In this paper, we reflect on the disciplinary contours of contemporary sociology, and social science more generally, in the age of ‘big and broad’ social data. Our aim is to suggest how sociology and social sciences may respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by this ‘data deluge’ in ways that are innovative yet sensitive to the social and ethical life of data and methods. We begin by reviewing relevant contemporary methodological debates and consider how they relate to the emergence (...) of big and broad social data as a product, reflexive artefact and organizational feature of emerging global digital society. We then explore the challenges and opportunities afforded to social science through the widespread adoption of a new generation of distributed, digital technologies and the gathering momentum of the open data movement, grounding our observations in the work of the Collaborative Online Social Media ObServatory project. In conclusion, we argue that these challenges and opportunities motivate a renewed interest in the programme for a ‘public sociology’, characterized by the co-production of social scientific knowledge involving a broad range of actors and publics. (shrink)

This publication forms a basis for the interdisciplinary development of a certification system for artificial intelligence. In view of the rapid development of artificial intelligence with disruptive and lasting consequences for the economy, society, and everyday life, it highlights the resulting challenges that can be tackled only through interdisciplinary dialogue between IT, law, philosophy, and ethics. As a result of this interdisciplinary exchange, it also defines six AI-specific audit areas for trustworthy use of artificial intelligence. They comprise fairness, transparency, autonomy (...) and control, data protection as well as security and reliability while addressing ethical and legal requirements. The latter are further substantiated with the aim of operationalizability. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Publikation dient als Grundlage für die interdisziplinäre Entwicklung einer Zertifizierung von Künstlicher Intelligenz. Angesichts der rasanten Entwicklung von Künstlicher Intelligenz mit disruptiven und nachhaltigen Folgen für Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Alltagsleben verdeutlicht sie, dass sich die hieraus ergebenden Herausforderungen nur im interdisziplinären Dialog von Informatik, Rechtswissenschaften, Philosophie und Ethik bewältigen lassen. Als Ergebnis dieses interdisziplinären Austauschs definiert sie zudem sechs KI-spezifische Handlungsfelder für den vertrauensvollen Einsatz von Künstlicher Intelligenz: Sie umfassen Fairness, Transparenz, Autonomie und Kontrolle, Datenschutz sowie Sicherheit und (...) Verlässlichkeit und adressieren dabei ethische und rechtliche Anforderungen. Letztere werden mit dem Ziel der Operationalisierbarkeit weiter konkretisiert. (shrink)

This paper offers a new account of how structural rationality, or coherence, is normative. The central challenge to the normativity of coherence – which I term the problem of “making space” for the normativity of coherence – is this: if considerations of coherence matter normatively, it is not clear how we ought to take account of them in our deliberation. Coherence considerations don’t seem to show up in reasoning about what to believe, intend, desire, hope, fear, and so on; moreover, (...) they seem awkward to take account of alongside more “substantive” considerations about the merits of such attitudes. I aim here to solve this problem, and in so doing to offer the aforementioned new account of how coherence is normative. On the view I defend, which I call the Reasons-to-Structure-Deliberation model, considerations of coherence constitute reasons for structuring deliberation in certain ways: more particularly, to treat incoherent combinations of attitudes as off-limits, and so to focus one’s deliberation on choosing between the coherent combinations. (shrink)

It's often said that it is impossible to respond to non-evidential considerations in belief-formation, at least not directly and consciously. Many philosophers think that this provides grounds for accepting a normative thesis: typically, some kind of evidentialism about reasons for belief, or what one ought to believe. Some also think it supports thinking that evidentialist norms are constitutive of belief. There are a variety of ways in which one might try to support such theses by appeal to the impossibility-claim. In (...) this paper, I put pressure on these various attempts by raising a simple yet overlooked problem for them. In brief, the problem is that it isn't true that one cannot (directly and consciously) respond, in belief-formation to considerations that don't actually constitute (good) evidence for the proposition under consideration; what is true, at most, is that one cannot (directly and consciously) respond, in belief-formation to considerations that one oneself takes to be evidentially irrelevant to that proposition. While this point is obvious once stated, its significance hasn't been appreciated, or so I'll argue. Once we take full account of it, the standard arguments from the impossibility-claim to evidentialism don't go through. (shrink)

Comment on Brogaard's Seeing and Saying (OUP 2018).

Indifferent lies have been proposed as a counterexample to the claim that lying requires an intention to deceive. In indifferent lies, the speaker says something she believes to be false (in a trut...

This chapter develops a contextualist account of normative language, focusing on broadly normative readings of modal verbs. The account draws on a more general framework for implementing a contextualist semantics and pragmatics, Discourse Contextualism. The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the discourse properties of normative language from a contextualist interpretation of an independently motivated formal semantics, along with principles of interpretation and conversation. In using normative language, interlocutors can exploit their grammatical and world knowledge, and general pragmatic reasoning (...) skills, to manage an evolving system of norms. Discourse Contextualism provides a perspicuous framework for further philosophical theorizing about the nature of normativity, normative language, and normative judgment. Delineating these issues can help refine our understanding of the space of overall theories and motivate more fruitful ways the dialectics may proceed. Discourse Contextualism provides a linguistic basis for a more comprehensive theory of normativity and normative discourse and practice. (shrink)

In response to our critics, we clarify and defend key ideas in the report Open and Inclusive: Fair Processes for Financing Universal Health Coverage. First, we argue that procedural fairness has greater value than Dan Hausman allows. Second, we argue that the Report aligns with John Kinuthia’s view that a knowledgeable public and a capable civil society, alongside good facilitation, are important for effective public deliberation. Moreover, we agree with Kinuthia that the Report’s framework for procedural fairness applies not merely (...) within the health sector, but also to the wider budget process. Third, we argue that while Dheepa Rajan and Benjamin Rouffy-Ly are right that robust processes for equal participation are often central to a fair process, sometimes improvements in other aspects of procedural fairness, such as transparency, can take priority over strengthening participation. Fourth, while we welcome Sara Bennett and Maria Merritt’s fascinating use of the Report’s principles of procedural fairness to assess the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, we argue that their application of the Report’s principle of equality to development partners’ decision-making requires further justification. (shrink)

If I am confused, and I think two people are one and the same, that may impair my ability to refer to either of them. This is combinatory confusion. What if I am confused, and think that one person is actually two people? This is separatory confusion, and it seems quite different. After all, even in my confusion, my thoughts and my referential devices seem to track back to a single individual. Elmar Unnsteinsson has recently argued that both types of (...) confusion corrupt, i.e. they may prevent us from referring the right way. In this paper, I examine the four arguments he offers for this conclusion, and I argue that the intuitive view that separatory confusion does not corrupt can withstand his challenge. (shrink)

We summarize key messages from the World Bank report Open and Inclusive: Fair Processes for Financing Universal Health Coverage. A central lesson of the Report is that in decision-making on the path to UHC, procedural fairness matters alongside substantive fairness. Decision systems should be assessed using a complete conception of procedural fairness that embodies core commitments to impartial and equal consideration of interests and perspectives. These commitments demand that comprehensive information is gathered and disclosed and that justifications for policies are (...) publicly debated; that participation in decision-making is enabled; and that these characteristics of the decision system are institutionalised rather than up to the good will of decision-makers. Procedural fairness can improve equity in outcomes, raise legitimacy and trust, and can help make reforms last. While improving procedural fairness can be costly and there are barriers to achieving it, the range of instruments that countries at varying levels of income and institutional capacity have used with some success shows that, in many contexts, advances in procedural fairness in health financing are possible and worthwhile. (shrink)

This paper provides new examples of vagueness phenomena with comparatives. I show that comparatives of the form ‘x is ADJ-er than y’ can be vague due to a fuzziness in how much of some property makes for a difference in ADJ-ness. The sorites examples I provide cannot be assimilated to cases of indiscriminability or fuzziness in relevant dimensions, standards, or measurement procedures. A revised degree-based semantics with semiorders, a well studied threshold structure, is developed. The treatment of equatives captures the (...) truth of the claim that adjacent items in the sorites series are not relevantly distinguishable in ADJ-ness; and it avoids validating transitivities that would yield paradoxical conclusions. (shrink)

Epidemiology is one of the fastest growing and increasingly important sciences. This thorough analysis lays out the conceptual foundations of epidemiology, identifying traps and setting out the benefits of properly understanding this fascinating and important discipline, as well as providing the means to do so.

The trend towards postponement of childbearing has seen increasing numbers of women turning towards oocyte banking for anticipated gamete exhaustion (AGE banking), which offers a realistic chance of achieving genetically connected offspring. However, there are concerns around the use of this technology, including social/ethical implications, low rate of utilisation and its cost-effectiveness. The same societal trends have also resulted in an increased demand and unmet need for donor oocytes, with many women choosing to travel overseas for treatment. This has its (...) own inherent social, medical, financial and psychological sequelae. We propose a possible pathway to address these dual realities. The donation of oocytes originally stored in the context of AGE banking, with appropriate compensatory mechanisms, would ameliorate AGE banking concerns, while simultaneously improving the supply of donor oocytes. This proposed arrangement will result in tangible benefits for prospective donors, recipients and society at large. (shrink)

Circumcision is often claimed to be simpler, safer and more cost-effective when performed in the neonatal period as opposed to later in life, with a greater benefit-to-risk ratio. In the first part of this paper, we critically examine the evidence base for these claims, and find that it is not as robust as is commonly assumed. In the second part, we demonstrate that, even if one simply grants these claims for the sake of argument, it still does not follow that (...) neonatal circumcision is ethically permissible absent urgent medical necessity. Based on a careful consideration of the relevant evidence, arguments and counterarguments, we conclude that medically unnecessary penile circumcision—like other medically unnecessary genital procedures, such as ‘cosmetic’ labiaplasty—should not be performed on individuals who are too young (or otherwise unable) to provide meaningful consent to the procedure. (shrink)

More than perhaps any other major social theorist, Niklas Luhmann adopted a perspective on society at the opposite end of the atomistic-holistic spectrum to that of mainstream economics. While the position of mainstream economics is that society is nothing more than a collection of individuals, so that it can be understood simply in terms of those individuals and their interactions, Luhmann abstracts from individuals entirely, understanding social phenomena as being produced by society itself, with individuals playing a merely peripheral or (...) “enabling” role. This radical reconceptualization of society and the relation of the individual to society allowed Luhmann to build from the ground up a highly systematic theory of society which allows one to formulate economic and social questions in new ways, freed from preconceptions that are poorly grounded or simply wrong. After providing a brief overview of Luhmann’s general social theory, this article considers two questions for which Luhmann’s theory can produce a fresh point of view. The first concerns what is the nature of markets. According to Luhmann, markets are not a kind of system, but collections of observations--the observations of market participants of other market participants. The second concerns the old question of what is the appropriate degree of intervention in the economy. Mainstream economics approaches this problem through the distinction between markets and planning. According to Luhmann, this is a false dichotomy, since all economies have markets and planning. The real question is who should do the planning: private organizations or the state. The former operate on the basis of competition, that is, rivalry; the latter operates on the basis of cooperation. The problem with “socialist” or “centrally planned” economies was not that they were planned or centrally organized, since “free market” economies have planning and centralization too; it was that they relied solely on cooperation, with there being no space for competition. The paper concludes with some reflections on whether freemarket economies with minimal intervention by the state are any more sustainable than are “socialist” economies.Niklas Luhmann, peut-être plus que les autres auteurs en théorie sociale, a adopté une approche de la société qui est à l’opposé du spectre individualismeholisme des économistes orthodoxes. Alors que l’économie orthodoxe considère que la société n’est rien d’autre que la somme des individus et qu’elle ne peut être appréhendée qu’en termes d’individus et de leurs interactions, Luhmann fait totalement abstraction des individus et comprend les phénomènes sociaux comme étant produits par la société elle-même dans laquelle les individus jouent un rôle périphérique ou un rôle “d’habilitation”. Cette radicale reconceptualization de la société ainsi que la relation des individus à la société a permis à Luhmann de construire une théorie très méthodique de la société qui permet d’appréhender de façon différente les questions économiques et sociales, sans préreprésentations fragiles ou erronées. Après avoir donné un aperçu général de la théorie sociale de Luhmann, l’article considère deux questions pour lesquelles la théorie de Luhmann peut apporter un nouveau point de vue. La première traite de la nature des marchés. D’après Luhmann, les marchés ne sont pas une sorte de système mais des sommes d’observations faites par les participants au marché sur les autres participants. La seconde question concerne l’éternel problème du degré d’interventionnisme dans l’économie. Les économistes orthodoxes abordent cette question à travers la distinction entre les marchés et la planification. D’après Luhmann cette dichotomie est erronée dans la mesure où toutes les économies connaissent à la fois le marché et la planification. La véritable question est: Qui devrait planifier: les organisations privées ou l’Etat?. Les premières agissent sur la base de la concurrence, i.e de la rivalité; l’Etat agit sur la base de la coopération. Le problème avec les économies “socialistes” ou “centralement planifiées” n’est pas qu’elles sont planifiées ou qu’elles relèvent d’une organisation centralisée puisque les économies de “marché libre” connaissent aussi la planification et la centralisation. Le problème vient du fait qu’elles reposent uniquement sur la coopération et n’accordent pas de place à la concurrence. Le papier conclut en s’interrogeant sur l’idée selon laquelle les économies de libre marché avec une intervention étatique minimale sont plus viables que les économies “socialistes”. (shrink)

Geach's account of the Aristotelian logic of categorical sentences supplemented the views shared by Frege, Russell, Quine and others. I argue that this particular predicate logic approach and Geach's points apply to only one variety of natural language categorical sentences. For example, it takes the universal categorical as a universal conditional “If anything is a man, then it is mortal”. A different natural language form can and should be invoked: “Every man is a mortal.” Employing special restricted quantifiers in a (...) version of predicate logic, we justify a full square of opposition and the rules of quality and quantity that Geach rejected. (shrink)

This paper considers a form of scepticism according to which sentences, along with other linguistic entities such as verbs and phonemes, etc., are never realized. If, whenever a conversational participant produces some noise or other, they and all other participants assume that a specific sentence has been realized (or, more colloquially, spoken), communication will be fluent whether or not the shared assumption is correct. That communication takes place is therefore, one might think, no ground for assuming that sentences are realized (...) during a typical conversation. I reject both this ‘folie-a-deux’ view and the arguments for it due to Georges Rey. I do so by drawing on Gilbert Harrnan’s no-false-lemmas principle. Since testimony is a form of knowledge and, according to the principle, knowledge cannot depend essentially on false assumptions, testimony is incompatible with the claim that sentence realization is but an illusion. Much of the paper is given over to defending this appeal to the no-false-lemmas principle. After all, a more attractive option might seem to be to infer instead that the principle is itself falsified by the folie-a-deux view. (shrink)

Hendricks’ The Impairment Argument (TIA) claims that it is immoral to impair a fetus by causing it to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Since aborting a fetus impairs it to a greater degree than causing it to have FAS, then abortion is also immoral. In this article, I argue that TIA ought to be rejected. This is because TIA can only succeed if it explains why causing an organism to have FAS impairs it to a morally objectionable degree, entails that (...) abortion impairs an organism to a morally objectionable and greater degree than causing FAS, and satisfies The Impairment Principle’s ceteris paribus clause. In order to do all three things, TIA must presuppose some theory of well-being. Even then, no theory of well-being accomplishes all three tasks that TIA must in order to succeed. However, even if this is false and TIA can meet all three objectives by presupposing some theory of well-being, it would not do very much to advance the debate about the morality of abortion. As I argue, TIA would essentially restate well-established arguments against abortion based on whatever theory of well-being it must presuppose in order to be successful. (shrink)

In this paper, the author argues that the revelatory form Parmenides gives his poem poses considerable problems for the account of being contained therein. The poem moves through a series of problems, each building on the last: the problem of particularity, the cause of human wandering that the goddess would have us ascend beyond ; the problem of speech, whose heterogeneity evinces its tie to experience’s particularity ; the problem of justice, which motivates man’s ascent from his “insecure” place in (...) being, only ultimately to undermine it ; and finally the question of the good, the necessary consequence of man’s place in being as being out-of-place in being. What emerges is a Socratic reading of Parmenides’s poem, a view that Plato appears to have shared by using Parmenides and his Eleatic stranger to frame the bulk of Socrates’s philosophic activity. (shrink)

If you are kind to me, I am likely to reciprocate and doing so feels fair. Many theories of social exchange assume that such reciprocity and fairness are well aligned with one another. We argue that this correspondence between reciprocity and fairness is restricted to interpersonal dyads and does not govern more complex multilateral interactions. When multiple people are involved, reciprocity leads to partiality, which may be seen as unfair by outsiders. We report seven studies, conducted with people from the (...) United States, in which participants were asked to evaluate situations involving resource distribution in contexts such as economic games, government, and the workplace. Specifically, we find that equal resource distribution in multilateral interactions is seen as more fair than engaging in reciprocity. We also find that negative reciprocity is seen as more fair than positive reciprocity in these multilateral situations because positive reciprocity is perceived as based in favoritism. We rule out alternative explanations and demonstrate that there are contexts where favoritism is not viewed as unfair. These findings are important for theories of fairness and reciprocity as they demonstrate the central role of perceived partiality in the evaluation of multi‐party resource allocation. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo avaliar em que medida as considerações feitas por Gilbert Simondon sobre a natureza dos _objetos técnicos_ fundamentam teses incompatíveis com a prática da _obsolescência programada_. Mais precisamente, interessa saber como o conceito de _concretização_, que está relacionado a aspectos ontológicos de tais objetos, possui implicações éticas contra o descarte de objetos produzidos pelo mundo contemporâneo industrializado. No contexto industrial capitalista, a obsolescência programada tem sido usada no sentido de uma manutenção econômica. Contudo, há vários problemas (...) resultantes dessa prática. Um deles diz respeito aos impactos destrutivos causados ao meio ambiente. Assim, haveria na proposta de Simondon elementos para encontrar respostas aos problemas causados pela obsolescência programada? Defendemos que uma saída para isso está na própria orientação ética inerente ao desenvolvimento adequado dos objetos técnicos, constituído na perspectiva da concretização de tais objetos. (shrink)

The work of Hardt and Negri offers the field of education important theoretical resources for reconceptualizing subjectivity as a site of politics. Yet recent shifts on the Left toward more articulated mobilizations, along with the emergence of new decolonizing movements that interrogate the undifferentiated character of the common, partly affirm long-standing critiques of Hardt and Negri’s theses. Rather than rejecting their arguments, we should rethink their central assertions—from the starting point of decolonial theory—in a way that responds to these concerns. (...) We argue that the notion of constituent power grounding their theorization of politics be rethought in dialogue with the ethico-political concept of obediential power ; that the “monstrous” subjectivity they propose as the mode of exodus from given forms of biopolitical production take direction from Wynter’s new Human Project; and that the insurrectionary figure of the multitude be reconsidered alongside the variegated figure of insurgent cosmopolitanism. This rethinking restores to Hardt and Negri’s project a more contextualized and less universalistic theory of politics, and establishes a foundation for a critical pedagogy that, beginning from an accountability to student agency, engages a form of insurgent leadership that responds to the centrality in capitalist education of the historical processes of colonial partition. (shrink)

The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper, we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are ‘diffuse’. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that (...) we think does better. Finally, we disarm the objection that is responsible for dispositionalism’s bad press. (shrink)

Propositional logic is understood as a set of theorems defined by a deductive system: a set of axioms and a set of rules. Superintuitionistic logic is a logic extending intuitionistic propositional logic \. A rule is admissible for a logic if any substitution that makes each premise a theorem, makes the conclusion a theorem too. A deductive system \ is structurally complete if any rule admissible for the logic defined by \ is derivable in \. It is known that any (...) logic can be defined by a structurally complete deductive system—its structural completion. The main goal of the paper is to study the following problem: given a superintuitionistic logic L, is the structural completion of L hereditarily structurally complete? It is shown that, on the one hand, there is continuum many of such logics, including \, and many of its standard extensions. On the other hand, there is continuum many superintutitionistic logics structural completion of which is not hereditarily structurally complete. It is observed that the class of hereditarily structurally complete superintuitionistic consequence relations does not have the smallest element and it contains continuum many members lacking the finite model property. The following statement is instrumental in obtaining negative results: if a Lindenbaum algebra of formulas on one variable is finite and has more than 15 elements, then a structural completion of such a logic is not hereditarily structurally complete. (shrink)

A publicação de 2007, Homo Sacer II, 2, Il Regno e la Gloria, constitui marco na obra agambenana. Por um lado, o projeto Homo Sacer, que tinha por objetivo a genealogia do poder político, ascende a nova e decisiva dimensão: desvela o paradigma da teologia econômica, que permite explicar com maior precisão a articulação entre o reino e o governo, e os alcances do diagnóstico biopolítico. Por outro, Agamben crê haver encontrado nesse livro o arcano do poder: a glória. A (...) concepção da política como administração, ὀιχονομία, governo no qual a onipresença da economia expande-se por todos os aspectos da vida social é índice do movimento que alcança na glória sua máxima expressão. (shrink)

Scholars have typically viewed book 3 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as an unsystematic array of different metaphysical problems. In this article, the author argues that Aristotle organizes them with great care. The principle behind his ordering of the problems stems from Aristotle’s concern with impressing upon his audience the difficulty of becoming thoroughly perplexed. This principle is found to make sense of the discrepancies between Aristotle’s list of the problems in 3.1 and his discussion of them in 3.2–6. In short, Aristotle’s (...) primary concern in Metaphysics 3 is to temper the ambitions of his audience of enterprising physicists, a concern that takes him from the aim of metaphysics to the tension between theology and philosophy. Borrowed as this concern is from the Platonic Socrates, the author shows that the arc of Metaphysics 3 is Socratic, and how it is Socratic. (shrink)

O objetivo desse artigo é apresentar as vias de pesquisa da filosofia de Machado de Assis. Parte-se da perspectiva não colonial para analisar o dilema da crítica literária a respeito da presença da filosofia na obra de Machado de Assis. Os argumentos da crítica justificam-se pela retórica da modernidade e pela lógica da colonialidade. Sob três critérios interpretativos distintos – o racial, o geográfico e o ideológico – mantém-se o mesmo dilema: como tornar filósofo aquele que não pode ser filósofo? (...) Novas vias de interpretação da obra de Machado de Assis podem solucionar esse dilema ao indicarem temas e métodos de pesquisa não coloniais sobre a relação entre a filosofia e a vida intelectual do autor. (shrink)

In this paper I consider ways in which seawater––both on its surface and in its depths––opens up alternative forms of thought and expression in Homer, especially with respect to the body. By tracking the relationship between body and simile as it is mediated by the surface of the sea, I argue that water emerges as an especially mobile and adaptive medium for expressing the transformation that takes place between self and simile in Homer. In the Iliad, similes are well-known for (...) bringing weather, waves, and other aspects of the natural environment into the poem, whereas in the Odyssey those aspects more often introduce similes of their own. I offer a reading of the shipwreck scene in Odyssey 5 to suggest that the body’s struggle to stay afloat is matched there, on a formal level, by the role of waves in drawing simile and body to the sea’s surface. I then address a different kind of figurative language (closer to metaphor and associated with grief) that takes place in the depths, through readings of scenes in Books 18 and 24 of the Iliad and Archilochus fragment 13. (shrink)

Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have offered a purported counterexample to the acyclicity of the relationship “all things considered better than”. This example invokes our intuitive preferences over pairs of alternatives involving a single person’s painful experiences of varying intensity and duration. These preferences, Rachels and Temkin claim, are confidently held, entirely reasonable, and cyclical. They conclude that we should drop acyclicity as a requirement of rationality. I argue that, together with the findings of recent research on the way people (...) evaluate episodes of pain, the use of a heuristic known as similarity-based decision-making explains why our intuitive preferences may violate acyclicity in this example. I argue that this explanation should lead us to regard these preferences with suspicion, because it indicates that they may be the result of one or more biases. I conclude that Rachels’ and Temkin’s example does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting acyclicity. (shrink)

This book examines the development and fundamental nature of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism evokes two distinctions: 'state' vs 'non-state' law; and 'law' vs 'non-law'. As such, although this book focuses upon circumstances where two or more legal orders compete to govern the same social space, it also addresses the nature of law in general. Drawing on material conflicts arising within jurisdictions such as Australia, Burundi, Cameroon, Gambia, the United States, and Zambia, this book explores the conceptual, moral, and political challenges (...) that legal pluralism creates. Emphasising that non-state law carries no less dignity than that often ascribed to the legal orders of contemporary states, it advances a theoretically sophisticated argument in favour of recognising and respecting genuine cases of legal pluralism, wherever they arise. Accessible and thought provoking, this book will appeal to legal scholars, anthropologists, sociologists, and political and social philosophers as well as practising lawyers, judges, and policy makers who deal with issues of legal pluralism. (shrink)

This article explores three distinct approaches to politics identified by Deleuze and Guattari. I argue that they consistently privilege a 'problematic' approach entailing individuals and associations establishing norms on the basis of the potential they possess within a concrete situation, and that this implies resistance to both the 'theorematic' politics they associate with statist philosophy and struggles aiming to alter the 'axiomatic' determination induced by global forces of capital. While this resistance necessarily proceeds in relation to established notions of identity (...) and value, it must also do more than aim for the establishment of particular institutional 'constants,' including particular democratic procedures and human rights. (shrink)

800x600 Proponho neste trabalho fazer algumas anotações sobre as questões relacionadas à subjetividade, a alteridade e a educação contemporânea, sobretudo, considerar que os desajustes de uma persistente razão instrumental, que interferem no âmbito educacional. A necessidade de uma reflexão crítica para tais temas tornou-se a marca central de nosso tempo. Desse modo, cabem-nos algumas questões importantes: Como situar a educação no horizonte dos nossos problemas contemporâneos? Como pensá-la nesse tempo em que floresce cada vez mais aspectos de barbárie civilizatória do (...) que aspectos de esclarecimento da humanidade? Para isso, me oriento em uma aproximação entre Theodor W. Adorno e Emanuel Levinas, que em suas interpretações da racionalidade, entendem porque a humanidade, ao invés de realizar seus potenciais emancipatórios, caminhou em direção contrária. Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4. (shrink)