The study of human evolution has attracted scientists of various disciplines, judging by the attendance of the conferences devoted to it, and by the publications concerned. In the course of years I became amazed about the seeming absence of a synthesis of the available information. This article presents an attempt to combine some results of the various publications.The study of human evolution has become particularly focussed on the emergence of language and human consciousness with respect to the social behaviour and (...) mental capacities of our closest relatives: the apes. Social relations imply communication, and mentation underlies the ability to communicate. The more it becomes apparent that the social behaviour of the apes resembles that of man in many respects, the greater the danger that typically, and perhaps even uniquely, human traits are ascribed to anthropoids. Anthropomorphic descriptions of animal behaviour tend to prevent a clear view on animal mentality. (shrink)

My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...) clearer once we understand what it is to act directly on one’s own intentions. But I take it to be a fundamental assumption of the prevailing individualism of the theory of action— one at the core of its conception of the separateness of individuals— that one person cannot act directly on another’s intention. I agree that there is an important way in which we are or can be separate and autonomous thinkers and agents. But the way the individualist tries to capture this separateness is misguided. (shrink)

Why should we decolonise knowledge? One popular rationale is that colonialism has set up a single perspective as epistemically authoritative over many equally legitimate ones, and this is a form of...

One important thesis Ásta defends in Categories We Live By is that social properties and categories are somehow dependent on our thoughts, attitudes, or practices—that they are inventions of the mind, projected onto the world. Another important aspect of her view is that the social properties are related to certain base properties; an individual is placed in a category when the relevant base properties are thought to hold of them. I see the relationship between the social and the base as (...) connected to the problem of explaining how the social properties are sufficiently stable so as to be taken seriously, both in theoretical endeavors as well as in practical matters of how we relate to each other. In this light, I identify stability constraints for an adequate account of social categories. I argue that certain distinctive aspects of Ásta's conferralist view of social categories, such as the radical contextualism in her account of gender, undermine the stability of categories and are at odds with taking social categories seriously. I end with the suggestion that a distinctive “sheltered” form of normativity might help us do justice to Ásta's insights while avoiding some of the destabilizing elements of conferralism. (shrink)

[R]eflection is a system of thought no less closed than insanity, with this difference that it understands itself and the madman too, whereas the madman does not understand it.– Merleau-Ponty, Phen...

A meta-ethical analysis demonstrates that care ethics is a grounded in a distinct mode of moral reasoning. This is comprised primarily of the rejection of principles such as impartiality, and the endorsement of emotional or moral virtues such as compassion, as well as the notion that the preservation of relations may override the interests of the individuals involved in them. The main conclusion of such a meta-ethical analysis is that such meta-ethical foundations of care ethics are not sound. Reasonable alternatives (...) for care ethics may be its formulation as an additional principle within an established principlist framework, or the move to a dialogical ethics, where the good to be acted upon is not decided in advance but rather critically discussed and established within the encounter of the parties involved. (shrink)

The debate over risk-related standards of decisional capacity remains one of the most important and unresolved challenges to our understanding of the demands of informed consent. On one hand, risk-related standards benefit from significant intuitive support. On the other hand, risk-related standards appear to be committed to asymmetrical capacity—a conceptual incoherence. This latter objection can be avoided by holding that risk-related standards are the result of evidential considerations introduced by (i) the reasonable person standard and (ii) the standing assumption that (...) patients have capacity. This evidential approach to justifying risk-related standards of capacity avoids the most significant challenges faced by extant views while grounding risk-related standards in two fairly uncontroversial views in biomedical ethics. (shrink)

What is it for a duty or obligation to be directed? Thinking about paradigmatic cases such as the obligations generated by promises will take us only so far in answering this question. This paper starts by surveying several approaches for understanding directed duties, as well as the challenges they face. It turns out that shared agency features something similar to the directedness of duties. This suggests an account of directedness in terms of shared agency – specifically, in terms of the (...) so-called practical intimacy that holds between individuals when they act together. The final section addresses a challenge to the shared agency approach posed by legal wronging in tort law. (shrink)

An appreciation of Hume’s psychology of object identity allows us to recognize certain tensions in his discussion of the origin of our belief in personal identity---tensions which have gone largely unnoticed in the secondary literature. This will serve to provide a new solution to the problem of explaining why Hume finds that discussion of personal identity so problematic when he famously disavows it in the Appendix to the Treatise. It turns out that the two psychological mechanisms which respectively generate the (...) ideas of object and of personal identity are mutually incompatible. It is this sort of conflict within Hume’s introspective or subjectivist psychology which is the source of his worry. (shrink)

While copious quantities of ink have been spilled on the topic of autonomy in the context of health care, little has been written about autonomy in relation to intellectual disability. After presenting the received account of capacity, we argue that it cannot account for the moral permissibility of limiting an individual with intellectual disability’s access to diet soda. In cases of preventative medicine and intellectual disability, the philosophical motivation for the received account of capacity is incompatible with the actions it (...) recommends. We consider and reject several potential solutions; then, drawing on applied behavior analysis and the phenomenon of automatic reinforcement, we propose our own solution. The article concludes by considering the broader implications of our discussion. (shrink)

Davidson held that the explanation of action in terms of reasons was a form of causal explanation. He challenged anti-causalists to identify a non-causal relation underlying reasons---explanation which could distinguish between merely having a reason and that reason being the one for which one acts. George Wilson attempts to meet Davidson’s challenge, but the relation he identifies can serve only in explanations of general facts, whereas reasons explanation is often of particular acts. This suggests that the relation underlying reasons explanation (...) is not only causal, but singular as well. A further proposal, extracted from Fred Dretske’s views, characterizes this singular causal relation in terms of non-mental triggers. But this suggestion underestimates the explanatory role of the environment at the time of action, and shares with Wilson’s proposal the inability to account for the rationalization of particular acts. A situational environmentalist conception of reasons explanation, however, does not face these difficulties. (shrink)

A travers les faits et manifestations considérés comme irrationnels par l'entendement scientiste et positiviste, on décèle du point de vue de la philosophie de l'esprit une rationalité poétique qui est à l'oeuvre dans tout esprit humain. Ce super-rationalisme qui intègre en même temps le sensible et le rationnel obéit à une logique du symbolisme qu'on retrouve dans l'ontologie africaine. L'africanisme ontologique induit une philosophie de l'invisible où la connaissance intuitive libère l'esprit du dogmatisme rationaliste. Il permet d'appréhender l'Etre dans sa (...) totalité en examinant la question du rapport à soi, et du rapport à l'autre à travers la figure du sage africain. Aujourd'hui, la rencontre des cultures et des civilisations permet un croisement des rationalités et une pluralité de valeurs qui fondent le nouvel humanisme dont nous nous réclamons. Un humanisme spirituel basé sur le respect et la compréhension de l'autre par la différence de sa pensée et de ses attributs socio-psychologiques. (shrink)

As a site of colonial conquest, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced colonialism’s historic and continuing harms. One of the aspects of this harm is epistemic. In the analytic philosophical tradition, this harm can partly be theorised in line with the literature on epistemic injustice, although it does not fit squarely. I show this by arguing for what can be understood as a colonial state’s specific manifestation of epistemic injustice. This manifestation takes into account the historical context of colonisation and the continuing (...) coloniality of sub-Saharan African countries. From this, I argue for an approach to remediating this epistemic injustice that relies on the fair-minded pursuit of knowledge. This approach, I briefly argue, gains valuable insights from African epistemological traditions and can be beneficial to other epistemic injustice instances that result specifically from historical cases of oppression. (shrink)

You and I are going to die. We are aware that it is going to happen, but not exactly when—in which there is relief, but also anxiety. What happens to us when we know with some precision what our last day will be? In this text, we discern the process of our own death, once we have reliable information about the approximate moment of the cessation of our life. Tú y yo vamos a morir. Estamos al tanto de que va (...) a ocurrir, pero no exactamente cuándo —en lo cual hay alivio, pero también angustia—. ¿Qué nos ocurre al saber con cierta precisión cuál será nuestro último día? En este texto, discernimos el proceso de nuestra propia muerte, una vez que tenemos información confiable sobre el momento aproximado del cese de nuestra vida. (shrink)

What are the implications for agency – and in particular, the idea of acting for reasons – if we are to take seriously the notion of collective responsibility? My thesis is that some cases of individuals subject to a collective form of responsibility and blame will force us to make sense of how it is that an individual can be entitled to collective reasons for action, i.e. entitled to a reason had in the first place by a plurality of individuals (...) together rather than any one of them alone. This entitlement makes it possible for the collective reason to be a reason for which one acts, even if one’s contribution on its own makes little or no difference in the collective effort. Although a full defense of this entitlement cannot be undertaken here, I will gesture at how this might work by suggesting that intentions function to preserve reasons for action. . (shrink)

The emergence of COVID-19 has made it ever more onerous for the world economy to rethink the way things are done and to be done. The need and almost compulsory way of services being catered for will never have been made so practically obvious without the influence of a pandemic like COVID-19. The world at some point in time was almost brought to a standstill, with services pertaining to supply-chain deliverables, education / professional development and many more almost brought to (...) a halt. This paper has the platform for critically assessing the pathway SSA economies (SSA) should follow, notably creativity in new technologies, while adopting a stance on ISI approach in order to reduce its reliance on the importation of essential commodities, which seem to have been a worrying concern throughout the crisis of COVID-19. Suggestions for SSA economies to embrace the notion of creative destruction is the focal point in this paper for the realization of growth and development, while at the same time harnessing the power of human integrity to champion competitive innovation. (shrink)

The assessment of student learning is widely regarded with suspicion. Philosophers in particular have been reluctant to take this practice seriously. The essay reviews an ongoing effort to assess the development of philosophical dispositions among undergraduate students at a religiously affiliated liberal arts college. The procedure used in this effort as well as the results obtained so far strongly suggest that the deep learning valued most highly by philosophy teachers can be measured without harm to the teaching enterprise. The essay (...) argues that in light of a current cultural climate that fails to recognize the value of our enterprise, philosophers would be well advised to clearly define our particular learning goals, develop our own instruments, and to exercise more initiative in assessing our students learning. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar a relação entre ser e perceber a partir da análise do princípio central da filosofia de George Berkeley - esse est percipi -, conforme é apresentado na obra A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge. Para desenvolver essa análise e seguindo o tratamento dado por Grayling à fundamentação desse princípio, pretendemos mostrar que os argumentos de Berkeley se dispõem em três níveis: o estritamente empírico ; o fenômenico ; e o metafísico que, em (...) última instânci, explica os dois anteriores. (shrink)

Este artigo examina a relação entre subjetividade e vontade à luz de alguns resultados parciais obtidos em nossa pesquisa sobre a filosofia de Henri Bergson, cujo carro-chefe é a noção de “duração”. Pensar a subjetividade a partir da duração significa admitir que a transição ininterrupta que vai do passado para o futuro passando pelo presente é a temporalidade atuando no nível mais simples de nossa relação com o mundo. Destacamos a subjetividade a partir da duração porque já na percepção estamos (...) evocando o passado para iluminar o presente e, assim, podemos compreender o “problema” da subjetividade a partir de uma ação na qual se observa uma diferença de funções: a diferença entre o presente que atua e o passado que já não atua. É precisamente esse caráter temporal da ação que leva os comentadores de Bergson a interpretarem de maneira original a gênese da subjetividade, o papel da memória na percepção e a conceberem novos sentidos para o conceito de “vontade”. Por conseguinte, a estrutura argumentativa que adotamos neste texto deverá mover-se em três níveis de análise que correspondem, respectivamente, a três aspectos da subjetividade humana (percepção, memória e vontade). Desse modo, pretendemos ressaltar a temporalidade viva como marca registrada do bergsonismo. (shrink)

The debate over the grounds of full moral status relies heavily on the “method of cases.” In the method of cases intuitions about particular cases are taken as evidence for philosophical theories. Much in the debate over the grounds of full moral status turns on our intuitions regarding the moral status of individuals with intellectual disability. This paper argues that the intuitions of those in close personal relationships with individuals with intellectual disability are more reliable than the intuitions of those (...) who lack such a relationship. When theorizing about full moral status, we should privilege the intuitions of those who have a close personal relationship with an individual with intellectual disability. (shrink)

I have developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the SIM-style argument. In this paper, I have four main aims. First, I employ the SIM-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s Brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the SIM-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my (...) approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson’s, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism. (shrink)

This volume includes all Dewey's writings for 1938 except for Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, as well as his 1939 Freedom and Culture, Theory of Valuation, and two items from Intelligence in the Modern World. Freedom and Culture presents, as Steven M. Cahn points out, the essence of his philosophical position: a commitment to a free society, critical intelligence, and the education required for their advance.