This article discusses a particular example of the intelligent design argument, which is one of the theistic arguments put forward to prove the existence of God. The intelligent design argument, in contrast to evolutionary theory, is central to the debate between religion and science. In this context, the problem that the article deals with is the validity and persuasiveness of William A. Dembski's design argument based on spatial regularities. Both historical and contemporary versions of design arguments mainly focus on spatial (...) regularities. However, with the widespread acceptance of evolutionary theory in scientific and philosophical circles, design arguments based on spatial regularities have been severely criticized. The article aims to examine a contemporary example of design arguments based on spatial regularities, and to determine whether it maintains its strength against the objections originating from the theory of evolution. Literature review, one of the qualitative data collection methods, was used in the study, and the data were philosophically evaluated in terms of consistency and defensibility. This subject, which has a very comprehensive place in the debates in the context of philosophy of religion, science and religion, is limited to Dembski's proof and objections to him. As a result of this study, it will be argued that Dembski's design argument based on spatial regularities is not convincing enough in the face of criticisms originating from the theory of evolution. (shrink)

Review of Charles Ray's recent show, Figure Ground, at The Metropolitan Museum of Art.

A salient tradition in contemporary affect theory heavily relies on distinguishing between emotions and affects. The former refers to structured categories of socially coded affective states, while the latter denotes the pre-social libidinal flow underlying emotions. This distinction is commonly attributed to Spinoza and is thought to have been further developed by Deleuze. In this article, I argue that this overall historical picture is misleading and inaccurate. Deleuze radically transforms Spinoza’s theory of affect for the ends of his own ethical-political (...) philosophy. Moreover, I argue that Deleuzian and similar conceptualizations of affect fail to fulfill their political and ethical promises due to two critical problems. In the last section, I show that a unified notion of emotion inspired by Spinoza, which does not create a sharp rift between emotions and affect, can perform the same explanatory function intended by the emotion-affect distinction while allowing us to circumvent these problems. (shrink)

A commissioned article about philosopher of ecology Levi Bryant, and his theory of urban space.

Ijmā is ranked as the third shariah evidence after the Qur’ān and Sunnah in the science of Uṣūl. Shafi was the first one who made Uṣūl which had been known and used by the Islamic scholars, into a written document and who ascertained that Ijmā was the third of the shariah evidences. Kalām is one of the sciences in which Ijmā evidence is used. The scholars of Kalām used this evidence as far as the science of Uṣūl made it possible. (...) They always used it without changing any basics of religious beliefs and acceptances. That the aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been supported with Ijmā which is regarded as one of naqly evidences, played an important role in eliminating suspicions which were tried to be aroused in momins’ mind. In this article, the function and importance of Ijmā evidence, which is one of the primary sources of the science of Uṣūl, in the science of Kalām and Aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been studied.SummaryWhat the Qur’ān demands from us is to emphasize the spirit of unity among ummah and to keep out the factors that could trigger separation and division. Indeed, Allah emphasizes in the following verses in the Qur’ān on the protection of the unitary structure of the ummah: “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided” (Āl a-Imrān 3/103) and “And do not be like the ones who became divided and differed after the clear proofs had come to them” (Āl al-Imrān 3/105). Allah has commanded the Ulul ‘Azm Prophets to hold the religion upright and to avoid division. (al-Shūrā 42/13). The command of holding the religion upright and not to be divided in this religion means to certify what needs to be confirmed in the religion of Allah and to obey those that must be obeyed. This is also the proclamation of the principle of religion that all the prophets have consensus over.Ahl al-Sunnah understanding of Islam is identical to the understanding of the Prophet and his companions. For this reason, Ahl al-Sunna is the school that represents the main backbone of Islam. In Ahl al-Sunna, in many subjects, be it usūlî / primary or furū’ī / secondary, there has been ijmā. These ijmās are Sahaba ijmās and deductive ijmās that come from mutakallimūn (theologians) ijtihāds. Therefore, ijmā and ijtihād are closely connected to each other. Ijmā is supported by ijtihād and ijtihād is also the source of ijmā. Thus, the issue is no longer just a pure ijtihād; it turns out to be a degree that gives a solid knowledge after it has risen to some degree just after the nass/texts.Ahl al- Sunnah theologians are talking about two kinds of ijmā. The first is “ijmā taṣdīqī” (approval consensus) which is the consensus based on Sahaba İjmā. These are the ijmās that occur on the principles called ḍaruratal-diniyya (necessities of the religion), and accepted as solid proofs in religion. Issues such as the principles of faith, obligation of prayer and the fasting are the subjects that are determined by the solid/definite ijmā. Such ijmās are valid approvals on existing provisions. These ijmās based on solid nass (verses and hadiths). Such ijmās do not give any new information. The existing information is strengthened by the alliance of Muslims. In these areas, ijtihād cannot be done and Muslims do not need ijtihād on these issues. There is an consensus of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars about the unfaithfulness of the one who denies one or more of the principles which are accepted as the main obligatory principles in Islam. The other is the “deductive ijmā which the ijtihāds have roles over. This kind of ijmās, are formed as a result of mujtahids’ consensus over the same opinion on the issue of theological secondary issues. The issues related to the secondary theological issues which were open to the ijtihāds and the different results obtained on matters are not accepted as the cause of takfīr. However, depending on the subject he/she can be a sinner. Istidlālī/deductive ijmās are not considered as an independent proofs in ‘Ilm al-Kalām, rather a supportive ones and are considered as textual evidences.Since, texts that are accepted as sources give supposed information. In this regard, the Ahl al-Sunnah scholars accepted other members of the sect who have in secondary theological issues opposed the ijmā of the salaf / predecessor as Ahl al-Qibla, but named them as Ahl al-Bid’a (innovator in religion) because of their opposition to Salaf’s İjmās. Moreover, the scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah did not see them appropriate to participate in the Ijmās, which could occur between the generations that come after Sahābas/companions.Not all disputes have been criticized in Islam. It is a blessing for the ummah to claim different opinions on the issues subject to ijtihād. Since the ummah, in this way, will bring new solutions to emerging issues and as a result, Islam will have a mechanism to produce a dynamic solution. This can only be possible through ijtihād. Dispute is to propose different views on a subject. If this view is not in the actual matters that could harm the unity of the Ummah, rather in the case of ijtihādi issues, this conflict could turn to be mercy.The reason why the methodists evaluate the ijmā within the scope of the authorized evidence is that because they think it is essential that the ijmā be based on a proof. From this point of view, the alliances that occurred in mental matters were not considered as ijmā. The theologians always tried to support their claims with nass/textual proofs. When the ijmā is realized, whether known or not, they have stated that there is certainly a religious proof behind it. Because, the provisions that were reached through ijmā, cannot be against the provisions of the Prophet.Many issues in Islamic Belief and Kalām works are supported by the mental and textual evidences as well as by deductive ijmā. However, many of the claims of Ijmās in these works reflect the inter-sect ijmās of the Ahl al-Sunnah. The sects outside the Ahl al-Sunnah were excluded. This attitude is, above all, the aim of ensuring the integrity within the sect, and trying to protect the Ahl al-Sunnah belief. Since the ijmā evidence has a function that prevents all kinds of arbitrary and divisive thoughts and turns the supposed knowledge into the qat’ī/certain one, it raises the provision to the next level just after the nass, rather than merely being a ijtihādi provision. In the case of the forerunner of the Ahl al-Sunnah, the Māturīdes and Ash‘arites have not differed in in understanding of ijmā in terms of methodology.Although they have different views on the definition and content of the ijmā, they have a common understanding of alliances of Mujtahids on the same view. The mutakallims (theologians) of Māturīdī and Ash’arī schools have used the proof of ijmā as supportive evidence in the cases related to Kalām. al-Ash’arī not only adopted the proof of ijmā but also used it in practice in. He did not make any distinction in proof of ijmā as practical, theological, methodological or sub-divisional; he used it freely in every field. Māturīdī and Ash’arī scholars decided that the ijmā could occur in religious matters and that there would be evidence when it was formed; In the case of mental issues, they have required the knowledge to be based on solid information. In the case of ijmā in purely mental issues, they have disputed over the issue. While some Ahl al-Sunnah scholars stated that since purely mental matters were certain knowledge and therefore don’t need ijmā, they also ruled that because the mujtahids could get this knowledge from religious texts, therefore ijmā could occur in mental matters as well. (shrink)

The concepts of “Islamic Fundamentalism” and “Islamic Terrorism” are the usual suspects in the present political reality and discourse. After the tragic events in New York, Madrid, Istanbul, and London, one has every reason to think that Islam is somehow a part of the problem. But in terms of the issues that we currently face, we must be careful to distinguish between understanding and the creation of scapegoats. There is no doubt that a terrorist act is unjustifiable, and it must (...) be categorically condemned in every situation. We must resolutely fight against any claim to the contrary. Even so, the…. (shrink)

Both Peter Sloterdijk and Richard David Precht have characteristics of the so-called media intellectuals in their gesture and appearance and also implicitly refer to the protection of human rights. Whereby Sloterdijk seems to be focused on the rights of the individual and his individual interests, a Richard David Precht is more focused on community as well as individual interests. It will be briefly outlined how they can be viewed as representatives of two media tendencies of the media public in the (...) German public - or to establish certain contradictions. (shrink)

This paper seeks to show how Kant’s epistemological conception of the transcendental faculties of cognition relates to his ontological conception of the transcendental distinction between mind-dependent, ideal appearances (viz., empirical objects) and mind-independent, transcendentally real things in themselves, as they relate to the self. I engage the metaphysical foundations of Kant’s account of self-consciousness and how this account relates to the self as an empirically perceivable and conceptualizable object of observation. This paper also connects Kant’s work in the Transcendental Deduction (...) on the transcendental unity of apperception with Kant’s work on “clear” and “obscure” representations. (shrink)

While many film theorists declare Agamben as, in equal part, a Deleuzian film theorist, I pose that, through this Benjaminian lens, we can parse distinctive cinematic questions that Agamben exclusively pursues - in particular, cinema's potential as a repurposive counter-dispositif to combat dominant forms via critique. This is not to suggest that parallels do not exist between Agamben and Deleuze’s approaches: as Meillassoux has noted, Deleuze's logic of representation (also known as "correlationism") develops an "image of thought that attempts to (...) overcome the binary separation” between matter and spirit, mind and body. Furthermore, Agamben is unequivocally astricted to the Bergson-bound Deleuzian tradition of "untimeliness," whereby cinema extricates "the fallacious psychological distinction between image as psychic reality and movement as physical reality." Furthermore, both Agamben and Deleuze are committed to a notion of "cinema-thought," as Jean-Luc Nancy terms it, or haecceities of Oneness—a commitment to cinema-as-immanence, or indexing thought, rather than mediating it via hermetic historicism. However, Agamben's concept of gesture, as a prelinguistic mode of communication, suspends the symbolic, replacing taxonomy and, therefore, offers a sublime breach: "Gesture is the communication of a potential to be communicated." In other words, Agamben’s gesture is something of an “enigmatic signifier,” insofar as it is impregnated with a primitive and unconscious meaning. (shrink)

The epistemic basic structure of a society consists of those institutions that have the greatest impact on individuals’ opportunity to obtain knowledge on questions they have an interest in as citizens, individuals, and public officials. It plays a central role in the production and dissemination of knowledge and in ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate this knowledge. It includes institutions of science and education, the media, search engines, libraries, museums, think tanks, and various government agencies. This article identifies (...) two demands of justice that apply specifically to the institutions that belong to it. First, the epistemic basic structure should serve all citizens fairly and reliably. It should provide them with the opportunity to acquire knowledge they need for their deliberations about the common good, their individual good, and how to pursue them. Second, the epistemic basic structure should produce and disseminate the knowledge that various experts and public officials need to successfully pursue justice and citizens need to effectively exercise their rights. After arguing for these duties, I discuss what policies follow from them and respond to the worry that these duties have illiberal implications. (shrink)

Review of Alison Laywine's Kant's Transcendental Deduction (2020) alongside Béatrice Longuenesse's I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again (2017).

Review of Gerhard Richter's work on randomness in his recent abstract art paintings, compared with John Cage's work on randomness; the review asks about what randomness in representation qua art amounts to.

Understanding, for Kant, does not intuit, and intuition—which involves empirical information, i.e., sense-data—does not entail thinking. What is crucial to Kant’s famous claim that intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts without intuitions are empty is the idea that we have no knowledge unless we combine concepts with intuition. Although concepts and intuition are radically separated mental powers, without a way of bringing them together (i.e., synthesis) there is no knowledge for Kant. Thus Kant’s metaphysical-scientific dualism: (scientific) knowledge is limited (...) to the world of phenomena—the world of appearance—while the thing-in-itself is unknowable because there is no intuition that can correspond to the it. This paper sets to cull Béatrice Longuenesse’s recent work on the first-person ‘I’ and put forth a novel Kantian approach to the first-person reference of mental states, working in the tradition of P.F. Strawson, Rudolf Carnap, and Wilfrid Sellars, while offering an empirical study of deafferentation to ground the thesis that the binding of representations is separate from phenomenal consciousness. Accordingly, we stake a kind of self-consciousness vis-à-vis the Fundamental Reference-Rule qua apperception that, while intimately connected to consciousness of one’s own body, apperception is nevertheless distinct from it and is, moreover, the condition for any use of ‘I’. We compliment neuroscientist Oliver Sacks’ research with Ned Block’s recent work on “no-post‐perceptual cognition” and attentional variation to couch Kant’s schema in perceptual psychology. We navigate Kant’s work on intuitions (viz. sensation, perception, and the empirical side of the cognitive faculties) and indirect realism/weak representationism first via Sellars’ naturalization of Kant’s inaccessible thing-in-itself, before challenging Sellars’ functionalist and inferentialist conception of perception and discursive intentionality. We ultimately endeavor to conceptualize the limit-conditions regarding our having reportable knowledge about our access to percepts and concepts. (shrink)

One of the most influential figures in the history of Islamic thought is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). The identities of mushakkik, which creates problems on many subjects, especially metaphysical and theological ones, the muhaqqiq who tries to solve the problems above the sects, and the jâmî who brings many different views together in the highest concepts, have seriously affected all the thinkers after him. Therefore, in the tradition, all schools had to inherit the philosophical and scientific dynamism that he (...) created and displayed an attitude about the problems he created and the solutions he offered. The real important motive that makes Râzî so indispensable and effective is his problematic identity (mushakkik), which carries the kalām to philosophy and philosophy to kalām, and criticizes philosophy on the basis of the kalām, and the kalām on the basis of philosophy. For this reason, when we look at the works of Râzî, who has been evaluated politically and sociologically within Ash'arism throughout his life, it is clearly seen that he is a thinker who is suitable to be embraced by different schools and to be interpreted in different ways. The fact that many Ahl as-sunnah theologians emphasized the works written by Râzî with a theological-Ash'ari theme, caused his supra-sectarian identity to be overshadowed. On the other hand, it is seen that some thinkers are making an effort to know and recognize Râzî as a philosopher-theologian and muhaqqiq. This effort is clearly seen especially in scientific figures who benefited from Kamaladdin Ibn Yûnus (d. 639/1242) in some way. Afḍal al-Dīn Khūnajī (d. 646/1248), Athir al-Din al-Abharî (d. 663/1265), Najm al-Din al-Qazwinî al-Kâtibî (d. 675/1277) can be given as examples. These personalities, on the one hand, played an active role in the spread of Râzî's scientific heritage and they were effective in bringing Râzî to the fore with his supra-sectarian identity on the other. Sirāj Al-Dīn Al-Urmawî (d. 682/1283), who inherited his scientific legacy, is among the important names who established his identity as a muhaqqiq who mostly solved supra-sectarian problems. Human actions are at the forefront of the issues in which this facility has clearly emerged. Urmawî tries to revise al-Arba'în's expressions, which seem to ignore the power and influence of human beings in terms of human actions as well as criticizing Razi's arguments very seriously. In his work Lübâb, on the one hand, he summarizes al-Erba'în of Razî he seriously criticizes Razi's Ash'ari attitude towards human actions on the other. He does this largely on the axis of the arguments that Râzî himself expressed from his encyclopedic works such as al-Matâlibu'l-'âliyya mina'l-'ilmi'l-ilâhi. It is clear that this is not an ordinary situation. Because human actions are at the forefront of the issues that determine the thinkers' conception of divinity and the relationship between God and man. In this study, Râzî's attitude on this issue and Urmavi's philosophical and theological criticisms will be tried to be determined. Thus, it is clearly seen that he is trying to establish Râzî as a muhaqqiq in the axis of human actions. (shrink)

In this paper, we compare Heidegger and Sellars’ respective responses to Kant’s Schematism section of the Transcendental Analytic, taking heed of how both philosophers motivate a criticism of representationalism in their respective renderings while also prodding their Kantian insights towards a holist conception of normativity. We begin with an overview and analysis of Heidegger and Sellars’ holism, comparing both thinkers’ systematic thought. We then turn to how both appraise Kant' Schematism section, first working through Heidegger’s analysis of Kant’s understanding and (...) imagination. We follow this up with Sellars’ naturalized Kantianism, taking particular interest in how Sellars emphasizes the basic foundational units, i.e., ‘this-suches’, grounding Kant’s theory of perception. We appraise both approaches, making the case that they offer a compatible productive misreading. (shrink)

A book review of The Michel Henry Reader, edited by Scott Davidson and Frédéric Seyler.

Notwithstanding the advantages of physical power, the struggle for survival among societies is not merely a matter of serial armed clashes but of the nation's spiritual resources that in the end always decide upon the victory.

Kur’ân’ın yedi harf üzere indirildiğine dair pek çok hadis bulunmaktadır. Konuyla ilgili sahih hadislerde yedi harfin, Kur’ân’ın okunuşuyla ilgili bir olgu olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Ancak söz konusu hadislerde yedi harfin mahiyetine dair açık bir bilgi yer almadığından bundan maksadın ne olduğu ile ilgili çok fazla görüş ortaya atılmıştır. Zayıf hadislere dayanan birçok görüşe göre yedi harf, Kur’ân’ın okunuşundan ziyade içeriğiyle ilgili bir kavramdır. Kaynaklarda sahiplerine nispet edilmeden aktarılan bu yöndeki görüşler kıraat alanında uzman âlimler tarafından ya zayıf görüşler olarak kabul edilmiş (...) ya da bütünüyle reddedilmiştir. Kuvvetli görüşler arasında ise şu üç görüş diğerlerine nazaran daha çok benimsenmiştir: 1. Kur’ân lafızlarının farklı lehçelere göre okunması 2. Kur’ân lafızlarının eş anlamlı kelimelerle okunması 3. Kur’ân lafızlarının farklı vecihlerle okunması. Kıraat alanında temayüz etmiş bilginler tarafından tercih edilen bu görüşler de ikna edici olmaktan uzaktır. Zira bu görüşlerin hepsinde şâz kıraatler de yedi harfin içeriğine dâhil edildiğinden yedi harfin kısmen de olsa neshedildiği iddia edilmiştir. Ancak Hz. Peygamber’in açık beyanına dayanmadan yedi harfin bir kısmının neshedildiğini iddia etmek mümkün değildir. Son arzada ya da Hz. Osman döneminde yedi harfin neshedildiğini ileri sürmek de zan ve tahminden öteye geçmemektedir. İşte bu çalışmada ilgili görüşler tahlil edilerek sahih olmayan kıraatlerin yedi harfin kapsamına alınamayacağı ve yedi harfin sahih kıraatten farklı bir olgu olamayacağı, böylece kısmen de olsa neshedilemeyeceği ortaya konacaktır. (shrink)

Similar words and utterances in the Qurʾān are the subject of the technical term lafẓī mutashābih. The rephrasing of meanings (maʿnā) and use of different words (lafẓ) in the Qurʾān are dealt with under the rubric of the theme “Qurʾānic style.” The stylistic variations in the Qurʾān are expressed as takrār al-Qurʾān, tasrīf (Affix and Paraphrase), ʿudūl (inversion), and tafannun (stylistic variation). However, when compared with other terms of exegesis, “tafannun” remained in the background and its conceptualization was thwarted. This (...) could be attributed not only to other concepts brought to the fore but also to the fact that tafannun underwent semantic restriction and was confined to iftinān within the framework of badīʿ. This study aims to clarify the true meaning of tafannun which reflects stylistic variations in the Qurʾān and revealing the contribution of this term to the more appropriate interpretation of the Qurʾān, assessing its significance for the field of tafsīr. The first chapter of this study deals with the etymology of tafannun, its historical background and conceptualization as well as the relationship between iʿjāz (inimitability) and tafannun in the history of tafsīr, while the second one identifies and illustrates the kinds of tafannun to expound on the true nature of this concept.Summary: Similar words and utterances in the Qurʾān are the subject of the technical term lafẓī mutashābih. The change and variety of the rephrasing of meanings (maʿnā) and words (lafẓ) in the Qurʾān are dealt with under the rubric of the theme “Qurʾānic style.” The stylistic differences and variations in the Qurʾān are expressed in the literature with terms such as takrār al-Qurʾān, tasrīf (affix and paraphrase), ʿudūl (inversion), tafannun (stylistic variation). However, in the terminology of exegesis, the term “tafannun” remained in the background, and its conceptualization was thwarted. This could be attributed not only to other concepts brought to the fore but also to the fact that the word tafannun underwent semantic restriction and therefore was confined to iftinān within the framework of badīʿ. Yet in earlier times it was widely used in the exegesis literature as part of Arabic language to identify the stylistic variations in the Qurʾān. Starting with 8th century AH, there have been numerous references to the term tafannun. From 9th century AH to present, many Muslim exegetes, especially Ibn Āshūr (1879-1973) used tafannun as one of the fundamental concepts to understand and explain the proper meaning of the Qurʾān. This study aims to clarify the true meaning of tafannun which reflects stylistic variations in the Qurʾān and revealing the contribution of it to the proper interpretation of the Qurʾān, assessing its significance for tafsīr. The first chapter of this study deals with the etymology of tafannun, its historical background and conceptualization as well as the relationship between iʿjāz (inimitability) and tafannun in the history of tafsīr, while the second one identifies and illustrates the kinds of tafannun to expound on the true nature of this concept.According to the result of this research, iftinān means following various styles and genres (types), while tafannun denotes variations in styles and genres (types). In vernacular, these two terms are considered the same. The term iftinān was dealt with in some works under the subject of muhassināt al-maʿnaviyya within the framework of badīʿ. In the Arabic literature, when the definition of the term iftinān was given, the term tafannun was not defined under any section of any book or any other place in the rhetoric of science. Tafannun is used to express the way any action is carried out, as it is mentioned in the definition of iftinān.The word tafannun was used to demonstrate the expertise, depth and mastery of Islamic scholars in one or various fields of Islamic studies in the early works of Islamic literature. In later times, the term iftinān was used to show rhetorical and oracy skills of a person. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. 400/1009) define tafannun as “the variation in words while two paragraphs bear the same meaning.” His definition proved to be a turning point in the conceptualization process of the word tafannun. Al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) was the first Islamic scholar to refer to the word tafannun in the interpretation of the Qurʾān. He used the words iftinān and tafannun in the same sense in his works. He mostly regarded examples of iltifāt as iftinān. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 666/1268), establishing a connection between tafannun and repetition, stated that the term tafannun was used to avoid boredom of repetitive diction.Among other authors who used the term tafannun in their works, Bayḍāwī, (d. 685/1286), Nīsābūrī (d. 730/1329), Ibn Cemāʿa (d. 733/1333), Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745/1344), Samīn al-Ḥalabī (d. 756/1355), Zarkashī (d. 794/1392), Suyūṭī, (d. 911/1505), Ḥaṭīb al-Shirbīnī (d. 977/1570), Shihāb al-Dīn al-Khafājī (d. 1069/1659), Ālūsī, (d. 1270/1854), Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905)-Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935) and Ibn Āshūr are the notable ones. Rather than merely defining the term tafannun, the majority of these commentators emphasized the function, benefit and aim of this word. Thanks to the use of this word by these commentators, a distinction was made between tafannun called iftinān as a literary device in the science of badīʿ and tafannun gaining a new meaning used to express stylistic variations. As a result, two words with the same dictionary definition were distinguished from each other during the conceptualization process. Among the authors using the word tafannun, Ibn Āshūr clearly defined the term and contributed significantly to its conceptualization. He defines the word tafannun as the uniqueness of the Qurʾān in employing stylistic variations by offering synonymous words in case of iʾtirāz (discursive), tanzīr, (resemblance), tazyīl (appendix) and takrār (repetition), creating the most comprehensive definition until that time.Tafannun is also defined as expression of the same meaning through re-signifying, stylistic variation in two verses, difference in the repetition of parables, variations in choice of diction and synonymous words, and avoidance of repetition. As a result of its definition, the word tafannun also denotes providing stylistic variations, using vivid language, avoiding prosaic diction, using denotative and connotative language, helping readers to grasp shades of meaning and read between the lines in the most clear and economic way.In the related literature, there are a lot of references to the word tafannun when demonstrating iʿjāz of the Qurʾān. When looked at the historical development of the relationship between iʿjāz and tafannun, it is observed that tafannun was accepted to be an element of iʿjāz. Defined as providing stylistic variation, tafannun is employed in various ways. The literary devices used to carry out tafannun are through ʿudūl, iltifāt, taqdīm and taʾhīr, change of utterances, use of synonymous words, objection, resemblance, and addition. In the proper interpretation of the Qurʾān, tafannun has a comprehensive usage, making many more academic studies a necessity with a view to making a significant contribution to a deeper and better grasp of words and shades of meanings employed in the Qurʾān. (shrink)

A eulogy on the late Bernard Stiegler, reflecting on Ekin Erkan's friendship with Stiegler and Stiegler's influence on the philosophical study of technology, stoking a comparative review between Stiegler and other thinkers in analytic and continental traditions.

Review of Etienne Balibar's On Universals with an eye towards Balibar's Hegelianism and work on translation.

We can find the origins of the notion of void in the Kalām tradition’s recognition of atomism. However, the main debates on the subject appeared after the Greek philosophical heritage transitioned to the Islamic world in the 3 rd century of Hijra. The literature of Kalām, just as in the metaphysical tradition, has two main types for this void being discussed. The first one is the external void (extracosmic) in which the cosmos floats. In the sources of Kalām, the question (...) of whether such a type of void exists is debated around the questions of whether anyone who might look beyond the cosmos can see anything or whether someone who stretches their hand outside the cosmos can move it. The second type of void, which occupies more of the mutakallimūn (Muslim theologians) agenda, is the internal void (intercosmic), assumed to be within the cosmos and between the body-forming atoms. This kind of void is discussed around the question of “Whether separating the two atoms is possible so that a third one can be inserted between them?” An ongoing discussion on the intercosmic void is found between the Baṣran and Baghdād Schools of Mu’tazila. Ibn Mattawayh and al-Nīsābūrī narrated the evidence presented in these discussions in their original form. The current essay discusses the debates between the two Schools and assesses the theoretical and experimental arguments both Schools present to justify their viewpoints, considering their philosophical origins. (shrink)

As one of the seminal theorists further developing François Laruelle’s politically-poised “non-standard philosophy,” Katerina Kolozova’s approach to animality and feminism is part of a particular post-humanist Marxist continuum (which includes Rosi Braidotti, Luce Irigaray, Donna Haraway and N. Katherine Hayles). Nonetheless, Kolozova distinguishes herself from this lineage by adhering to Laruelle’s method, liquidating philosophy of its anthropomorphic nexus. Thus, Kolozova also belongs to a more recently inaugurated and nascent tradition, working in tandem with post-Laruellean philosophers of media, technology, aesthetics and (...) feminist critique, such as Bogna Konior, Yvette Granata, Jonathan Fardy and John Ó Maoilearca. Within this variegated assemblage, Kolozova’s most recent project, Capitalism’s Holocaust of Animals(2019), saliently reconciles and radicalizes Haraway’s epochal dyad of the “inhuman”—a bifurcation riven by technology on one node and the animal on the other—by a resolution of superlative unity. This methodology, adhering to Laruelle’s system of“synthesis-without-synthesizing” attempts to dissolve the spectral chimeras that have haunted philosophy’s metaphysical heredity, proffering a generic identity. (shrink)

Over the last thirty years, once staunchly film history scholars such as Thomas Elsaesser, Jane Gaines, Siegfried Zielinski, André Gaudreault and Benoît Turquety (to name just a few) have abandoned history for historiography and film studies for media archaeology. Considering the heightened attention given to kulturtechnik (Siegert), the database as a dominant symbolic metaphor,1 and the decentered networked tenants of the postmodern global present, cinema is taking on the characteristics of new media, existing in increasingly intertextual space. Thus, the term (...) “post-cinema” has been co-opted as a viable intermediary that accounts for new media conditions, as cinema is no longer emblematic of our cultural climate. It was once presaged in 1992 that “[t]he end of the cinema truly sounds the death knell of the ultimate metaphysical adventure of Dasein. In the twilight of post-cinema, of which we are seeing the beginning, human quasi-existence, now stripped of any metaphysical hypostasis and deprived of any theological model, will have to seek its proper generic consistency elsewhere.” Accordingly, we are no longer “moviegoing animals” who seek images of ourselves among a collective in the dark but, rather, users interfacing within a network of moving images. By locating post-cinema within the semblance of social media, we are allocated a newfound series of theoretical interventions, the most marked of which is that of media archeology vis-à-vis dialectical materialism. This is a lens through which Brian Winston has recently deftly decried Virtual Reality’s “empathy machine” utopic illusionism, bolstered by Chris Milk and a slew of neurohumanities researchers, steadily maintaining that the fundamental myth of “technologies of seeing” is in disguising “their artifice, their cultural formation and their ideological import.” However, this approach, which illuminates the bifurcation between Max Horkheimer/Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin, neglects what Benjamin identified as occurring to the work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility—a shift from a technology’s “cult value,” associated with the unique work, to its “exhibition value,” associated with the social act of viewing as part of a mass. Speaking to this divarication, Benjamin Barber, in Strong Democracy, foresaw new media’s two-fold potential—as they are organized and networked, new media and communications technologies possess the possibility to both energize citizen information and political participation but, simultaneously, to supplement the deterioration of public debate. As evinced by Mark Adrejevic’s concept of Infoglut, this two-pronged possibility has only been exacerbated by the interlocking relationship between the advent of a “glut” of information, post-truth politics, the demise of symbolic efficiency, and a renewed focus on the role of affect and emotion as “alternative modalities for thinking about the role of communication in a post-referential era.” Manuel Castells qualifies Barber’s pessimism, noting that the Internet can “be an appropriate platform for informed, interactive politics, stimulating political participation.. […] beyond the closed doors of political institutions,” but that the Internet, like any technology, “is shaped by its uses and users.” Thus, if there exists a positive correlation between exposure to post-cinema media artifacts and political participation, then I seek to explore the revelatory political possibilities of “exhibition value” by way of a particular “post-cinema” case study: the Marxist-Leninist Turkish hacktivist group Redhack’s YouTube-circulated documentary RED! (2013), a project that demanded—by way of the moving-image—to galvanize cyberprotest and democratize a “hacktivist commons. (shrink)

Küresel güç mücadelesinde ağırlık merkezinin son yıllarda Asya-Pasifik’e kaymasıyla birlikte, 21. yüzyılın yükselen iki gücü olan Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti (ÇHC) ile Hindistan arasındaki rekabet de önemli ölçüde arttı. Hindistan’ın 1947’de İngiltere’den bağımsızlığını kazanması ile Çin’in Komünist bir Halk Cumhuriyeti olarak 1949’da kurulmasından günümüze dek aralarında süregelen sınır anlaşmazlıkları, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiyi belirleyen en önemli konuların başında gelmektedir. İki ülkenin de geçmişinde Batı’nın aşağılayıcı müdahalelerine maruz kalmış olmasının yanında bu dönemde uluslararası siyasete hâkim olan iki kutupluluğun dünya barışına hizmet etmeyeceğine (...) olan ortak inançları dünya barışı için alternatif bir oluşum olan Bağlantısızlık Hareketine katılmalarını sağladı. Dolayısıyla bu iki neden ve her iki ülkenin de ulus-devlet oluşumunun erken aşamalarında olması, kuruluşlarının ilk on yılında birbirlerine karşı idealist yaklaşımlar benimsemelerini sağladı. Ancak çok geçmeden her iki ülkenin de materyal kapasitelerini arttırmasıyla birlikte çatışmaya başlayan ulusal çıkarları, Asya idealizminin altını oymaya başladı. Netice itibariyle 1962 gibi erken bir dönemde sıcak çatışmaya girerek Asya idealizmini bir kenara bırakıp ulus devlet realizmini benimsemiş oldular. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma 21. yüzyılın yükselen iki gücü arasındaki en sorunlu alanlardan biri olan sınır anlaşmazlıklarının süreç içerisindeki evrimini ve bunun iki ülkenin dış politika vizyonlarının değişimleri üzerindeki etkisini ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Bu analizde neoklasik realizm teorik bir çerçeve olarak rehberlik ederken ÇHC ve Hindistan arasındaki sınır sorunlarının yerel, bölgesel ve küresel yönlerini ve bunların iki ülkenin dış politikası üzerindeki etkilerini anlamak için süreç izleme yöntemi kullanılacaktır. (shrink)

Serious thinking about the computational aspects of situation theory is just starting. There have been some recent proposals in this direction (viz. PROSIT and ASTL), with varying degrees of divergence from the ontology of the theory. We believe that a programming environment incorporating bona fide situation-theoretic constructs is needed and describe our very recent BABY-SIT implementation. A detailed critical account of PROSIT and ASTL is also offered in order to compare our system with these pioneering and influential frameworks.

While situation theory and situation semantics provide an appropriate framework for a realistic model-theoretic treatment of natural language, serious thinking on their 'computational' aspects has just started. Existing proposals mainly offer a Prolog- or Lisp-like programming environment with varying degrees of divergence from the ontology of situation theory. In this paper, we introduce a computational medium (called BABY-SIT) based on situations. The primary motivation underlying BABY-SIT is to facilitate the development and testing of programs in domains ranging from linguistics to (...) artificial intelligence in a unified framework built upon situation-theoretic constructs. (shrink)