When Albert Hunt joined the staff of the Regional College of Art, Bradford, in 1965, he found himself working mostly with ‘non-academic’ students on a fascinating range of games, projects and theatre events outside the main stream of exam-oriented education. In this title, first published in 1976, Albert Hunt describes this experience, and explains how he himself evolved from a conventional grammar school teacher to a radical and experimental educator. In particular, Hunt describes the evolution (...) of new working relationships between teachers and students, which in turn highlight an alternative way of viewing society. _Hopes for Great Happenings_ is not only a vividly interesting account of Albert Hunt’s teaching methods, but is of practical value to anybody involved in the study of liberal arts, theatre studies or in community arts work. (shrink)

A Nobel Prize winner, Dr. Szent-Györgyi concerns himself with the underlying forces and conditions that have prevented the realization of the higher possibilities of the American Dream, and, by extension, of all mankind. He addresses himself especially to the youth of the world in his attempt to show how man, the more he progresses technologically, seems the more to regress psychologically and socially, until he resembles his primate ancestors in a state of high schizophrenia. The fundamental question asked by this (...) book is: Why is it that most of the scientific research that is done to elevate human life serves in the end to destroy it? That this phenomenon exists is unarguable. How to alter it is the problem the author tackles. He finds the possibility, indeed the instrument of our survival, in our youth. Dr. Szent-Györgyi calls upon youth the world over to organize and exercise their power to create a new world. He implores them not to waste their energies in petulance and frustration-the world is ripe for the radical changes needed for man's survival, and for youth to fritter away their opportunity would be to compound the tragedy and seal the fate of mankind. Born into the fourth generation of a noted family of scientists in Hungary, Albert Szent-Györgyi decided at an early age to devote his life to biological research. As a medical student he required international recognition for his studies in microscopic anatomy. The First World War, which he spent in the service of the Austro-Hungarian army, caused a break in his career. After the war he left his devastated country to work for ten years in various countries, notably Germany, Holland, England and the United States. He then returned to his native Hungary to help rebuild science there. In 1937, he won the Nobel Prize for his studies on metabolism and for the discovery of ascorbic acid (Vitamin C). He soon found himself in conflict with the growing movement of Nazism, was arrested, escaped, and was hunted for years by the secret service of Hitler. After World War II, disappointed by Soviet colonialism and the terrorist methods of Stalin, he left Hungary and found refuge at the Marine Biological Laboratory of Woods Hole, Massachusetts. (shrink)

The literature on ethical decision-making is rooted in a cognitive perspective that emphasizes the role of moral judgment. Recent research in interpersonal dynamics, however, has suggested that ethics revolves around an individual’s perceptions and views of others. We draw from both literatures to propose and empirically examine a contingent model. We theorize that whether the individual relies on cognitions about the ethical issue or perceptions of others depends on the level of social consensus surrounding the issue. We test our hypotheses (...) in three studies. Results suggest that not only does social consensus determine whether an individual relies on ethical cognitions about the issue or perceptions of others, but also that an individual’s view of self is an important moderator in these relationships. We conclude by considering implications of this research for theory and practice. (shrink)

This essay focuses on how casuistry can become a useful technique of practical reasoning for the clinical ethicist or ethics consultant. Casuistry is defined, its relationship to rhetorical reasoning and its interpretation of cases, by employing three terms that, while they are not employed by the classical rhetoricians and casuists, conform, in a general way, to the features of their work. Those terms are (1) morphology, (2) taxonomy, (3) kinetics. The morphology of a case reveals the invariant structure of the (...) particular case whatever its contingent features, and also the invariant forms of argument relevant to any case of the same sort: these invariant features can be called topics. Taxonomy situates the instant case in a series of similar cases, allowing the similarities and differences between an instant case and a paradigm case to dictate the moral judgment about the instant case. This judgment is based, not merely on application of an ethical theory or principle, but upon the way in which circumstances and maxims appear in the morphology of the case itself and in comparison with other cases. Kinetics is an understanding of the way in which one case imparts a kind of moral movement to other cases, that is, different and sometimes unprecedented circumstances may move certain marginal or exceptional cases to the level of paradigm cases. In conclusion, casuistry is the exercise of prudential or practical reasoning in recognition of the relationship between maxims, circumstances and topics, as well as the relationship of paradigms to analogous cases. (shrink)

In the recent literature on concepts, two extreme positions concerning animal minds are predominant: the one that animals possess neither concepts nor beliefs, and the one that some animals possess concepts as well as beliefs. A characteristic feature of this controversy is the lack of consensus on the criteria for possessing a concept or having a belief. Addressing this deficit, we propose a new theory of concepts which takes recent case studies of complex animal behavior into account. The main aim (...) of the paper is to present an epistemic theory of concepts and to defend a detailed theory of criteria for having concepts. The distinction between nonconceptual, conceptual, and propositional representations is inherent to this theory. Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that some animals, e.g., grey parrots and apes, operate on conceptual representations. (shrink)

Two leaves of typescript and 7 leaves of galley proofs with corrections in Einstein's hand for the article "Relativity" in American Peoples Encyclopedia.

Im Folgenden wird der Versuch unternommen, ausgehend von John Deweys Kunst als Erfahrung ein Verständnis des Kitsches als ästhetischer Untugend zu entwickeln. Dabei wird der leitenden Frage des Bandes, ob Kunst moralisch sein muss, in der Weise begegnet, dass nach der spezifischen moralischen Wirkungsweise von Kunstwerken gefragt wird. Nachdem entgegen einer Dichotomisierung von Kunst und Moral die Leistung moderner Literatur und Kunst darin erkannt wird, die Grenzen lebensleitender moralischer Begriffe und Werte anschaulich zu machen und damit Lern- und Reflexionsprozesse auszulösen, (...) wird Kitsch als Umkehr dieser Wirkungsweise von Kunst aufgearbeitet. Kitsch stabilisiert demnach moralische Überzeugungen, Wertvorstellungen und Lebensmodelle, indem er eine sinnliche Welt vor Augen führt, die einen stetigen Resonanzraum letzterer darstellt. Vom Befund ausgehend, dass sein ideologischer Gebrauch in der Natur des Kitsches angelegt ist, wird schließlich Krieg – und insbesondere der gegenwärtige Krieg in Europa – als ein Anlass betrachtet, der die Untugend der Kunst zum Gedeihen bringt. -/- The following paper aims at developing an understanding of Kitsch as an aesthetic vice, drawing mainly upon John Dewey’s Art as Experience. Does art have to be moral? - the guiding question of this volume is addressed by reflecting on the specific operativity of art in moral terms. The genuine force of modern art and literature lies, contrary to a dichotomic view of the relation of morality and the arts, in showing the limits of concepts and values guiding the recipient and therefore activating processes of learning and reflection. It is then argued that Kitsch is the inversion of such an activity. Kitsch stabilizes moral convictions, value orientations and thus ways of life by creating an image of the world that resonates with the latter. Following the observation that Kitsch has a manifest affinity to be used for ideological purposes, war – with focus on the current war in Europe – is considered a primal occasion for the thriving of the aesthetic vice. (shrink)

The narrow-the-scope proposal for defining racism posits that a narrow definition is preferable to a wide definition because the former better facilitates interracial dialogue. Important critiques of the narrow-the-scope proposal have so far focused on the content of narrow definitions. This paper argues that it is important to critique the use of narrow definitions, as well. An examination of white uses of the term “racism” reveals that narrow definitions tend to be interchangeable with individualist definitions, as individualism is an effective (...) framework for white co-optation in the service of white interests. Consequently, philosophers interested in theorizing racism for racial justice purposes ought to reject the narrow-the-scope proposal. Individualist forms of racism should be accommodated within a wide conception of racism that centers the phenomenon of white racism. (shrink)

This is the first collected volume dedicated to Olympiodorus of Alexandria, the last pagan Platonic philosopher at the end of antiquity.

We argue that thinking of the man-machine comparison in terms of a contest involves, in a reasonable scenario, a criterion of success that is neutral. This is because we want to avoid a petitio principii. We submit, however, that, by looking at things this way, one makes the most essential human things invisible. Thus, in a sense, the contest approach is self-defeating.

Dans un climat où l'indifférence massive à l'égard de la religion suscite l'exaltation identitaire, Albert Rouet propose une voie singulière : vivre la foi chrétienne comme l'expérience d'un Dieu incarné dans des gestes quotidiens, désirable, c'est-à-dire bon pour vivre. Que signifie croire dans un monde qui n'est plus séparé en deux, d'un côté le profane et ses contingences matérielles et de l'autre le sacré et ses préoccupations spirituelles? De quoi peut témoigner la foi chrétienne dans une société où "la (...) Bourse est devenue un temple et le foot une grande messe"? C'est à cette question essentielle que se confronte Albert Rouet. Au lieu de gémir sur l'état de la société actuelle en déplorant son indifférence massive à l'égard de la pratique religieuse, l'ancien archevêque de Poitiers propose un christianisme qui se déprend d'un sacré aliénant pour s'engager "dans les domaines où l'humanité joue les conditions de son existence : la justice et la paix, la dignité et le respect". En se démarquant de la volonté de constituer des citadelles chrétiennes pour faire face à l'indifférence, cet essai dessine les traits d'une foi chrétienne qui accepte de se laisser questionner par le désir. Aux antipodes de la figure d'un Dieu qui juge "d'en haut" les conduites des femmes et des hommes, Albert Rouet trace, en s'appuyant sur la tradition biblique, notamment les récits évangéliques, une voie autre : faire du dialogue avec Dieu, le lieu où l'existence se creuse, une expérience où l'insatisfaction du désir n'est pas comblée par la possession et la consommation toujours plus grandes d'objets. Loin de se limiter un nouveau discours, cet essai très argumenté invite à vivre le christianisme comme une expérience qui libère le désir car "quand des hommes disent ne plus croire à rien, il leur reste encore à mieux devenir humains... Ouvrir sa porte débouche sur l'inconnu de tous les possibles". En se mettant à l'écoute des récits que font les hommes de leur vie, la foi chrétienne peut se vivre au quotidien : elle devient alors cette "sortie de soi vers le bien de l'autre qui caractérise le lieu où Dieu peut être cité". (shrink)

Radical empiricism is the view that experience is the only source of knowledge. Hence, radical empiricism denies the existence of a priori knowledge. Its most famous proponents are John Stuart Mill and W. V. Quine. Although both reject a priori knowledge, they offer different empiricist accounts of the knowledge alleged by their opponents to be a priori. My primary concern in this paper is not with the cogency of their positive accounts. My focus is their arguments against a priori knowledge. (...) My goal is to establish that although they offer very different arguments against the existence of a priori knowledge, each of their arguments suffers from a common defect. They both fail to appreciate the phenomenon of epistemic overdetermination and its role in the theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Recently, scholars have argued that disclosure of personal information is an effective mechanism for building high-quality relationships. However, personal information can focus attention on differences in demographically diverse teams. In an experiment using 37 undergraduate teams, we examine how sharing personal information by ethnically similar and ethnically distinct newcomers to a team affects team perceptions, performance, and behavior. Our findings indicate that the disclosure of personal information by ethnically distinct newcomers improves team performance. However, the positive impact on team performance (...) comes at a cost to the newcomers, who are perceived as less competent by others and experience heightened social discomfort in team interactions. Ironically, what benefits the ethnically diverse team may undermine its ethnically distinct members. This study highlights how the management of diversity may sometimes require making trade-offs between individual interests and those of the team. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

"La Philosophie de M. Bergson" d'Albert Farges est un ouvrage qui explore la philosophie du célèbre philosophe français Henri Bergson. Albert Farges était un philosophe et un écrivain français du XIXe et du XXe siècle, et son livre offre une analyse et une interprétation de la pensée philosophique de Bergson. Henri Bergson était un philosophe majeur de la philosophie française au tournant du XIXe et du XXe siècle, et il est surtout connu pour ses travaux sur la philosophie (...) de la durée, de la créativité et de l'évolution. Son œuvre a eu une influence significative sur la philosophie, la littérature et la science de son époque. "La Philosophie de M. Bergson" de Farges peut examiner en détail les concepts philosophiques clés de Bergson, tels que l'élan vital, la durée, la mémoire, l'intuition, et d'autres. Il peut également explorer la manière dont les idées de Bergson ont été reçues et discutées dans le contexte intellectuel de son époque. Cet ouvrage d'Albert Farges peut servir de ressource précieuse pour ceux qui souhaitent comprendre la philosophie complexe et novatrice de Bergson et son impact sur la philosophie moderne. (shrink)