements about comparative color statements. In reply, I note that the disagreements of this kind are merely hypothetical, probably few if actual, and not evidently relevant as test cases for a semantic theory. Furthermore, even if they turned out to be actual and semantically relevant, they would be intuitively unusable by the subjectivist.

In the first part of this paper, I express doubts that Tarski and Carnap were guilty of some confusions about the relations between truth and meaning, attributed to them by Soames. In the second part, I consider Quine's Carrollian argument against conventionalism about logical truth, discussed only briefly and approvingly by Soames, and I explore the question whether some not obviously incorrect forms of conventionalism about logical truth, such as what I call "finitary conventionalism", are immune to Quine's argument.

Among the influential contributions of Alfred Tarski to logic and philosophy, and close in importance to his widely applied and discussed definition of truth, one finds his definition of logical consequence for formal languages. Like his definition of truth, Tarski's definition of logical consequence has been widely and fruitfully applied. Unlike the definition of truth, that of logical consequence has been rarely discussed philosophically. The main aim of this dissertation is to offer a thorough discussion of some philosophical issues arising (...) from the neglected definition. ;The point of departure is an interpretative reading of the relevant writings by Tarski. This reading yields historically interesting data that refute other recent readings. It also provides philosophical illumination, by clarifying how Tarski thought that his definition satisfied some pretheoretic desiderata. ;Next it is discussed whether Tarski's definition satisfies other pretheoretic desiderata, not stated by Tarski and in some cases not endorsed by him, but which are desiderata nonetheless from reasonable standpoints. These include the desiderata that all instances of logical consequence in Tarski's defined sense be instances of analytical implication, and that they be instances of valid implication. The conclusion of this part of the dissertation is that, under reasonable assumptions regarding the field of applicability of the definition and the concepts used in it, there are reasons to believe that these desiderata are met, and none to believe they are not. ;Finally, the problem of logical constants is examined. The concept of a "logical constant" is the only concept not taken from logic and mathematics that appears in Tarski's definition. The problem of logical constants is that of replacing the primitive 'logical constant' with a defined, better understood concept, and in a such a way that the resulting defined concept of logical consequence meets the previously discussed desiderata. The main conclusion of this part is that some attempts to do this replace the obscure with the more obscure, while other attempts that seem to be in the right spirit have shortcomings of their own. (shrink)

El artículo se propone elucidar la lectura deconstructiva que Derrida lleva a cabo de la filosofía de Marx y, más ampliamente, de los presupuestos metafísicos de la filosofía marxista. Espectros de Marx (1993) funciona como el punto de partida de un análisis histórico y conceptual que rastrea algunas de las principales hipótesis de este libro en publicaciones, entrevistas, cursos y seminarios fechados entre 1964 y 2004. La pregunta que sirve como hilo conductor de este trabajo es cómo interpretar filosófica y (...) políticamente la deconstrucción de la ontología marxista. (shrink)

Quotation marks are ambiguous, although the conventional rules that govern their different uses are similar in that they contain quantifications over quotable expressions. Pure uses are governed by a simple rule: by enclosing any expression within quotation marks one gets a singular term, the quotation, that stands for the enclosed expression. Impure uses are far less simple. In a series of uses the quotation marks conventionally indicate that (part of) the enclosed expression is a contextually appropriate version of expressions uttered (...) by some relevant agent. When the quotation marks have this meaning, it is tempting to think of them as contributing that indication to the truth-conditional content of the utterance. I adopt a cautious attitude towards this hypothesis, for the evidence in its favor is inconclusive. In other uses the quotation marks conventionally indicate that the enclosed expression should be used not “plainly” but in some broadly speaking “distanced” way, or that it is being so used by the utterer, and typically context makes clear the exact nature of the “distance” at stake. In these cases the quotation marks do not even appear to contribute that indication to the truth-conditional content of the utterance. (shrink)

Recent research in philosophy of science has shown that scientists rely on a plurality of strategies to develop successful explanations of different types of phenomena. In the case of biology, most of these strategies go far beyond the traditional and reductionistic models of scientific explanation that have proven so successful in the fundamental sciences. Concretely, in the last two decades, philosophers of science have discovered the existence of at least two different types of scientific explanation at work in the biological (...) sciences, namely: mechanistic and structural explanations. Despite the growing evidence about the radically different nature of these two types of explanation, no inquiry has been conducted to date to determine the ontological reasons that might underlie these differences, nor the way in which these types of explanations can be systematically related with each other. Here, we aim to cover this gap by connecting this plurality of research strategies with the existence of emergent levels of reality. We argue that the existence of these different—and apparently incompatible—explanatory strategies to account for biological phenomena derives from the existence of “ontological jumps” in nature, which generate different regimes of causation that in turn demand the development of different explanatory frameworks. We identify two of these strategies—mechanistic modelling and network modelling—and connect them to the existence of two ontological regimes of causation. Finally, we relate them with each other in a systematic way. In this vein, our paper provides an ontological justification for the plurality of explanatory strategies that we see in the life sciences. (shrink)

En las últimas décadas los especialistas de la filosofía cartesiana se han enfocado en indagar si la naturaleza de la duda metódica que el meditador instaura en la primera de las Meditaciones debe ser considerada como una preocupación sistemáticamente rigurosa o si, por el contrario, corresponde a un artificio que cumple un valor instrumental dentro del planteamiento que propone el autor, con la esperanza de que la respuesta a esta pregunta logre esclarecer el proceso que guía a las Meditaciones. Tanto (...) quienes sostienen que la duda metódica es fingida como quienes piensan que, en algún sentido, debe ser considerada rigurosamente, recurren a una distinción conceptual advertida por el propio Descartes para validar sus respectivas lecturas, a saber: la distinción entre certeza metafísica y certeza moral. En el presente artículo se postula que la interpretación más apropiada es la que sostienen quienes consideran que la duda metódica guarda cierto nivel genuino de rigurosidad. Para justificar nuestra adhesión se evaluará el rendimiento explicativo de cada interpretación, tanto para el orden de desarrollo planteado en la primera meditación como para la aproximación a otros problemas filosóficos planteados en las Meditaciones. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene por objetivo ofrecer un análisis del argumento técnico que habitualmente se esgrime para defender el sistema de capitalización individual chileno. Se mostrará que, tras la discursividad técnica, permanecen ocultos dos asuntos íntimamente conectados que buscaremos develar: la existencia de supuestos altamente idealizados y la relación entre financiarización de la economía, privatización de la seguridad social y precarización del mercado laboral. Se argumentará que ambos aspectos dificultan la aceptación del razonamiento y se mostrará la relevancia de transparentar aquello (...) que subyace a la técnica económica. (shrink)