Compatibilists about free will maintain that free will is compatible with determinism, and incompatibilists disagree. Incompatibilist believers in free will have been challenged to solve a problem that luck poses for them—the problem of present luck. This article articulates that challenge and then explores a novel compatibilist view recently proposed by Christian List. It is argued that List’s view, unlike standard compatibilist views, faces a very similar problem about luck.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In Immunity, Alfred Tauber sets forth a new theory of immunology that rejects the common principle of self and non-self, and the immune system's role as a protector of the self from external threats. Rather than serving to defend an independent entity, he argues, immunity participates in a large, complex eco-system of porous and flexible boundaries. Tauber's new approach to immunology necessitates a new biology in which symbiosis is the rule, not the exception.

Der Laie spricht manchmal die Ansicht aus, die Mathematik ware heutzutage schon eine tote Wissenschaft: nachdem sie einen ungemein hohen Grad der Entwicklung erreicht hat, sei sie in ihrer steinernen Vollkommenheit erstarrt. Dies ist ein vollig irriges Bild der Situation: nur wenige Wissenschaftsgebiete befinden sich heute in der Phase einer solch intensiven Entwicklung wie die Mathematik. Diese Entwicklung ist dabei auBerordentlich vie1seitig: die Mathematik erweitert ihre Domane nach allen moglichen Richtungen, sie wachst in die Rohe, in die Weite und in (...) die Tiefe. Sie wachst in die Rohe, da auf dem Boden ihrer alten Theorien, denen eine jahrhundert-, ja sogar jahrtausend- lange Entwicklung zugrunde liegt, immer wieder neue Prob1eme auftauchen, immer scharfere und vollkommenere Resultate er- zielt werden; in die Weite, da ihre Methoden andere Wissen- schaftszweige durchdringen, ihr Untersuchungsbereich immer umfangreichere Gebiete von Erscheinungen umfaBt und immer neue Theorien in den groBen Kreis mathematischer Disziplinen einbezogen werden; und schlieBlich in die Tiefe, da ihre Grund- lagen immer mehr gefestigt, die bei ihrem Aufbau angewandten Methoden immer vollkommener werden und ihre Prinzipien an Dauerhaftigkeit gewinnen. In dem vorliegenden Buch wiinschte ich dem Leser, der fiir die gegenwartige Mathematik Interesse aufweist, aber ihr fern- steht, mindestens einen ganz allgemeinen Begriff von dieser dritten Entwicklungslinie der Mathematik, d. i. von ihrer Ent- wicklung in die Tiefe, zu geben. (shrink)

This book was originally conceived as a sequel to bertrand russell's "a history of western philosophy". it takes up where russell left off. rather than examining a wide number of philosophers superficially, this book deals with a small number of philosophers in depth. the book examines american pragmatists, the analytic movement, phenomenology and existentialism. it examines both critical and speculative philosophy. (staff).

In this, the Aquinas Lecture for 1980, Alvin Plantinga proposes (p. 9) to discuss three questions: (i) does God have a nature? (ii) if so, is there a conflict between God's sovereignty and his having a nature? and (iii) how is God related to properties (including his nature), propositions, states of affairs, numbers, and other denizens of the Platonic realm of necessarily existing abstract entities? Plantinga's conclusions are straightforward: (i) God has a nature distinct from himself; (ii) the claim that (...) God has a nature, while not incompatible with the belief that God is sovereign, does conflict with a common though mistaken intuition about God's sovereignty; and (iii) in whatever way we are ultimately to conceive of God's relation to his own nature and to other necessarily existing abstract entities, it is at any rate clear that God has no control over either their existence or their essential characteristics. (shrink)

What limits should there be on the areas of life that are governed by market forces? For many years, no one seriously defended the buying and selling votes for political elections. In recent years, however, this situation has changed, with a number of authors defending the permissibility of vote markets. One popular objection to such markets is that they would lead to a tyranny of wealth, where the poor are politically dominated by the rich. In a recent paper, Taylor :313–328, (...) 2017. doi: 10.1007/s11158-016-9327-0) has argued that this objection can be avoided if certain restrictions are placed on vote markets. In this paper we will argue that this attempt to rebut an argument against vote markets is unsuccessful. Either vote markets secure their purported benefits but then they inevitably lead to a tyranny of wealth, or they are restricted so heavily that they lack the features that have been claimed to make vote markets attractive in the first place. Using Taylor’s proposal as a test case, we make the more general claim that vote markets cannot avoid the tyranny of wealth objection and bring about their supposed benefits at the same time. (shrink)

Globalization is a part of modern life. Sharing a common set of professional nursing values is critical in this global environment. The purpose of this research was to examine the professional values of nursing students from two distinct cultural perspectives. Nurse educators in Taiwan partnered with nurse educators in the United States to compare professional values of their respective graduating nursing students. The American Nurses Association Code of Ethics served as the philosophical framework for this examination. The convenience sample comprised (...) 94 Taiwanese students and 168 US students. Both groups reported high scores on an overall measure of values. They did differ substantially on the relative importance of individual items related to advocacy, competence, education, self-evaluation, professional advancement, and professional associations. Global implications for the collaborative practice of nurses from different cultures working together can be improved by first recognizing and then attending to these differences in value priorities. (shrink)

The arguments against the existence of Īśvara that are advanced by Śālikanātha’s Prakaraṇapañcikā are quite peculiar and cryptic, due to both the idiosyncratic nature and opaque style of Śālikanātha’s writing. This has contributed to the difficulty in identifying the actual nature of the views that Śālikanātha opposes. This article analyses the framework by which Śālikanātha interrogates the concept of Īśvara and discusses the possible sources of his arguments. It shows, contrary to the conclusions of past scholarship, that considerations of both (...) Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sources are certainly apparent in Śālikanātha’s formulation of his critique of Īśvara. This paper also discusses the possible sources from which Śālikanātha derives the notion of Īśvara as the creator of the Vedas. It concludes that rather than any Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika sources, it is most likely that Śālikanātha derives this notion of Īśvara from Kumārila, who potentially has Yoga opponent in mind. (shrink)

" Recourir à la métaphysique est comme lancer une allumette dans une poudrière. Cela fait exploser la scène entière. C'est exactement ce que font les philosophes de la science quand ils sont conduits dans une impasse et convaincus d'incohérence. Aussitôt ils font entrer de force l'esprit et parlent d'entités qui sont selon le cas dans l'esprit ou hors de l'esprit. Pour la philosophie naturelle, toute chose perçue est dans la nature. Nous ne pouvons pas faire le difficile. Pour nous, la (...) lueur rouge du crépuscule est autant une partie de la nature que les molécules ou les ondes électriques par lesquelles les hommes de science expliqueraient le phénomène. Il appartient à la philosophie naturelle d'analyser comment les éléments variés de la nature sont liés ". Whitehead. (shrink)

How can we make sense of God’s moral goodness if God cannot be subject to moral obligations? This question is troubling for divine command theorists, as if we cannot make sense of God’s moral goodness then it seems hard to see how God’s commands could be morally good. Alston argues that the concept of supererogation solves this problem. If we accept the existence of acts that are morally good but not morally required then we should accept that there is no (...) need for an act to fulfill a moral obligation in order for it to be morally good. This view has been criticized by both Stump and Lombardi :313–326, 2005), who claim that it is impossible for an agent who has no obligations to perform acts of supererogation. Young attempts to defend Alston’s solution by offering a new analysis of supererogation. In this paper I will argue first that Young fails to provide an adequate response to Lombardi’s objection. I will then provide my own defence of Alston’s proposal. (shrink)

Originally published under title: Dictionary of eighteenth-century German philosophers: London: Continuum, 2010.

despair.” In effect, he is telling us, “There is no God or divine providence, and there is no hope for eternal life. So there!” And even though today’s..

A leading figure in sixteenth-century Iberian scholasticism, Molina was one of the most controversial thinkers in the history of Catholic thought. In keeping with the strongly libertarian account of human free choice that marked the early Jesuit theologians, Molina held that God's causal influence on free human acts does not by its intrinsic nature uniquely determine what those acts will be or whether they will be good or evil. Because of this, Molina asserted against his Dominican rivals that God's comprehensive (...) providential plan for the created world and infallible foreknowledge of future contingents do not derive just from the combination of his antecedent "natural" knowledge of metaphysically necessary truths and his "free" knowledge of the causal influence - both natural (general concurrence) and supernatural (grace) - by which he wills to cooperate with free human acts. Rather, in addition to God's natural knowledge, Molina posited a distinct kind of antecedent divine knowledge, dubbed "middle" knowledge, by which God knows pre-volitionally, i.e., prior to any free decree of his own will regarding contingent beings, how any possible rational creature would in fact freely choose to act in any possible circumstances in which it had the power to act freely. And on this basis Molina proceeded to forge his controversial reconciliation of free choice with the Catholic doctrines of grace, divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination. In addition to his work in dogmatic theology, Molina was also an accomplished moral and political philosopher who wrote extensive and empirically well-informed tracts on political authority, slavery, war, and economics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Myth Of ReadingAlfred LouchThe Myth of Theory, by William Righter; x 7 224 pp. Cambridge University Press, 1994, $49.95.IThe critics mill about in the welcome break between interminable and terminal conference sessions, eager to see and be seen. William Righter wanders about, listening and telling anyone who stays to listen what he hears, musing all the while on what each of them has done, or tried to do, (...) or failed to do. One hopes for a dénouement—something, perhaps, like the tableau at the end of The Inspector General: critics frozen in typical and typically ludicrous attitudes. Alas, the prospective tone of ironic detachment is not sustained. Righter is too close to his perambulating colleagues; he shares too many of their academic reflexes to keep the requisite distance. If there is a tableau at the end, the reader must imagine it, and place Righter along with the rest, caught in (may we call them?) Gallosaxon attitudes.It seems to be an important conference. Everyone’s milling about. One wonders, do they have anything else to do? Here’s Derrida, de Man, Barthes, Hillis Miller, Booth, Bersani, Lyotard, Poulet, and Todorov. The remarks of one seem to flow seamlessly into the allegedly counter-claims of the next. It’s all amazingly friendly. Of course there’s that rude fellow Eagleton, who says: “Methodologically speaking, literary criticism is a non-subject.... If literary theory is a kind of meta-criticism [End Page 218], a critical reflection on criticism, then it follows that it too is a non-subject” (p. 210). But don’t mind him. For criticism is about literature and literature exists. So these promenading and posturing critics can’t be mere phantasms of brains fevered by much reading, or anyway by references to many books.Curious that the first critic available for a chat is Leavis. A bit of nostalgia that. I suppose most English critics of sufficient vintage recall their Leavis-inflicted wounds the way they might reminisce about the bit of shrapnel they got in the way of on Omaha Beach and bear now with pride. But my, how temperate he appears here! How on earth can he come across so bland? Remember him saying: Snow does not begin to exist as a novelist. Now that was Leavis. You may have disagreed with him, you may have thought him silly, but you certainly understood him, as one comprehends a slap in the face. But here: “... Leavis takes on vividly and personally the total responsibility of consciousness for a wide area of assumptions that obviously trail their implications behind them” (p. 4). This is an extraordinarily spongy way of saying that Leavis knew he was right, and if you didn’t agree with him, a humiliating place in a cheap and tawdry consumer society awaited you.Still, it is a lucky thing that Leavis appears first on the scene. As a critic to help frame more exactly the kinds of questions about literary theory and practice Righter wants to ask, Leavis offers an easily recognizable starting point. He somehow manages to take the high moral ground. You want to ask, how is it that Elijah’s mantle descends on him? Does he compel assent only by the stridency of his words, and not by an ostensibly rational way in which his critical judgments hang together?A pity if this should be so, because the point of Leavisite diatribes, though not their excesses, is close to the hearts of passionate readers. Such readers (ourselves perhaps) read judgmentally. A book bowls us over. Describing the experience we are tempted to draw invidious comparisons to other books, which perhaps move us less, or not at all. We say of minor things that come our way: it’s not Shakespeare (or D. H. Lawrence). If you agree the project comes to an end. If you don’t, you want to know what it is that bowls us over, and why we don’t find those qualities in your favorite author. You want an explanation of a particular kind, not one that adduces new facts, but one that allows us to appreciate how the case at dispute... (shrink)