The hollow peristasis at Segesta presents two interrelated problems. The question of how Greek temples were constructed, and whether the method generally used was applied to the structure at Segesta, depends to some extent for its answer upon the Segestans' motives for building. And the problem of motive is affected by considerations of architectural method. Neither problem appears to have been fully discussed in the light of the other. The result is that at the moment the prevailing views of either (...) problem stand quite unconnected. Thus while many scholars accept the structure as the sole surviving member of a projected scheme to build a complete temple, the theory is now widely held that it was meant to serve merely as a hellenizing decorative element round an Elymian shrine or open-air altar, and so, that the Segestans' interest in Greek temple-architecture was purely superficial. (shrink)

In this paper I contribute to the recovery of women in the history of philosophy by giving the first modern-day philosophical account of the ideas on aesthetics and ethics of Anna Jameson (1794–1860). Although Jameson was massive in her time, she wrote in a place and period, nineteenth-century Britain, and on an area, aesthetics, that the recovery effort has hardly reached yet. Throughout her work Jameson argued that aesthetics and ethics were very closely connected. Here I focus on how she (...) made that connection in her 1832 work _Characteristics of Women: Moral, Poetical, and Historical_. Looking at Shakespeare’s female characters, Jameson argued that they provide moral examples of various sorts: role models, warnings, or a mixture of the two. The characters only provide these examples because they are rounded, psychologically complete individuals who are therefore in a certain sense real. In addition, because they are complete, the characters are aesthetic wholes, and art-works in turn are aesthetic wholes just when they depict characters as aesthetic wholes. The consequence for Jameson is that art-works can only be aesthetically good – in virtue of being wholes – if they are also morally good – in presenting characters that serve as moral examples. Published on 2023-03-21 09:06:33. (shrink)

Three major aspects of G1 regulation acting at START in fission yeast are discussed in this review. Firstly, progression towards S phase in the mitotic cycle. This is controlled by the activation of transcription complexes at START which cause cell cycle‐dependent activation of genes required for DNA synthesis. The second aspect is the regulation of developmental fate occurring during G1. Passage through START appears to inhibit sexual differentiation because the meiotic and mitotic pathways are mutually exclusive. This is brought about (...) because the meiotic pathway is inhibited by the same gene functions that are required for S phase onset. Thirdly, distinct checkpoint, or dependency, controls operate both pre‐ and post‐START in the mitotic cycle to inhibit mitosis in the absence of replicated DNA, and also to limit rounds of DNA replication to one per cell cycle. (shrink)

Round to elongate microbodies associated with fossil vertebrate soft tissues were interpreted as microbial traces until 2008, when they were re‐described as remnant melanosomes – intracellular, pigment‐containing eukaryotic organelles. Since then, multiple claims for melanosome preservation and inferences of organismal color, behavior, and physiology have been advanced, based upon the shape and size of these microstructures. Here, we re‐examine evidence for ancient melanosomes in light of information reviewed in Vinther (2015), and literature regarding the preservation potential of microorganisms and (...) their exopolymeric secretions. We: (i) address statements in Vinther's recent (2015) review that are incorrect or which misrepresent published data; (ii) discuss the need for caution in interpreting “voids” and microbodies associated with degraded fossil soft tissues; (iii) present evidence that microorganisms are in many cases an equally parsimonious source for these “voids” as are remnant melanosomes; and (iv) suggest methods/criteria for differentiating melanosomes from microbial traces in the fossil record. (shrink)

Feminist standpoint theory has been marginal to mainstream philosophical analyses of science–indeed, it has been marginal to science studies generally–and it has had an uneasy reception among feminist theorists. Critics of standpoint theory have attributed to it untenable foundationalist assumptions about the social identities that can underpin an epistemically salient standpoint, and implausible claims about the epistemic privilege that should be accorded to those who occupy subdominant social locations. I disentangle what I take to be the promising core of feminist (...) standpoint theory from this conflicted history of debate. I argue that non-foundationalist, non-essentialist arguments can be given (and have been given) for attributing epistemic advantage (rather than privilege) to some social locations and standpoints. They presuppose a situated knowledge thesis, and posit contingent advantage relative to epistemic purpose. I illustrate these claims in terms of the epistemic advantages that accrue to a fictional character, from Neely’s novel Blanche on the Lam, who represents a type of standpoint invoked by diverse advocates of standpoint theory: that of a race, class, and gender disadvantaged “insider-outsider” who has no choice, given her social location, but to negotiate the world of the privileged while at the same time being grounded in a community whose marginal status generates a fundamentally different understanding of how the world works. (shrink)

Court cases involving sexual assault and police violence rely heavily on victim testimony. We consider what we call the “Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument (TUA)” according to which we should be skeptical about victim testimony because people are particularly liable to misremember traumatic events. The TUA is not obviously based in mere distrust of women, people of color, disabled people, poor people, etc. Rather, it seeks to justify skepticism on epistemic and empirical grounds. We consider how the TUA might appeal to the (...) psychology and neuroscience of memory for empirical support. However, we argue that neither support the TUA. (shrink)

According to ‘orthodox’ representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality (truth, accuracy, or satisfaction) conditions. Typically, philosophers who deny orthodox representationalism endorse some variety of anti-representationalism. But we argue that these haven’t always been, and needn’t continue to be, the only options. Philosophers including Descartes, Malebranche and Helmholtz appear to have rejected orthodox representationalism while nonetheless endorsing perceptual representations of a fundamentally practical kind not captured by orthodox representationalism. Moreover, we argue that the perceptual science called on by contemporary philosophers to (...) defend orthodox representationalism instead motivates a return to this older view, and we suggest that contemporary philosophers may conceptualize fundamentally practical perceptual representations as _‘de agendo’_ representations, a species of representation that has constitutive appropriateness rather than veridicality conditions. (shrink)

According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory ineliminability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate a different kind of representationalism.

ABSTRACTThe acquisition of a skill, or knowledge-how, on the one hand, and the acquisition of a piece of propositional knowledge on the other, appear to be different sorts of epistemic achievements. Does this difference lie in the nature of the knowledge involved, marking a joint between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge? Intellectualists say no: All knowledge is propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists say yes: Knowledge-how and propositional knowledge are different in kind. What resources or methods may we legitimately and fruitfully employ to adjudicate (...) this debate? What is the right way to show the nature of the knowledge knowers know? Here too there is disagreement. I defend the legitimacy of the anti-intellectualist appeal to cognitive neuroscientific findings against a recent claim that anti-intellectualists conflate the scientific categories of procedural and declarative knowledge with the mental kinds of skill and propositional knowledge, respectively. I... (shrink)

The book forms the first critical study of Jacques Rancière’s impact and contribution to contemporary theoreticaland interdisciplinary studies. It showcases the work of leading scholars infields such as political theory, history and aesthetic theory; each of whom areuniquely situated to engage with the novelty of Rancière’s thinking withintheir respective fields. Each of the essays provides aninvestigation into the critical stance Rancière takes towards hiscontemporaries, concentrating on the versatile application of his thought todiverse fields of study. The aim ofthis collection is (...) to use the critical interventions Rancière’s writing makeson current topics and themes as a way of offering new critical perspectives onhis thought. Wielding their individual expertise, each contributor assesses hisperspectives and positions on thinkers and topics of contemporary importance.The edition includes a new essay by Jacques Rancière, which charts thedifferent problems and motivations that have shaped his work. (shrink)

Intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and consequently that the knowledge involved in skill is propositional. In support of this view, the intentional action argument holds that since skills manifest in intentional action and since intentional action necessarily depends on propositional knowledge, skills necessarily depend on propositional knowledge. We challenge this argument, and suggest that instructive representations, as opposed to propositional attitudes, can better account for an agent’s reasons for action. While a propositional-causal theory of action, according (...) to which intentional action must be causally produced “in the right way” by an agent’s proposition-involving reasons, has long held sway, we draw on Elizabeth Anscombe’s insights offer a path toward an alternative theory of action. In so doing, we reject the implicitly Cartesian conception of knowledge at the core of the intentional action argument, while hanging on to the idea that mental states are representations of a certain kind. Our argument provides theoretical support for anti-intellectualism by equipping philosophers with an account of non-propositional, practical content. (shrink)

Sara Ruddick's Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace is both an anomaly and a product of the tradition associating maternal activities with peace. Ruddick argues that maternal work gives mothers distinct motives for rejecting war, unique abilities for nonviolent conflict resolution, and a critical perspective on military thinking. If she is correct, maternal thinking may provide the foundation for a feminist peace politics. My project is a critical account of maternal thinking as Ruddick unfolds it in her book. Ruddick's (...) argument has two central components: The theoretical development of maternal thinking, which she explains in terms of a "practicalist conception of truth" , and The case that maternal thinking can ground a feminist peace politics, based on Nancy Hartsock's version of feminist standpoint theory. ;Ruddick constructs mothering as a genderfree practice under the PCT to distinguish from earlier accounts of mothering. This is problematic for three reasons. First, it portrays mothers as autonomous, ahistorical, and acultural caretakers and ignores how other practices shape and contribute to maternal practice's definition. Second, Ruddick does not say enough about the identity of her mothers. She acknowledges racial and cultural differences, but does not explore the implications of her pluralism. Also, her genderfree account excludes any discussion of masculine and feminine styles of mothering. Third, the cross-practice critical power of MT is restricted by the practicalist view that "there is no truth by which all truths can be judged." I suggest Ruddick can overcome this confusion by distinguishing between internal and external goals of practices. I argue that a holistic view, which places maternal practice within a complex web of related practices, helps to eliminate the remaining problems with mothering under the PCT. ;Ruddick's move from a practicalist to a standpoint version of MT solves a critical problem for her. Feminist standpoint theorists typically argue that distinctions between men's and women's understandings of the world are rooted in the sexual division of labor; they maintain that "thinking from women's lives" makes available a privileged view on male supremacy. Ruddick draws on Hartsock's radical version of a feminist standpoint, which holds that both the sexual division of labor in women's subsistence activities and the intimate involvement of their bodies in "menstruation, coitus, pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation" have epistemological consequences. To show the superiority of feminist standpoint, she compares maternal and military "histories of the human flesh." The central role of this comparison in Ruddick's argument makes her position dangerously close to the essentialist arguments she desires to avoid. (shrink)

A highly original rereading of Kierkegaard through the concept of birthing, highlighting a speculative hypothesis about the nature of Being in Kierkegaard’s work.

In this article I consider whether Hegel is a naturalist or an anti-naturalist with respect to his philosophy of nature. I adopt a cluster-based approach to naturalism, on which positions are more or less naturalistic depending how many strands of the clusternaturalismthey exemplify. I focus on two strands: belief that philosophy is continuous with the empirical sciences, and disbelief in supernatural entities. I argue that Hegel regards philosophy of nature as distinct, but not wholly discontinuous, from empirical science and that (...) he believes in the reality of formal and final causes insofar as he is a realist about universal forms that interconnect to comprise a self-organizing whole. Nonetheless, for Hegel, natural particulars never fully realize these universal forms, so that empirical inquiry into these particulars and their efficient-causal interactions is always necessary. In these two respects, I conclude, Hegel's position sits in the middle of the naturalism/anti-naturalism spectrum. (shrink)

The August 2011 riots in England occasioned widespread condemnation from government and the media. Here, we apply the concepts of hypocrisy and affiliation to explore reactions to these riots. Initially acknowledging that politics necessitates a degree of hypocrisy, we note that some forms of hypocrisy are indefensible: they compromise integrity. With rioters condemned as thugs and members of a feral underclass, some reactions exemplified forms of corrosive hypocrisy that deflected attention away from economic, social and cultural problems. Moreover, such reactions (...) omitted to attend to the concept of [dis]affiliation amongst young rioters. Accordingly, we look to the role that education might play in re-affiliating those who do not feel they belong to, or have a sufficient stake in, society. Whilst our focus is on the riots in England, the exploration of hypocrisy and affiliation, and discussion of education for re-affiliation, transcends that national context. (shrink)

In this paper I address a tension in Samantha Vice’s claim that humility and silence offer effective moral responses to white shame in the wake of South African apartheid. Vice describes these twin virtues using inward-turning language of moral self-repair, but she also acknowledges that this ‘personal, inward directed project’ has relational dimensions. Her failure to explore the relational strand, however, leaves her description of white shame sounding solitary and penitent. -/- My response develops the missing relational dimensions of white (...) shame and humility arguing that this strand, once visible, complicates Vice’s project by (1) challenging her unitary and homogenous view of white identity, and (2) demonstrating the important role vulnerability plays in our understandings of white shame. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:As Vice Chair of Clinical Services of Psychiatry at the University of Colorado, I choose to work where clinical services need most attention. As a woman, I want to show up where we can be seen and show up in the best possible way. Just as COVID began, I found myself doing clinical shifts in the newly created psychiatry emergency room. I became part of a front-line team, where “I” became “We,” facing an unknown enemy. Not only was my work (...) life upended, but my personal life was too, as I rushed to help my daughter, a medical student, care for her son when his day-care closed. My commentary highlights the increased burden experienced by women during this time, an example of systemic bias in medicine. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Merabet and Hudry discuss models explaining the functional evolution of fushi tarazu (ftz) from an ancestral homeotic to a pair‐rule segmentation gene in Drosophila. As most of the experimental work underlying these models comes from our research, we wish to reply to Merabet and Hudry providing an explanation of the experimental approaches and logical framework underlying them. We review experimental data that support our hypotheses and discuss misconceptions in the literature. We emphasize that the change in (...) ftz function required changes in both expression pattern and protein function and review the evidence that these functional changes involved a switch in cofactor‐interaction motifs during arthropod radiations. While agreeing with Merabet and Hudry that protein context likely contributes to Ftz function, we argue that until supporting evidence for alternative mechanisms is obtained, the role of cofactor‐interaction motifs in driving a functional switch remains compelling. (shrink)

My project is to explain why the question ‘How does it feel to be a white problem?’ cannot be answered in the fluttering grammar of white talk. The whiteness of white talk lies not only in its having emerged from white mouths, but also in its evasiveness—in its attempt to suppress fear and anxiety, and its consequential [if unintended] reinscription and legitimation of racist oppression. I White talk is designed, indeed scripted, for the purposes of evading, rejecting, and remaining ignorant (...) about the injustices that flow from whiteness and its attendant privileges. I want to suggest a new point of entry—a way to flip the script, so to speak. -/- I begin with some observations about the basic advantages and disadvantages of using white talk as a route into the white problem. My account develops an expanded version of Alice MacIntyre’s definition of white talk that is attentive to the racialized bodily scripts that accompany white talk. I argue that white talk persists because it has an enduring and powerful moral, ontological, and epistemic pay off for white folks. I explore each payoff with an eye towards clarifying how white talk functions to maintain the illusion that we are invulnerable beings. Next, I pause to reply to the popular objection that this particular critique of white talk silences white people in conversations on race. If we cannot address the question ‘how does it feel to be a white problem’ in the fluttering grammar of white talk, then how shall we begin? In closing, I suggest that we might reduce fluttering by replacing white talk with a discourse of vulnerability, where vulnerability is defined not as weakness, but as a condition for potential. I offer some brief guidelines for how we might start this conversation. (shrink)

Jim Jarmusch's Dead Man is a modern myth. Like many ancient myths it seems to have the structure of a rite of passage analysed by van Gennep into three stages: separation, marginal existence and reintegration. Separation is precipitated by a traumatic event and the marginal state is characterized by extraordinary experiences and feats. However, Jarmusch's tale does not quite fit the ancient initiation pattern since the last stage, reintegration, is at least prima facie missing. This already undermines the social function (...) of initiation and warps the significance of the myth. The modern town of ?Machine?, where the marginal existence of Blake is sealed, looms in the background of the story of his final journey to the world of spirits whence he had come. But Blake cannot quite embrace the story in which he plays the protagonist. The story is cobbled together by the Native American called ?Nobody.? Blake sceptically resigns himself to his fate. Why does Blake do this? Jarmusch manipulates the generic structure of the initiation tale in order to say something culturally significant about the possibility of living a meaningful life in a world dominated by the machine. In other words, he tells a modern myth. What does his tale say? (shrink)

This article puts forward a philosophical interpretation of Bettina von Arnim's epistolary bookDie Günderode, in the following stages. First I situate von Arnim's work in relation to women's participation in early German Romanticism and idealism. The ideal ofSymphilosophie, which was integral to Romantic epistemology, created possibilities for women to participate in philosophical discussion, albeit not on equal terms with men. This suggested that perhapsSymphilosophiebetween women could be more equal and reciprocal. However, interpreters have considered theSym-in Günderrode and von Arnim'sSymphilosophiemore than (...) the-philosophie, whereas here I foregroundDie Günderode's rich philosophical content. I trace the stages in the unfolding dialogue between Günderrode and von Arnim and identify von Arnim's philosophical standpoint as it emerges from this dialogue. For Günderrode, finite beings are attracted together and can only fully unite by dying and superseding their boundaries. This feeds into a gigantic cosmic process through which the earth spiritualizes itself, progressively transcending its own materiality. Von Arnim likewise thinks that all finite beings are dynamically interconnected within the earth's creative process. But, unlike Günderrode, von Arnim thinks that finite beings can realize their interconnectedness within life without needing to die, which means in turn that material nature can rise into successive levels of spirit without its materiality having to be superseded. This metaphysical difference orchestrates many other philosophical disagreements between the two women. I then conclude that on balance, and with significant qualifications,Die Günderodeembodies a successfulSymphilosophiebetween women, but that von Arnim is simultaneously pointing out the fragility ofSymphilosophie. The more independence dialogue partners have, the more liable they are to move away in new directions and abandon or outgrow the conversation, just as Günderrode turns away from von Arnim by the end of the book. (shrink)

Universities and colleges have become hotbeds of scandal. For these institutions to reclaim their respected status, the ethical foundations of higher education must be examined and rebuilt. This book gathers faculty and administrators from some of the most respected schools to examines the current situation and pave the way for change.

The US food regime maintained some degree of stability in terms of prices and production levels for commodities in the world economy. This food regime, resting on supply management policy, began to falter in the early 1970s. In the late-1980s and 1990s, notable changes occurred in the world economy regarding agriculture as the food regime became more market-oriented. The end of the twentieth century saw the breakdown of many institutions, organizations, and international agreements that had tried to stabilize prices and (...) production from 1945 to 1975. This paper examines this period of change and explores the effects on five commodities: cocoa, coffee, corn, soybeans, and wheat. These commodities offer important points of comparison. First, while cocoa, coffee, and wheat were regulated by international organizations and agreements, corn and soybeans were not. Second, the US dominated the international corn and soybean markets, but the cocoa, coffee, and wheat markets were much more competitive. And third, corn, soybeans, and wheat were commodities largely produced in the core of the world economy, while cocoa and coffee were produced in the periphery. Thus, comparing the effect of the fall of the US food regime on these commodities reveals the importance of previous regulation, the level of market competition, and geographic origin in the world economy. (shrink)

This article provides an introduction to Irigaray's work, dealing with the questions of cultural difference that a culture of sexual difference raises. It sets out the main elements of Irigaray's thought and work without assuming any prior knowledge of it. It discusses her status as a French thinker and her reception in Anglo-academia, emphasizing the influence of Heidegger and Hegel on her thinking, and questioning her categorization as a `French feminist' and exponent of `feminine writing'. It highlights Irigaray's work in (...) the 1990s, particularly its more political aspects. Her proposals for a democracy based on the man-woman couple are discussed, as is her relation to Italian feminism and her work within the European Parliament to bring about a sexed definition of citizenship. Irigaray is presented as a political philosopher of change who is concerned with a future of justice for everyone. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary volume of contributed essays focuses on issues of gender in the British novel of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly Hardy and Trollope. Approaching the topic from a variety of backgrounds the contributors reinvigorate the law-and-literature movement by displaying a range of ways in which literature and law can illuminate one another, and in which the conversation between them can illuminate deeper human issues with which both disciplines are concerned.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mother-Daughter Relations and the Maternal in Irigaray and ChodorowAlison StoneGod the Father and Jesus the Son; Abraham and Isaac; Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus; Zeus and Dionysus; Hamlet and his father; Fyodor Karamazov and his three sons—representations of and fantasies about father-son relationships are central to Western culture and philosophy. Within philosophy, one thinks of Hegel’s conception of the dialectic in terms of the divine trinity, Nietzsche’s preoccupation with Christ (...) and Dionysus, or Kierkegaard’s meditations on Abraham’s near-murder of Isaac. In contrast, mother-daughter relationships have been shrouded in near-universal silence—much more so than representations of either mothers and sons (Oedipus and Jocasta; Mary and Jesus) or fathers and daughters (Agamemnon and Iphigenia; Lear and Cordelia). Female and feminist theorists, writers, and artists have done much to bring mother-daughter relationships into representation and to reimagine the maternal beyond its traditional subservience to father-son dynasties.Amongst continental feminists, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva have, of course, made major contributions to this task. Within Anglophone feminism, too, feminist psychoanalytic thinkers have sought to rectify Freud’s overemphasis on the paternal and on father-son relations. Nancy Chodorow’s important work in this area paints a portrait of contemporary mother-daughter relations which seems, at first sight, strikingly similar to Irigaray’s. Both thinkers suggest that mothers and their infant daughters experience a unique level of mutual identification. But under patriarchy—specifically, given exclusively female childrearing for Chodorow and given the absence of any symbolization of female subjectivity for Irigaray—daughters are forced to turn to the father [End Page 45] to achieve any psychical independence from their mothers. The independence that daughters thus attain coexists with ongoing psychical identification with their mothers, so that women oscillate endlessly between separation from and mergence with their mothers. If the dominant template for father-son relations involves violent rivalry followed by guilt-ridden father-worship as the cement of fraternal society, as Freud described in Totem and Taboo (Freud 2001), the template for mother-daughter relations involves hostile separation constantly undone by ongoing fusion. This difference in templates maps the social-symbolic difference between the paternal position of power/authority/law and the maternal position of powerlessness/silence/body.However, the manifest similarities between Irigaray’s and Chodorow’s pictures are embedded in deep theoretical differences. The details of their descriptions of mother-daughter relations differ, and they give different explanations for why these relations follow a logic of separation and fusion: female mothering for Chodorow, the paternal symbolic order for Irigaray. They make different proposals for how to change these relations: shared parenting for Chodorow versus symbolic transformation for Irigaray. They hold conflicting conceptions of the self and of language, reflecting their heterogeneous psychoanalytic backgrounds in Anglo-American object relations versus French Lacanianism and poststructuralism. These deep differences raise questions about whether Chodorow and Irigaray are discussing mother-daughter relations in the same sense at all.Bringing Irigaray and Chodorow together across their different intellectual contexts, this article compares and partially synthesizes their visions of the maternal and of mother-daughter relations. By integrating their perspectives, we can move beyond the “impasse” between Lacanian and object-relations feminisms that dominated psychoanalytic feminist debates in the 1980s and 1990s (Brennan 1991)—debates that have crucially shaped continental feminists’ orientation towards questions of sexual difference, language and representation, and the embodied psyche.The impasse in question has at least two strands. First, for object-relations feminists such as Chodorow, our pre-Oedipal relations with our mothers shape us so that we acquire “core” selves with a fairly stable gender. This approach elevates the mother in importance (compared to classical psychoanalysis with its emphasis on the father), but it loses sight of psychic and gender instability. This can make Chodorow’s views seem rather dated given the impact of Judith Butler’s work and her emphasis on the unstable, shifting nature of gender. Lacanian feminists such as Jacquelyn Rose (Rose 1986) reemphasize psychic instability, but they do so by stressing that the subject is split between paternal language and the pre-Oedipal maternal realm, which means that these theorists also... (shrink)

Volume 27, Issue 4, October 2019, Page 597-608.

The most popular uniting theme in feminist peace literature grounds women's peace work in mothering. I argue if maternal arguments do not address the variety of relationships different races and classes of mothers have to institutional violence and/or the military, then the resulting peace politics can only draw incomplete conclusions about the relationships between maternal work/thinking and peace. To illustrate this I compare two models of mothering: Sara Ruddick's decription of "maternal practice" and Patricia Hill Collins's account of racial-ethnic women's (...) "motherwork.". (shrink)