Reseña de: Filosofía, educación y sociedad global compilado por Manuel Bernales Alvarado y Marcelo Lobosco, Buenos Aires, Asociación Olimpíada Argentina de Filosofía, UNESCO Montevideo, Ediciones del Signo, 2005, 163 págs.

This report by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage addresses how countries can make fair progress towards the goal of universal coverage. It explains the relevant tradeoffs between different desirable ends and offers guidance on how to make these tradeoffs.

La cobertura universal de salud está en el centro de la acción actual para fortalecer los sistemas de salud y mejorar el nivel y la distribución de la salud y los servicios de salud. Este documento es el informe fi nal del Grupo Consultivo de la OMS sobre la Equidad y Cobertura Universal de Salud. Aquí se abordan los temas clave de la justicia (fairness) y la equidad que surgen en el camino hacia la cobertura universal de salud. Por lo (...) tanto, el informe es pertinente para cada agente que infl uye en ese camino y en particular para los gobiernos, ya que se encargan de supervisar y guiar el progreso hacia la cobertura universal de salud. (shrink)

This report from the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage offers advice on how to make progress fairly towards universal health coverage.

The fact that philosophy is systematic—that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected—was a commonplace among nineteenth century idealists, then neglected by analytic philosophers throughout much of the twentieth century, and has now finally started to get some renewed attention. But other than calling attention to the fact, few philosophers have tried to say what it consists in, or what its implications are. -/- I argue that the systematicity of philosophy has disastrous epistemological implications. In particular, it implies philosophical skepticism: philosophers are (...) rationally prohibited from believing any philosophical thesis. The argument goes by way of a new principle that connects inquiry with what is rational to believe. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between my argument and other, more well-trodden arguments for philosophical skepticism. (shrink)

This title was first published in 2002. This collection of essays aims to present a wide range of interpretations of central themes in Spinoza's philosophy. Philosophical interpretations of Spinoza divide into three general categories. The first sets Spinoza within what is taken to be his historical context. Special emphasis is laid here on aspects of his teaching that seem to bear the influence of Spinoza's own education (and self-education), either through concepts assimilated into his own thinking, or those he undertook (...) to refute and displace. A second interpretative approach uses analytical tools in an attempt to reconstruct Spinozistic issues and theories critically. Finally, there are philosophers who explore Spinoza's texts in their own terms, attempting to present a coherent picture of one or more aspects of Spinoza's teaching. Given the broad span of issues with which Spinoza deals, the latter is often the most difficult track to follow. The 25 articles in this collection exemplify these three attitudes to Spinoza interpretation, though most avail themselves of more than one. In making the selection the editors preferred studies that treat their subject as a viable, endurable philosophical issue, whether the writer accepts Spinoza's presentation or highlights his difficulties. On each issue the articles critically analyze the texts, rather than simply portraying the Spinozistic ideas they express. (shrink)

This paper studies the relationship between organizational ethical climate and the forms of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), including in-role and extra-role behaviors, and examines the mediating effect of employee loyalty. A sample of employees from a traditional Hong Kong-based company was used as a study group. The purpose of this study was to examine the causes and implications of how various ethical work climates affect employee performance. Based on a model proposed by Victor and Cullen, ethical climate is arranged from (...) lower levels to higher levels. The results suggest that lower levels of ethical climate (instrumentality and independence), characterizing a weak relational contract between employee and employer, are associated with negative extra-role behavior. In contrast, higher levels of ethical climate (caring and law-and-code), symbolic of a strong relational contract at work, are associated with positive extra-role behavior. Moreover, normative commitment mediated a positive relationship between caring and identification with the company, whereas attitudinal loyalty mediated the negative relationship between independence and altruism. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

I explore the idea of language reaching its limits by distinguishing two kinds of limits language may have: The first are “Boundaries” which lie on the edges of language, and distinguish what makes sense from what does not. These, I claim, are suitable in making theoretical generalizations. The second are “Contours,” which lie within language, and allow for contrasting and comparing meanings and shades of meanings that we capture in language. These are more suitable for characterizations of particulars, and for (...) literary use. I claim that failure to draw this distinction is responsible for confusions in Sabina Lovibond’s and Richard Rorty’s views of moral thought and language. (shrink)

This article explores Ruth’s theology of resilience amidst vulnerability: a resilience rooted in ḥesed. Ḥesed is a powerful social force that could address current issues for those both in privileged positions and in vulnerable situations. A re-reading of Ruth offers modern theologians and serious students of the Bible pathways towards building resilience amidst vulnerability, and in caring for those in vulnerable positions. The text at hand offers a pathway to be true to one’s core values and character, even amidst desperate (...) situations. In Ruth resilience is developed by caring for others, identifying with a particular faith community, and taking initiatives while maintaining integrity. The narrative unveils a sustainable life of resilience that happens when one’s private and public life is lived congruently to each other. This article also reads Ruth’s narrative through a lens of a minority foreign woman that uses feminist and post-colonial approaches while looking at Ruth through a hermeneutic of trust. First, the author identifies her assumptions and considerations. Secondly, the article examines resilience as rooted in one’s identity and explores ḥesed under cultural and spiritual frameworks, within the narrative of Ruth and Naomi’s road scene from Moab to Bethlehem. Lastly, it examines resilience as rooted in ḥesed, within the narrative of the threshing floor scene encounter between Ruth and Boaz. The road and threshing floor scenes are decisive moments for Ruth. Her words and actions in each instance reveal her resilience: her strength of mind, emotion, and spirit, in spite of her vulnerability. (shrink)

Equality is a key concept in our moral and political vocabulary. There is wide agreement on its instrumental value and its favourable impact on many aspects of society, but less certainty over whether it has a non-instrumental or intrinsic value that can be demonstrated. In this project, Shlomi Segall explores and defends the view that it does. He argues that the value of equality is not reducible to a concern we might have for the worse off, or to ensuring that (...) individuals do not fall into poverty and destitution; instead he claims that undeserved inequalities, wherever and whenever we might find them, are bad in themselves. Assessing the strength of competing accounts, such as sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, he brings together for the first time discussions of the moral value of equality with luck- or responsibility-sensitive accounts of distributive justice. His book will interest readers in political and moral philosophy. (shrink)

The logical fatalist holds that the past truth of future tense propositions is incompatible with libertarian freedom. The theological fatalist holds that the combination of God’s past beliefs with His essential omniscience is incompatible with libertarian freedom. There is an ongoing dispute over the relation between these two kinds of fatalism: some philosophers believe that the problems are equivalent while others believe that the theological problem is more difficult. We offer a diagnosis of this dispute showing that one’s view of (...) the modal status of God’s existence and God’s rdation to free creatures should determine one’s position on the relation between the two fatalisms. (shrink)

The field of bioethics is calling for a new generation of scholars equipped with the normative, empirical, and practical knowledge and expertise to prioritize equity concerns largely underrepresent...

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S39-S41, March‐April 2022.

Proposals for health care cost containment emphasize high-value care as a way to control spending without compromising quality. When used in this context, ‘value’ refers to outcomes in relation to cost. To determine where health spending yields the most value, it is necessary to compare the benefits provided by different treatments. While many studies focus narrowly on health gains in assessing value, the notion of benefit is sometimes broadened to include overall quality of life. This paper explores the implications of (...) using subjective quality of life measures for value assessment. This approach is claimed to be more respectful of patients and better capture the perspectival nature of quality of life. Even if this is correct, though, subjective measurement also raises challenging issues of interpersonal comparability when used to study health outcomes. Because such measures do not readily distinguish benefits due to medical interventions from benefits due to personal or other factors, they are not easily applied to the assessment of treatment value. I argue that when the outcome of interest in value assessment is broadened to include quality of life, the cost side of these measures should also be broadened. I show how one philosophical theory of well-being, Jason Raibley’s “agential flourishing” theory, can be adapted for use in quality of life research to better fit the needs and aims of value assessment in health care. Finally, I briefly note some implications of this argument for debates about fairness in health care allocations. (shrink)

Why were luminaries of European philosophy like Bergson, Cassirer, Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Camus and Sartre, even Marx systematically excluded from the North Atlantic canon of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Why did Anglo-American university philosophy departments for the most part lump together the philosophical schools to which many of these thinkers belonged --Phenomenology, Existentialism, Structuralism, Constructivism, Deconstruction, and Postmodernism -- as Continental Philosophy. All were then dismissed as belonging more in literature and psychology departments than philosophy proper. That same (...) worldview categorized Americans Emerson and Thoreau as well as Spaniards Ortega y Gassett and Unamuno (along with Montaigne and Isaiah Berlin) as essayists, not philosophers. French Existentialists Sartre and Camus? They clearly belonged in the literature departments (just ask the Nobel committee!). Freud’s theory of the superego? Excluded from epistemology and relegated to the psychology department to keep company with Koehler’s Gestalt Psychology and Husserl’s Phenomenology. Most likely because his reductionism bottomed out at the scale of transactions on material production, Karl Marx too was shunted into the political science and economics departments, where Marcuse, Lacan, Gramsci, and Althusser would keep him company a few years later. Comte’s ideas were safely ensconced in a new discipline, sociology, with an even newer subdiscipline, sociology of science, carved out a few years later for Robert Merton and Bruno Latour. More recently, the rest of the philosophical lot (Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, and Foucault, to name the most prominent) were likewise dismissed along with Whitehead’s Process philosophy, and for the same reason: they were thought to belong more to psychology or sociology than philosophy proper Why? The monograph argues that the dismissals can be explained in terms of a generalized rejection of relations of interdependence and the context-dependent constraints that generate such mutualism. (shrink)

Mathematician. Philosopher. World traveler. Pythagoras was an intelligent and curious scholar and teacher. While he¿s best-known for the Pythagorean theorem, he shared ideas about numbers, animals, and many other areas of knowledge with his students. Since none of his writings were left behind, it¿s not always easy for historians to know what¿s true about Pythagoras and what may be legendary. What does seem apparent is that he was a vegetarian but not a trendy dresser. Some people saw him as godlike. (...) Others felt he made false claims about things. No matter what, Pythagoras¿s curiosity and willingness to grapple with complex issues have helped further the knowledge of mathematics and philosophy for thousands of years. (shrink)

La lectura de todo libro, de entrada, crea expectativas en el lector. Hay libros que consiguen despertar el interés a sabiendas de que han sido publicados gracias a la confluencia de diversos factores que prometen algo novedoso y de calidad. Este es el caso de la obra que nos ocupa, publicada por un Instituto que trabaja incansablemente por los Derechos Humanos, y que ha tenido a bien reconocer la obra y el compromiso humano de Raphael Lemkin, la persona que dio (...) su vida por dar nombre y luchar contra el infame delito del genocidio. A su vez, la edición corre a cargo de Donna–Lee Frieze, una profesora de la Universidad de Deakin, editora de la edición original en lengua inglesa de Totally Unoficial. The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin y del profesor de Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Alfonso X el Sabio de Madrid, impecable traductor y editor de esta obra en español Por su parte, el prólogo de esta Autobiografía ha salido de la pluma de un Académico de la RAE, Antonio Muñoz Molina y lleva por título: «El dueño de una sola palabra». (shrink)

Las perspectivas poscoloniales han generado una diversidad de reacciones por parte de especialistas en África al sur del Sáhara. Han existido esfuerzos, fundamentalmente en el ámbito de los estudios culturales, por reivindicar e incorporar a africanos y africanas entre los referentes fundamentales de la corriente. Pero también se han expresado rechazos, y formulado abiertas críticas a la misma en torno a su ahistoricidad, su apoliticismo o sus excesos discursivos. Este texto recoge los intentos de los primeros y sistematiza los argumentos (...) de los segundos, y mantiene que las principales contribuciones de los estudios africanos a la comprensión de nuestro mundo se han generado al margen del afán por consolidar una escuela poscolonial africana. (shrink)

En este artículo, se analizan las desiguales condiciones de habitabilidad que ofrecen las viviendas en la gran región metropolitana de Ciudad de México, las cuales inciden en la forma como la población enfrenta el distanciamiento social impuesto por el Covid-19. En particular, se consideran tres procesos que caracterizan a estas zonas metropolitanas: una nueva arquitectura espacial, la amplificación de las desigualdades urbanas y los dos patrones de gobernanza local que coexisten conflictivamente. Estos procesos llevan a que amplios sectores populares vivan (...) en condiciones de precariedad habitacional y tengan muchas dificultades para cumplir con las principales medidas de protección frente al contagio del virus. (shrink)

A sequel to a successful 1999 book from an author well known for her cutting edge work on dynamic systems theory.

Utilitarians are said to be indifferent between interpersonal and intrapersonal transfers. In doing so, they fail to register the separateness of persons. This ‘separateness of persons’ objection has been traditionally used against utilitarianism, but more recently against prioritarianism. In this paper, I examine how yet another distributive view, namely sufficientarianism, fares in this respect. Sufficientarians famously believe that while inequality as such does not matter, what does matter is that all individuals meet some adequate threshold. It is often taken for (...) granted that sufficientarianism does not violate the separateness of persons. In this paper, I seek to show that that is not the case. The main challenge, however, proves to be formulating an accurate understanding of what the separateness of persons precisely means. I offer several interpretations and argue that sufficientarianism, surprisingly, violates them all. Sufficientarianism, just like utilitarianism does not respect the separateness of persons. (shrink)

This article characterizes aspect-perception as a distinct form of judgment in Kant's sense: a distinct way in which the mind contacts world and applies concepts. First, aspect-perception involves a mode of thinking about things apart from any established routine of conceptualizing them. It is thus a form of concept application that is essentially reflection about language. Second, this mode of reflection has an experiential, sometimes perceptual, element: in aspect-perception, that is, we experience meanings—bodies of norms. Third, aspect-perception can be “preparatory”: (...) it may help us to decide what linguistic norms to develop and how to conceptualize—make the world thinkable. Fourth, the article discusses the forms of justification for which aspect-perception allows—the necessity and normativity involved in employing this form of judgment. (shrink)

Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And because we cannot know of any one of them (...) that it isn't true, we cannot know any substantive metaphysical thesis at all. My paper makes this argument much more precise and defends each of the premises in detail. (shrink)

Opening -- The structure of man -- The middle ground -- Conversations -- The ten oxherding pictures.

This study examines what Social Studies teachers can learn from Gay-Straight Alliances (GSA) in terms of the content that club members examine and the queer pedagogical approaches they employ. Findings reveal how educators can borrow students’ queer teaching and learning practices, and integrate their insights within Social Studies classrooms to disrupt (hetero/cis)normativity. Data derived from semi-structured interviews with five Canadian high school GSA members were analyzed using the queer theoretical and pedagogical insights of Britzman (1995. Educational Theory, 45(2), 151–165 ; (...) 1998. Lost subjects, contested objects: towards a psychoanalytic inquiry of learning. New York, NY: State University of New York Press), Sedgwick (1990/2008. Epistemology of the closet. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.), and Shlasko (2005 Equity & Excellence in Education, 38(2), 123–134). Three prominent themes emerged: (1) GSAs’ queer educative role compensated for a void in LGBTQ curricular content. Although LGBTQ-inclusive content was evident within some Social Studies, English, and French classes participants called for their teachers to integrate more content that disrupts homophobia and transphobia; (2) the personal characteristics of GSA members provide insight into how Social Studies educators can mirror students’ drive to learn about and challenge preconceived and (hetero/cis)normative assumptions/beliefs; and (3) GSA's queer educational approaches differed from the (hetero/cis)normative teaching and learning practices of their educators. GSA members engaged in student-led dialogue, and spearheaded queer initiatives and events to contest anti-LGBTQ attitudes at their schools. It is argued that when educators follow the lead of GSA members they may enhance their approach to and engagement with LGBTQ topics, and expand the queer pedagogical potential of the Social Studies. (shrink)

In recent work, Norman Daniels extends the application of Rawls's principle of ‘fair equality of opportunity’ from health care to health proper. Crucial to that account is the view that health care, and now also health, is special. Daniels also claims that a rival theory of distributive justice, namely luck egalitarianism (or ‘equal opportunity for welfare’), cannot provide an adequate account of justice in health and health care. He argues that the application of that theory to health policy would result (...) in an account that is, in a sense, too narrow, for it denies treatment to imprudent patients (e.g. lung cancer patients who smoked). In a different sense, Daniels argues, luck egalitarian health policy would be too wide: it arguably tells us to treat individuals for such brute-luck conditions as shyness, stupidity, ugliness, and having the ‘wrong’ skin colour. I seek to advance three claims in response to Daniels's revised theory, and in defence of a luck egalitarian view of health policy. First, I question Daniels's assertion regarding the specialness of health. While he is right to abandon his insistence on the specialness of health care, it is doubtful that health proper can be depicted as special. Second, I try and meet Daniels's objections to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarian health policy escapes being too narrow for it does not in fact require denying basic care to imprudent patients. As for it being allegedly too wide, I try to show that it is not, after all, counterintuitive to rid individuals of unfortunate and disadvantageous biological traits (say, a disadvantageous skin colour). And third, I question whether Daniels's own Rawlsian account is in fact wide enough. I argue that fair equality of opportunity fails to justify some standard medical procedures that many health systems do already practice. (shrink)

Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity, but recently there has been a sea-change in thinking about that concept. Shlomi Segall brings together these developments and offers a new account of 'radical equality of opportunity', which removes all obstacles (to one's opportunity-set) that lie outside one's control.

This paper aims to extend the dialogue between social intuitionism and the genetic perspectives of moral psychology, pointing out the contributions and limitations of each one to advance in the understanding of the formulation and transformation of moral judgments. An examination of how the relations between the subject and the object of knowledge have been approached in the light of the contributions of constructivist psychological tradition has been proposed. The relations between emotions, reasoning, and the specific social situation in which (...) such cognitive processes take place it will be examined, taking up particularly the contributions of cultural psychology. By critically examining the three theoretical perspectives, it was possible to point out their contributions and limitations, as well as to appreciate the undoubted contribution of social intuitionism to moral psychology, its limitations and to elucidate the theses that shape this theory. It is precisely by examining the relationships, convergences and profound differences between social intuitionism, constructivism, and cultural psychology in their approaches to moral judgment that it is possible to contribute to promoting their revision and elucidation. (shrink)

I defend the view that aspect-perception – seeing as a duck, or a face as courageous – typically involves concept-application. Seemingly obvious, this is contested by Avner Baz: ‘aspects may not aptly be identified with, or in terms of, empirical concepts […]’ – In opposition, I claim that they may. Indeed, in many cases there is no other way to identify aspects.I review the development in Baz’s view, from his early criticism of Stephen Mulhall, to his recent recruitment of the (...) discussion about aspects to criticize John McDowell’s conceptualism, and his claim: ‘the dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects reveals our power to perceive unity and sense that are not aptly thought of as conceptual’.I accept many of Baz’s claims against Mulhall and McDowell. However, his arguments go too far. Aspect-perception, I argue, typically involves a special kind of application of concepts. Denying that is denying much of what is important and of interest in the phenomena of aspect. The world revealed in aspect-perception is not the conceptualized world of science; but it is also not the pre-conceptualized ‘phenomenal’ world which, according to Baz, we normally have in perception, and which he wants to bring into view. (shrink)

This paper reports on an action research project about organizational change by a regional food bank in New York State’s southern tier. While the project team initially included a sociologist, food bank leadership and staff, it expanded to involve participants in food access programs and area college students. This paper combines findings from qualitative research about the food bank with findings generated through a collaborative inquiry about a ten-year process of organizational change. We ask how a regional food bank can (...) change its approach to address root causes of hunger. Acknowledging that narrow, pragmatic definitions of hunger promote charitable responses, our collaboration is grounded in structural understandings of poverty that refuse to blame the poor or treat poverty as an accident. Decades-long economic restructuring, deindustrialization and a rise in the service economy have resulted in growing inequality and long-term demand for “emergency” food in New York State. We outline critiques by scholars and practitioners of the emergency food regime. Description and analysis of the organizational change efforts of the Food Bank of the Southern Tier combine discourse analysis, collaborative inquiry, interviews, and participant observation. Discourse analysis of the agency’s strategic plans documents changes in aspirations, exposure to new epistemic communities and repertoires of actions. Interviews with participants evidence impacts of the organization’s advocacy and education programs on people with lived experience in poverty. Through a participatory process, we developed a collaborative chronology of phases of organizational change. Collaborative analysis of organizational changes demonstrates new definitions of the problem, a shift in service focus, changing outcomes and increased funding for advocacy. While recognizing substantial constraints, this project contributes to evidence that food banks may shift their discourse and practices beyond charity. (shrink)

What do we aim at when we teach general introductory courses in moral philosophy? What should we aim at? In particular, should we focus on practice or theory? Should we make the study of ethics easy for the students, or should we alternatively aim at making the hardness of ethics attractive to them? This review discusses four recently published textbooks in ethics designed for beginners’ level courses. The books are different in organization and emphases. In each case, I have given (...) a short overview of the book’s contents, its aims and methods. I have also made some assessment about the usefulness of each: the philosophical territory it covers, the philosophical approach it puts forward, and the amount of preparation-work it leaves with the teacher. My overview thus gives the necessary information, and creates for the teacher the occasion for reflecting on—leaves the teacher with the task of deciding—what and how they want to teach. (shrink)

Anscombe criticism of Kant on Self-Legislation.

Interpreters today often take Kant’s practical philosophy to share some of the basic insights of Aristotle’s. Such, for instance, is the main tone of Christine Korsgaard’s reading. I make a case for a different, non-Aristotelian, reading of Kant’s moral philosophy. In particular, I distinguish between two senses of self-legislation: Aristotelian and Kantian. Aristotelian self-legislation is a general project we are involved in as humans, and in which we determine the organizing principle of our practical life. Every action of ours takes (...) part in this project of self-determination, and the project is thus part of the principle of every action. As opposed to that, not all actions are acts of Kantian self-legislation. To legislate for ourselves is to be involved in an internal drama of legislation. It is to be bound to respect moral duties by a force that is akin to a force of nature, and is yet internal. Moral normativity is thus separated from practical normativity in general. (shrink)

We highlight the deep ecology movement, inspired on ecological knowledge but mainly on the life-style of the ecological and biological field-worker. Its creator, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, stresses that human and no human beings have, at least, one kind of right in common: namely the ‘right’ to express its own nature, to live and blossom. This idea shows the inspiration from perseverare in suo esse, from Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics. But beyond this Spinozan influence, the striving for expression of one’s (...) own nature is interpreted from the perspective of present evolutionism and endosymbiosis. Even though, scientific knowledge, if necessary, is considered limited. Thus, this movement should be regarded as ecophilosophical rather than ecological, as a kind of sophia orwisdom. In turn, many supporters of conservation biology (following Michael Soulé) associate their science with ecosophy, not encouraging the dichotomy fact/value. Conservation biology axioms such as: evolution in valuable, organism’s diversity is good, premature extinction of species populations is negative, etc., have been inspired on the deep ecology movement. The consideration of the terms biodiversity, evolution or biosphere as thick ethical concepts (following Hillary Putnam), shows this integration of the descriptive and the normative. (shrink)