1. In general we agree to recognize the existence, if not the methodological fertility or epistemological legitimacy, of a "rationalist model," at least when we refer to what economists do when they offer explanations.1 However two remarks must be made about this. First, it must be emphasized that this model is not unique, but generic: in fact, it is more a family of models of which the fundamental theoretical suppositions are susceptible to large variations. There are here, as it were, (...) several possible axiomatic bases. One formulation is, for example and to use von Mises's term, praxeological (axed on means/end relation). Another emphasizes the preference/constraint relation (Harsanyi). Other contrasting models are those putting forward the maximization of expected utility (von Neumann-Morgenstern) and those making the satisficing hypothesis (Simon). Second, however, it must also be said that philosophers of science do not really agree on what is asserted by the "principle of rationality" or on what is its status. For example, Popper (1982) made it a minimal empirical hypothesis, or practically empty, and denied, furthermore, that it was a universally valid psychological law. Hempel (1965) did not hesitate, in contrast, to make it a law of experimental psychology which would play an implicit or explicit role in any adequate and complete explanation of behaviour or action in social sciences or history. Dray, to cite another classic author (cf. Dray 1957), made this principle the base for the explanations of historians, but denied it the status of a nomological proposition. In consequence, it is difficult to proceed as if there were a theoretical consensus among researchers when they base their explanatory arguments on the rationality of agents. This is clearly not the case. However, Raymond Boudon is right to consider the "rationalist model" an extension to all the social sciences of the model of explanation which is found at the base of what has been called the "marginalist revolution" in economics.. (shrink)

1.- Introduction: articulating Hayek’s evolutionary argument with his socialist calculation dispute I completely agree with Bruce Caldwell (Caldwell 1988b: 74-75; Caldwell 1988a) that it is precisely within the conceptual and theoretical framework of the debate on the possibility of socialist calculation that Hayek definitively breaks with the standard static equilibrium approach to the market economy and finds out that the central problem of economics is related to the complex question of social coordination. From the Hayekian standpoint, this problem cannot be (...) solved without articulating a genuine theory about the role and the use of knowledge in society.1 This forms the hard core of what I will call the Hayekian theoretical argument. But one can find a much different kind of argument in Hayek, i.e. an evolutionary argument. I will characterize this argument as the Hayekian empirical argument. Hayek first exposed the essential elements of this genuine argument systematically in Law, Legislation and Liberty (see especially Hayek 1973). But in Hayek’s last book (Hayek 1988), socialism is still analyzed from this evolutionary standpoint , and as such socialism is considered by Hayek to be the major problem not only of economic theory but also, more globally, of Western civilization itself. In that book, published the year before the Soviet Union collapsed, Hayek showed himself to be absolutely confident that economic analysis could prove that socialism was not only a social blunder and a political failure, but above all a formidable scientific error. My reading of Hayek’s work is that this evolutionary argument has to be linked to the first one, which is of a more theoretical nature as far as economics is concerned. Indeed, while the evolutionary argument puts forward a completely different conceptual framework tightening the theoretical argument, it first of all displaces the gist of Hayek’s claim against socialism.. (shrink)

In this article, I wish to show the importance of the consequentialist method for the realisation of the ideal of non-domination. If, as stated by Philip Pettit, consequentialist ethics helps to better conceive republican political institutions, we then have to see how the fundamental principles of republican liberty can meet the norms traditionally associated with consequentialism. After a brief presentation of consequentialism and republican liberty (as Pettit defines it), I criticize the idea that liberty as non-domination could be included in (...) a bundle of goods that we seek to maximize. Next, I argue that we should reject the maximization of liberty as non-domination when this concept is considered as an absolute. Finally, I explore the idea of liberty as a condition for other goods, where liberty is still taken in the republican sense. These three theses are all rejected by demonstrating that the maximization of republican liberty is not really the maximization of liberty itself, but the maximization of protections granted to the individuals with the aim of defending their liberty. (shrink)

Être responsable de notre conduite passée, c’est, en un sens, devoir en répondre. Cela signifie d’accepter qu’on en est l’auteur, à titre d’individu ou de membre d’un groupe. Mais cela implique aussi de devoir la défendre, c’est-à-dire de la justifier si possible ou de l’excuser et parfois d’en accepter les conséquences négatives. Bref, si nous sommes responsables, c’est que nous sommes concernés et que nous devons réagir. À la difficulté psychologique de cette prise de responsabilité s’ajoutent des défis intellectuels majeurs. (...) Peut-on être responsables si notre conduite est due à des mouvements d’atomes déterminés ou soumis au hasard? Comment pourrait-il y avoir responsabilité à titre de membre d’un groupe qui échappe à notre contrôle? -/- Ce livre contient trois chapitres principaux (« le réseau de la responsabilité », « responsabilité et métaphysique », « responsabilité et société ») et deux analyses de textes importants (un extrait du livre III de l'Éthique à Nicomaque et « La responsabilité collective et ses implications » de Margaret Gilbert). -/- // -/- To be responsible for our past conduct is, in a sense, to have the duty to answer for it. This duty implies accepting that we are its author, either qua individual or qua member of a group. It may also imply defending our past conduct, by justifying or excusing it or, in the absence of a good defence, accepting adverse consequences. If we are responsible, we are concerned and must act. Clearly, taking our responsibilities is psychologically difficult; but it also poses tricky intellectual challenges. Can we be responsible for our conduct if it is due to the determined or random movements of atoms? Can we be responsible as a member of a group whose behaviour lies outside of our control? -/- This book contains three main chapters ("The network of responsibility", "responsibility and metaphysics", and "responsability and society"), as well as comments on two seminal texts (an extract of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book III and Margaret Gilbert's "Collective Responsibility and its Implications"). (shrink)

"I believe," André Breton said, "in the future resolution of the states of dream and reality--in appearance so contradictory--in a sort of absolute reality, or surréalité." The Surrealist movement, born in the 1920s out of the ferment of Dada, committed to revolution against bourgeois rationalism, and inspired by Freudian exploration of the unconscious, has reverberated more widely and deeply than perhaps any other art movement in our century. Its automatism, biomorphic shapes, visionary mode, and manipulation of found objects mark the (...) work of artists as different as Ernst, Miró, Magritte, and Dali. Maurice Nadeau's History of Surrealism, first published in French in 1944 and in English in 1965, has become a classic. It is both lucid and authoritative--by far the best overall account of this complex movement. Nadeau traces the evolution of Surrealism, bringing to life its many internal debates about politics and art. He relates the movement to its intellectual and artistic environment. And he provides the statements and manifestos of Breton, Aragon, Tzara, and others. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Fear can be a crippling disease, and there is no more fearful prospect for most of us than nuclear war. Following recent popular accounts of ...

What is typical of Hayek's challenge concerning socialism is that he always maintained that this question was for economic theory to decide. Sketching the historical background of what has come to be known as the "socialist calculation debate" (section 1), I try to link this debate with the Menger-Wieser Zurechnungsproblem and show that the Pareto-Barone approach has determined the theoretical form of this economic controversy. I then go on to explore Hayek's 'inapplicability' argument (section 2) and try to show how (...) it is related to Mises' 'logical impossibility’ argument. This is followed by an examination of Hayek's second argument (section 3), which I refer to as 'the evolutionary argument'. I display what is the specific gist of this argument and connect it tightly to the first one. I then discuss certain methodological issues (section 4) pertaining to the allegedly radical difference between Mises' arguments and Hayek's tentative refutation of socialism. Here I challenge the received view that Mises' based his case on the 'impossibility in principle' of socialism, whereas Hayek's own position was to challenge the 'possibility in practice' of a centrally planned economy. This reading (especially by Willem Keizer) of Hayek's contribution to the debate seems to me misguided and unwarranted. I attempt to propose, on the contrary, that both lines of reasoning involve the same kind as arguments since both of them should be interpreted as impossibility theorems. Finally (section 5) I try to give an appropriate and adequate answer to the question raised in the title of this paper. (shrink)

Le corps fait partie de manière significative de l'identité de tout être humain. Il s'agit d'une réalité familière, incontournable. Longtemps, le corps a été dévalorisé, voire méprisé, au profit de l'âme, de l'esprit. Aujourd'hui, on assiste à une dissociation corps/personne aussi regrettable que l'ancien dualisme corps/ âme. En effet, cette dissociation ne fait que provoquer des ravages dans la perception personnelle du corps, tout spécialement dans l'expérience de la maladie, du vieillissement, de la mort, et même de l'au-delà. Il est (...) alors nécessaire de s'interroger à nouveau sur la véritable signification du corps humain, sur les représentations plus ou moins adéquates dont il fait l'objet, pour dépasser les pièges rattachés à certaines visions du corps actuellement très à la mode. Repenser le corps humain avec un seul but : vivre pleinement son corps. Telle est la raison d'être de ce livre. (shrink)

S'il fallait identifier le champ de la réflexion philosophique qui a pris le plus déampleur au cours de la dernière décennie, sans doute faudrait-il dire: la philosophie de l'économique, appelée le plus souvent «méthodologie économique». Mais qu'entendre par «méthodologie «conomique»? Le signe le plus tangible peut-être de l'ébullition que connaît ce domaine a l'heure actuelle est que son identite meme fait l'objet d'âpres disputes. Tenter d'en fournir une caractérisation qui ferait consensus rélèverait de l'étourderie et se révélerait sans doute une (...) perte de temps complète. Comment, alors, dois-je m'y prendre pour présenter le domaine qui fournit son thème au prèsent numéro deDialogueEn y allant d'une réflexion qui aura peut-être davantage l'allure d'un discours a bâtons rompus que celle d'un exposé systematiqué, puis en illustrant mon propos d'exemples tirès des diverses contributions au présent numéro plutôt qu'en tentant de d'finir strictement ce champ de recherches. (shrink)

Hayek is, with Mises, one the prominent Austrian economists who took part in the historical “socialist calculation debate” of the 1930s. After recalling precisely what Mises’s crucial argument against socialism was (socialism means the abolition of market prices which are necessary for real rational economic decisions to be taken in production), this paper goes on to show what Hayek’s main argument was (state planning of the economy is impossible because no super-brain can have all the necessary knowledge to be economically (...) efficient). I will further show that, while this last argument is theoretical, Hayek has also an argument about the preeminence of competitive economy from an evolutionary standpoint, which is an empirical question and thus forms a less conclusive argument. In the second part of this paper, I will summarize how Myrdal explains in his 1960 book, and from a completely different angle, how state intervention and planning historically occurred—and continues to work—in our Western Capitalist Welfare States. Myrdal’s account is explicitly presented by him as having empirical import, but also strong normative content. Hayek, on the contrary, argues that the efficiency of state planning is a problem for economists to solve on exclusively scientific grounds. My purpose is to show important divergences between these two economic viewpoints and to sketch a philosophical appraisal of both. (shrink)

Hayek is, with Mises, one the prominent Austrian economists who took part in the historical “socialist calculation debate” of the 1930s. After recalling precisely what Mises’s crucial argument against socialism was (socialism means the abolition of market prices which are necessary for real rational economic decisions to be taken in production), this paper goes on to show what Hayek’s main argument was (state planning of the economy is impossible because no super-brain can have all the necessary knowledge to be economically (...) efficient). I will further show that, while this last argument is theoretical, Hayek has also an argument about the preeminence of competitive economy from an evolutionary standpoint, which is an empirical question and thus forms a less conclusive argument. In the second part of this paper, I will summarize how Myrdal explains in his 1960 book, and from a completely different angle, how state intervention and planning historically occurred—and continues to work—in our Western Capitalist Welfare States. Myrdal’s account is explicitly presented by him as having empirical import, but also strong normative content. Hayek, on the contrary, argues that the efficiency of state planning is a problem for economists to solve on exclusively scientific grounds. My purpose is to show important divergences between these two economic viewpoints and to sketch a philosophical appraisal of both. (shrink)

En 1962, Thomas Kuhn fait paraître l'ouvrage qui allait le rendre célèbre, à savoir La Structure des révolutions scientifiques. Il visait à produire en philosophie des sciences ce quil appela une « gestalt switch ». Il entendait, en effet, mettre en cause le « paradigme épistémologique cartésien » et proposer que l'analyse logico-méthodologique cède définitivement la place à une approche historique et psychologique des sciences . Mon propos est de faire voir que, bien que les premiers critiques de Kuhn se (...) soient le plus souvent fourvoyés, en proposant ce virage radical, Kuhn a amplifié sinon induit une crise profonde dans la philosophie des sciences post-positiviste. Car, ni l'histoire, ni la sociologie des sciences ne sont adéquatement outillées pour répondre aux questions spécifiquement logico-méthodologiques que la connaissance scientifique suscite.In publishing his 1962 book on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn became world famous. He wanted to provoke what he called a "gestalt switch" in philosophy of science. After having characterized the "Cartesian Paradigm" as the most prominent failure of our epistemohgy, Kuhn finally proposes that we switch from logic and methodology to history and sociology of science. I would like to show that, even if we grant that Kuhn's first critics were out of focus, in taking the Kuhnian turn, philosophy of science and epistemohgy runs into crisis. For, using exclusively historiographical and sociological concepts and types of investigation, epistemological and methodological analysis are no longer adequatly feasible. Transformed into historians and "metahistorians" of science, philosophers of the new Kuhnian persuasion are no longer apt to give proper treatment to those still legitimate concerns related to the strictly logical and methodological dimensions of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

The Road to Serfdom (Hayek 1944)2 is without a doubt the book that made Friedrich Hayek world famous. But one must immediately add that Hayek the trained economist was far from being satisfied with this situation, at least at the beginning. “I have long resented”, writes Hayek, “being more widely known by what I regarded as a pamphlet for the time than by my strictly scientific work.” But he adds immediately: “After reexamining what I wrote then in the light of (...) some thirty years’ further study of the problems then raised, I no longer do so” (Hayek 1976: xxiv-xxv). (shrink)

Cet article se penche sur la question de savoir ce qu’apporte le modèle conséquentialiste lorsqu’on s’intéresse aux problèmes moraux propres aux agents collectifs, plus précisément à la responsabilité collective. Il est d’usage de parler de responsabilité collective pour désigner une situation ou un groupe dans son ensemble ou les membres d’un groupe sont sanctionnés pour une faute ou félicités pour une action juste. L’enquête présentée ici est de nature différente. Il s’agit de définir la responsabilité comme projet moral. En outre, (...) cet article offre une version conséquentialiste du principe de responsabilité collective permettant de répondre aux objections bien connues selon lesquelles le conséquentialisme demande trop aux agents et est incohérent. (shrink)

Le but de cet ouvrage n'est pas de présenter une généalogie conceptuelle du châtiment ni de brosser un panorama exhaustif des travaux en philosophie, en criminologie ou en droit sur les justifications de la peine. De façon plus modeste, nous avons voulu offrir au public un ensemble de travaux permettant de voir d'un peu plus près nos conceptions modernes de la justice pénale. De l'idée selon laquelle les peines sont infligées pour le propre bien des criminels à celle selon laquelle (...) tout crime mérite d'être réparé par le châtiment, en passant par le caractère préventif des peines, nos conceptions de la légitimité des peines reposent sur un certain nombre de postulats en apparence assez simples et que pour cette raison l'on hésite à remettre en cause : nécessité de l'ordre public, dette du criminel à l'égard de ses victimes et de la société, etc. L'ensemble de ces articles permet de jeter un regard critique sur la justice pénale sans prétendre pour autant vouloir la disqualifier. (shrink)

Like Mises before him, Hayek challenges the validity of socialism as a centrally planned economic regime typically characterized by state ownership of all means of production. What is typical of Hayek's challenge is that he holds that this question is fully theoretical in nature and that it has consequently to be raised and decided as a scientific question. Sketching the historical background of the socialist calculation debate of the 1920s and 1930s, I first show how this debate is linked with (...) the Menger-Wieser Zurechnungsproblem, which indeed constitutes the very topic of Hayek’s 1923 Ph. D. dissertation. I recall that the Pareto-Barone approach based on General Equilibrium Theory (GET) has determined the conceptual framework of this controversy. I then go on to explore Hayek's impracticability argument against market socialism and try to show how it is related to, but different from, Mises’s logical impossibility argument. I argue that the contexts of discussion were completely different in both cases: if Mises was criticizing the possibility of rational economic decisions in a moneyless economy, Hayek was debating against the Lange-Dickinson-Lerner model of market socialism where the prices of first order goods were supposedly fixed following a GET simulation of the competetive market process. The core of Hayek’s line of reasoning is shown to be related to a clever analysis of the notion of ‘data’: the data on which a Central Planification Board is suppose to work out a production and distribution schema for the whole economy are simply unavailable to him because this kind of economic knowledge (which Michael Polanyi calls “tacit knowledge”) cannot be accumulated and stored up anywhere in society, as if the global economy could be directed by a super-brain possessing complete knowledge of every particular situation and able to compute a perfect solution to any economic problem whatsoever.. (shrink)

Throughout his writings, Hayek has emphasized that a "scientistic prejudice" is working as a bad steering factor in the research for sound theories in the general field of social sciences, and especially in economics. Notwithstanding Hayek's criticism, most contemporary economists still think that they must imitate methods of physical and biological sciences in order to do good and valid science. While Hayek was first vehemently reproving this methodological choice in his early writings (for example, Hayek 1952), he was afterwards convinced (...) by Popper, as he himself acknowledges (see Hayek 1967) that the scientific method social scientists sought to transpose into their own research field was mere illusion. Consequently, Hayek rejected the confirmationist approach to economic theories and adopted a strict falsificationist one (this is very clear in the Nobel Memorial Lecture: see Hayek 1974). (shrink)

La question de savoir si l'épistémologie est encore possible, et quelle voie elle doit emprunter, est à l'ordre du jour. En effet, suite à l'échec du modèle standard proposé par l'empirisme logique, nous nous retrouvons pour ainsi dire a la croisée des chemins. C'est ainsi que, par exemple, nous prenons progressivement conscience des enjeux opposant les partisans de la « LSE Position » aussi bien aux empiristes qu'à ceux qui favorisent plutôt une sorte de « virage sociologiste », ou encore (...) que nous nous trouvons confrontés à l'inadéquation des deux principales façons d'envisager la testabilité des théories scientifiques, à savoir la conception hypothético-déductive d'un côté et la conception bayésienne de l'autre. (shrink)

Cet article défend la thèse suivant laquelle le républicanisme de Machiavel doit être pensé dans le cadre théorique des tumulti, c’est-à-dire des conflits entre les grands — qui veulent dominer— et le peuple — qui veut être libre. Cela signifie d’abord que le républicanisme de Machiavel ne présuppose aucune conception compréhensive de la liberté politique ni de quelque vision du bien que ce soit. La valeur normative de la thèse du conflit tient en ce que les dissensions entre les groupes (...) sociaux sont garants de la liberté politique et de la neutralité axiologique des institutions qui favoriseront cette liberté. Cela signifie ensuite, mais il s’agit en réalité de la même affirmation, que la pensée politique de Machiavel ne doit pas être interprétée en fonction des paramètres de l’humanisme civique, qui est une forme de néo-aristotélisme sur le plan politique et éthique et dont on associe trop souvent et trop facilement les thèses au républicanisme sous prétexte qu’il en est une des origines.This article defends the claim that Machiavelli’s republicanism should be approached via the theoretical framework of tumulti, that is, the conflicts among the powerful “who want to dominate” and the people “who wants to be free”. It means that Machiavelli’s republicanism presupposes neither a comprehensive conception of political freedom, nor any vision of what the good is. The normative value of the conflict thesis lies in the fact that social dissent between the social groups secures the political freedom and the axiological neutrality of the institutions that promote this freedom. It means therefore — and it is in reality the same assertion — that Machiavelli’s political thought should not be interpreted as related to some form of civic humanism, that is, a neo-Aristotelian conception of ethics and politics, and which we too easily associate with republicanism. (shrink)

A good way of characterizing what is usually called the 17th-century “revolution of modern science” is to focus on Galileo Galilei’s theory of explanation. As is well known, he set aside three of the four Aristotelian causes (material, formal and final causes) in order to base all sound scientific explanations in terms of efficient causes. In the second half of the 19th century a new scientific revolution occurred, with Darwin’s theory of evolution. As it has been stated repeatedly, Darwinism also (...) has something to do with the abandoning of teleology in science, as speciation is explained without any appeal to final causes. But in the last quarter of the 19th century a third scientific revolution occured, this time in the social sciences. Many philosophers of science fail to notice or understand this intellectual event. This third scientific revolution is usually called the “marginalist revolution.” The transformation of political economy into pure economics, and progressively, into mathematical economics had at least two distinctive features. First, this revolution broke out simultaneously but independently in three different European countries: with Carl Menger (1840- 1921) in Austria, with William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) in England, and with Léon Walras (1834- 1910), who, in 1870, was the first to hold the Chair of Political Economy at the University of.. (shrink)

Résumé Dans le paysage littéraire chrétien, il est un lieu particulier, fruit d’une triple activité, spirituelle, artistique et cognitive : la parole mystique, parole à la fois esthétique, théologique et éthique. Cette brève étude se propose de revisiter ce site et de tenter de montrer comment la manière poétique y recentre la matière théologique ; comment aussi, dans une étonnante dynamique d’échange, l’acte poétique trouve, dans la matière théologique, un accomplissement inattendu. Le dire et le dit mystiques, pratiquement exclus depuis (...) sept siècles du savoir théologique, se révèlent alors comme lieux possibles d’inspiration pour redécouvrir et ré-envisager l’acte théologique, épuisé par des siècles d’inféodation aux rationalités modernes.The mystical discourse, indebted to the spiritual, cognitive, and artistic spheres, occupies a distinct place within Christian literature, being simultaneously an esthetic, theological and ethical writing. This brief paper proposes a re-examination of this sort of discourse and attempts to show how the poetic style works to reorient the theological material. It also shows how, in a striking dynamic of exchange, poetic activity finds its unexpected fulfillment in the theological material. Mystical speech and sayings, almost completely excluded from theology for the last seven centuries, are shown as possible sources of inspiration for the rediscovery and reinvigoration of theological activity, exhausted by centuries of sterile modern rationalism. (shrink)

The concept of spontaneous order is an important framework in many fields of research in the natural and social sciences today, and it bears heavily on methodological problems related to economics in particular. In fact, all domains of scientific and philosophical research where it can be maintained intelligibly that an undesigned but nevertheless effective order has emerged solely through the interaction of the constituent parts of a given system and also through the interaction of this system as a whole with (...) its environment fall under what is now often preferably called the "paradigm of auto-organization". This paradigm can be traced back to Leibniz (Dobuzinkis 1989, p. 245) or even to the Spanish Jesuits of the Salamanca School of the XVIth century (Lepage 1983, p. 347), and a lot of scientific work has now been done from within its conceptual framework, for instance Varela & Maturana's theory of "autopoiesis", Heinz von Foerster's second generation cybernetic models, Ilya Prigogine's thermodynamics of open systems and dissipative structures, and chaos theory. In economics, the concept of social spontaneous order is intimately linked with Friedrich Hayek's work, and Hayek has himself insisted on the effective kinship of such approaches (Hayek 1979, p. 158). One can say that there is today in economics a full-fledged Theory of Spontaneous Order (TSO) which articulates four distinct arguments. (shrink)

"S'il devait un jour n'être plus possible pour les observateurs scientifiques de s'entendre au sujet des énoncés de base, cela équivaudrait à l'échec du langage comme moyen de communication universel. Cela équivaudrait à une nouvelle ‘‘Tour de Babel’’, la découverte scientifique s'en trouverait réduite à une absurdité. Dans cette nouvelle Babel le haut édifice de la science tomberait bientôt en ruines.".

Of the many twentieth-century Austrian intellectuals who have left an indelible mark, Friedrich Hayek is without a doubt one of the most multidimensional, and for this reason also one of the most difficult to comprehend. Who was he, in fact? He presented himself as a fourth-generation economist trained in the famous “Austrian School” which Carl Menger had founded in 1871. Indeed, Hayek may well be its last representative, given his own opinion that after him the Austrian School had more or (...) less ceased to exist. (shrink)

Many methodologists are firmly convinced that Popper's arguments concerning the status of the rationality principle (RP) are incoherent or incompatible with the essentials of falsificationism. The present essay first shows that the accusation of incompatibility of situational logic with falsificationism does not hold up to scrutiny but then shows that Popper's arguments are nonetheless flimsy if not indefensible. For it seems that one can distinguish between two different versions of the RP in Popper's writings. If the first version is plainly (...) "objectivist" and can be characterized with Popper as empirically false, the second one is rather "subjectivist" and is not falsifiable as such. The essay shows that this second reading of the RP is the one that Popper finally adopts but that, unfortunately enough, this formulation of the RP looks more like a metaphysical statement than like an empirical law. It could then be held to be a priori valid as such, by analogy with Popper's line of argument concerning the principle of causality. If this is correct, then Popper's thesis on the empirical status of the RP is confuted. (shrink)

Claudia Nadeau-Morissette | : En théorie littéraire comme dans tout domaine scientifique, certaines catégories font fortune au point de ne plus être remises en question par les chercheurs. Ce fut le cas de l’idéalisme et du réalisme dans l’interprétation de l’oeuvre romanesque de Premchand. De concepts théoriques, ces catégories sont devenues les échafauds sur lesquels s’est construit un schéma idéologique en trois phases de l’oeuvre et de la pensée de cet écrivain, le faisant passer du stade de l’idéalisme au (...) réalisme. Le présent article examine comment s’est opéré ce glissement chez les critiques de Premchand et les conséquences qu’il a eues dans l’analyse de la dimension religieuse de son oeuvre. | : In the theory of literature, like in any scientific domain, some categories become so popular that they are left unquestioned by the scholars. This is the case of idealism and realism when it comes to the interpretation of the fiction works of Premchand. These categories, from theoretical concepts, become the base on which an ideological schema of this writer’s work and thought is constructed in three steps, evolving from the stage of the idealism to that of the realism. The present article looks at how this shift finds its way with the critics of Premchand and the consequences they have on the analysis of the religious dimension of his work. (shrink)

In this reflection on the debates that surrounded gay marriage in Europe and North-America , Chantal Nadeau wonders what are the costs and benefits for the queer and the Nation-State when blood-as-sex is traded for blood-as-status, within a legal apparatus that is pro-family and pro-nation, working as a vector of social cohesiveness. Queer sexuality is no longer imagined as an aberration or as a misalliance, but rather as a machine of inclusion and erosion of difference, producing a new emblematic (...) figure : the queer family man. In its obsession with filiation, blood-as-status resurrects a community within which the alliance between the queer and the State guarantees the protection of the “ordinary” citizen: the normal, reasonable, patriotic citizen, whose sexuality no longer carries any dynamics of differentiation. (shrink)

Alice Le Goff ,Christian Nadeau | : Ce texte constitue une introduction au dossier. Il introduit les différentes contributions en mettant en relief leurs principales orientations. Ce faisant, il propose donc une cartographie conceptuelle, forcément partielle, des enjeux associés à la notion de démocratie épistémique et des enjeux du croisement de cette notion avec celle de démocratie de contestation. En un premier temps, nous revenons sur l’apport du procéduralisme épistémique et sur les questions qu’il soulève. Ensuite, nous revenons sur (...) le néo-pragmatisme et la façon dont il permet d’envisager une justification épistémique de la démocratie. Puis nous mettons l’accent sur les enjeux d’un dialogue entre modèle républicain de la démocratie contestataire et modèle épistémique. Enfin, le texte propose un résumé du parcours proposé dans le cadre de ce dossier. | : This introduction brings out the main lines of the articles collected in the present issue. Our aim is to provide the reader with a conceptual overview of the main stakes of epistemic democracy and of its intersections with the model of contestatory democracy. First, we focus on epistemic proceduralism, its contributions and the questions it raises. Second, we emphasize the way neo-pragmatism deals with the epistemic justification of democracy. Then, we insist on the interest of a dialogue between epistemic democracy and the neo-republican model of contestatory democracy. Finally, the text sums up the path followed in that issue. (shrink)

Quelle est la responsabilité des intellectuels en temps de guerre? Cet article entend offrir une analyse de la pensée de Michael Walzer afin de répondre à cette question. Il s’agira d’abord de revenir sur la distinction classique, au sein des théories de la guerre juste, entre combattants et non combattants. Par la suite, il sera possible d’examiner de manière plus exacte la responsabilité des citoyens en temps de guerre, et plus particulièrement des intellectuels.

La Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophic comprend maintenant un ouvrage où l'on trouve la traduction française de quatre textes importants pour l'historien du savoir. Le texte central est celui du Collogue Cassirer-Heidegger qui eut lieu à Davos en mars 1929, où les deux philosophes confrontèrent leur lecture de Kant. Les trios autres textes ont pour but de mettre un peu mieux en lumière le sens de cette confrontation: il s'agit1. du résumé anonyme des « Conférences du Professeur Martin Heidegger sur (...) la Critique de la Raison Pure de Kant et sur la tâche d'une fondation de la Métaphysique » et du résumé des « Conférences du Professeur Ernst Cassirer »;2. du compte rendu fait par Cassirer du Kant-Buch de Heidegger;3. du compte rendu fait par Heidegger du deuxième volume de la Philosophie der symbolischen Formen de Cassirer. (shrink)

It has already been argued by Frazer and Boland (1983) that, interpreted in an instrumentalist fashion, Milton Friedman’s well known and much criticized 1953 paper on “The Methodology of Positive Economics”1 proved to be convergent with Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science2. I think that this comparison is flawed. For one can assuredly contest this interpretation in view of the fact that Popper always opposed any kind of instrumentalist philosophy of science3. It is not even clear that what Friedman has to (...) say on the intricate question of the status of theories and on the function of tests has anything to do with what Popper criticizes under the general category of “instrumentalism”. What I will do here is not so much to directly challenge the Frazer-Boland interpretation as to replace it with a completely new comparison of both methodologies in order to get a new look at Friedman's methodological stance. Of course, one has to focus only on the arguments that really are comparable and leave aside those that could easily be proved to be fundamentally different, if not plainly incompatible. But, as I will try to show, the exercise is worthwhile, for this new comparison will force us to reinterpret, at least partially, what seem to me to be the two central tenets of Friedman's methodological doctrine. Of course, in order to find convergence between Friedman's and Popper's views on economic methodology, we have to read.. (shrink)

Une analyse minutieuse du dernier ouvrage de Hayek publié quatre ans avant sa mort, soit en 1988 , permet de mettre au Jour les tenants et aboutissants de la perspective évolutionnaire épousée par Hayek en matière d'économie politique. Examinant d'abord le concept d'ordre spontané, exposant ensuite le fonctionnement de Véconomie marchande comme système en expansion continue, je montre alors comment s'articulent pour Hayek compétence économique et compétence épistémique d'un côté, puis coordination économique et compétence morale de l'autre. L'analyse fait apercevoir (...) que, fondamentalement, l'optique de Hayek est évolutionnaire parce qu 'elle est résolument populationnelle, ce que les commentateurs de Hayek ont plutôt ignoré jusqu'ici, ce qui fournit l'occasion de passer en revue les critiques adressées par Hayek au principe de population de Malthus .Four years before his death, Hayek published a book in which he particulates the main reasons for adopting an evolutionary point of view in economics. This paper tries precisely to systematize these reasons as clearly as possible. I begin by a systematic discussion of the concept of spontaneous order. I then look at what mainly defines the catallaxy as a still extending market order. Following this line of theoretical argument, I then try to show how for Hayek economic competence and epistemic competence are to be seen as developing together in a free market economy. Furthermore, 1 try to show how for Hayek economic coordination and moral competence are to be seen as the unintended results ofrule-governed individual dimensions of behaviour mutually. (shrink)

Résumé Au sein d’une théologie considérée comme fondamentalement pratique, la théologie pratique comme sous-discipline se distingue par un intérêt particulier — empirique, herméneutique, critique et stratégique — pour les pratiques dont elle fait souvent son objet propre. Après avoir signalé quelques impacts de ce centrement sur la pratique, l’article présente quelques définitions de la pratique et quelques éléments d’histoire du concept. Il expose ensuite quelques traits des pratiques, en particulier avec Paul Ricoeur et Jürgen Habermas, conjuguant des perspectives sémantique, pragmatique (...) et communicationnelle. Il vise particulièrement à faire ressortir la richesse et la complexité de la pratique dont l’étude est trop souvent prise comme allant de soi et qui surprennent toujours celui qui s’y adonne.At the heart of a theology which is fundamentally considered to be practical, practical theology, as a sub-discipline, distinguishes itself by its particular empirical, hermeneutic, critical, and strategic interest in the practices with which it is concerned. After pointing out some of the impacts of this central concern with practice, the present article presents some definitions of practice as well as some historical background of the concept. It then examines some of the characteristics of practice, particularly in relation to Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas, while discussing semantic, pragmatic, and communicational perspectives. In particular, this article aims at highlighting the richness and complexity of practice. (shrink)

This article follows the 14th national STS meeting in Baltimore. The original paper was a Major Qualifying Project, equivalent to a senior thesis, at Worcester Polytechnic Institute titled “Control of Mount Wachusett.” The conclusions of the case study of a rather local event have implications in policy, ethics, the environment, and education that are more far-reaching than one might expect.

Virtual environment landmarks are essential in wayfinding: they anchor routes through a region and provide memorable destinations to return to later. Current virtual environment browsers provide user interface menus that characterize available travel destinations via landmark textual descriptions or thumbnail images. Such characterizations lack the depth cues and context needed to reliably recognize 3D landmarks. This paper introduces a new user interface affordance that captures a 3D representation of a virtual environment landmark into a 3D thumbnail, called a worldlet. Each (...) worldlet is a miniature virtual world fragment that may be interactively viewed in 3D, enabling a traveler to gain first-person experience with a travel destination. In a pilot student conducted to compare textual, image, and worldlet landmark representations within a wayfinding task, worldlet use significantly reduced the overall travel time and distance traversed, virtually eliminating unnecessary backtracking. (shrink)

Dramatic advances in 3D Web technologies have recently led to widespread development of virtual world Web browsers and 3D content. A natural question is whether 3D thumbnails can be used to find one’s way about such 3D content the way that text and 2D thumbnail images are used to navigate 2D Web content. We have conducted an empirical experiment that shows interactive 3D thumbnails, which we call worldlets, improve travelers’ landmark knowledge and expedite wayfinding in virtual environments.

This paper proposes several concepts of efficient solutions for multicriteria decision problems under uncertainty. We show how alternative notions of efficiency may be grounded on different decision ‘contexts’, depending on what is known about the Decision Maker's (DM) preference structure and probabilistic anticipations. We define efficient sets arising naturally from polar decision contexts. We investigate these sets from the points of view of their relative inclusions and point out some particular subsets which may be especially relevant to some decision situations.