In this paper we argue that physical strength is in philosophical terms best understood as general agentive ability to exercise difficult physical effort. We develop this metaphysical claim about strength, by focusing on the historically developed most paradigmatic test of overall strength: The sport of Strong (Wo)Man. We extract the understanding of strength present in this sport, and show how the current philosophical agents' abilities, and physical effort, lend themselves to capture the essential features of strength, providing the justification for (...) our claim. Finally we argue that strongman itself is already surprisingly well thought through to assess strength, balancing different tradeoffs that exist when quantitatively attempting to measure strength, making it a robust epistemic tool to determine strength in an interdisciplinary manner. (shrink)

We challenge the standard interpretation of pain asymbolia (PA), a neuropsychiatric condition that causes unusual reactions to pain stimuli. The standard interpretation asserts that PA subjects experience pain but lack important features of the experience. However, we argue that the clinical evidence for PA does not support this interpretation and that the arguments put forward by the defenders of the standard interpretation end up making self-contradicting claims. Finally, we suggest that the best interpretation of the available evidence is to take (...) a deflationist stance toward PA, at least until further evidence becomes available. (shrink)

Since its beginnings, modern bodybuilding has been accompanied by the background issue of whether it should be considered a sport. The problem, culminating in its provisional acceptance as a sport by the International Olympic Committee, was later retracted. The uncertainty of whether bodybuilding is a sport or not seems to linger. Addressing this issue, Aranyosi (2018) provided an account to determine the status of bodybuilding as a sport that arrives at the negative answer: bodybuilding is not a sport but rather (...) a form of artistic presentation. In this paper, we disagree with Aranyosi. We argue that by the standards he presents in his first argument, bodybuilding should be considered a sport. Further, we argue that his alternative approach on how to evaluate a discipline as more sport- or art-like on a spectrum, is not a valid basis to make such a judgment regarding bodybuilding. Further, even if his spectrum was modified to enable such a judgment, again it would result in bodybuilding being evaluated as a sport. Therefore, we conclude that everyone who accepts Aranyosi´s (or any less restrictive) requirements to decide whether bodybuilding is a sport, has to consider bodybuilding as a sport or refrain from making claims about its status. (shrink)

Precision medicine impacts virtually all medical specializations, including psychiatry. Though precision psychiatry, in general, is a flourishing area of research and debate, psychotherapy as one pillar of psychiatry has received little attention. Theoretical discussions about precision psychotherapy are rare; research on precision in psychotherapy is just evolving. In this paper we provide a conceptualization of precision psychotherapy providing a common idea of what should be understood as precision in the context of psychotherapy and what kind of psychotherapy research can be (...) considered to contribute to the aims of precision psychotherapy. (shrink)

In attempting to explain the properties and behavior of an evolved artefact with the breathtaking complexity of the human brain, dissociating conventional causes and effects is like pulling apart an autosarcophagic snake. To paint a representative picture, we need a palette of explanatory languages capable of portraying the multifarious interactions within a complex system at suitable levels of abstraction. In particular, in addition to conventional causal explanations, the philosophy of science offers a framework of so-called constitutive explanations. Here, we motivate, (...) describe, differentiate and discuss the use of causal and constitutive explanations in the field of computational psychiatry. (shrink)

An important question in the philosophy of psychiatry is: what is the proper method of psychiatric diagnostic reasoning? Let us call this the Methodological Question. In this paper, I criticize the answer that proponents of phenomenological psychiatry have given to this question and present an alternative. I argue that their answer fails to meet several adequacy conditions for a theory of psychiatric diagnostic reasoning. I then show how my own answer to the Methodological Question – the Model-Based Account of diagnostic (...) reasoning – meets these adequacy conditions. I conclude that the Model-Based Account of diagnostic reasoning is preferable to the Phenomenological Account. (shrink)

Chiara Caporuscio and Adrian Kind argue that psychedelic-assisted therapy is different from traditional therapy in an ethically fraught way and, as a result, arguably require ethical guidelines beyond those constitutive of traditional therapy. The way in question pertains to the therapist’s role as participatory sense-maker of the patient’s experiences and, with it, the balance of power between the therapist and the patient. In both traditional and psychedelic-assisted therapy, the therapist role as sense-maker can give rise to an imbalance of power (...) between the therapist and the patient, such as when the therapist’s attempt at sense-making totally disregards the patient’s attempt at doing so. But in psychedelic-assisted therapy, the possibility of such a power imbalance is exacerbated. For, given her use of a psychedelic drug, the patient’s conscious experience is altered in such a way as to render her much more vulnerable than she otherwise would be. To give just one example, since the therapist is perceived by the patient to be an authoritative sense-making guide, the former’s attempts at making sense of the latter’s experiences can have much more influence on a psychedelically intoxicated patient’s interpretation of her experiences than they otherwise would have. Hence, Caporuscio and Kind’s conclusion that the ethical guidelines constitutive of traditional therapy are probably not sufficient for psychedelic-assisted therapy. (shrink)

How do clinical psychiatrists arrive at their diagnostic conclusions? Little attention has been directed to this question by philosophers of psychiatry. Adrian Kind presents a systematic, in-depth philosophical investigation into this question and argues that psychiatric diagnostic reasoning can be understood as a model-based reasoning procedure analogous to scientific model-based reasoning. To support this, he draws on ideas from the philosophy of science, psychiatry, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. This study is an invaluable resource for practicing psychiatrists, philosophers interested in (...) psychiatry, and researchers in artificial intelligence or cognitive science interested in medical cognition. (shrink)

Overview of the contribution of Lichtenberg to psychoanalytic developmental psychology.

The aim of this paper is to develop a new position regarding the current conflict between concept pluralism and concept eliminativism in the philosophy of psychology.