ABSTRACTMany discussions of the ‘preface paradox’ assume that it is more troubling for deductive closure constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All that we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. The only view that escapes my way of formulating the problem for the deductive closure constraint is in fact itself a reductive (...) view: namely, the view that outright belief is credence 1. However, I argue that this view is unsustainable. Moreover, my version of the problem turns on no particular theory of evidence or evidential probability, and so cannot be avoided by adopting some revisionary such theory. In sum, deductive closure is in more serious, and more general, trouble than some have thought. (shrink)

This paper offers a new account of how structural rationality, or coherence, is normative. The central challenge to the normativity of coherence – which I term the problem of “making space” for the normativity of coherence – is this: if considerations of coherence matter normatively, it is not clear how we ought to take account of them in our deliberation. Coherence considerations don’t seem to show up in reasoning about what to believe, intend, desire, hope, fear, and so on; moreover, (...) they seem awkward to take account of alongside more “substantive” considerations about the merits of such attitudes. I aim here to solve this problem, and in so doing to offer the aforementioned new account of how coherence is normative. On the view I defend, which I call the Reasons-to-Structure-Deliberation model, considerations of coherence constitute reasons for structuring deliberation in certain ways: more particularly, to treat incoherent combinations of attitudes as off-limits, and so to focus one’s deliberation on choosing between the coherent combinations. (shrink)

Suppose that you must make choices that may influence the well-being and the identities of the people who will exist, though not the number of people who will exist. How ought you to choose? This paper answers this question. It argues that the currency of distributive ethics in such cases is a combination of an individual’s final well-being and her expected well-being conditional on her existence. It also argues that this currency should be distributed in an egalitarian, rather than a (...) prioritarian, manner. (shrink)

This book carefully engages philosophical arguments for and against open borders, bringing together major approaches to open borders across disciplines and establishing the feasibility of open borders against the charge of utopianism.

Does lying require a speaker to explicitly express something (she believes to be) false, or is it also possible to lie with deceptive implicatures? Given that consistency with ordinary language is a desideratum of any philosophical definition of lying, several studies have addressed this question empirically in recent years. Their findings, however, seem to be in conflict. This paper reports an experiment with 222 participants that investigates the hypothesis that these conflicting results are due to variation regarding whether or not (...) the speaker’s intention to deceive and the implicated content are made explicit. It is found that the presence versus the absence of such explicitness has a strong impact on people’s lie judgements, and can thus account for the conflicting results in the literature. (shrink)

Stephen Finlay’s book Confusion of Tongues is extraordinarily sophisticated, ambitious and thought-provoking. I highly commend it to those who haven’t read it yet. I will begin this commentary with a summary of which big-picture issues Finlay and I agree on and which we disagree on.

Before participants can be enrolled in a clinical trial, an institutional review board must determine that the risks that the research poses to participants are ‘reasonable.’ This paper examines the two dominant frameworks for assessing research risks and argues that each approach suffers from significant shortcomings. It then considers what issues must be addressed in order to construct a framework for risk assessment that is grounded in a compelling normative foundation and might provide more operationally precise guidance to the deliberations (...) of various stakeholders. The paper concludes by sketching the outlines of what is referred to as the ‘Integrative Approach’ to risk assessment and by highlighting some of the ways in which this approach may be more promising than current alternatives. (shrink)

Indifferent lies have been proposed as a counterexample to the claim that lying requires an intention to deceive. In indifferent lies, the speaker says something she believes to be false (in a trut...

We all learn about the mistake of treating ‘nothing’ as if it were a term standing for something; but is it a mistake to treat it as an empty term, denoting nothing? We argue not, and we introduce ‘zilch’, defined as ‘the non-self-identical thing’, as a term which is empty as a matter of logical necessity. We contrast its behaviour with that of the quantifier ‘nothing’, and illustrate its uses. We use the same idea to vindicate Locke’s, Descartes’ and Hume’s (...) handling of ‘nothing’, and we show how Heidegger’s ‘das Nichts nichtet’ comes out as logically true. (shrink)

Theorists concerned about the distributive effects of skilled emigration (brain drain) often argue that its harmful effects can be justly mitigated by restricting emigration from sending countries or by limiting immigration opportunities to receiving countries. I raise moral and practical concerns against restricting the movement of skilled migrants and contend that conceptualizing the moral issue in these terms leads theorists to neglect the moral salience of institutions that determine the distributive effects of migration. Using an analogy to skilled migration in (...) a domestic context, I argue for locating brain drain in a more holistic, institutional context that includes the reform of global institutions and of policies affecting migration. (shrink)

While Marx’s animating spirit can be found at the heart of much work in critical discourse studies, use of his ideas and concepts in this work is much less widespread. This has, however, been slowl...

Academic misconduct is widespread in schools, colleges, and universities and it appears to be an international phenomenon that also spills over into the workplace. To this end, while a great deal of research has investigated various individual components such as, demographic, personality and situational factors that contribute to cheating, research has yet to examine why students help others cheat and which students are being asked to help others cheat. In this study, we investigated if the closeness of the relationship to (...) the individual requesting help in cheating to the individual being asked to help cheat, influenced the decision to help cheat. We also investigated if past cheating behavior predicted how an individual would respond to requests to cheat. Additionally, we sought to answer the following questions; whether minor cheating is more prevalent than serious cheating, what personality factors predict helping others cheat, who is helped, and how people rationalize helping others cheat. Results indicate minor cheating to be more prevalent, prudent personalities are less likely to have cheated or to help others cheat, individuals are more likely to help friends cheat than to help strangers, and past cheating behaviors is indicative of helping others to cheat. Implications for research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

I argue that Scanlon's Value of Choice View does not offer a plausible account of substantive responsibility. I offer a new account, which I call the Potential Value of Opportunities View. On this view, when a person is in a position to freely and capably make an informed choice, we assess her situation not by the outcome she achieves but by the potential value of her opportunities. This value depends on the value of the various things that she can achieve (...) through her choices, as well as on how disposed she is to choose her better options and avoid her worse options. This view explains the priority we give to preventing harm that a person cannot avoid by choosing appropriately over harm that a person can so avoid by the fact that the second person has a valuable opportunity that the first does not have. It explains the importance of protecting people against choosing badly by the value of being placed in circumstances in which one is disposed to choose well, and the disvalue of being exposed to the danger of coming to harm by choosing badly. (shrink)

Education has two distinct but interconnected layers. There is an outer layer concerned with knowledge transfer and skills and an inner layer concerned with the development of character and relationships with others, both individually and socially. This inner layer provides the individual with the capacity to influence and to change society. In that sense, such an inner layer is ‘political’. In this article we argue that the ‘political’ in education can take two distinct forms: either that of dialogue or of (...) defiance. We claim that the former is epitomised by the philosophy of Martin Buber and the latter by the philosophy of Frantz Fanon. Our analysis contrasting these two philosophies clarifies the implications for education, and thereby for the individual and for society. (shrink)

In contemporary Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, "attention" is a burgeoning field, with ever-increasing amounts of empirical research and philosophical analysis being directed toward it.1 In this essay I make a first attempt to contrast how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas2 and Buddhists would address some aspects of attention that are discussed in that literature. The sources of what I attribute to "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas" are the sections dealing with the manas in the Nyāyabhāṣya, Nyāyamañjarī, and Praśastapādabhāṣya. The words "Buddhist" and "Buddhism" in this essay (...) refer specifically to the Sautrāntika Buddhism of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako-śabhāṣya.3 A comparison... (shrink)

An interview with Philippa Foot about her book 'Natural Goodness' and the development of her thought. (Note: A slightly revised version appears in Conversations on Ethics, OUP 2009).

This article proposes building on the success of publicly funded drug research and development and expanding the model to include the full cycle development, testing, manufacture and distribution of innovative and affordable new drugs.

Nossa proposta neste ensaio é descrever a primeira problematização apresentada por Merleau-Ponty a respeito da noção de Natureza em seus cursos ministrados no Collège de France,defendendo a hipótese de que ele a constrói, em grande medida, através de um diálogo e de umainterpretação particular do pensamento cartesiano. Procuraremos mostrar que Merleau-Pontyreconhece em Descartes a permanência de uma ontologia implícita ou latente – coexistente com suaontologia “oficial” –, que “resiste” à formulação puramente inteligível da ideia de Natureza, e que,por isso mesmo, (...) preserva para ela o campo da existência e da realidade. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo defende o ponto de vista de que as bases da ciência cognitiva contemporânea estão em sintonia com o pensamento de Merleau-Ponty, em seus aspectos antiobjetivista e antirrepresentacionalista. A ideia de representação mental é contestada, tanto na CC quanto no pensamento de Merleau-Ponty. A cognição não espelha um mundo exterior independente dos sujeitos incorporados. O mundo é um existencial, como afirmam Merleau-Ponty e a CC. A hipótese da representação mental supõe que o mundo pode ser percebido de forma (...) independente do sujeito que percebe. Isso não é verdade. A percepção depende da forma como o sujeito age em seu mundo percebido. Todas as estimulações que o organismo encontra só são possíveis pelos seus movimentos precedentes que resultam na exposição do órgão receptor às influências externas. Os estímulos sensoriais que o organismo encontra dependem diretamente do seu comportamento motor e a forma como o organismo se move depende diretamente das consequências sensoriais dos seus comportamentos anteriores.This article defends the view that the foundations of contemporary cognitive science are in tune with Merleau-Ponty’s thinking in its anti-objectivist and anti-representationalist aspects. The idea of mental representation is contested both in CC and in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. Cognition does not mirror an outside world independent of embodied subjects. The world is an existential one as Merleau-Ponty and the CC say. The mental representation hypothesis assumes that the world can be perceived independently of the perceiving subject. This is not true. Perception depends on how the subject acts in his perceived world. All the stimulations that the organism finds are only possible by its previous movements that result in the exposure of the receiving organ to external influences. The sensory stimuli that the organism finds depend directly on its motor behavior and the way the organism moves depends directly on the sensory consequences of its previous behaviors. (shrink)

Este texto procura circunscrever alguns traços de um tipo de racionalidade formal, que encontra no cinismo uma de suas expressões privilegiadas. Buscamos delimitar algumas características do modo de operação dessa razão, sobretudo enquanto negatividade ou recusa da significação própria ao seu objeto e, no limite, ao mundo. Nessa direção, tentamos, ainda, apontar alguns limites para esse projeto de formalização total e de negação completa do mundo enquanto tal.

This paper addresses the question of the relation between mortal and immortal time in the Iliad as it is represented by the physical act of falling. I begin by arguing that falling serves as a point of reference throughout the poem for a concept of time that is specifically human. It is well known that mortals fall at the moment of death in the poem, but it has not been recognized that the movement of the fall is also connected with (...) the time of birth, aging, and generation. In light of the significance of falling for mortals, I then go on to examine the problematic case of two particular immortals who fall in the Iliad. When Hephaestus tumbles down to earth from Olympus, and when Ares is knocked flat on the battlefield, both gods, I argue, also “fall into” human time. This complicates their status as ageless and eternal beings, and draws into question the different temporal registers at work in the narrative . The single action of falling brings together several key concepts in the poem which hinge on the issue of the separation between the mortal and immortal spheres in the Iliad. (shrink)

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception (...) of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice. (shrink)

People with severe learning disability are particularly difficult to include in the research process. As a result, researchers may be tempted to focus on those with learning disability who can be included. The problem is exacerbated in this field as the political agenda of inclusion and involvement is driven by those people with learning disability who are the higher functioning. To overcome this we should first detach the notion of consent from ideas about autonomy and think instead of it as (...) a way to avoid wronging others; this fits the original historical use of consent in research. This allows us to think in terms of including participants to the best of their abilities rather than in terms of a threshold of autonomy. Researchers could then use imaginative ways to include the least able and to ensure they are not wronged in research or by exclusion from it. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse how Ernst Cassirer’s approach of a phenomenology of knowledge deals with the general question of disunity in science and society. By elaborating on the concept of functional unity, which presupposes difference, Cassirer’s work helps to revise foundational concepts of modern science and society, such as pluralism and truth. Relating Cassirer’s approach to the current interest in political epistemology, we show the implications of Cassirer’s theory of knowledge and analyses of modern science, particularly physics. In these (...) analyses, Cassirer carves out the relational logic of scientific knowledge and its consequences on epistemological and ethico-political levels. While this logic of relations relativises absolute claims on either level, it entails its distinct normative criteria as elements of the scientific ideal. Cassirer’s project defends this ideal and thus can simultaneously defend plurality _in_ science (including the humanities) in terms of methods, perspectives and aims, and preserve the unity _of_ science as a normative ideal and symbolic form in constant interaction with other forms. Thus, Cassirer’s pluralism must be distinguished from mere historicist or relativist conceptions. (shrink)

Progress towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) requires making difficult trade-offs. In this journal, Dr. Margaret Chan, the WHO Director-General, has endorsed the principles for making such decisions put forward by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and UHC. These principles include maximizing population health, priority for the worse off, and shielding people from health-related financial risks. But how should one apply these principles in particular cases and how should one adjudicate between them when their demands conflict? This paper by some (...) members of the Consultative Group and a diverse group of health policy professionals addresses these questions. It considers three stylized versions of actual policy dilemmas. Each of these cases pertains to one of the three principal dimensions of progress towards UHC: which services to cover first, which populations to prioritize for coverage, and how to move from out-of-pocket expenditures to pre-payment with pooling of funds. Our cases are simplified to highlight common trade-offs. While we make specific recommendations, our primary aim is to demonstrate both the form and substance of the reasoning involved in striking a fair balance between competing interests on the road to UHC. (shrink)

A short obituary of the philosopher Philippa Foot.

The rising cost of the opioid antagonist and overdose reversal agent naloxone is an urgent public health problem. The recent and dramatic price increase of Evzio, a naloxone auto-injector produced by Kaléo, shows how pharmaceutical manufacturers entering the naloxone marketplace rely on market exclusivity guaranteed by the patent system to charge prices at what the market can bear, which can restrict access to life-saving medication. We argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1498, a section of the federal code that allows the (...) government to use patent-protected products for its own purposes in exchange for reasonable compensation, could be used to procure generic naloxone auto-injectors, or at least bring Kaléo to the negotiating table. Precedent exists for the use of § 1498 to procure pharmaceuticals, and it could give meaning to the federal government's recent declaration of a public health emergency around the opioid epidemic, discourage new market entrants from charging exorbitant prices, and yield important public health benefits. (shrink)

This dissertation is informed by the general project of applying ethics to intellectual property, and focuses on a matter of particular concern within the field of applied bioethics, in conjunction with business ethics. Ensuring access to life-saving medical treatments for those in need of them is of crucial contemporary relevance. This line of enquiry led me to a specific question, which provides a conceptual framework for this work. That question is the following: should patents on pharmaceuticals be prohibited or restricted (...) in order to achieve that objective? ;To address that question, I use a very old and familiar example of a thought experiment, namely the Heinz dilemma, to make the case for paying attention to intellectual property issues. The Heinz dilemma is the focus of Chapter One. In Chapter Two, I endorse the application of mid-level principles in applied ethics. I elaborate on the mid-level principle of "economic efficiency" in Chapter Three, and then examine the "social responsibility of business" principle in Chapter Four. ;I recommend a relatively anti-theoretical approach to applying ethics to intellectual property issues. It is easier, I suggest, to appreciate the merits of such approaches if one first acquires an appreciation for the wonders and perplexities of intellectual property jurisprudence. To that end, Chapter Five contains background material on the particulars of intellectual property jurisprudence, especially patent law. In it, I contrast patents with trade secrecy protection, and briefly discuss compulsory licensing, stockpiling provisions, infringement exemptions. In Chapter Six, I survey the economic literature on patents and the debates over increased innovation as a desirable social goal. I propose several concepts---namely, technique, proportional property rights and the enhancement effect---which can contribute to a clearer understanding of what is at stake in the debates. ;The next three chapters, Seven to Nine, each deal with a different objection to patent protection in the context of biotechnology. Chapter Seven addresses the objections to bioprospecting. Chapter Eight deals with the objections to the increasing commercialization of medical research. Then Chapter Nine explicitly tackles the objections to unreasonable pricing practices, the ones so frequently charged against pharmaceutical patents, in particular. Lastly, I explore a range of policy options, alternatives to altering the scope or availability of patent protection, which may more effectively address the specific problem of ensuring access to innovative medical treatments. (shrink)

The key claims of left accelerationism are grounded upon a network of concepts. Crucial here have been the notions of hegemony ; strategy ; and rationality. Though the concepts of hegemony–strategy and strategy–rationality have received wide treatment, the hegemony and rationality pair has received minimal attention. Yet to render the core arguments of left accelerationism explicable requires that these three ideas are placed in some concrete relation. To put the issue another way: what is the relationship between power and rationality? (...) This article will argue that many of the critiques which the left accelerationist position has received are bound up in misunderstanding this relationship. To remedy such misnomers, we will argue that it is a more sophisticated understanding of strategy that can help bridge these two domains. This leads us to delineate a form of strategy-without-a-strategiser, a distributed and emergent strategic orientation which mediates the power/rationality binary. (shrink)