Background Despite decades of anti-racism and equity, diversity, and inclusion (EDI) interventions in academic medicine, medical racism continues to harm patients and healthcare providers. We sought to deeply explore experiences and beliefs about medical racism among academic clinicians to understand the drivers of persistent medical racism and to inform intervention design. Methods We interviewed academically-affiliated clinicians with any racial identity from the Departments of Family Medicine, Cardiac Sciences, Emergency Medicine, and Medicine to understand their experiences and perceptions of medical racism. (...) We performed thematic content analysis of semi-structured interview data to understand the barriers and facilitators of ongoing medical racism. Based on participant narratives, we developed a logic framework that demonstrates the necessary steps in the process of addressing racism using if/then logic. This framework was then applied to all narratives and the barriers to addressing medical racism were aligned with each step in the logic framework. Proposed interventions, as suggested by participants or study team members and/or identified in the literature, were matched to these identified barriers to addressing racism. Results Participant narratives of their experiences of medical racism demonstrated multiple barriers to addressing racism, such as a perceived lack of empathy from white colleagues. Few potential facilitators to addressing racism were also identified, including shared language to understand racism. The logic framework suggested that addressing racism requires individuals to understand, recognize, name, and confront medical racism. Conclusions Organizations can use this logic framework to understand their local context and select targeted anti-racism or EDI interventions. Theory-informed approaches to medical racism may be more effective than interventions that do not address local barriers or facilitators for persistent medical racism. (shrink)

I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that (...) cognitive accounts are plausible given that much of our mental activity has unnoticed effects on our mental life, and that certain illusory experiences of body ownership sometimes described as thought-independent may be best explained as imaginative perceptual experiences. (shrink)

How do clinical psychiatrists arrive at their diagnostic conclusions? Little attention has been directed to this question by philosophers of psychiatry. Adrian Kind presents a systematic, in-depth philosophical investigation into this question and argues that psychiatric diagnostic reasoning can be understood as a model-based reasoning procedure analogous to scientific model-based reasoning. To support this, he draws on ideas from the philosophy of science, psychiatry, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. This study is an invaluable resource for practicing psychiatrists, philosophers interested (...) in psychiatry, and researchers in artificial intelligence or cognitive science interested in medical cognition. (shrink)

Debate about the epistemic prowess of historical science has focused on local underdetermination problems generated by a lack of historical data; the prevalence of information loss over geological time, and the capacities of scientists to mitigate it. Drawing on Leonelli’s recent distinction between ‘phenomena-time’ and ‘data-time’ I argue that factors like data generation, curation and management significantly complexifies and undermines this: underdetermination is a bad way of framing the challenges historical scientists face. In doing so, I identify circumstances of epistemic (...) scarcity where underdetermination problems are particularly salient, and discuss cases where legacy data—data generated using differing technologies and systems of practice—are drawn upon to overcome underdetermination. This suggests that one source of overcoming underdetermination is our knowledge of science’s past. Further, data-time makes agnostic positions about the epistemic fortunes of scientists working under epistemic scarcity more plausible. But agnosticism seems to leave philosophers without much normative grip. So, I sketch an alternative approach: focusing on the strategies scientists adopt to maximize their epistemic power in light of the resources available to them. (shrink)

. Philosophers and scientists often cite ontic factors when explaining the methods and success of scientific inquiry. That is, the adoption of a method or approach is explained in reference to the kind of system in which the scientist is interested: these are explanations of why scientists do what they do, that appeal to properties of their target systems. We present a framework for understanding such “Opticks to his Principia. Newton’s optical work is largely experiment-driven, while the Principia is primarily (...) mathematical, so usually, each work is taken to exemplify a different kind of science. However, Newton himself often presented them in terms of a largely consistent method. We use our framework to articulate an original and plausible position: that the differences between the Opticks and the Principia are due to the kinds of systems targeted. That is, we provide an ontic-driven explanation of methodological differences. We suspect that ontic factors should have a more prominent role in historical explanations of scientific method and development. (shrink)

Researchers in the life sciences often make uniqueness attributions; about branching events generating new species, the developmental processes generating novel traits and the distinctive cultural selection pressures faced by hominins. Yet since uniqueness implies non-recurrence, such attributions come freighted with epistemic consequences. Drawing on the work of Aviezer Tucker, we show that a common reaction to uniqueness attributions is pessimism: both about the strength of candidate explanations as well as the ability to even generate such explanations. Looking at two case (...) studies—elephant trunks and human teaching—we develop a more optimistic account. As we argue, uniqueness attributions are revisable claims about the availability of several different kinds of comparators. Yet even as researchers investigate the availability of such comparators, they are able to mobilize complex sets of empirical and theoretical tools. Rather than hindering scientific investigation, then, we argue that uniqueness attributions often spur the generation of a range of epistemic goods. (shrink)

When someone thanks someone for something, or advises him against something, or refuses something from him, his action is directed not merely at but to the other. He addresses the other. But is it only actions that exemplify this mode of directedness? This essay argues that it is not.

I propose a new class of interpretations, real world interpretations, of the quantum theory of closed systems. These interpretations postulate a preferred factorization of Hilbert space and preferred projective measurements on one factor. They give a mathematical characterisation of the different possible worlds arising in an evolving closed quantum system, in which each possible world corresponds to a (generally mixed) evolving quantum state. In a realistic model, the states corresponding to different worlds should be expected to tend towards orthogonality as (...) different possible quasiclassical structures emerge or as measurement-like interactions produce different classical outcomes. However, as the worlds have a precise mathematical definition, real world interpretations need no definition of quasiclassicality, measurement, or other concepts whose imprecision is problematic in other interpretational approaches. It is natural to postulate that precisely one world is chosen randomly, using the natural probability distribution, as the world realised in Nature, and that this world’s mathematical characterisation is a complete description of reality. (shrink)

The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s and Graham Priest’s interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent their interpretation is an adequate model of the logic for the catuskoti, and the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā. Priest and Garfield try to make sense of the contradictions within the catuskoti by appeal to a series of lattices – orderings of truth-values, supposed to model the path to enlightenment. They use Anderson & Belnaps's framework of First Degree Entailment. Cotnoir has argued (...) that the lattices of Priest and Garfield cannot ground the logic of the catuskoti. The concern is simple: on the one hand, FDE brings with it the failure of classical principles such as modus ponens. On the other hand, we frequently encounter Nāgārjuna using classical principles in other arguments in the MMK. There is a problem of validity. If FDE is Nāgārjuna’s logic of choice, he is facing what is commonly called the classical recapture problem: how to make sense of cases where classical principles like modus pones are valid? One cannot just add principles like modus pones as assumptions, because in the background paraconsistent logic this does not rule out their negations. In this essay, I shall explore and critically evaluate Cotnoir’s proposal. In detail, I shall reveal that his framework suffers collapse of the kotis. Taking Cotnoir’s concerns seriously, I shall suggest a formulation of the catuskoti in classical Boolean Algebra, extended by the notion of an external negation as an illocutionary act. I will focus on purely formal considerations, leaving doctrinal matters to the scholarly discourse – as far as this is possible. (shrink)

Negative self-views have proved to be a consistent marker of vulnerability for depression. However, recent research has shown that a particular kind of cognitive conflict, implicative dilemma, is highly prevalent in depression. In this study the relevance of these conflicts is assessed as compared to the cognitive model of depression of a negative view of the self. In so doing, 161 patients with major depression and 110 controls were assessed to explore negative self-construing (self-ideal discrepancy) and conflicts (implicative dilemmas), as (...) well as severity of symptoms. Results showed specificity for the clinical group indicating a pattern of mixed positive and negative self-descriptions with a high rate of conflict. Regression analysis lent support to the conflict hypothesis in relation to clinically relevant indicators such as symptom severity, global functioning. However, self-ideal discrepancy was a stronger predictor of group membership. The findings showed the relevance of cognitive conflicts to compliment the well-consolidated theory of negative self-views. Clinical implications for designing interventions are discussed. (shrink)

This essay argues that modern sovereignty is not simply a legal or political concept that is coterminous with the modern nation-state. Rather, at the theoretical level modern sovereign power is inscribed into a wider theological dialectic between “the one” and “the many”. Modernity fuses juridical-constitutional models of supreme state authority with a new, “biopolitical” account of power whereby natural life and the living body of the individual are the object of politics and are subject to state control (section 1). The (...) origins of this dialectic go back to changes within Christian theology in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period. In particular, these changes can be traced to Ockham's denial of the universal Good in things, Suárez's priority of the political community over the ecclesial body and Hobbes's “biopolitical” definition of power as state dominion over life (section 2). At the practical level, modern sovereignty has involved both the national state and the transnational market. The “revolutions in sovereignty” that gave rise to the modern state and the modern market were to some considerable extent shaped by theological concepts and changes in religious institutions and practices: first, the supremacy of the modern national state over the transnational papacy and national churches; second, the increasing priority of individuality over collectivity; third, a growing focus on contractual proprietary relations at the expense of covenantal ties and communal bonds (section 3). By subjecting both people and property to uniform standards of formal natural rights and abstract monetary value, financial capitalism and liberal secular democracy are part of the “biopolitical” logic that subordinates the sanctity of life and land to the secular sacrality of the state and the market. In Pope Benedict's theology, we can find the contours of a post-secular political economy that challenges the monopoly of modern sovereignty (sections 4–5). (shrink)

Editor's note: Adrian Piper is a conceptual artist whose work from the past twenty-five years has included performances, graphic art, and installation pieces. Always provocative, Piper seeks to challenge viewers' assumptions about the nature of art, aesthetic response, and modes of evaluating by creating art that involves issues of gender and race. Piper uses political art to confront viewers with emotionally charged environments that preclude our maintaining a safe, aesthetically distanced stance toward the subject matter. being forced to confront (...) our own prejudices, both emotionally and aesthetic ally, we undergo a process of change that is both cognitive (evidenced by how our interpretations of the work change and evolve) and affective (resulting in a higher level of social awareness and sensitivity). Thus, according to Piper, political art has "the potential for furnishing a forceful antidote to racism." The following two statements consist of text written by Piper and recorded on audiotapes for two installation pieces, "Four Intruders Plus Alarm Systems" (1980) and "Safe" (1990). (shrink)

In these discussions between Mircea Eliade and Thomas Altizer we can recognise two important things: there are some points of contact between these two thinkers and some differences. The problem lies in determining whether or not these points of contact are simply two different ways of understanding the same concepts. On the one hand,“Death of God” theology was in vogue in the United States in the 1960s, but today has few adherents. However, a new evaluation of this theological movement is (...) necessary because we need to understand its possible impact on the renewal of Christianity. On the other hand, Eliade was considered an important scholar in the field of history of religions. In our time, many critics contest his influence in this field and criticize him for the fact that he relativizes Christianity. This new interpretation of both scholars was an opportunity to link the research in the theology with that in the history of religions, an important motive for our time. In ecumenical discussions, the link between research in both these fields is so important. The concept of coincidentia oppositorum, the understanding of the sacrality of our time, in different religions, and the new language for discussing with people of different faiths are the main preoccupations of the ecumenical movement. (shrink)

John Dryzek's justification of deliberative democracy rests on a critique of instrumental rationality and a defence of Habermas's idea of communicative rationality. I question each stage of Dryzek's theory. It defines instrumental rationality broadly but only criticises narrow applications of it. It conflates communicative rationality with Habermas's idea of ‘discourse’ – the real motor of Dryzek's democratic theory. Deliberative democracy can be better defended by avoiding overstated criticisms of instrumental rationality, by altering the emphasis on communicative rationality, and by focusing (...) more on different models of politics than different models of rationality. Dryzek's theory can thus present deliberative democracy as a better means to better ends – a more powerful and more positive position. (shrink)

Actualment en Filosofia, tenim dues caracteritzacions canóniques sobre la naturalesa de la Metafísica, la carnapiana i la quineana, tot i que són dues tesis diferenciades, ambdues coincideixen en que la Metafísica és reduïda a qüestions d'existència. No obstant, Kathrin Koslicki considera que aquestes caracteritzacions de la naturalesa de la Metafísica són errònies i que comporten una crítica explícita a la Metafísica o redueixen la resolució dels problemes metafísics a un pragmatisme. Per això, Koslicki considerant que els desacords metafísics són legítims (...) i profunds, tenint com a marc de referència la filosofia aristotèlica, considera que la tesi quineana i carnapiana no reflecteixen bé la naturalesa de la Metafísica, ja que, hi ha disputes metafísiques que es deuen a disputes no-existencials sobre temes de fonamentabilitat. Koslicki considera que la Metafísica no pot ésser reduïda a qüestions d'existència, sinó que ha de ser pensada com la reflexió de quines entitats són fonamentals, i quines són derivades d'aquestes. L'article està dividit en una primera part introductòria sobre els meus objectius, seguit d'una breu exposició de les tesis carnapiana i quineana de la metafísica, i per últim l'exposició de la proposta neo-aristotèlica de Koslicki. (shrink)

This paper endeavours to point towards the direction of an answer to the problem whether or not philosophical hermeneutics is post-metaphysical. Starting from Derrida’s critique of hermeneutics, the author argues that this problem reduces itself to the question: “is hermeneutics a violent form of thought?” Through a reinterpretation of Gadamer’s concept of “living language of dialogue” starting from the point of view upon the history of the concept of language offered by Truth and Method and on the basis of the (...) similitude between language and art the answer to this latter question is given in the negative. (shrink)

Not only is Lacan’s repeatedly advanced assertion that Freud categorically denies the existence of unconscious affects a misleading oversimplification of Freud’s various ambivalent discussions of this issue—Lacan’s own circumnavigations around the topic of affect are much more nuanced and subtle than either he or many of his commentators often acknowledge. What’s more, such complexities aren’t confined solely to the tenth seminar of 1962-1963 devoted to a sustained discussion of anxiety, a seminar to which Lacan sometimes appeals in response to criticisms (...) according to which he reduces the psychoanalytic unconscious to the lifeless formal skeleton of pure linguistic-symbolic units alone. Through analyzing Lacan’s explorations of the distinction between signifiers and affects as articulated across the full span of le Séminaire, this essay seeks to complicate and problematize the standard picture of Lacan’s metapsychology of affective life. In so doing, it strives to clarify hitherto obscure remarks made about affects by Lacan as well as, through this work of clarification, to lay down foundational elements for the construction of a much more accurate and systematic rendition of a Lacanian theory of affects. (shrink)

RESUMENEl trabajo examina críticamente la afirmación central de la hermenéutica de Paul Ricoeur, a saber, que el soporte material de la escritura es el rasgo determinante para que una secuencia discursiva sea considerada como un texto. La escritura cancela las condiciones fácticas de la enunciación y crea, de este modo, un ámbito de sentido estable en el que se puede validar una concepción de la subjetividad que está implicada en las dos estrategias de lecturas (el análisis estructural y la apropiación), (...) esto es, un sujeto pasivo que se constituye por la idealidad del significado. Asimismo, el trabajo intentará precisar una serie de ambigüedades en el uso que Ricoeur hace del «ser en el mundo» para sostener la referencialidad del discurso.PALABRAS CLAVETEXTO, ESCRITURA, REFERENCIA, SUBJETIVIDAD, MUNDOABSTRACTThis paper critically examines the main assertion of Paul Ricoeur´s hermeneutics, i.e., that the material base of writing is the determining feature to consider a discursive sequence as a text. Writing cancels the factual conditions of enunciation and creates, in this way, a background of stable meaning where it is possible to validate a conception of subjectivity implicated in the two reading strategies (the structural analysis and the appropriation), i.e., a passive subject constituted by the ideality of meaning. Likewise, this paper aims to clarify some ambiguities in the way Ricoeur uses the «beings in the world» to support the discourse referentiality.KEY WORDSTEXT, WRITING, REFERENCE, SUBJECTIVITY, WORLD. (shrink)

By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular (...) works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant's view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant's view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects. This last point is worth emphasizing, in order to correct an interpretation of Kant's account of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment that wrongly reads Kant as claiming that aesthetic judgments do not have to satisfy the same basic requirements of judgment that any other kind of judgment also must satisfy, such as the synthetic subsumption of such objects under certain necessary and hard-wired concepts of understanding, the internal coherence of such judgments with other, non-aesthetic ones of a more abstract and comprehensive character, the unified consciousness within which such judgments are intelligibly made, and the like. Of course Kant recognizes the special character of aesthetic judgments and unpacks it in the... (shrink)

I provide an analysis of the concept of an “affordance” that enables one to conceive of “structural affordance” as a kind of affordance relation that might hold between an agent and its body. I then review research in the science of humanoid bodily movement to indicate the empirical reality of structural affordance.

In recent years organisational and management discourse has been akin to a battle-ground. Open challenges to the foundations of these fields and competing truth claims have arisen from the plurality of interpretation that is possible from the variety of new paradigms that has emerged. This proliferation of paradigms seems to undermine the possibility of a single unambiguous voice to guide management practice. The variety of competing voices that has produced this discordant chorus is described. The work of Thomas Barr Greenfield (...) offers a useful circuit breaker. What emerges is a discourse not anchored in rationality, as it has in the past, but anchored in values and a morally concerned scepticism. (shrink)

This study explores new philosophical foundations for democracy in revolutions. Alain Badiou’s thought is in focus, but this essay is not just an exegesis. The thought of Alain Badiou is appraised (and adapted) in this essay in the light of the main currents of European thought on the hopes and history of European revolutions. This essay dismisses Badiou’s ultra-gauche Maoism, focusing instead on Badiou’s ways to reconcile revolutionary change, social inclusion and human freedom. These ways are important. By overcoming hegemonic (...) traditions of study, Badiou’s methods promote democratic ethics of restraint. They also help re-invigorate methods in the social sciences privileging participant perspectives. (shrink)

The essay draws together a number of disparate elements from Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s various engagements with Spinoza. Specifically, the essay connects the notion of expressionism, which Deleuze develops in the early work Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, to the notion of living a philosophical life from Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, to the ideas of friendship and conceptual personae in Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy? To think philosophically, which following Spinoza Deleuze treats as a matter of thinking immanently and essentially, (...) is to live a philosophical life, that is, to re-express the contingencies of an empirical life in and as the essence of a life. Such is the existential and ethical task Spinoza presents us. The essay argues that a Spinozan existential ethics is realisable only in relation to – only in friendship with – the image of a philosopher as conceptual persona. Further, the essay argues that Spinoza is an exemplary philosopher in this regard because expressionism, which he alone in the history of philosophy conceptualises in fully univocal fashion, presents an image of a philosopher as a friend to one and to all. The ethical implication of thinking immanently and living essentially in the image of Spinoza as a photographic lens is to constitute a community of friends – distant and non-communicative as that community may be. Or, to put the point in Dickensian terms that Deleuze appeals to in ‘Immanence: A Life’, the Ethics is of ethico-existential import in expressing the image of Spinoza as our mutual philosophical friend. (shrink)

Artykuł poświęcony jest realizacji celu badawczego, na który składają się trzy zadania. Pierwszym z nich jest zarysowanie głównych cech ekspresywizmu metaetycznego, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem różnic i podobieństw zachodzących między tym typem teorii a tradycyjnym emotywizmem. Drugim zadaniem jest przedstawienie podstawowych twierdzeń najbardziej wyrafinowanej wersji współczesnego ekspresywizmu – koncepcji Allana Gibbarda – z uwzględnieniem miejsca uczuć moralnych w analizie sądów moralnych. Po trzecie w artykule omawia się podjęte przez Gibbarda zastosowanie podejścia ekspresywistycznego w metateorii znaczenia i jego metaetyczne konsekwencje, zwłaszcza w (...) zakresie relacji między ekspresywizmem a antynaturalizmem. (shrink)

In this short paper, I examine the notion of everyday heritage as developed by Lisa Giombini in her article Everyday Heritage and Place-Making. While I argue that the article’s main contribution is to combine the literature on place-making with current debates in everyday aesthetics, I also highlight some of the issues that I think should be addressed to further refine the notion of ‘everyday heritage’ and make it more resistant to criticism.

El objetivo de este trabajo es demostrar que el lugar que ocupa la figura de Sócrates en la obra de Diderot es problemático, ambivalente. Ciertas actitudes y escritos de Diderot llevaron a sus coetáneos a trazar un paralelismo entre éste y el filósofo ateniense, sin embargo este artículo revela que el editor de la Encyclopédie se alejó de la figura de Sócrates en diferentes ocasiones. Esto arroja algunas luces, por otra parte, acerca de la posición que Diderot mantuvo en sus (...) trabajos de madurez con respecto a la relación entre el filósofo o el sabio y la sociedad. (shrink)

RESUMEN En las primeras páginas de la Histoire de l'empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand, publicada entre 1759 y 1763, Voltaire presenta una serie de reflexiones acerca del método que se debería seguir al escribir un trabajo histórico y de las características que debería tener un historiador ideal. El objetivo de este trabajo es evaluar en qué medida el texto se ajusta a la metodología que Voltaire se propone seguir. Se intenta mostrar que el autor se aleja por momentos (...) de la misma, poniendo en riesgo el plan de la obra. Por otra parte, el artículo pone de relieve ciertas diferencias ideológicas y epistemológicas entre Voltaire y Diderot a propósito de la historia rusa, algo que puede resultar llamativo, en la medida en que sus textos son colocados, en general, bajo las mismas categorías historiográficas. En un plano más general, el texto arroja algunas luces acerca de la teoría de la historia en el siècle des Lumières. ABSTRACT On the first pages of Voltaire's Histoire de l'empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand, published between 1759 and 1763, he reflects upon the method which should be used when writing a historical work and the characteristics an ideal historian should have. The aim of this paper is to assess to what extent the text follows the methodology Voltaire is proposing. This article attempts to demonstrate that the author himself, occasionally, does not respect his own methodology, jeopardizing the objective of his work. On the other hand, the paper highlights some ideological and epistemological differences between Voltaire and Diderot as regards Russian history, something which may be noteworthy, since their texts are usually studied within the same historiogra-phical categories. In a more general sense, this work sheds some light on the theory of history during the siècle des Lumières. (shrink)

Tekst stanowi głos w dyskusji dotyczącej filozoficznych wniosków, jakie można wysnuć z systematycznych badań empirycznych nad intuicjami w kwestii odniesienia nazw własnych. Artykuł nawiązuje do słynnych badań Machery’ego i współpracowników, w których zaobserwowali oni różnice międzykulturowe w intuicjach semantycznych Amerykanów i Chińczyków. Autorzy badań używają tego rezultatu, by podać w wątpliwość użyteczność intuicji w sporach filozoficznych dotyczących zagadnienia odniesienia nazw własnych. W artykule przedstawiam wyniki własnych badań filozoficzno-eksperymentalnych, które mają na celu nie tyle badanie intuicji semantycznych, ile analizę metod wykorzystywanych (...) do tego w dotychczasowych studiach poświęconych tej tematyce. Rezultaty moich badań wskazują na znaczącą niestabilność werdyktów dotyczących kwestii odniesienia nazw własnych i podatność tych werdyktów na czynniki nieistotne z filozoficznego punktu widzenia. Bazując na zebranych danych, twierdzę, że metody stosowane w dotychczasowych badaniach filozoficzno-eksperymentalnych poświęconych tematyce odniesienia nazw własnych nie gwarantują pomiaru intuicji o pożądanym charakterze. (shrink)

Adrian Piper joins the ranks of writer-artists who have provided much of the basic and most reliable literature on modern and contemporary art. Out of Order, Out of Sight is an artistic and intellectual autobiography and an (occasionally scathing) commentary on mainstream art, art criticism, and American culture of the last twenty-five years. Piper is an internationally recognized conceptual artist and the only African American in the early conceptual art movement of the 1960s. The writings in Out of Order, (...) Out of Sight trace the development of her thinking about her artwork and the art world, and her evolving awareness of herself as a creative, racial, and gendered subject situated in an often limiting and always absurd cultural and social context. (shrink)

El texto aborda una de las cuestiones metodológicas fundamentales que Heidegger se planteaba en las Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen (1919-1923), a saber, el problema de la indicación formal. En efecto, si la vida misma (Dasein) es un acontecimiento de sentido cerrado en sí mismo es necesario establecer un punto de vista que exprese conceptualmente la vida sin objetivarla. El gran problema con el que Heidegger se enfrenta es encontrar un metalenguaje no objetivante. El concepto de indicación formal es lo que le (...) permite elaborar un discurso sobre el origen. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10912-021-09685-3.

I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’: first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt to (...) shed light on a number of issues: the structure of the sceptical regress; the content of the thought that ‘meaning is normative’, and its force against reductive theories; the connection between meaning and justification; and the notion of ‘primitive normativity’. (shrink)

Historical sciences like paleontology and archaeology have uncovered unimagined, remarkable and mysterious worlds in the deep past. How should we understand the success of these sciences? What is the relationship between knowledge and history? In Scientific Knowledge and the Deep Past: History Matters, Adrian Currie examines recent paleontological work on the great changes that occurred during the Cretaceous period - the emergence of flowering plants, the splitting of the mega-continent Gondwana, and the eventual fall of the dinosaurs - to (...) analyse the knowledge of historical scientists, and to reflect upon the nature of history. He argues that distinctively historical processes are 'peculiar': they have the capacity to generate their own highly specific dynamics and rules. This peculiarity, Currie argues, also explains the historian's interest in narratives and stories: the contingency, complexity and peculiarity of the past demands a narrative treatment. Overall, Currie argues that history matters for knowledge. (shrink)

The paper proposes a novel solution to the problem of scope posed by natural language indefinites that captures both the difference in scopal freedom between indefinites and bona fide quantifiers and the syntactic sensitivity that the scope of indefinites does nevertheless exhibit. Following the main insight of choice functional approaches, we connect the special scopal properties of indefinites to the fact that their semantics can be stated in terms of choosing a suitable witness. This is in contrast to bona fide (...) quantifiers, the semantics of which crucially involves relations between sets of entities. We provide empirical arguments that this insight should not be captured by adding choice/Skolem functions to classical first-order logic, but in a semantics that follows Independence-Friendly Logic, in which scopal relations involving existentials are part of the recursive definition of truth and satisfaction. These scopal relations are resolved automatically as part of the interpretation of existentials. Additional support for this approach is provided by dependent indefinites, a cross-linguistically common class of special indefinites that can be straightforwardly analyzed in our semantic framework. (shrink)