The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are (...) partially vindicated, because perceptual error is due to false belief. (shrink)

"This admirable volume of readings is the first of a pair: the editors are to be applauded for placing the philosophy of color exactly where it should go, in ...

Anything is similar to anything, provided the respects of similarity are allowed to be gerrymandered or gruesome, as Goodman observed.2 But similarity in non-gruesome or—as I shall say—genuine respects is much less ecumenical. Colors, it seems, provide a compelling illustration of the distinction as applied to similarities among properties.3 For instance, in innumerable gruesome respects, blue is more similar to yellow than to purple. But in a genuine respect, blue is more similar to purple than to yellow (genuinely more similar, (...) as I shall sometimes put it). (shrink)

These volumes will serve as useful resources for anyone interested in philosophy of color perception or color science.

A persistent argument against the transitivity assumption of rational choice theory postulates a repeatable action that generates a significant benefit at the expense of a negligible cost. No matter how many times the action has been taken, it therefore seems reasonable for a decision-maker to take the action one more time. However, matters are so fixed that the costs of taking the action some large number of times outweigh the benefits. In taking the action some large number of times on (...) the grounds that the benefits outweigh the costs every time, the decision-maker therefore reveals intransitive preferences, since once she has taken it this large number of times, she would prefer to return to the situation in which she had never taken the action at all. We defend transitivity against two versions of this argument: one in which it is assumed that taking the action one more time never has any perceptible cost, and one in which it is assumed that the cost of taking the action, though (sometimes) perceptible, is so small as to be outweighed at every step by the significant benefit. We argue that the description of the choice situation in the first version involves a contradiction. We also argue that the reasoning used in the second version is a form of similarity-based decision-making. We argue that when the consequences of using similarity-based decision-making are brought to light, rational decision-makers revise their preferences. We also discuss one method that might be used in performing this revision. (shrink)

Nineteenth-century medical advances were entwined with a conceptual innovation: the idea that many cases of disease which were previously thought to have diverse causes could be explained by the action of a single kind of cause, for example a certain bacterial or parasitic infestation. The focus of modern epidemiology, however, is on chronic non-communicable diseases, which frequently do not seem to be attributable to any single causal factor. This paper is an effort to resolve the resulting tension. The paper criticises (...) the monocausal model of disease, so successful in the nineteenth century. It also argues that a multifactorial model of disease can only be satisfactory if it amounts to more than a mere rejection of the monocausal model. A third alternative, the contrastive model, is proposed and defended on the grounds that it links the notions of disease and of general explanation, while avoiding the philosophical naiveties and practical difficulties of the monocausal model. (shrink)

Saul Kripke’s much discussed Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has, I believe, been widely misinterpreted. The purpose of this note is to offer a correction. As it happens, on my reading of Kripke’s text Kripke’s Wittgenstein begins to look recognisably like Wittgenstein himself. But I shall not be concerned here with the question of whether Kripke’s Wittgenstein is Wittgenstein. My only aim is to correct the misinterpretation.

Jackson's black-and-white Mary teaches us that the propositional content of perception cannot be fully expressed in language.

The Dangerous Book for Boys Abstract: Seventeenth and eighteenth century discussions of the senses are often thought to contain a profound truth: some perceptible properties are secondary qualities, dispositions to produce certain sorts of experiences in perceivers. In particular, colors are secondary qualities: for example, an object is green iff it is disposed to look green to standard perceivers in standard conditions. After rebutting Boghossian and Velleman’s argument that a certain kind of secondary quality theory is viciously circular, we discuss (...) three main lines of argument for the secondary quality theory. The first is inspired by an intuitively compelling picture of perception articulated by Reid; the second is that the secondary quality theory is a conceptual truth; the third line of argument is presented in Johnston’s influential paper ‘How to speak of the colors’. We conclude that all these arguments fail, and that the secondary quality theory is unmotivated. Keywords: color, secondary quality, disposition, vision, perception.. (shrink)

Dummctt argues that classical quantification is illegitimate when the domain is given as the objects which fall under an indefinitely extensible concept, since in such cases the objects are not the required definite totality. The chief problem in understanding this complex argument is the crucial but unexplained phrase 'definite totality' and the associated claim that it follows from the intuitive notion of set that the objects over which a classical quantifier ranges form a set. 'Definite totality' is best understood as (...) disguised plural talk like Cantor's 'consistent multiplicity', although this does not help in understanding how a totality could be anything other than definite. Moreover, contrary to his claims, Dummett's own notion of set is not intuitive and he does not demystify the set-theoretic paradoxes. In conclusion, it is argued that Dummett's context principle is responsible for the incoherent projection of the haziness of a conception of some objects onto reality. (shrink)

This article proposes to examine some theories of non-religious spirituality in light of the growing phenomenon of those individuals who declared themselves as having "no religion" by Brazilian religious census conducted in 2010 by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The intention here is to identify how the poetic question presents itself as the fundamental element of these proposals about spirituality for authors, since beauty is part of the spiritual quest, as in: Viktor Frankl and existential religiosity grounded (...) in the search for meaning in life; Marià Corbí and his non-religious or secular spirituality; Robert Solomon and his spirituality for skeptics, and André Comte-Sponville and his atheistic spirituality, or spirituality without God. From there, we then present the perception of spirituality in the poetry of the thought of Jean Paul Sartre, primarily in his work “what is Literature?”. (shrink)

Interpreters of Plato’s Parmenides have long agreed that it is a canonical work in the history of ontology. In the first part, the aged Parmenides presents a devastating critique of Platonic ontology, followed in the second by what purports to be a response to that critique. But despite the scholarly agreement as to the general subject matter of the dialogue, what makes it one whole has nevertheless eluded its readers, so much so that some have even speculated it to be (...) a patchwork of two dimly related dialogues. -/- In Becoming Socrates, Alex Priou shows that the Parmenides’ unity remains elusive due to scholarly neglect of a particular passage in Parmenides’ critique—a passage Parmenides identifies as the hinge between the dialogue’s two parts and as the “greatest impasse” facing Platonic ontology. There Parmenides situates the concern with ontology or the question of being within the concern with political philosophy or the question of good rule. In this way, the Parmenides shows us how a youthful Socrates first learned of the centrality of political philosophy that would become the hallmark of his life—that it, and not ontology, is “first philosophy.”. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 734-737.

Epicurus argued that the good life is the pleasurable life. He also argued that “death is nothing to us”. These claims appear in tension. For, if pleasure is good, then it seems that death is bad when it deprives us of deeply enjoyable time alive. Here, I offer an Epicurean view of pleasure and the complete life which dissolves this tension. This view is, I contend, more appealing than critics of Epicureanism have allowed, in part because it assigns higher value (...) to pleasures that we produce by exercising our rational capacities and by establishing control over our lives. (shrink)

Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have offered a purported counterexample to the acyclicity of the relationship “all things considered better than”. This example invokes our intuitive preferences over pairs of alternatives involving a single person’s painful experiences of varying intensity and duration. These preferences, Rachels and Temkin claim, are confidently held, entirely reasonable, and cyclical. They conclude that we should drop acyclicity as a requirement of rationality. I argue that, together with the findings of recent research on the way people (...) evaluate episodes of pain, the use of a heuristic known as similarity-based decision-making explains why our intuitive preferences may violate acyclicity in this example. I argue that this explanation should lead us to regard these preferences with suspicion, because it indicates that they may be the result of one or more biases. I conclude that Rachels’ and Temkin’s example does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting acyclicity. (shrink)

Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have offered a purported counterexample to the acyclicity of the relationship “all things considered better than”. This example invokes our intuitive preferences over pairs of alternatives involving a single person’s painful experiences of varying intensity and duration. These preferences, Rachels and Temkin claim, are confidently held, entirely reasonable, and cyclical. They conclude that we should drop acyclicity as a requirement of rationality. I argue that, together with the findings of recent research on the way people (...) evaluate episodes of pain, the use of a heuristic known as similarity-based decision-making explains why our intuitive preferences may violate acyclicity in this example. I argue that this explanation should lead us to regard these preferences with suspicion, because it indicates that they may be the result of one or more biases. I conclude that Rachels’ and Temkin’s example does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting acyclicity. (shrink)

Nossa proposta neste ensaio é descrever a primeira problematização apresentada por Merleau-Ponty a respeito da noção de Natureza em seus cursos ministrados no Collège de France,defendendo a hipótese de que ele a constrói, em grande medida, através de um diálogo e de umainterpretação particular do pensamento cartesiano. Procuraremos mostrar que Merleau-Pontyreconhece em Descartes a permanência de uma ontologia implícita ou latente – coexistente com suaontologia “oficial” –, que “resiste” à formulação puramente inteligível da ideia de Natureza, e que,por isso mesmo, (...) preserva para ela o campo da existência e da realidade. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo defende o ponto de vista de que as bases da ciência cognitiva contemporânea estão em sintonia com o pensamento de Merleau-Ponty, em seus aspectos antiobjetivista e antirrepresentacionalista. A ideia de representação mental é contestada, tanto na CC quanto no pensamento de Merleau-Ponty. A cognição não espelha um mundo exterior independente dos sujeitos incorporados. O mundo é um existencial, como afirmam Merleau-Ponty e a CC. A hipótese da representação mental supõe que o mundo pode ser percebido de forma (...) independente do sujeito que percebe. Isso não é verdade. A percepção depende da forma como o sujeito age em seu mundo percebido. Todas as estimulações que o organismo encontra só são possíveis pelos seus movimentos precedentes que resultam na exposição do órgão receptor às influências externas. Os estímulos sensoriais que o organismo encontra dependem diretamente do seu comportamento motor e a forma como o organismo se move depende diretamente das consequências sensoriais dos seus comportamentos anteriores.This article defends the view that the foundations of contemporary cognitive science are in tune with Merleau-Ponty’s thinking in its anti-objectivist and anti-representationalist aspects. The idea of mental representation is contested both in CC and in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. Cognition does not mirror an outside world independent of embodied subjects. The world is an existential one as Merleau-Ponty and the CC say. The mental representation hypothesis assumes that the world can be perceived independently of the perceiving subject. This is not true. Perception depends on how the subject acts in his perceived world. All the stimulations that the organism finds are only possible by its previous movements that result in the exposure of the receiving organ to external influences. The sensory stimuli that the organism finds depend directly on its motor behavior and the way the organism moves depends directly on the sensory consequences of its previous behaviors. (shrink)

This book draws on studies of movement, gesture, and early film to offer a series of readings on repetition through the body in Homer. Each chapter presents an argument based on a specific posture, action or gesture, through which to rethink epic practices of embodiment and formularity.

Realism in Duhem's Natural Classification. Pierre Duhem is an outstanding exponent of empiricism. According to the empiricist view scientific laws and theories merely describe formal relations between observable phenomena. Duhems' important notion of natural classification is intended to explain the predictive success of science. I shall argue that it can only be interpreted realistically. Besides the success of science, two further arguments are put forward in favor of realism: the fact that laws of nature are necessary, and the extension of (...) observation by using instruments. (shrink)

O livro Frankenstein: ou o Prometeu moderno – romance escrito por Mary Shelley e publicado em 1818 – é conhecido como uma contundente crítica à atividade científica, principalmente, considerando as concepções de ciência e de técnica subjacentes ao amplo projeto do iluminismo. Há intérpretes da obra de Shelley que assumem que uma possível fonte do modelo de pensamento criticado por ela se localiza nas teses defendidas por Francis Bacon acerca do tema do “domínio da natureza”. Assumindo isso como pressuposto, o (...) objetivo de nossa investigação é explorar a suposta presença do pensamento baconiano no livro de Shelley. A partir de uma chave de leitura filosófica, mais especificamente o tema compreendido como atitude prometeica, avaliaremos os limites para aproximar, por um lado, Bacon e Victor Frankenstein (personagem protagonista do romance) e, por outro, Bacon e Mary Shelley. Mais especificamente essas aproximações são realizadas a partir das considerações morais que orientam o saber técnico e científico desses autores. (shrink)

The diversity of topics discussed in this book reflects the breadth of Judith Jarvis Thomson's philosophical work. Throughout her long career at MIT, Thomson's straightforward approach and emphasis on problem-solving have shaped philosophy in significant ways. Some of the book's contributions discuss specific moral and political issues such as abortion, self-defense, the rights and obligations of prospective fathers, and political campaign finance. Other contributions concern the foundations of moral theory, focusing on hedonism, virtue ethics, the nature of nonconsequentialism, and the (...) objectivity of moral claims. Finally, contributions in metaphysics and epistemology discuss the existence of sets, the structures reflected in conditional statements, and the commitments of testimony. Contributors: Jonathan Bennett, Richard L. Cartwright, Joshua Cohen, N. Ann Davis, Catherine Z. Elgin, Gilbert Harman, Barbara Herman, Frances Myrna Kamm, Claudia Mills, T.M. Scanlon, Ernest Sosa. (shrink)