Contours and barriers: What is it to draw the limits of moral language?

Philosophy 84 (4):549-570 (2009)
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Abstract

I explore the idea of language reaching its limits by distinguishing two kinds of limits language may have: The first are “Boundaries” which lie on the edges of language, and distinguish what makes sense from what does not. These, I claim, are suitable in making theoretical generalizations. The second are “Contours,” which lie within language, and allow for contrasting and comparing meanings and shades of meanings that we capture in language. These are more suitable for characterizations of particulars, and for literary use. I claim that failure to draw this distinction is responsible for confusions in Sabina Lovibond’s and Richard Rorty’s views of moral thought and language.

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2009-10-02

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Reshef Agam-Segal
Virginia Military Institute

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References found in this work

Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-50.
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - The Personalist Forum 5 (2):149-152.
Losing your concepts.Cora Diamond - 1988 - Ethics 98 (2):255-277.
Introductory essay : Communal agreement and objectivity.Christopher M. Leich & Steven H. Holtzman - 1981 - In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. Boston: Routledge.
On euthanasia: Blindspots in the argument from mercy.Sarah Bachelard - 2002 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):131–140.

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