Even given the final truths of what is right and wrong, good and bad, ethics is not complete. For one may yet ask “Why should I be moral?” Of course, we have no prior assurance that it will be possible to provide a non-moral and justifiable answer to the rational and self-interested person. Nevertheless, I claim that reasons for being moral can be provided even for the rational, self-interested, and remorseless individual who knows he will not be caught. In defending (...) my claim I will draw on empirical data from recent social psychology and game theory. Actual human selves are malleable in a number of ways. I will show that it is rational for the self-interested person to modify selves in such a way that moral actions are increasingly preferred. Specifically, I will argue that it is in one’s rational self-interest to enhance empathy in others and future selves in such a way that for increasing numbers other-injury becomes a component of self-injury, and other-benefit becomes a component of self-benefit. This will allow a linkage to be drawn from rational and self-interested action to moral action. The development of this theory will begin by distinguishing my approach from that of Gauthier, then three interpretations of the “Why be moral?” question will be delineated, next the decision theoretic components of my account will be presented, and finally the role of empathy will be considered in detail. (shrink)

While the importance of mechanisms in determining causality in medicine is currently the subject of active debate, the role of mechanistic reasoning in clinical practice has received far less attention. In this paper we look at this question in the context of the treatment of a particular individual, and argue that evidence of mechanisms is indeed key to various aspects of clinical practice, including assessing population-level research reports, diagnostic as well as therapeutic decision making, and the assessment of treatment effects. (...) We use the pulmonary condition bronchiectasis as a source of examples of the importance of mechanistic reasoning to clinical practice. (shrink)

Population-level biomedical research offers new opportunities to improve population health, but also raises new challenges to traditional systems of research governance and ethical oversight. Partly in response to these challenges, various models of public involvement in research are being introduced. Yet, the ways in which public involvement should meet governance challenges are not well understood. We conducted a qualitative study with 36 experts and stakeholders using the World Café method to identify key governance challenges and explore how public involvement can (...) meet these challenges. This brief report discusses four cross-cutting themes from the study: the need to move beyond individual consent; issues in benefit and data sharing; the challenge of delineating and understanding publics; and the goal of clarifying justifications for public involvement. The report aims to provide a starting point for making sense of the relationship between public involvement and the governance of population-level biomedical research, showing connections, potential solutions and issues arising at their intersection. We suggest that, in population-level biomedical research, there is a pressing need for a shift away from conventional governance frameworks focused on the individual and towards a focus on collectives, as well as to foreground ethical issues around social justice and develop ways to address cultural diversity, value pluralism and competing stakeholder interests. There are many unresolved questions around how this shift could be realised, but these unresolved questions should form the basis for developing justificatory accounts and frameworks for suitable collective models of public involvement in population-level biomedical research governance. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson is one of the most influential living philosophers working in the areas of logic and metaphysics. His work in these areas has been particularly influential in shaping debates about metaphysical modality, which is the topic of his recent provocative and closely-argued book *Modal Logic as Metaphysics* (2013). The present book comprises ten essays by metaphysicians and logicians responding to Williamson’s work on metaphysical modality. The authors include some of the most distinguished philosophers of modality in the (...) world, as well as several rising stars. Each essay is followed by a reply by Williamson. In addition, the book contains a major new essay by Williamson, ‘Modal science,’ concerning the role of modal claims in natural science. This book was originally published as a special issue of the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy.*. (shrink)

This special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy is dedicated to Timothy Williamson's work on modality. It consists of a new paper by Williamson followed by papers on Williamson's work on modality, with each followed by a reply by Williamson. -/- Contributors: Andrew Bacon, Kit Fine, Peter Fritz, Jeremy Goodman, John Hawthorne, Øystein Linnebo, Ted Sider, Robert Stalnaker, Meghan Sullivan, Gabriel Uzquiano, Barbara Vetter, Timothy Williamson, Juhani Yli-Vakkuri.

2012 will mark 60 years since the death of Walter Williamson Bryden. This reprint of his bold 1940 publication, featuring a new introduction by Dr John A. Vissers, Principal of Knox College, Toronto, celebrate the work of this eminent Presbyterian theologian. Best known for bringing Karl Barth to Canada, W.W. Bryden predicted the decline of Idealism and liberal theology in Protestantism at the start of the twentieth-century. When that crisis hit the Canadian Protestant Churches he was ready with (...) this book. The Christian's Knowledge of God is a re-examination of Reformation teachings with particular focus on the revelation of God, by God through Christ. Bryden challenges his readers to question their blind acceptance of Christian doctrine and to reconsider what it means to have knowledge of the Divine and with it "the power to confront the world, no longer as those seeking, but as those having found God". Although the book concludes "Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis", we have not changed so much with the times as to make this book less relevant today than it was when first published. Indeed those seeking for knowledge of God today could do well to be reminded of Bryden's message. (shrink)

Objective Bayesianism has been criticised on the grounds that objective Bayesian updating, which on a finite outcome space appeals to the maximum entropy principle, differs from Bayesian conditionalisation. The main task of this paper is to show that this objection backfires: the difference between the two forms of updating reflects negatively on Bayesian conditionalisation rather than on objective Bayesian updating. The paper also reviews some existing criticisms and justifications of conditionalisation, arguing in particular that the diachronic Dutch book justification fails (...) because diachronic Dutch book arguments are subject to a reductio: in certain circumstances one can Dutch book an agent however she changes her degrees of belief . One may also criticise objective Bayesianism on the grounds that its norms are not compulsory but voluntary, the result of a stance. It is argued that this second objection also misses the mark, since objective Bayesian norms are tied up in the very notion of degrees of belief. (shrink)

This chapter explores some general aspects of the tension between one’s role as a believer and one’s role as an appraiser of oneself as a believer in philosophy. The proposal is to replace true belief by knowledge in a principle of charity constitutive of content. Knowledge maximization need not make the ascription of knowledge come too cheap. By contrast, Davidson’s principle of charity gives good marks to an interpretation for having Stone Age people assent to many truths of quantum mechanics, (...) if it happens to fit the compositional structure of their language. Perhaps the underlying worries about knowledge maximization can be captured in a more abstract form. A subtler attempt to extract knowledge from Davidson’s principle of charity exploits beliefs that one knows. Knowledge maximization implies that our ancestors had some primitive knowledge as soon as they had some primitive beliefs; it is not as though archaeology suggests otherwise. (shrink)

0. Logic is sometimes conceived as metaphysically neutral, so that nothing controversial in metaphysics is logically valid. That conception devastates logic. Just about every putative principle of logic has been contested on metaphysical grounds. According to some, future contingencies violate the law of excluded middle; according to others, the set of all sets that are not members of themselves makes a contradiction true. Even the structural principle that chaining together valid arguments yields a valid argument has been rejected in response (...) to sorites paradoxes. In each case, a deviant metaphysics corresponds to the deviant logic. Of course, if one is trying to persuade deviant metaphysicians of the error of their ways, one is unlikely to get far by relying on logical principles that they reject. But that obvious dialectical exigency stably marks out no realm of logic. Each logical principle has persuasive force in some dialectical contexts and not in others. We do better to admit that logic has metaphysically contentious implications, and embrace them ─ if we know what they are. (shrink)

This chapter lays out a case that with the proper perspective on the place of epistemology within normative inquiry more generally, it is possible to appreciate what was on the right track about some of the early approaches to the analysis of knowledge, and to improve on the obvious failures which led them to be rejected. Drawing on more general principles about reasons, their weight, and their relationship to justification, it offers answers to problems about defeat and the conditional fallacy (...) that plagued early defeasibility analyses of knowledge and offers a sketch of a contemporary alternative that is motivated by the idea that knowledge requires the right kind of “match” between objective and subjective factors. (shrink)

For over thirty years, Robert Audi has produced important work in ethics, epistemology, and the theory of action. This volume features thirteen new critical essays on Audi by a distinguished group of authors: Fred Adams, William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Roger Crisp, Elizabeth Fricker, Bernard Gert, Thomas Hurka, Hugh McCann, Al Mele, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Raimo Tuomela, Candace Vogler, and Timothy Williamson. Audi's introductory essay provides a thematic overview interconnecting his views in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of action. The volume concludes (...) with his comprehensive response essay that yields an illuminating dialog with all his critics and often extends his previous work. (shrink)

Both formal semantics and cognitive semantics are the source of important insights about language. By developing precise statements of the rules of meaning in fragmentary, abstract languages, formalists have been able to offer perspicuous accounts of how we might come to know such rules and use them to communicate with others. Conversely, by charting the overall landscape of interpretations, cognitivists have documented how closely interpretations draw on the commonsense knowledge that lets us make our way in the world. There is (...) no opposition between these insights. Sooner or later we will have a semantics that responds to both. However, developing such a semantics is profoundly difficult, because there are certain tensions to be overcome in reconciling the two perspectives. For one thing, the overall landscape of meaning does seem to be characterized by a much richer ontology and more dynamic categories than are exhibited by the fragments typically studied in the formal tradition. One sign of strain is the recent tendency to talk of “procedural”, “non-compositional”, or “computational” semantics, as in Hamm, Kamp and van Lambalgen 2006, hereafter HK&vL. We think such locutions can serve as useful reminders to keep semantics fixed on the central question of how language allows us to share information that some have and others need to get. However, there is some danger that formalists will merely by put off by an idea that, taken literally, may not be such a good one. In this short article, we want to explore and defend the traditional realist view attributed by HK&vL to Lewis among others. In fact, this view offers a well-developed, extremely straightforward and robust account of the relation between semantics and cognition. Moreover, while the realist view has ways of accommodating the representationalist insights of DRT (Lewis 1979; Thomason 1990; Stalnaker 1998), it remains unclear how “computational” semantics can account for the key data for the realist view: cases where we judge interlocutors to be ignorant about aspects of meaning in their native language (Kripke 1972; Putnam 1975; Stalnaker 1979; Williamson 1994).. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that mathematical knowledge must be a priori, since mathematical truths are necessary, and experience tells us only what is true, not what must be true. This argument can be undermined either by showing that experience can yield knowledge of the necessity of some truths, or by arguing that mathematical theorems are contingent. Recent work by Albert Casullo and Timothy Williamson argues (or can be used to argue) the first of these lines; W. V. Quine and (...) Hartry Field take the latter line. I defend a version of the argument against these, and other objections. (shrink)

It is a long time since I have admired a book as much as I admire this one. It is a long time since I have disagreed with a book as profoundly as I disagree with this one. I hope this combination of reactions on my part has more than whatever limited biographical interest it has. I hope it helps to signal the combination of excellence and provocation that mark Timothy Williamson's book, which is at once beautifully clear, (...) forcefully argued, continually insightful, and, in my view, deeply wrong.One thing that I admire about the book is Williamson's preparedness to reflect philosophically on the nature of philosophy, something that is surprisingly rare in a discipline that is marked by such a high degree of self-consciousness and in which there are so few scruples about reflecting on the nature of other disciplines. One thing that gives me pause is Williamson's lack of serious engagement with the history of philosophy. 1 I am convinced that the philosophy of philosophy will always be seriously handicapped if it is as dissociated from the history of philosophy as this. But I shall not dwell on that concern here, because Williamson is clear enough about where his interests lie and I would be in danger, if I did, of succumbing to that familiar absurdity of berating an author for not having written a numerically different book.What I will say is that Williamson's failure to engage seriously with the history of philosophy seems to me indicative of a scientism about philosophy which, despite how much he does to motivate his conception of the discipline, is manifest in how much …. (shrink)

In the first section I outline the theory of abstraction, discussing first its con- ceptual basis, then its psychological-epistemological basis, and last its causal basis. My purpose throughout is to show how these bases, and thus the theory itself, were not only paramountly Aristotelian, but also eminently sensible. In the second section I draw the perspectivist account of vision within the bounds of the theory of abstraction and show stage by stage how that account unfolds coherently within those bounds. This (...) procedure should make clear that what the perspecti- vists actually offered was less a scientific theory of light or vision than a scientifi- cally justified world view. (shrink)

One problem facing Hockney and Falco is the lack of evidence among optical sources to support their claim that artists used image-projection by the early 1400s. After all, if quattrocento artists knew about image-projection, they must have learned about it from experts in the field, and no one was more expert at the time than Perspectivist opticians. As I argue in this paper, however, Perspectivist reflection-analysis posed certain theoretical and conceptual constraints that would have prevented Perspectivist opticians from recognizing, much (...) less understanding, image-projection. Their silence on this matter is therefore not evidence against the Hockney-Falco thesis. (shrink)

From the late thirteenth to the early seventeenth century, the process of visual imaging was understood in the Latin West as an essentially subjective act initiated by the eye and completed by the brain. The crystalline lens took center stage in this act, its role determined by its peculiar physical and sensitive capacities. As a physical body, on the one hand, it was disposed to accept the physical impressions of light and color radiating to it from external objects. As a (...) sensitive body, on the other hand, it was enabled by the visual spirit flowing to it from the brain to feel those impressions visually. Acting as a sentient selector of visual information, the lens transformed the brute physical impressions of light and color into visual impressions. These, in turn, gave rise to perceptual “depictions” that were passed back along the stream of visual spirits to the brain. Known in Scholastic parlance as “intentional species,” these depictions served as virtual representations of their generating objects. As such, they provided the wherewithal not only for perception, but also for conception and cognition. (shrink)

That the medieval Latin version of Ibn al-Haytham's Kitāb al-Manā[zdotu]ir was translated into Italian in the fourteenth century has been known for well over a century. Recent studies have shown that this translation, which is contained in Vat. Lat. 4595, was instrumental in the composition of Lorenzo Ghiberti's Commentario terzo on art. Some eight years ago, the author of the present article tentatively identified the actual manuscript-source of that translation as MS Royal 12.G.7, which is currently held in the British (...) Library. This study establishes beyond reasonable doubt that his tentative identification was correct: MS Royal 12.G.7 is indeed the Latin source for the Italian translation in Vat. Lat. 4595. (shrink)

In the fifth book of his De aspectibus, the medieval Latin version of Ibn al-Haythamb al-Manir, Alhacen undertakes to determine precisely where a given ray of light will reflect to a given center of sight from a variety of convex and concave mirrors based on circular sections. As applied specifically to convex and concave spherical mirrors, this problem exercised several seventeenth-century thinkers, Christiaan Huygens foremost among them, and in that context it soon became known as Alhazens solution (or solutions) of (...) this problem is deficient in comparison to that of Huygens and later mathematicians. It is my purpose in this paper to show by reconstruction that in fact, far from deficient in any absolute sense, Alhacen’s approach to this problem was remarkably ingenious and elegant in its conceptual simplicity. (shrink)

The authors use empirical research into the environmental practices of 31 manufacturing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to show that ‚business performance’ and ‚regulation’ considerations drive behaviour. They suggest that this is inevitable, given the market-based decision-making frames that permeate and dominate the industry in which manufacturing SMEs operate. Since the environment is a pillar of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the findings have important implications for CSR policy, which promotes voluntary actions predicated on a business case. It is argued that (...) this approach will not alter the behaviour of manufacturing SMEs significantly because CSR practice will be regarded as an optional and costly ‚extra’ affecting core business activity. Consequently, the use and development of existing regulatory structures, providing minimum standards for many activities covered by CSR, remains the most effective means through which the behaviour of manufacturing SMEs will be changed in the short to medium-term. Another feature of the paper is the distinction made between ‚business performance’ and the ‚business case’ argument. Business performance emphasises cost reductions and efficiency whereas the business case accentuates the benefits to shareholders of good practices as their firms become more attractive to stakeholders and society. Manufacturing SMEs␣try to improve business performance because of the pressures placed on them by market-dominated decision-making frames. These frames do not encourage manufacturing SMEs to undertake voluntary actions for the benefit of wider stakeholders and society. (shrink)

This second edition of the book contains a new chapter on the notions of natural-kind words and natural kinds.

Operational epistemology is, to a first approximation, the attempt to provide cognitive rules such that one is in principle always in a position to know whether one is complying with them. In Knowledge and its Limits, I argue that the only such rules are trivial ones. In this paper, I generalize the argument in several ways to more thoroughly probabilistic settings, in order to show that it does not merely demonstrate some oddity of the folk epistemological conception of knowledge. Some (...) of the generalizations involve a formal semantic framework for treating epistemic probabilities of epistemic probabilities and expectations of expectations. The upshot is that operational epistemology cannot work, and that knowledge-based epistemology has the right characteristics to avoid its problems. (shrink)

At the outset of this discussion, I undertook to present an argument from design which would follow Swinburne's example in making use of a priori judgments, while avoiding some of the objections which have been posed in response to his treatment of these issues. So we need to ask: how does this approach to the question of design compare with Swinburne's?Swinburne argues that a chaotic world is a priori more likely than an ordered world: this consideration provides one central reason, (...) on his account, for giving an explanation of some sort for the world's regularity. The other central argument he advances for this claim is the argument from analogy (in terms of the coins) which we noted earlier. The approach I have taken offers an alternative route to this same conclusion. In particular, it substitutes the simpler a priori judgments recorded in (i) and (ii) for the rather difficult and contentious claim that chaos is a priori more likely than order. In place of this claim, I have offered the judgment that order, or recurrence, is more likely given the activity of a common source or common kind of source than otherwise: this proposal does not commit us to a view either way on the question of whether order is a priori likely per se. Moreover, in place of Swinburne's analogical argument, I have offered an a priori approach, with the advantages I have noted.Given that recurrence is to be explained, we might ask: why offer an explanation in terms of design? On this point, Swinburne argues, for instance, that no other explanation of temporal regularity is even possible a priori. Again, the a priori principles which I have used, in (iv) and (v), may be less ambitious, but at the same time more persuasive. In support of this same idea, Swinburne also cites various ideas to do with the predictive power of the idea of design. I have tried to bring out the role of this sort of consideration in terms of my principle (v). Principle (iv) has no place in Swinburne's account, in view of his reliance on the principle of simplicity as a measure of prior probability.Lastly, we may ask: if we are to cite a designer, are there reasons for attributing to this agent more powers than are needed for the production of the effect to be explained? On this point, Swinburne cites the principle of simplicity. Again, my approach avoids what has proved to be a relatively controversial judgment about the nature of a priori probabilities, offering in place of the principle of simplicity the less ambitious principle recorded in (iii). At this point, I have moreover inverted the logical sequence of Swinburne's argument: it seems to me that, in the ways I have indicated, it is helpful to consider the extent of the powers of the source of recurrence before addressing the question of design.In these various ways, I hope I have made good my undertaking to present an argument which avoids some of the controversy surrounding the particular measures of a priori probability which figure in Swinburne's argument. Moreover, I hope that this approach provides an indication of how a priori judgments may function in a relatively unproblematic way within an argument from design, in so far as (i)–(v) are all rather modest proposals. In sum, the argument I have presented is distinguished by its explicit use of the a priori judgments recorded in (i)–(v), by its attempt to buttress in this fashion analogical forms of argument, and by the logical role it gives to the idea that the source of regularity possesses more powers than are required for the production of this effect.Lastly, we might ask: how persuasive is this argument? Of course, the cogency of the idea of design depends upon the balance of debate in other areas of the philosophy of religion, especially upon our ability to provide some account of the existence of evil. In this paper, I have been concerned to argue simply that recurrence by kind provides evidence for design: I have not addressed the question of whether other features of the world provide good evidence against the idea of (benevolent) design. However, if we confine our attention to this one phenomenon, there is it seems to me good evidence for the idea of design, (i) and (ii) suggest that recurrence surely calls for some explanation; (iii), together with the existence in nature of statistical irregularities, suggests that whatever provides this explanation could have brought about other effects besides; and design seems the only clear explanation of why this effect should have been brought about, if (as I have argued) analogies drawn from vegetable and animal reproduction fail, and if we cannot explain the effect satisfactorily by reference to the conditions of observation. Moreover, I have argued that there are reasons for supposing that the probability a priori of design is relatively high in relation to the probability a priori of any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. In brief, this is because the design hypothesis (unlike the hypothesis of theism) can cite an agent of relatively indeterminate power in order to account for the phenomenon to be explained. In this regard, it is less ‘precisely defined’ than any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. If all of this is so, then as philosophers from early times have supposed, temporal regularity provides the basis for a powerful argument in favour of design. It remains true, of course, that its import can be judged in full only when we have taken into account the relevance of other phenomena, many of which are apparently less favourable to the idea of design. (shrink)

The main result of this paper is that KT is closed under a cancellation principle. This result extends to KTG1, but it does not extend to modal systems associated with the provability interpretation of L, such as KW and KT4Grz. Following Williamson, these results are applied to philosophical concerns about the proper form for theories of meaning, via the interpretation of L as some kind of veriflability. The cancellation principle can then be read as saying that verifilability conditions and (...) falsiflability conditions jointly determine truth conditions. (shrink)

Contemporary ICTs such as speaking machines and computer games tend to create illusions. Is this ethically problematic? Is it deception? And what kind of “reality” do we presuppose when we talk about illusion in this context? Inspired by work on similarities between ICT design and the art of magic and illusion, responding to literature on deception in robot ethics and related fields, and briefly considering the issue in the context of the history of machines, this paper discusses these questions through (...) the lens of stage magic and illusionism, with the aim of reframing the very question of deception. It investigates if we can take a more positive or at least morally neutral view of magic, illusion, and performance, while still being able to understand and criticize the relevant phenomena, and if we can describe and evaluate these phenomena without recourse to the term “deception” at all. This leads the paper into a discussion about metaphysics and into taking a relational and narrative turn. Replying to Tognazzini, the paper identifies and analyses two metaphysical positions: a narrative and performative non-dualist position is articulated in response to what is taken to be a dualist, in particular Platonic, approach to “deception” phenomena. The latter is critically discussed and replaced by a performative and relational approach which avoids a distant “view from nowhere” metaphysics and brings us back to the phenomena and experience in the performance relation. The paper also reflects on the ethical and political implications of the two positions: for the responsibility of ICT designers and users, which are seen as co-responsible magicians or co-performers, and for the responsibility of those who influence the social structures that shape who has power to deceive or to let others perform. (shrink)

Written by the 11th-century Spanish Arab, Abh Muhammad ibn MucnOn Twilight and the Rising of Cloudsdh's value of around 52 miles remained standard until the 17th century, when it was revised sharply downward in consideration of atmospheric refraction and barometric studies. The treatise itself survives in a single Hebrew exemplar, 25 Latin exemplars, and an Italian exemplar derived from the Latin. At the heart of this present study is a critical text based on a fullscale comparative transcription of 22 of (...) the Latin manuscripts, ranging in date from the 13th to the 17th century. (shrink)

“Although up to now the [visual] image has been [understood as] a construct of reason,” Kepler observes in the fifth chapter of his Ad Vitellionem Paralipomena, “henceforth the [visible] representations of objects should be considered as paintings [ picturae ] that are actual[ly projected] on paper or some other screen.” While not intended as a historical generalization, this claim nonetheless reflects historical reality. Virtually all visual theorists before Kepler did, in fact, conceive of optical images as subjective, not objective constructs (...) – or, to put it in modern terms, as virtual rather than real entities. By current lights, of course, the distinction between virtual and real images is both obvious and common-place: whereas the latter can be physically projected upon a screen, the former cannot. (shrink)

In what has become known as the ‘Science Wars,’ two sides have emerged. Some philosophers of science have claimed that, because science is a social practice, it is hopelessly infected with political bias. Others have claimed that science is a special kind of practice, structurally immune to bias. They are both right, because they are referring to different things when they use the word ‘science.’ The second group is referring the method of theory selection, as practiced by scientists in the (...) laboratory, while the first group is referring to the ongoing social practice of science, of which theory choice is a part. The scientific method of theory choice, when practiced correctly, is resistant to bias, while the socially embedded practice is particularly sensitive to political forces, and so is subject to bias. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI consider objections to the use of living wills based upon the discontinuity of personal identity between the time of the execution of the directive anbd the time the person becomes incompetent. Recent authors, following Derek Parfit's “Complex View” of personal identity, have argued that there is often not sufficient identity interests between the competent person who executes the living will and the incompetent patient to warrant the use of the advance directive. I argue that such critics err by seeking (...) personal identity in a purely descriptive manner. By exploring Buchanan and Brock's concept of “surviving interests”, an argument is developed that certain future‐oriented acts have a normative force that contributes to the narrative unity which is constitutive of personal ideality. This narrative concept of the self is entailed by many of the our ordinary practices and challenges the philosophical consensus to view the self in a more dynamic and communitarian manner. (shrink)

The rise of quantum information theory has lent new relevance to experimental tests for non-classicality, particularly in controversial cases such as adiabatic quantum computing superconducting circuits. The Leggett-Garg inequality is a “Bell inequality in time” designed to indicate whether a single quantum system behaves in a macrorealistic fashion. Unfortunately, a violation of the inequality can only show that the system is either (i) non-macrorealistic or (ii) macrorealistic but subjected to a measurement technique that happens to disturb the system. The “clumsiness” (...) loophole (ii) provides reliable refuge for the stubborn macrorealist, who can invoke it to brand recent experimental and theoretical work on the Leggett-Garg test inconclusive. Here, we present a revised Leggett-Garg protocol that permits one to conclude that a system is either (i) non-macrorealistic or (ii) macrorealistic but with the property that two seemingly non-invasive measurements can somehow collude and strongly disturb the system. By providing an explicit check of the invasiveness of the measurements, the protocol replaces the clumsiness loophole with a significantly smaller “collusion” loophole. (shrink)