The object of G. F. Meier's Vernunftlehre and its abridgement for courses, the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, does not consist exclusively in the elaboration of the formal aspects of logic, but rather in the individuation of the elements of thought and language, which make human understanding possible. Instead of limiting himself to formal truth, Meier investigates the realms of epistemic, aesthetic, and historic truths, of horizons, and prejudices. Kant used both Meier's Vernunftlehre and its Auszug for about forty years in (...) his logic-lectures. Kant's Logik, and also his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, were thus strongly influenced by Meier. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Worldview: How Judgment Shapes Human Comprehension by Rudolf A. MakkreelRiccardo PozzoRudolf A. Makkreel. Kant’s Worldview: How Judgment Shapes Human Comprehension. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2021. Pp. 284. Hardback, $99.95. Paperback, $34.95.This is the last book Rudolf Makkreel published before passing away in October 2021. No wonder, then, that it makes some strong points, one of which is truly fundamental: the time has come to recognize the (...) expediency of reading Kant along with Dilthey for a better understanding of the workings of human comprehension. Makkreel maintains that Kant endorsed “a more inclusive idea of philosophizing according to a world-concept (Weltbegriff ),” for Kant had realized that, because reason cannot simply extrapolate from the ways in which the understanding proceeds to a determinate lawful order, it is necessary to tame the speculative projections of reason by our own powers of orientation and judgment. Hence, Makreel concludes that “the overall worldview we can actually arrive at will need [End Page 511] to include supplementary modes of organizational order that are not determinant but reflective” (3).Throughout the book, Makkreel is pleading for Kant scholars to acknowledge the heuristic value of a set of concepts whose philosophical effectiveness has been to date underestimated. Readers will find many convincing analyses of the lexical cloud around judgment: determining judgment (bestimmende Urteilskraft) against reflecting judgment (reflektierende Urteilskraft) in its connection with the Weberian distinction between explaining (Erklären), understanding (Verstehen), and comprehending (Begreifen). What is at stake in contrasting the last two, understanding and comprehension, insists Makkreel, is the scope of what humans can claim to know, for while it is important to base knowledge claims on the empirical understanding, we must remain open to what could lie beyond the horizon of sense. Hence, critical philosophy is there to supplement “the limits of actual geographical” surveys of the earth with the “boundaries of all possible descriptions of the earth” (KrV A 759/B 787), whereby limits (Schranken) are negative empirical markers that do not take into account what could be beyond them, while boundaries (Grenzen) are positive markers that “presuppose a space existing outside a certain definite space and enclosing it” (Prolegomena, AA 4:352). Makkreel suggests we can infer that whereas earthly limits are imposed from without, worldly boundaries are in some sense self-imposed. Earthly limits would act as external negative restraints on the understanding, while worldly bounds work as internal positive constraints on reason as it attempts to comprehend both what we can and cannot know. Comprehension, argues Makkreel, can be “shown to be a mode of reason whose bounds must be judgmentally self-binding” (14).Let me take a step back. Makkreel intends to show that the task of understanding in its relation with comprehension is what we need to provide an overall characterization of Kant’s philosophical project. This is a bold stance, given Kant’s argument that the faculty of understanding (Verstand) proceeds discursively, namely one step at a time, which makes the project of a more holistic comprehension (Begreifen) highly problematic. However, Makkreel notes that if it is true that “concepts of reason serve for comprehension” (KrV A 311/B 367), it is also true they are purely inferential and at times sophistical (13). To help define what Kant ends up meaning by ‘comprehension,’ Makkreel provides exhaustive references to important discussions about this notion in Kant’s Lectures on Logic and the Critique of Judgment (40–46).Here comes to the foreground the notion of worldview (Weltanschauung) that stands alone in the title of his book. It is in the context of his discussion of the mathematical sublime that Kant broached the idea of an overall “worldview [Weltanschauung]” (KU AA 5:255), which nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers (e.g. Hegel, Dilthey, and Jaspers) took to denote a common or generic outlook on life. For Makkreel, though, ‘worldview’ designates a comprehensive way of characterizing Kant’s distinctive philosophical project (13).As I said above, this is a bold stance. While the first part of the book focuses on philosophizing according to a world-concept, the second part turns to our practical concerns as we act in the world. In... (shrink)

Hegel scholars have been waiting two and a half decades for this book to appear. It contains the historicocritical edition of all unpublished papers written by Hegel from the end of the Frankfort period through to the end of the Bamberg period. Most importantly, it contains the first edition of two sets of until now unpublished manuscripts that had been discovered by Eva Ziesche in the early seventies referring to the lectures given by Hegel at Jena on “Introduction to Philosophy” (...) and “Logic and Metaphysics,” in the 1801/02 Winter Term, and on “Philosophy of Spirit” in the 1803 Summer Term. These fragments are a very important piece in the rather complicated history of Hegel’s development, because they document the state of Hegel’s thought after the nonsystematic essays of the Frankfurt period and before the turn toward subjectivity beginning with the Jenese lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit of the 1803/04 Winter Term. In those years Hegel was working on a metaphysics of substance that he was to give up as soon as he became aware that the foundation of dialectic lies in the subjective structure of the self. The fragments had been last accounted for by Karl Rosenkranz in his Hegel’s Leben, and were misplaced in the manuscript section of the Berlin State Library sometime afterwards. The rediscovery of the fragments was made public by Eva Ziesche in 1975 in the Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung; and some passages of the fragments were reported in a seminal paper by Baum and Meist which appeared in 1977 in the Hegel-Studien under the title “Durch Philosophie leben lernen,” that is, to learn to live through philosophy. Unfortunately, for twenty-two long years the paper by Baum and Meist has remained the only source of information about the content of this crucial stage of Hegelian thought; and this is too bad, because a lot of good research might have been produced had this edition appeared earlier. (shrink)

‘Social and Cultural Innovation’ is a syntagma that is receiving increased usage among researchers since it was the title chosen by the European Strategy Forum Research Infrastructures for the working group that deals with research infrastructures primarily connected with Social Sciences and the Humanities. Innovation refers to the creation of new products and services by bringing a new idea to the market. Economic growth turns on infrastructures, which provide access to services and knowledge, e.g. by overcoming the digital divide. The (...) current migrant and refugee crisis has made it clear with extraordinary effectiveness that a most urgent objective is to work out policies of social and cultural innovation to the advantage of new citizens – policies that will make them feel welcome in full dignity. (shrink)

Inhalt: K.-O. Apel: Vorwort - G. Calabro: Gesprach uber Hobbes mit Karl-Heinz Ilting - I. Grundfragen der praktischen Philosophie: H.-G. Gadamer: Die Gegenwart der sokratischen Frage in Aristoteles - P. Lorenzen: Politische Ethik - J. D'Hondt: Die Ethik und der Weltlauf - K.-O. Apel: Faktische Anerkennung oder einsehbar notwendige Anerkennung? - H. Schnadelbach: Rationalitat und Normativitat - F. W. Veauthier: Vom sozialen Verantwortungsapriori im phanomenologischen Denken - K. Lorenz: Der Antagonismus von Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit - P. Rohs: Moralische Praferenzen - (...) H. Hoppe: Normenbegrundung ohne naturalistischen Fehlschluss? - W. Kuhlmann: Solipsismus in Kants praktischer Philosophie und die Diskursethik - R. Maliandi: Anerkennung oder Argumentation? - L. H. Meyer: Anerkennung, Zumutbarkeit und Diskussion als praktische Prinzipien - A. Cortina: Substantielle Ethik oder wertfreie Verfahrensethik? - R. Zimmer: Der Selbstbezug des asthetischen Zeichens - II. Zur Geschichte der praktischen Philosophie: P. R. Franke: Zu einem Munzbildnis des Stoikers Chrysippos - V. Hosle: Recht und Geschichte bei Giambattista Vico - M. Riedel: Imputation der Handlung und Applikation des Sittengesetzes - A. Buha: Moral und Geschichte - C. Cesa: Zum Begriff des Praktischen bei Fichte - N. Bobbio: Hegel und das Recht - L. W. Beck: Reformation, Revolution und Restauration in Hegels politischer Philosophie - D. Losurdo: Moralisches Motiv und Primat der Politik bei Hegel - P. Becchi: Die Wurzeln der Ethik der Uberzeugung - R. Pozzo: 'Bourgeois' oder 'citoyen'? Zu Hegels Begriff der burgerlichen Gesellschaft - Die Veroffentlichungen K.-H. Iltings von P. Becchi - Personenregister - Sachregister. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Zwischen Aufklärungund Vernunftkritık. Studıen zum Kantischen Logıkcorpus by Norbert HinskeRiccardo PozzoNorbert Hinske. Zwischen Aufklärungund Vernunftkritık. Studıen zum Kantischen Logıkcorpus. Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1998. Pp. 192. Cloth, DM 156.00.This book is the result of a decade of research that Hinske has undertaken and continues to pursue into Kant’s logical writing in which philological, lexicographic, historical, and genuinely philosophical aspects are connected in an inseparable unity. In fact, it was (...) in order to cope scientifically with the peculiar problems that affect Kant’s logical writings from the point of view of the constitution of the text and of the recognition of the sources due to the mutual explanation and correction of published works, manuscript notes (which appeared in 1914), and lecture transcripts (which appeared first in 1966), that Hinske decided to open the venture of the Kant-Index. Hinske notices that the Kant-Index (seven volumes have appeared so far) had been started with the goal of providing a comprehensive approach to Kant’s logical writing, “whose composite forms [End Page 681] of expression rather hide its wealth of ideas” instead of clarifying it, and at the same time of providing “philological foundations for a responsible new edition of the lecture transcripts, whose scandalous [1966] edition within the fourth section of the Akademie-Ausgabe should have been rewarded with something more than the embarrassed silence of the Kant-Forschung and of both the academies [Berlin and Göttingen] responsible for this disaster” (13f.). The present book accompanies the Kant-Index in the sense that it collects a series of investigations (some of which have already appeared in journals, but have been entirely revised in order to guarantee uniformity to the volume) focusing on the two main issues indicated in its title: Kant’s proximity to the philosophy of German Enlightenment, “that finds expression in Kant’s logical writings in a quite peculiar way,” and the progressive elaboration of the Critique of Pure Reason, “which can be reconstructed at least partially on the basis of the extant lecture transcripts” (14).The development Kant underwent from an enlightened philosopher to the architect of the critique of reason is the subject of the title essay that serves as an introduction to the whole book (17–40). Hinske shows that Kant’s logic lectures are a mirror of the philosophy of the German Enlightenment (20) because Kant was not supposed to teach logic as such, but rather logic as an introduction to philosophy in general. For this reason, one finds in Kant’s logic lectures an original elaboration on the three fundamental issues expressed by the German Enlightenment, namely the programmatic ideas of thinking for oneself, the polemical idea of prejudice, and the basic idea of universal human reason. There was no “overcoming” of the Enlightenment by Kant, just as there was no “double life” of Kant as a teacher in Königsberg and as a scientist within the république des lettres (27); there was rather a genuine connection of teaching and research. In fact, if one considers the relation of the logic lectures to the Critique, it becomes clear that the terminology adopted by G. F. Meier, the author of the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, the logic textbook Kant used for over forty years, has a remarkable influence in constituting the terminology of the Critique (28), and that the doctrine of elements and doctrine of method division of the Critique finds its roots in the Enlightenment research on the pair of concepts logica theoretica and logica practica (30). Considering continuities and transformations in Kant’s logical writings (32–40), Hinske shows how Kant step by step puts together a new philosophical language by relying on recent Germanizations of the Enlighteners, especially the ones introduced by Wolff and G. F. Meier (33), as well as on traditional Latin terms (39).The first part of Hinske’s book deals with the heritage of the Enlightenment. It contains papers on Kant’s use of the distinction between learning philosophy and learning to philosophize (42–59), on the prejudice of antiquity (60–73), and on the pair of concepts pluralism-egoism (74... (shrink)

This book investigates the relation between mathematics and philosophy in Kant with special focus on the doctrine of the magnitudes. Without doubt, Moretto, who is himself both a mathematician and a philosopher, achieves final results on this matter, because not only does he provide an immanent interpretation of all parts of Kant’s systematic construction of magnitudes, he also provides a detailed history of Kant’s development. Kant gave courses on mathematics during the first eight years of his teaching at Königsberg and (...) warmly recommended the study of mathematics to his most gifted disciples. He himself expressed a profound admiration for it. He wrote in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God that infinitesimal analysis, or, as he calls it, “higher geometry... in its account of the affinities between various species of curved lines,” reveals many of “the harmonious relations which inhere in the properties of space in general.... All these relations, in addition to exercising the understanding by means of our intellectual comprehension of them, also arouse the emotions, and they do in a manner similar to or even more sublime than that the contingent beauties of nature stir our feelings”. In On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World, Kant wrote that pure mathematics “provides us with a cognition which is in the highest degree true, and, at the same time, it provides us with a paradigm of the highest kind of evidence in other cases”. Besides, the mathematician-philosophers of the Leibniz-Wolff school, J. A. Eberhard, J. C. Schwab, J. G. E. Maaß at Halle, and A. G. Kästner at Göttingen, were among the very first to move critiques against the Critique of Pure Reason by focusing on the problem of the foundation of mathematics. They defended Leibniz against Kant, which prompted Kant to start a mathematical school of his own at Königsberg, and J. Schultz, J. G. K. C. Kiesewetter, and C. G. Zimmermann were Kant’s most notable defenders. Finally, one should not forget that it was in order to introduce a completely new set of ideas concerning the philosophy of mathematics that Kant laid out not only the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, but also the whole of the transcendental aesthetics. In fact, Kant proposed giving foundation to rational absolute numbers by means of synthetical a priori judgments; he also considered all arithmetical judgments as synthetical a priori; and by dedicating two antinomies to infinite series he suggested analogies to the representation of infinite series of irrational numbers. (shrink)

This article presents evidence supporting the claim that ethical reasoning is a skill that can be taught and assessed. We propose a working definition of ethical reasoning as 1) the ability to identify, analyze, and weigh moral aspects of a particular situation, and 2) to make decisions that are informed and warranted by the moral investigation. The evidence consists of a description of an ethical reasoning education program—Ethical Reasoning in Action —designed to increase ethical reasoning skills in a variety of (...) situations and areas of life. ERiA is housed at a public, major comprehensive U.S. university—James Madison University—and assessment of the program focuses on interventions delivered prior to and during orientation for incoming first-year students. Findings indicate that the interventions measurably enhance the ability of undergraduate students to reason ethically. ERiA’s competency-targeted program and positive student learning outcomes offers a promising model for higher education ethics programs seeking to connect classroom learning in ethics to decision-making in everyday life. (shrink)

Now in its fourth edition, Rational Diagnosis and Treatment: Evidence-Based Clinical Decision - Making is a unique book to look at evidence-based medicine and the difficulty of applying evidence from group studies to individual patients._ The book analyses the successive stages of the decision process and deals with topics such as the examination of the patient,_the reliability of clinical data, the logic of diagnosis, the fallacies of uncontrolled therapeutic experience and the need for randomised clinical trials and meta-analyses. It is (...) the main theme of the book that, whenever possible, clinical decisions must be based on the evidence from clinical research, but the authors also explain the pitfalls of such research and the problems involved in applying evidence from groups of patients to the individual patient._ For this new edition, the sections on placebo and meta-analysis and on alternative medicine have been thoroughly updated, and there is more focus on insufficient reporting of harms of interventions. The sections on different research designs describe advantages and limitations, and the increased medicalisation and the effects of cancer screening on health people are noted. A section on academic freedom when clinicians collaborate with industry and ghost authors is added._ This essential reference work integrates the science and statistical approach of evidence-based medicine with the art and humanism of medical practice; distinguishing between data, sets of data, knowledge and wisdom, and their application. Such an intellectually challenging book is ideal for both medical students and doctors who require theoretical and practical clinical skills to help ensure that they apply theory in practice. (shrink)

In this book G. W. Leibniz presents not only his reflections on predestination and election but also a more detailed account of the problem of evil than is found in any of his other works apart from the _Theodicy_. Surprisingly, his _Dissertation on Predestination and Grace_ has never before been published in any form. Michael J. Murray's project of translating, editing, and providing commentary for the volume will therefore attract great interest among scholars and students of Leibniz's philosophy and theology. (...) Leibniz addresses such topics as free will, moral responsibility, divine causation, justice, punishment, divine foreknowledge, and human freedom, revealing crucial aspects of the genesis of his mature metaphysics and the theological motivations behind it. (shrink)

Contemporary medical education must train skilled and compassionate health care professionals who are rigorous in their approach to patient care and their pursuit of knowledge and solutions. Problem-based learning has been widely introduced, but there is no evidence that it leads to better outcomes than more traditional programs, and fundamental gaps in conceptual knowledge may result. Recently, emphasis has been placed on a solid grounding in underlying concepts combined with a systems-based approach, and ability to transfer information and solve problems. (...) Integrating traditional scientific and clinical disciplines with progressive and continuous assessment, may be a better means of achieving the combined aims of clinically relevant curriculum design, vertical integration of medical knowledge, and facilitation of the continuum of training. Being adaptable and flexible, cognisant of costs, and driven by evidence are key features of delivering medical education and contemporary medical practice. Educational research should lead to continuous improvement, but innovation without evaluation and attention to costs may create as many, or more, problems as are solved. (shrink)

Anastasia G. Yangaki Amphores crétoises : le cas d'Éleutherna p. 503-523 L'étude des amphores crétoises de la période paléochrétienne mises au jour sur le site d'Éleutherna, dans la région de Mylopotamos, enrichit considérablement notre connaissance des amphores de production crétoise identifiées à la suite des recherches récentes sur plusieurs sites de la Méditerranée. Cet article tend à préciser la datation précédemment proposée pour certains types déjà connus. Il présente un groupe uniforme d'amphores à l'intérieur du type initial, produit par un (...) nouvel atelier, et révèle plusieurs types nouveaux à Éleutherna, utilisés surtout à la fin de la période protobyzantine et même au cours du VIIIe siècle ; parmi ces derniers, on signale les types qui imitent des formes d'amphores importées sur l'île. Des analyses chimiques ont permis d'ajouter le site d'Éleutherna ou la région de Mylopotamos au nombre des centres de fabrication d'amphores crétoises. (shrink)

Sun Yat-Sen was a Chinese philosopher and politician, who served as the provisional first president of the Republic of China, and first leader of the Kuomintang. He argued that common blood, language, customs, religion and livelihood were the five essential elements that constituted a nation. Sun was influenced by social Darwinism in his understanding that socio-cultural forces could override the innate characteristics of race. Thus, he employed racially defined nationalism by invoking anti-Manchuism. Although China’s modernisation in the first decades of (...) the 20th century was attributed to Sen, this paper shows that his insistence on the consanguine Han race produced inconsistencies, as his racially defined nationalism and republicanism were mutually exclusive, the latter being based on the inclusion of all citizens regardless of their ethnic background. Indeed, modern nations are constituted by both naturally inherited and culturally acquired qualities of the people. Since China consists of many ethnic groups, Sen’s emphasis on consanguine Chinese race has produced a racially exclusionary nation and has caused racial conflict. (shrink)