Rationality and deliberative democracy: A constructive critique of John Dryzek's democratic theory

Contemporary Political Theory 10 (1):37-57 (2011)
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Abstract

John Dryzek's justification of deliberative democracy rests on a critique of instrumental rationality and a defence of Habermas's idea of communicative rationality. I question each stage of Dryzek's theory. It defines instrumental rationality broadly but only criticises narrow applications of it. It conflates communicative rationality with Habermas's idea of ‘discourse’ – the real motor of Dryzek's democratic theory. Deliberative democracy can be better defended by avoiding overstated criticisms of instrumental rationality, by altering the emphasis on communicative rationality, and by focusing more on different models of politics than different models of rationality. Dryzek's theory can thus present deliberative democracy as a better means to better ends – a more powerful and more positive position

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Citations of this work

Habermas on rationality: Means, ends and communication.Adrian Blau - 2022 - European Journal of Political Theory 21 (2).
Public Deliberation in a Globalized World? The case of Confucian Customs and Traditions.Elena Ziliotti - 2018 - In Michael Reder, Alexander Filipovic, Dominik Finkelde & Johannes Wallacher, Yearbook Practical Philosophy in a Global Perspective. Verlag Karl Alber. pp. 339-361.

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