Here the philosopher and physicist David Z Albert argues, among other things, that the difference between past and future can be understood as a mechanical phenomenon of nature and that quantum mechanics makes it impossible to present the entirety of what can be said about the world as a narrative of “befores” and “afters.”.

There are many similarities between the Christian concept of the Seven Deadly Sins, the Stoic concept of internal events, the Hebrew concept of 'awon (sin, punishment), and the existential concept of bad faith. All of these evidence a concern for an internalization of sin or bad faith, which is more common in Eastern than Western religions. These four views are contrasted with the English concept synne which represents the Western extemalization of sin or bad faith. This existential interpretation includes an (...) exploration of 'awon in the Cain and Abel story as well as several reflections concerning the difference between bad faith and good faith. (shrink)

The political theory of the property-owning democracy can be seen as a way of overcoming the ideological conflict between individualism and collectivism. Rawls offers the contemporary reference-point for this theory. Rawls contrasted the ideal-type of the property-owning democracy with the ideal-type of a capitalist welfare state. However, the terms of that contrast are not well drawn and raise a number of questions, in particular regarding Rawls’s a priori specification of the welfare state. An inductively derived specification of ideal-typical welfare states (...) suggests that horizontal redistribution, in line with the principle of social savings, is more important than vertical redistribution. Rawls’s preference for a social dividend or negative income tax scheme can be contrasted with the use of social insurance, but the latter has a claim to instantiate Rawlsian ideals better than a social dividend. There is a potential problem with the pre-emption of private savings in the welfare state, but this turns out not to be troublesome empirically or conceptually. The irony of the discussion is that those who have interpreted Rawlsian theory as justifying the welfare state have the better of the argument, despite Rawls’s own views. (shrink)

As Descartes noted, a proper account of the nature of the being one is begins with a basic self present in first-person experience, a self that one cannot cogently doubt being. This paper seeks to uncover such a self, first within consciousness and thinking, then within the lived or first-person felt body. After noting the lack of grounding of Merleau-Ponty’s commonly referenced reflections, it undertakes a phenomenological investigation of the body that finds the basic self to reside in one’s espoused (...) feelings and striving, both bodily in nature. It then examines the relationship of the lived body to the visual body and to the body studied by science. Two issues concerning that relationship are taken up. It is concluded that on the available evidence neither the apparent agency nor the apparent free will of the lived body is illusory. (shrink)

Starting with the hypothesis that during this first decade of the 21st century a certain territorial culture has spread that implies greater awareness of landscape on the part of the authorities, the economic and social agents who exercise a degree of leadership in territorial matters and the general public, this article sets out to analyse the possibility that a new ethics of landscape is beginning to take shape. The notion of landscape as proposed by the European Convention in Florence in (...) 2000 looks at the idea of the social construction of landscape. In this new paradigm, landscape is conceived as a social product, the cultural projection of a society in a given space from a material, spiritual and symbolic standpoint. Landscape is understood to be inherently dynamic and changing. When the elements that give a particular landscape its historical and cultural continuity are suddenly removed and its sense of place is lost, we are seeing not evolution in the landscape but its destruction. And the very idea of intervention in these landscapes gives rise to the need for principles and moral values that will provide guidelines that allow landscapes, whether unique or commonplace, to evolve without being destroyed. As I see it, therefore, there is an obvious need for an ethics applicable to regional and landscape planning and management. The new ethics of landscape must be based on the ethics of responsibility, taking into account the dignity of nature, the rights of future generations to enjoy quality landscapes and the rights and duties of today's citizens whose interventions transform landscapes and with them their collective identity, their quality of life, their physical and social welfare and, in short, their happiness. (shrink)