The paper deals with the Sartrean concept of lived experience which constitutes a bridge between phenomenology and Marxism, psychology and ontology, individual and society, as well as between philosophy and literary criticism. The notion of lived experience is rooted in psychology, at the same time being embedded in literary criticism and phenomenology. It is interlinked with the notions of facticity, contingency, singularity, intersubjectivity, and body in the Being and Nothingness, and became the theoretical base of Sartre’s essays on Baudelaire, Genet, (...) and especially of that on Flaubert. This lived experience is closely related to the Sartrean phenomenological concept of nature which consists in the non-reflexive conscience of our own presence-at-theworld, including corporeality. (shrink)

A. W. Moore argues in this bold, unusual, and ambitious book that it is possible to think about the world from no point of view. His argument involves discussion of a very wide range of fundamental philosophical issues, including the nature of persons, the subject-matter of mathematics, realism and anti-realism, value, the inexpressible, and God. The result is a powerful critique of our own finitude.

I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that (...) cognitive accounts are plausible given that much of our mental activity has unnoticed effects on our mental life, and that certain illusory experiences of body ownership sometimes described as thought-independent may be best explained as imaginative perceptual experiences. (shrink)

[A. W. Moore] Criteria of ineffability are presented which, it is claimed, preclude the possibility of truths that are ineffable, but not the possibility of other things that are ineffable—not even the possibility of other things that are non-trivially ineffable. Specifically, they do not preclude the possibility of states of understanding that are ineffable. This, it is argued, allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and those who adopt the new (...) reading recently championed by Cora Diamond, James Conant, and others. By maintaining that what the nonsense in the Tractatus is supposed to convey is ineffable understanding, rather than ineffable truth, we can do considerable justice to each of these readings. We can also do considerable justice to the Tractatus. /// [Peter Sullivan] Moore proposes to cut between 'traditional' and 'new' approaches to the Tractatus, suggesting that Wittgenstein's intention is to convey, through the knowing use of nonsense, ineffable understanding. I argue, first, that there is indeed room for a proposal of Moore's general kind. Secondly, though, I question whether Moore's actual proposal is not more in tune with Wittgenstein's later thought than with the attitude of the Tractatus. (shrink)

In this essay I consider the argument that Bernard Williams advances in ‘The Makropolus Case’ for the meaninglessness of immortality. I also consider various counter-arguments. I suggest that the more clearly these counter-arguments are targeted at the spirit of Williams's argument, rather than at its letter, the less clearly they pose a threat to it. I then turn to Nietzsche, whose views about the eternal recurrence might appear to make him an opponent of Williams. I argue that, properly interpreted, these (...) views in fact make him an ally. (shrink)

How do clinical psychiatrists arrive at their diagnostic conclusions? Little attention has been directed to this question by philosophers of psychiatry. Adrian Kind presents a systematic, in-depth philosophical investigation into this question and argues that psychiatric diagnostic reasoning can be understood as a model-based reasoning procedure analogous to scientific model-based reasoning. To support this, he draws on ideas from the philosophy of science, psychiatry, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. This study is an invaluable resource for practicing psychiatrists, philosophers interested in (...) psychiatry, and researchers in artificial intelligence or cognitive science interested in medical cognition. (shrink)

The author begins with an outline of Bernard William's moral philosophy, within which he locates William's notorious doctrine that reflection can destroy ethical knowledge. He then gives a partial defence of this doctrine, exploiting an analogy between ethical judgements and tensed judgements. The basic idea is that what the passage of time does for the latter, reflection can do for the former: namely, prevent the re-adoption of an abandoned point of view (an ethical point of view in the one case, (...) a temporal point of view in the other). In the final section the author says a little about how reflection might do this. Footnotes1 This essay is derived from a lecture entitled ‘Bernard Williams’, delivered at Oxford University in 2000, in the series ‘Oxford Philosophers on Oxford Philosophers’, organized by Peter Hacker and David Wiggins. I am grateful to those who attended the lecture, and to Bernard Williams, for helpful comments. (shrink)

John McDowell espouses a certain conception of the thinking subject: as an embodied, living, finite being, with a capacity for experience that can take in the world, and stand in relations of warrant to subjects' beliefs. McDowell presents this conception of the subject as requiring a related conception of the world: as not located outside the conceptual sphere. In this latter conception, idealism and common-sense realism are supposed to coincide. But I suggest that McDowell's conception of the subject scuppers this (...) intended coincidence. The upshot is a dilemma: McDowell can retain his conception of the subject, but lose the coincidence; or he can keep the coincidence, but abandon his conception of the subject. (shrink)

A characterization of transcendental arguments is proffered, whereby they yield conclusions about how things are via intermediate conclusions about how we must think that they are. A variant kind of argument is then introduced. Arguments of this variant kind are dubbed ‘conative’ transcendental arguments: these yield conclusions about how it is desirable for things to be via intermediate conclusions about how we must desire that they are. The prospects for conative transcendental arguments are considered. It is argued that, although they (...) can never be of practical use, they may nevertheless be of use in dissolving certain applications of the debate—initiated by Bernard Williams—about whether anyone can have an ‘external’ reason to do anything, that is to say a reason that is not grounded in some desire of the person’s, in a suitably broad sense of ‘desire’. The relevance of conative transcendental arguments to this debate is that they highlight desires that we cannot help having and with respect to which the debate lacks any suitable focus. In the final section of the essay five conative transcendental arguments deriving from the work of five moral philosophers are briefly considered. (shrink)

This essay was written for a special issue of Philosophical Topics on the links between Kant and analytic philosophy. It explores these links through consideration of: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus; the logical positivism endorsed by Ayer; and the (very different) variation on that theme endorsed by Quine. It is argued that in all three cases we see analytic philosophers trying to attain and express a general philosophical understanding of why the bounds of sense should be drawn where they should—but thereby confronting the (...) aporia, which Kant too confronted, that it is impossible to do this without transgressing those very bounds. It is suggested in conclusion that the problem is in trying to attain and express such an understanding; in other words, that such an understanding is attainable, but not expressible. (shrink)

Negative self-views have proved to be a consistent marker of vulnerability for depression. However, recent research has shown that a particular kind of cognitive conflict, implicative dilemma, is highly prevalent in depression. In this study the relevance of these conflicts is assessed as compared to the cognitive model of depression of a negative view of the self. In so doing, 161 patients with major depression and 110 controls were assessed to explore negative self-construing (self-ideal discrepancy) and conflicts (implicative dilemmas), as (...) well as severity of symptoms. Results showed specificity for the clinical group indicating a pattern of mixed positive and negative self-descriptions with a high rate of conflict. Regression analysis lent support to the conflict hypothesis in relation to clinically relevant indicators such as symptom severity, global functioning. However, self-ideal discrepancy was a stronger predictor of group membership. The findings showed the relevance of cognitive conflicts to compliment the well-consolidated theory of negative self-views. Clinical implications for designing interventions are discussed. (shrink)

We show how voting rules like the simple and the absolute majority rules, unanimity, consensus, etc. can be represented as logical operators in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic. First, we prove tha...

Este artículo estudia la estructura lógico-matemática ligada a la mereo-topología de la teoría de conjuntos (MTTC), en cuanto esta estructura es el núcleo gnoseológico del neoliberalismo. En este contexto, analizamos los componentes lógico-matemáticos de tal estructura, a saber, la mereología, la topología y la teoría de conjuntos en oposición a la noción dialéctica de totalidad, como un medio para superar las consecuencias políticas y gnoseológicas derivadas de la asunción de tal aparato lógico-matemático. Asimismo, establecemos una relación entre la MTTC y (...) la fenomenología, lo cual permite analizar algunas inconsistencias relacionadas no solo con la estructura lógico-matemática de la MTTC, sino también con la implementación de la intencionalidad fenomenológica y la subsecuente ley eidética de dependencia. (shrink)

Comprendre les mécanismes sous-jacents de la «nouvelle économie» permet d'augmenter ses chances de gagner au jeu. Un rapide survol des conditions de naissance et de développement de la nouvelle économie montre que le passage de l'économie industrielle à l'économie du savoir a été accompagné par des malentendus similaires à ceux qu'a soulevés l'avènement de l'industrie dans les sociétés agraires. Dans cet article, nous montrons qu'il faut bien distinguer la nouvelle économie, l'économie des services et l'économie du don. Nous évaluons la (...) pertinence des grandes théories économiques pour rendre compte de la nouvelle économie. En examinant les sources des revenus qu'elle peut fournir, nous montrons les dangers qu'une gestion imprudente et non orthodoxe risque d'engendrer. Le temps romantique des pionniers est révolu; la crise de croissance est dépassée. Il reste que la nouvelle économie offre à l'homme du nouveau millénaire l'occasion de se réinventer.Understand the underlying mechanisms of the "new economy" to increase his chances of winning the game A quick overview of the conditions of birth and development of the new economy shows the transition from the industrial economy to the knowledge economy has been accompanied by misunderstandings similar to those that were raised the advent of industry in agrarian societies. In this paper, we show that it is necessary to distinguish the new economy, the service economy and the gift economy. We evaluate the relevance of major economic theories to account for the new economy. In examining the sources of income it can provide, we show that the dangers reckless and unorthodox management may cause. Romantic time of the pioneers are gone, the growth crisis is exceeded. It remains that the new economy offers to man the new millennium opportunity to reinvent itself. (shrink)

While the genesis of self-awareness at approximately 18 months old is a dramatic landmark in human development, there is at this stage no explicit awareness on the toddler's part of his/her truly standing apart from others. Only much later does a distinct sense of self shift into focus, and here Sartre provides us with a compelling theory of a first reflective experience of self-awareness. He explains this phenomenon by emphasizing a violent shift in ontological status, one in which the pre-adolescent (...) child is precipitated from functional unity with a primary caregiver to an individuated state involving self-awareness as privative, i.e. where the child becomes aware of existing only in the form of not-being-the-adult. For Sartre this new experience of self is not therefore positive but rather formal or empty; there has in fact been a psychic transition, from being to nothingness. In addition, Sartre also states that all children first explicitly experience themselves in this fashion. These claims find support in the work of developmental psychologist Margaret Mahler. In fact, in spite of the vast developmental discrepancies between toddler and pre-adolescent child, given the appropriate environmental triggers privative subjectivity will be shown to involve a regression to the much earlier rapprochement stage of development described by Mahler. (shrink)

The paper develops a semantical approach to the theories of social welfare functions (SWFs). On this approach, to present a theory is to give a (structured) family of models, that is, of possible applications of the theory. The structuralist approach in the philosophy of science is applied to the example of the theory of the simple majority rule. This theory is reconstructed in two versions, as a structured set of appropriately defined models. The adequacy of the two reconstructions is proved. (...) An important implication of the reconstructions is that the collective preference is characterised, in structuralist terms, as a theoretical concept of the theory. (shrink)

O I Colóquio Internacional de Epistemologia e Psicologia Genéticas: atualidade da obra de Jean Piaget, organizado pelo Grupo de Estudos de Psicologia e Epistemologia Genética e Educação – GEPEGE –, em setembro de 2009, na Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências da Universidade Estadual Paulista – Unesp, na cidade de Marília –SP, teve o objetivo de promover o encontro de pesquisadores nacionais e estrangeiros, bem como de grupos de estudo e de pesquisa brasileiros, que se dedicam ao estudo da obra de (...) Jean Piaget. Os textos que agora apresentamos neste livro se referem às conferências e às palestras expostas nas mesas-redondas, durante o evento.O I Colóquio Internacional de Epistemologia e Psicologia Genéticas: atualidade da obra de Jean Piaget, organizado pelo Grupo de Estudos de Psicologia e Epistemologia Genética e Educação – GEPEGE –, em setembro de 2009, na Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências da Universidade Estadual Paulista – Unesp, na cidade de Marília –SP, teve o objetivo de promover o encontro de pesquisadores nacionais e estrangeiros, bem como de grupos de estudo e de pesquisa brasileiros, que se dedicam ao estudo da obra de Jean Piaget. Os textos que agora apresentamos neste livro se referem às conferências e às palestras expostas nas mesas-redondas, durante o evento. Com esta obra acreditamos que o I Colóquio confirme o seu propósito básico de divulgar a obra de Jean Piaget e de evidenciar a potência da sua teoria por meio do debate de novas pesquisas científicas e filosóficas. (shrink)

Kant, in his third Critique, confronts the issue of how rule-governed objective judgement is possible. He argues that it requires a particular kind of aesthetic response to one's experience. I dub this response 'the Feeling of Unity', and I raise the question whether it is a type of inexpressible knowledge. Using David Bell's account of these matters as a touchstone, I argue that it is.

El presente artículo muestra los esfuerzos realizados por Cristina de Pizán a la hora de combatir el discurso misógino. En este contexto de lucha por el reconocimiento de las mujeres, Pizán se sirve de dos armas: el dominio del propio cuerpo femenino para contrarrestar los ataques masculinos y el discurso como herramienta para configurar performativamente una identidad flexible, abierta y en constante proceso de construcción.

This study examined the recall of car and food advertisements within either a car or food television program to investigate the relationship between recall, program content, and viewer involvement. The participants, 92 sixth-form students, aged between 16–17 years, were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. As predicted, advertisements placed within a program of dissimilar content were recalled significantly better than if placed within a program of similar content. A gender bias in recall was found with females recalling female-orientated products (...) significantly better than males. Viewer-involvement ratings factored onto three factor clusters: enjoyable, cheerful, and humorous. Negative correlations were shown between cheerfulness and recall in the car program, and positive correlations were shown between cheerfulness and recall in the food program. Finally, implications of the results were considered. (shrink)

Se edita, traduce, anota y comenta un texto conservado en el Ms. _Ambrosianus Graecus_ 855 y se propone que se trata de un mimo breve, representable en ámbito reducido, con intención satírica y que su autoría podría ser adjudicada a Teodoro Pródromos.

La lógica, tal como sostienen algunos autores, es una disciplina normativa. Nos dice qué está bien y qué está mal a la hora de inferir, e influye en nuestras prácticas inferenciales. Por otro lado, el problema de la adopción de Kripke y Padró propone que la idea de adoptar principios lógicos no tiene sentido o no es posible. Mediante una comparación con distintas interpretaciones de la idea de normatividad en la lógica, analizaré la compatibilidad entre ambas posturas. La aparente desconexión (...) entre lo que es correcto y las prácticas de los agentes, sumada a la impotencia de las normas para influir en las prácticas inferenciales, llevarán a una conclusión poco alentadora para quienes quieran sostener ambas posturas: si aceptamos que el problema de la adopción es un problema real, entonces hay que borrar todo rastro de normatividad de nuestra concepción de la lógica. (shrink)

Últimamente se ha producido una copiosa traducción de textos de Hei-degger. Ante la complejidad de sus expresiones, es necesario un trabajo de revisión y unificación de los términos castellanos. Con el ánimo de abrir un proceso de diá-logo entre los traductores, expondremos brevemente algunos puntos en los que se ejemplifica el problema. Por un lado, se trata de mostrar las tareas de traducción todavía pendientes de Ser y tiempo, a pesar de las dos traducciones existentes. A tal efecto se realizan (...) una serie de calas de pasajes, tanto de la versión de Gaos como de la de Rivera, ofreciendo en cada caso las propias sugerencias de traduc-ción. Y, por otro lado, se expone a discusión un elenco de términos que todavía están pendientes de una traducción definitiva.In recent times, there has been a lot of translation of Heidegger's texts. The complexity of his philosophical expressions and the diversity of translation solu-tions offered so far need to be unified. In order to open a dialogue among transla-tors we would like to expose briefly some examples that illustrate the problem of translation. On the one hand, we show that the task of translating Sein und Zeit is not yet finished, despite the translations of Gaos and Rivera. We take under consid-eration some quotes from Gaos's and Rivera's versions, offering in each case our own translation suggestion. On the other hand, we bring up for discussion different Heideggerian terms whose translations are still problematic. (shrink)