Philosophers have rightly condemned lookism—that is, discrimination in favor of attractive people or against unattractive people—in education, the justice system, the workplace and elsewhere. Surprisingly, however, the almost universal preference for attractive romantic and sexual partners has rarely received serious ethical scrutiny. On its face, it’s unclear whether this is a form of discrimination we should reject or tolerate. I consider arguments for both views. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that preferring attractive partners is bad. (...) The idea is that choosing partners based on looks seems essentially similar to other objectionable forms of discrimination. (In particular, the preference for attractive partners is arguably both unfair and harmful to a significant degree.) One can try to resist this conclusion in several ways. I consider three possible replies. The first has to do with the possibility of controlling our partner preferences. The second pertains to attractiveness and “good genes”. The last attempts to link certain aspects of attractiveness to a prospective partner’s personality and values. I argue that the first two replies fail conclusively, while the third only amounts to a limited defense of a particular kind of attractiveness preference. So the idea that we should often avoid preferring attractive partners is compelling. (shrink)

The field of AI safety aims to prevent increasingly capable artificially intelligent systems from causing humans harm. Research on moral alignment is widely thought to offer a promising safety strategy: if we can equip AI systems with appropriate ethical rules, according to this line of thought, they'll be unlikely to disempower, destroy or otherwise seriously harm us. Deontological morality looks like a particularly attractive candidate for an alignment target, given its popularity, relative technical tractability and commitment to harm-avoidance principles. I (...) argue that the connection between moral alignment and safe behavior is more tenuous than many have hoped. In general, AI systems can possess either of these properties in the absence of the other, and we should favor safety when the two conflict. In particular, advanced AI systems governed by standard versions of deontology need not be especially safe. (shrink)

The way we represent the world in thought and language is shot through with indeterminacy: we speak of red apples and yellow apples without thereby committing to any sharp cutoff between the application of the predicate ‘red’ and of the predicate ‘yellow’. But can reality itself be indeterminate? In other words, can indeterminacy originate in the mind-independent world, and not only in our representations? If so, can the phenomenon also arise at the microscopic scale of fundamental physics? Section 1 of (...) this Element provides a brief overview of the question of indeterminacy. Section 2 discusses the thesis that the world is comprised of indeterminate objects, whereas Section 3 focuses on the thesis that there are indeterminate states of affairs. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to the case study of indeterminacy in quantum physics. (shrink)

Classical modalism about essence is the view that essence can be analysed in modal terms. Despite Kit Fine's influential critique, no general refutation of classical modalism has yet been given. In the first part of the paper, I provide such a refutation by showing that the notion of essence cannot be analysed in terms of any sentential operator definable in the language of standard quantified modal logic. As a reaction to Fine's critique, some have defended sophisticated modalism, which attempts to (...) analyse essence in an enriched modal language quantifying over both possible and impossible worlds. In the second part of the paper, I argue that sophisticated modalism falls prey to variations on Fine's counterexamples to classical modalism. I conclude that the most promising approaches to understanding the notion of essence consist in taking essence either as primitive or as analysable via a combination of modal and non-modal notions. (shrink)

Mathematicians often describe the importance of well-developed intuition to productive research and successful learning. But neither education researchers nor philosophers interested in epistemic dimensions of mathematical practice have yet given the topic the sustained attention it deserves. The trouble is partly that intuition in the relevant sense lacks a usefully clear characterization, so we begin by offering one: mature intuition, we say, is the capacity for fast, fluent, reliable and insightful inference with respect to some subject matter. We illustrate the (...) role of mature intuition in mathematical practice with an assortment of examples, including data from a sequence of clinical interviews in which a student improves upon initially misleading covariational intuitions. Finally, we show how the study of intuition can yield insights for philosophers and education theorists. First, it contributes to a longstanding debate in epistemology by undermining epistemicism, the view that an agent’s degree of objectual understanding is determined exclusively by their knowledge, beliefs and credences. We argue on the contrary that intuition can contribute directly and independently to understanding. Second, we identify potential pedagogical avenues towards the development of mature intuition, highlighting strategies including adding imagery, developing associations, establishing confidence and generalizing concepts. (shrink)

The way we answer questions about what there is crucially depends on the language and the logic in which they are framed. This entry introduces the orthodox view on how to carry out such debates, as was formulated by W. V. O. Quine, as well as a number of influential alternatives. A further issue that is explored is whether disagreement about what there is turns on mind-independent features of reality, or it is an artifact of language.

Ted Sider has famously argued that existence, in the unrestricted sense of ontology, cannot be vague, as long as vagueness is modeled by means of precisifications. The first section of Chapter 9 exposes some controversial assumptions underlying Sider’s alleged reductio of vague existence. The upshot of the discussion is that, although existence cannot be vague, it can be super-vague, i.e. higher-order vague, for all orders. The second section develops and defends a novel framework, dubbed negative supervaluationary semantics, which makes room (...) for the possibility of super-vague existence. (shrink)

Within emotion theory, envy is generally portrayed as an antisocial emotion because the relation between the envier and the rival is thought to be purely antagonistic. This paper resists this view by arguing that envy presupposes a sense of us. First, we claim that hostile envy is triggered by the envier's sense of impotence combined with her perception that an equality principle has been violated. Second, we introduce the notion of â hetero-induced self-conscious emotionsâ by focusing on the paradigmatic cases (...) of being ashamed or proud of somebody else. We describe envy as a hetero-induced self-conscious emotion by arguing that the impotence felt by the subject grounds the emotion's self-reflexivity and that the rival impacts the subject's self-assessment because the rival is framed by the subject as an in-group member. Finally, we elaborate on the asset at stake in envy. We contend that this is esteem recognition: The envier covets the esteem that her reference group accords to the rival. Because, in envy, the subject conceives of herself as member of a group to which the other is also understood to belong, we conclude that envy is a social emotion insofar as it presupposes a sense of us. (shrink)

Philosophers distinguish between having a property essentially and having it accidentally. The way the distinction has been drawn suggests that it is modal in character, and so that it can be captured in terms of necessity, or cognate notions. The present chapter takes the suggestion at face value by considering a number of modal characterizations of the essential/accidental distinction that have been articulated and discussed since the early 20th century, as well as some of the challenges that they face.

This paper is an example of how contextual information interacts with the interpretation of noun phrases (NPs) in discourse. When we encounter an NP escorted by the definite article or a proper name, the expectation is triggered that the speaker is referring to some referent x that the hearer can normally identify. Strawson and Russell have agreed that a referent must be associated with a definite description so that the assertion containing it can be said to be true. In the (...) case where a description does not refer to anything, the assertion is considered by Russell to be false, while Strawson says that the issue of truth or falsity does not arise. In this paper, we examine a case in which contextual information interacts with the interpretation of NPs in discourse and the hearer is not expected to identify a referent when hearing a proper name. In this case, the issue of truth or falsity does not arise, because the hearer does not identify the referent. In fact, s/he does not intend for the discourse to about a referent at all. These situations are primarily represented by sentences uttered during the course of a grammar lecture, in which the lecturer is explaining a rule of language and does not focus on external reality. The hearers are aware of this focus and do not process the NP (in general a proper name) to identify a specific referent. This discourse is of three types, which will be discussed at the end of this paper. -/- Keywords: reference; pragmeme; presupposition; fictional discourse; exemplification acts. (shrink)

The dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry (in textbooks, research papers, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic processes rather than social epistemic processes. We endorse the social epistemological turn in recent philosophical epistemology, and claim that a corresponding turn (...) is needed in the study of delusions. It is a turn from the (purely) individualistic conception, which characterizes delusions only by individualistic epistemic defects and abnormalities, to the (partially) social epistemic conception, which characterizes delusions by individualistic as well as social epistemic defects and abnormalities. This paper is intended as an initial step toward such a social epistemological turn. In particular, we will develop a new model of the development of delusions according to which testimonial abnormalities, including testimonial isolation and testimonial discount, are a causal factor in the development of delusions. (shrink)

The paper offers a systematic reconstruction of the relations that, in Husserl’s work, bind together our shared social world (“the spiritual world”) with shared intentionality. It is claimed that, by sharing experiences, persons create social reasons and that these reasons impose a normative structure on the social world. Because there are two ways in which persons can share experiences (depending on whether these experiences rest on mutual communication or on group’s identity), social normativity comes in two kinds. It is either (...) directed (it has an addressee) or it is collective or absolute (it applies to all group members). Social normativity should be distinguished from axiological normativity: The first is grounded in shared intentionality, the second in values. (shrink)

We show that the semi-linear ordering principle for continuous functions implies the determinacy of all Wadge and Lipschitz games.

In this paper, I distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic presuppositions. I also propose that we should be interested in conversational presuppositions, which could also be called speaker-meant presuppositions or speaker's presuppositions. I also distinguish between potential and actual presuppositions. I propose that, in some cases, presuppositions can be conversationally implicated and cancellation is possible. I specify what the hard cases are and I try to explain them through ontological considerations. I try to reduce the hard cases through (a) the notion (...) that all actual presuppositions are speaker-meant; (b) the distinction between ontological and linguistic presuppositions; and (c) the uncontroversial notion that even ontological presuppositions are susceptible to semantic under-determination that has to be tackled though pragmatic intrusion. Pragmatic intrusion for presuppositional cases, however, cannot really amount to completing or expanding or in any case computing an explicature in an ordinary sense, as explicatures have to do with truth-conditions and aim to create propositionally complete forms that are truth-evaluable, unlike propositional fragments or schemata that are usually expressed in sentences (; , 2012). They are processes similar to explicatures, but since presuppositions are only pre-conditions for an utterance's being true or false (; Macagno; 2016; ; ), we cannot say that these processes are completely like those of explicatures. Nevertheless, they are pragmatically-motivated, even if hard to cancel. (See on lack of cancellability or on entrenched meanings.) This more or less brings my approach in line with contextualism (even if I accept semantic invariantism, along the lines of or (Invariantism is also shared by , in a form that is compatible with her contextualism.)). (shrink)

Measurement results are stated in terms of sentences ascribing measured values, as obtained via measurement processes, to measurands, as defined by measuring agents. Since both the definition of the measurands and the characterization of the processes depend on models constructed on the basis of relevant theories, the issue arises of the theory dependence of the truth of those sentences. This paper aims at assessing the question by introducing suitable distinctions about the sense and reference of the terms used to refer (...) to individual and general quantities, in a framework where measurement is construed as an agent-dependent, model-based, purpose-driven activity. (shrink)

In this paper the notion of sensus communis, as articulated by Kant in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, is discussed from the vantage point of the author's project of exporting the model of exemplary universalism underlying reflective and, specifically, aesthetic judgment beyond the realm of aesthetics. In the first section, the relevance of such a project relative to an appraisal of the new and unsuperseded philosophical context opened by the Linguistic Turn is elucidated. Then the centrality of sensus (...) communis, for making sense of the specific universalism inherent in reflective judgment, is highlighted. In the second section, the limitations inherent in two opposite strategies for conceptualizing sensus communis are discussed: namely, the hermeneutic idea of a `horizon' and the phenomenological notion of a life-world on one hand, and the Kantian minimalist, naturalized concept of sensus communis on the other. The former is argued to become entangled in relativism, the latter to run against our intuitions concerning the inter-subjective constitution of the subject. In the final section, a third notion of sensus communis is offered, still compatible with the Kantian conception, different from the Gadamerian concept of a tradition or to the phenomenological notion of Lebenswelt, yet still capable of offering a plausible ground for the exemplary universalism of aesthetic judgment. Expanding on Kant's view of aesthetic pleasure, sensus communis is understood as consisting of a universal capacity, on the part of every human being, to sense from within a plurality of coordinates the flourishing of human life and what favours it. (shrink)

It has been argued that a combination of game-theoretic semantics and independence-friendly (IF) languages can provide a novel approach to the conceptual foundations of mathematics and the sciences. I introduce and motivate an IF first-order modal language endowed with a game-theoretic semantics of perfect information. The resulting interpretive independence-friendly logic (IIF) allows to formulate some basic model-theoretic notions that are inexpressible in the ordinary quantified modal logic. Moreover, I argue that some key concepts of Kripke’s new theory of reference are (...) adequately modeled within IIF. Finally, I compare the logic IIF to David Lewis' counterpart theory, drawing some morals concerning the interrelation between metaphysical and semantic issues in possible-world semantics. (shrink)

I introduce and defend the semantic notion of counterfactual identity, distinguishing it from the metaphysical notion of transworld identity. After showing that Lewis's counterpart theory misconstrues counterfactual identity facts, I outline and motivate a ‘Leibnizian counterpart theory’ where the notion of counterfactual identity is adequately modelled. Finally, I show that counterfactual identity can be characterized without relying on some implausible features of Lewis's theory of conditionals.

Este artículo presenta un enfoque del problema de la relación entre abducción y percepción en la filosofía de C. S. Peirce, tratando de mostrar la percepción y la abducción, o hipótesis, como procesos creativos capaces de introducir una novedad en el conocimiento. En primer lugar se muestra cómo cada conocimiento, incluso el lógico, está fundamentado en la experiencia de la percepción, y cómo esta presupone una continuidad cosmológica entre la mente y el mundo para poder funcionar. Sucesivamente se pone en (...) evidencia cómo la hipótesis no es nada más que aquel procedimiento que reconoce, como un relámpago, esta continuidad cosmológica de experiencia entre la mente y el mundo. Finalmente, la abducción se configura como un razonamiento que, libremente, obstruye y modifica el flujo continuo de. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss Baumgarten’s neglected doctrine of taste. In particular I investigate his definition of taste as the judgment of the senses against the backdrop of the philosophical debate of his day, pointing out the biblical and classical sources of the idea of a judging aisthesis. In addition, I analyse the radical change that the definition of taste as the judgment of the senses brings about in the idea of both taste and the judgment of the senses with (...) regard to Wolff. Highlighting the link with the issue of analogon rationis and beauty, I conclude that the concept of taste is at the core of Baumgarten’s new aesthetic project. (shrink)

Neste e no próximo artigo, buscamos articular a visão compreensiva arquitetônica de Peirce a respeito do fenômeno da retórica relacionando sua abordagem em Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing com seu tratamento na classificação muito negligenciado das ciências práticas. Neste artigo, primeiro, reconstruímos o principal eixo conceitual de Ideas, Stray or Stolen, que é erguido pelos termos ‘arte universal da retórica’, ‘retórica ordinária’, e ‘retórica especulativa’. Na medida em que este eixo nos guia para a classificação dos estudos especiais (...) da retórica que Peirce propõe na seção final de Ideas, Stray or Stolen, a cuidadosa reconstrução deste eixo constitui um dever hermenêutico, a negligência do qual impediria uma compreensão adequada do que Peirce está classificando no fim de sua abordagem mais madura da Retórica Especulativa. Em seguida, procedemos à exposição das raízes aristotélicas da concepção de Peirce da arte universal da retórica e analisamos a relação intrínseca que a semiose retórica tem com o summum bonum como uma de suas formas evolutivas históricas. Se esta interpretação da concepção de retórica do Peirce é adequado, no entanto, devemos esperar que ele nos dê em algum lugar uma descrição da capacidade de evolução da retórica – e portanto, de crescer – antes de tudo. Será a tarefa de um segundo artigo subsequente mostrar que e de que maneira a concepção de Peirce da a retórica como ciência prática e faculdade instintiva enraizado no “instinto gráfico” responde pela sua capacidade para o crescimento. (shrink)

Wittgenstein has written a great number of remarks relevant to aesthetical issues: he has questioned the relation between aesthetics and psychology as well as the status of our norms of judgment; he has drawn philosophers attention to such topics as aspect-seeing and aspect-dawning, and has brought insights into the nature of our aesthetic reactions. The examination of this wide range of topics is far from being completed, and the purpose of this book is to contribute to such completion. It gathers (...) both papers discussing some of Wittgenstein s most provocative and intriguing statements on aesthetics, and papers bringing out their implications for art critic and art history, as well as their significance to epistemology and to the study of human mind.". (shrink)

In a recent series of important papers, Søren Overgaard has defended a disjunctivist reading of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perception. According to Overgaard, Husserl commits to disjunctivism when arguing that hallucination intrinsically differs from perception because only experiences of the latter kind carry singular content and, thereby, pick out individuals. This paper rejects that interpretation by invoking the theory of intentionality developed by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. It is claimed that this theory not only lacks the notion of singular (...) content, but it also entails the idea that perceptions and hallucinations belong to the same kind of experience. If that is correct, a commitment to conjuctivism on Husserl’s end follows, pace Overgaard. (shrink)

We study the theory of K-vector spaces with a predicate for the union X of an infinite family of independent subspaces. We show that if K is infinite then the theory is complete and admits quantifier elimination in the language of K-vector spaces with predicates for the n-fold sums of X with itself. If K is finite this is no longer true, but we still have that a natural completion is near-model-complete.

: The multifaceted nature of the map animates a wide range of debates that reveal its interdisciplinary nature. Our goal is to overcome classical cognitivism harmonizing the fields of neuroscience, geography, and enactivism to promote a holistic view not only of the map, but also of human beings and, more specifically, of the dynamic subject-world relationship. We have retraced the spatiality of the body and described the spatial dimension of implicit and explicit bodily skills and properties involved in the exploration (...) of – and engagement with – the world. We believe that maps, which present space in isolation, cannot grasp the global quality of subjective experience: space and time are not separable concepts for a cognitive agent engaged in the world. Finally, going beyond the theory of the extended mind to extended consciousness, we argue that ecological mapping, mental mapping, and practical mapping are closely interrelated. Keywords: Mapping; Enactivism; Image; Perception; Extended Consciousness Sono una mente, quindi sono una mappa. La costruzione di mappe come processo spazio-temporale esteso Riassunto: La natura poliedrica della mappa anima una vasta gamma di dibattiti che rivelano la sua natura interdisciplinare. Nostro scopo è quello di superare il cognitivismo classico, armonizzando campi quali la neuroscienza, la geografia e l’enattivimo, per promuovere una visione olistica non solo della mappa, ma anche dell’essere umano e, più specificamente, del rapporto dinamico tra soggetto e mondo. Intendiamo ripercorrere la spazialità del corpo e descrivere la dimensione spaziale delle abilità e delle proprietà corporee implicite ed esplicite implicate nell’esplorazione del – e nel coinvolgimento con – il mondo. Crediamo che le mappe, che presentano lo spazio in maniera isolata, non possono cogliere la qualità globale dell’esperienza soggettiva: lo spazio e il tempo non sono concetti separabili per un agente cognitivo coinvolto nel mondo. Infine, passando dalla teoria della mente estesa a quella della coscienza estesa, intendiamo sostenere che la creazione di mappe ecologiche, mentali e pratiche sia un’attività profondamente interconnessa. Parole chiave: Mappatura; Enattivismo; Immagine; Percezione; Coscienza estesa. (shrink)

The axiom of dependent choice ( $\mathsf {DC}$ ) and the axiom of countable choice ( ${\mathsf {AC}}_\omega $ ) are two weak forms of the axiom of choice that can be stated for a specific set: $\mathsf {DC} ( X )$ asserts that any total binary relation on X has an infinite chain, while ${\mathsf {AC}}_\omega ( X )$ asserts that any countable collection of nonempty subsets of X has a choice function. It is well-known that $\mathsf {DC} \Rightarrow (...) {\mathsf {AC}}_\omega $. We study for which sets and under which hypotheses $\mathsf {DC} ( X ) \Rightarrow {\mathsf {AC}}_\omega ( X )$, and then we show it is consistent with $\mathsf {ZF}$ that there is a set $A \subseteq \mathbb {R}$ for which $\mathsf {DC} ( A )$ holds, but ${\mathsf {AC}}_\omega ( A )$ fails. (shrink)

This volume covers a wide range of topics that fall under the 'philosophy of quantifiers', a philosophy that spans across multiple areas such as logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and even the history of philosophy. It discusses the import of quantifier variance in the model theory of mathematics. It advances an argument for the uniqueness of quantifier meaning in terms of Evert Beth's notion of implicit definition, and clarifies the oldest explicit formulation of quantifier variance: the one proposed by Rudolf Carnap. The (...) volume further examines what it means that a quantifier can have multiple meanings, and addresses how existential vagueness can induce vagueness in our modal notions. Finally, the book explores the role played by quantifiers with respect to various kinds of semantic paradoxes, the logicality issue, ontological commitment, and the behavior of quantifiers in intensional contexts. (shrink)

An important thesis discussed in the literature on shared agency is that group identification motivates pre-school children to act together. This paper aims at further illuminating this thesis by clarifying what triggers the process of group identification in young children. It is argued that joint attention, among other functions in supporting joint actions, can reveal to the co-attenders that they share some preferences. Since sharing preferences has been established by the literature to be a reliable motivation of group identification and (...) since joint attention has an early emergence in development, one can consider joint attention to be a putative trigger of group identification in pre-school children. If this is on the right track, group identification, joint attention, and preferences identify a cluster of minimal pre-conditions for joint actions. (shrink)

Uma análise metodologicamente correta da profundidade e escopo da influência de Schiller sobre o pensamento maduro de Peirce requer três passos: uma análise preliminar das passagens que poderiam sustentar a hipótese de uma influência prolongada e, assim, poderá também indicar seus vetores sistemáticos. No caso de tal análise dar resultados positivos, tornar-se-ia necessário explorar as juvenilia que documentam a recepção inicial de Peirce de Schiller, para tentar identificar aquelas ideias que tornam inteligibilidade à re-emergência de Schiller no pensamento de Peirce (...) após 1900. Com base nos resultados que nossa contextualização arquitetônica preliminar das reminiscências de Peirce de seu estudo juvenil das Cartas Estéticas resultaram em um artigo duplo. O presente artigo foca nos segundo e terceiro passos. Logo, nosso propósito é mostrar que a tríplice aparência das categorias de Schiller fazem em seu disfarce – ora como momentos de determinação lógica, ora como estados mentais coletivo e individual de mentes socializadas moldadas pelas relações de unidades psíquicas elementares, e ora como estágios de processos históricos – primeiro agindo como o catalizador para o entendimento inicial de Peirce das deficiências da categoriologia de Kant e, consequentemente, foi ‘fadado’ à re-emergência posterior em consideração a determinar desafios arquitetônicos que Peirce encontrou-se confrontado enquanto trabalhava no redesenho da cenoscopia das ciências filosóficas nos anos de 1900 a 1903. A influência de Schiller exercida sobre Peirce, portanto, origina em sua prefiguração do conceito de Peirce de categorialidade e a coerência dos usos arquitetônicos que ela permite, em especial, como um meio para a estratificação prescisiva dos componentes – fenomenal, normativa e metafísico-entelequial –da experiência comum e os modos de racionalidade ali incorporadas. (shrink)

Em um artigo intimamente relacionado a este, mostramos que o estudo mais maduro de Peirce sobre a retórica especulativa, em Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing, nos convida a refletir e apreender o fenômeno da retórica em sua totalidade. Seguindo pistas aristotélicas, Peirce – implicitamente – diferencia três aspectos categoriais da ação retórica, diferenciando entre sua potencialidade [δύναμις] e perfeição [ἐντελέχεια] como uma faculdade instintiva de tornar signos eficazes em uma utópica arte universal, sua atualidade como um discurso prático (...) normativo historicamente eficaz e que molda a prática retórica [τέχνη], referida como retórica comum; e sua formalidade, articulada pela investigação puramente teórica [θεωρία] das condições necessárias da eficiência dos signos em geral, intitulada Retórica Especulativa. Assim como nosso modo de ser com os outros em um mundo comum de compartilhamento de propósitos, a retórica, tanto para Aristóteles quanto para Peirce, constitui uma forma semiótica do summum bonum, cujo cultivo é essencial para o crescimento da razoabilidade concreta em qualquer comunidade política e na civilização como um todo. No presente artigo, começamos reconstruindo o relato da retórica de Peirce, no quadro de sua classificação das ciências práticas, e depois mostramos como esse relato da retórica como uma faculdade enraizada no “Instinto Gráfico” confirma a análise que apresentamos no trabalho anterior. Na seção final, tentaremos esboçar em que sentido a importância de conceber a retórica como uma δύναμις com uma ἐντελέχεια específica, ou “potencialidade-ideia” do aperfeiçoamento do desenvolvimento, pode nos ajudar a apreciar o papel histórico emancipatório que Peirce atribui às Ciências Normativas. (shrink)

Amitav Ghosh's The Hungry Tide has been often interpreted from the point of view of postcolonial studies and environmental studies, overlooking the anthropological implications of the narrative. This paper investigates the worship and the myth of the sylvan deity Bonbibi, and of her counterpart, the demon Dakshin Rai. The goddess, endowed with an apotropaic function, protects the people who “do the forest” from the dangers of the wilderness, epitomized by tigers. According to anthropologist Annu Jalais, who accompanied Ghosh in the (...) Sundarbans when he was collecting material for the novel, Bonbibi is associated with a kind of forest ethics, which is owned by Fokir, the fisherman. This ethics, which in the novel remains in the background due to the urban viewpoint of the protagonists, very coherently explains otherwise eccentric behaviours and elusive answers of subaltern characters such as Fokir, Moyna and Horen. (shrink)

Ce livre se veut une lecture d'ensemble des reflexions que Wittgenstein a consacrees aux questions esthetiques concernant la musique. Il s'attache notamment a explorer les fonctions de l' entendre comme un outil conceptuel susceptible de nous aider a analyser nos manieres de comprendre cet art et a mieux definir ses proprietes expressives et son pouvoir emotionnel. Plus generalement, l'approfondissement de ces thematiques a pour objectif la definition d'une strategie pour re-penser l'acte performatif et l'experience auditive.

This article presents two studies that deepen the theme of how soundtracks shape our interpretation of audiovisuals. Embracing a multivariate perspective, Study 1 ( N = 118) demonstrated, through an online between-subjects experiment, that two different music scores (melancholic vs. anxious) deeply affected the interpretations of an unknown movie scene in terms of empathy felt toward the main character, impressions of his personality, plot anticipations, and perception of the environment of the scene. With the melancholic music, participants felt empathy toward (...) the character, viewing him as more agreeable and introverted, more oriented to memories than to decisions, while perceiving the environment as cozier. An almost opposite pattern emerged with the anxious music. In Study 2 ( N = 92), we replicated the experiment in our lab but with the addition of eye-tracking and pupillometric measurements. Results of Study 1 were largely replicated; moreover, we proved that the anxious score, by increasing the participants’ vigilance and state of alert (wider pupil dilation), favored greater attention to minor details, as in the case of another character who was very hard to be noticed (more time spent on his figure). Results highlight the pervasive nature of the influence of music within the process of interpretation of visual scenes. (shrink)

I. Dans un texte récent, le compositeur français Jean-Luc Hervé expose ainsi son projet d’une œuvre conçue pour un espace public, notamment un jardin : (…) une génération totalement aléatoire de son, si elle permet de varier continuellement le matériau sonore, interdit par définition toute construction musicale. Il est impossible par cette méthode de façonner des formes et de proposer à l’auditeur une écoute détaillée. Il ne peut reconnaître aucune forme, aucun objet musical (geste, phrase)....

The article examines some of the consequences of the migration of musical works in cyberspace, particularly with regard to their ways of being and the ways in which we listen to them. Streaming is interpreted as the last stage in the expansion of a phenomenon that arose with the advent of phonography, namely, the ubiquity and availability of the works. A new development consists in the production of musical units in modular terms: works can consist of independent parts, which can (...) be replaced or constituted, in an order that depends on the user, taking inspiration from the model of the playlist. The diffusion of works on the web has also facilitated the development of the remix practice, changing listening standards and generating new conceptual conflicts concerning the identity of the works. The web weakens the distinction between the medium of communication and the medium of recording. It also favors the formation of new cognitive dispositions and generates more flexible and interactive ways of listening, generally different from those implicated in the era of the disc. (shrink)

The multiplication of actors on the global scene displays how economics and political interdependences are plural and rooted, and how far are the States bonded to new political and economics subjects. The national space has no longer the centrality it acquired during modernity. This loss is due to the emergence of plural spaces in which the State – globalized and discontent – is forced to operate. However, the external bonds represented by this new economics of interdependences, are sided by the (...) transformations in the principles orienting the choices and the behaviours of individuals, interpreted as economic agents. Those principles do represent the inner bond of politics and the internal limits to the agency of the States. The economic governance of politics constitutes a new economics of interdependences and behaviours expressing, at the same time, the promotion and the management of subjectivities. It operates as a new ratio societatis : a new “global economic civilization”. (shrink)