The use of head-mounted displays (HMD) for virtual reality (VR) application-based purposes including therapy, rehabilitation, and training is increasing. Despite advancements in VR technologies, many users still experience sickness symptoms. VR sickness may be influenced by technological differences within HMDs such as resolution and refresh rate, however, VR content also plays a significant role. The primary objective of this systematic review and meta-analysis was to examine the literature on HMDs that report Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) scores to determine the impact (...) of content. User factors associated with VR sickness were also examined. A systematic search was conducted according to PRISMA guidelines. Fifty-five articles met inclusion criteria, representing 3,016 participants (mean age range 19.5-80; 41% female). Findings show gaming content recorded the highest total SSQ mean 34.26 (95%CI 29.57-38.95). VR sickness profiles were also influenced by visual stimulation, locomotion and exposure times. Older samples (mean age ≥35 years) scored significantly lower total SSQ means than younger samples, however, these findings are based on a small evidence base as a limited number of studies included older users. No sex differences were found. Across all types of content, the pooled total SSQ mean was relatively high 28.00 (95%CI 24.66-31.35) compared with recommended SSQ cut-off scores. These findings are of relevance for informing future research and the application of VR in different contexts. (shrink)

Institutional review board delays may hinder the successful completion of federally funded research in the U.S. military. When this happens, time-sensitive, mission-relevant questions go unanswered. Research participants face unnecessary burdens and risks if delays squeeze recruitment timelines, resulting in inadequate sample sizes for definitive analyses. More broadly, military members are exposed to untested or undertested interventions, implemented by well-intentioned leaders who bypass the research process altogether. To illustrate, we offer two case examples. We posit that IRB delays often appear in (...) the service of managing institutional risk, rather than protecting research participants. Regulators may see more risk associated with moving quickly than risk related to delay, choosing to err on the side of bureaucracy. The authors of this article, all of whom are military-funded researchers, government stakeholders, and/or human subject protection experts, offer feasible recommendations to improv... (shrink)

Albert Musschenga | : The central question of this article is, Are animals morally responsible for what they do? Answering this question requires a careful, step-by-step argument. In sections 1 and 2, I explain what morality is, and that having a morality means following moral rules or norms. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that some animals show not just regularities in their social behaviour, but can be rightly said to follow social norms. But are the norms they (...) follow also moral norms? In section 5, I contend, referring to the work of Shaun Nichols, that the basic moral competences or capacities are already present in nonhuman primates. Following moral rules or norms is more than just acting in accordance to these norms; it requires being motivated by moral rules. I explain, in section 6, referring to Mark Rowlands, that being capable of moral motivation does not require agency; being a moral subject is sufficient. Contrary to moral agents, moral subjects are not responsible for their behaviour. Stating that there are important similarities between animal moral behaviour and human, unconscious, automatic, habitual behaviour, I examine in section 7 whether humans are responsible for their habitual moral behaviour, and if they are, what then the grounds are for denying that moral animals are responsible for their behaviour. The answer is that humans are responsible for their habitual behaviour if they have the capacity for deliberate intervention. Although animals are capable of intervention in their habitual behaviour, they are not capable of deliberate intervention. | : La question centrale dans cet article est celle de savoir si les animaux sont moralement responsables de ce qu’ils font. Répondre à cette question nécessite une argumentation minutieuse et progressive. Dans les sections 1 et 2, j’explique ce qu’est la moralité, et qu’être doté de moralité signifie de se conformer à des règles ou à des normes morales. Dans les sections 3 et 4, je pose que certains animaux ne se contentent pas de montrer des régularités dans leur comportement social, mais qu’ils suivent aussi véritablement des normes sociales. Toutefois, les normes qu’ils suivent sont-elles morales? Dans la section 5, je prétends, en me référant aux travaux de Shaun Nichols, que les compétences ou capacités morales de base sont déjà présentes chez les primates non humains. Respecter des règles ou des normes morales est bien plus que d’agir conformément à ces normes; cela requiert d’être motivé par des règles morales. Dans la section 6, me référant à Mark Rowlands, j’explique que d’être capable de motivation morale ne nécessite pas d’être un agent moral; le fait d’être un sujet moral suffit. Contrairement aux agents moraux, les sujets moraux ne sont pas responsables de leur comportement. Affirmant qu’il y a de grandes similitudes entre le comportement moral d’un animal et le comportement inconscient, automatique et habituel d’un humain, je me penche, dans la section 7, sur la question de savoir si les humains sont responsables de leur comportement moral habituel, et si tel est le cas, sur quelle base on peut alors nier le fait que les animaux sont eux aussi responsables de leur comportement. La réponse à cette question est que les humains sont responsables de leur comportement habituel s’ils disposent d’une capacité d’intervention réfléchie, délibérée. Bien que les animaux soient capables d’intervenir dans leurs comportements habituels, ils ne peuvent le faire de manière réfléchie, délibérée. (shrink)

Lévi-Strauss's centennial is an opportunity to show his inextricable connections with the evolution of 20th-century thought and what these promise for 21st-century anthropology. He has mapped the philosophical parameters for a renewed ethnography which opens innovative approaches to history, agency, culture and society. The anthropological understanding of history, for instance, is enriched by methodical application of his mytho-logical analysis, in particular his claim that myths are `machines for the suppression of time'. Lévi-Strauss's thought has led to the development of new (...) and invigorated forms of structural analysis, exemplified by the way that his concept of canonical expression has provided the foundation for the sophisticated application of transformational analysis and formalization. (shrink)

In standard Albanian studies and Western scholarship, including either any interested religious and political activism or less 'interested' lay people, endeavours of historical and textual fact-finding have been relevant for only to re-confirm and indeed perpetuate the very meaning of a myth, according to which the thinking of Naim Frasheri was formed and dominated by Bektashism and that his 'Albanianism' had a Bektashi foundation. In this paper I intend to scrutinize and disprove this, arguing that while Frasheri did indeed have (...) a religious cast of thought, his religious thinking went far beyond Bektashism in its heterodoxy, being a kind of liberation theology and pantheism which generated an all-inclusive attitude to Albanian identity, not one limited in any special way to Bektashism. Methodologically, such a picture must arise if we submit the available empirical evidence to critical analysis from the perspective of social theoretical approaches to religion developed in sociology and anthropology. (shrink)

To single out "time" or "temporality" as the most important concept within a philosophical framework attempting to delineate "reality" immediately raises the question of how to situate temporality itself. I will distinguish only two ways of situating time, because they both appear to be simple and straightforward, and because they establish a sufficient framework for the incipient theory I propose briefly elaborating. On the one hand, temporality can certainly be situated in terms of cosmological and biological evolution. And on the (...) other hand, it is certainly the case that temporality has been situated in terms of the evolution of mind or of the development of consciousness. It is of interest to note that these two ways of situating time are analogous to the two sides of what is frequently called "the body/mind problem," and they seem to carry analogous implications. (shrink)

The Jewish exegete and philosopher Philo of Alexandria has long been famous for his complex and spiritually rich allegorical treatises on the Greek Bible. The present volume presents first translation and commentary in English on his treatise De plantatione (On planting), following on the volume devoted to On cultivation published previously by the same two authors. Philo gives a virtuoso performance as allegorist, interpreting Noah's planting of a vineyard in Genesis 9.20 first in theological and cosmological terms, then moving to (...) the spiritual quest of both of advanced souls and those beginning their journey. The translation renders Philo's baroque Greek into readable modern English. The commentary pays particular attention to the treatise's structure, its biblical basis and its exegetical and philosophical contents. (shrink)

This chapter addresses two questions: Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? Is the analytic/synthetic distinction cogent? The epistemic significance of the first derives from the assumption that synthetic a priori knowledge raises difficult explanatory problems that are circumvented by analytic a priori knowledge. The epistemic significance of the second derives from the assumption that if the analytic/synthetic distinction is not cogent, then the cogency of the a priori/a posteriori distinction is also doubtful. It is argued that both assumptions are false, (...) and that resolving the controversies surrounding these two questions is not necessary to answer the primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge. (shrink)

This is my response to the papers by Chris Pincock, Lisa Warenski and Jonathan Weinberg, which were presented at the Book Symposium on my Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings, March 16–19, 2014.