In this essay the visual arts of the machine age morph into literature and theory and then back again to images, gestures, and thought.

Works of art are usually meant to elicit psychological effects from their audiences whereas paradigmatic technical artifacts such as hammers or cars are rather meant to produce physical effects when used. This suggests that works of art and technical artifacts are sharply different entities. However, recent developments in the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of technology have individuated special artifacts, namely cognitive and affective artifacts, which also generate psychological effects. In particular, affective artifacts, which have the capacity to alter the (...) affective condition of agents, seem to share crucial features with works of art. Can we subsume works of art under that kind? I will argue that we cannot. Still, comparing art with affective artifacts will help us to clarify the relationship between art and technology, and to introduce a new category, namely the experiential artifact, which can properly encompass works of art. (shrink)

This paper argues that Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility” provides a rich analytic framework for understanding how the many dimensions of aesthe...

Among the meritorious attempts to unravel the enigma of artistic creation are the views of Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer. In the following, we want to emphasise an aspect that is less discussed in the specialised literature, namely the relation between memory and creation. We are talking about the authentic creation that Kant and Schopenhauer consider to be the one that carries in itself the Aesthetic Ideas. With minor differences, the concept, as well as the associated linguistic expression, come together (...) in the work of both German philosophers. An authentic work of art is the work of genius and it has the role of transmitting Ideas. Thus, we will be able to observe “the secret” of a work of art – the Aesthetic Idea. (shrink)

Walter Benjamin wrote his prophetic essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” almost a century ago, yet it is still pertinent today. Benjamin warned that as art becomes devoid of aura through reproduction, less attention is needed to engage with it. What role does aura play in AI-generated work? Despite recent advances in AI it produces “artwork” that for the most part operates as entertainment. It can’t produce work that has grown out of (...) reckoning with culture the way artists do in their efforts to provide space for grappling with deep questions that ultimately inform culture. Nevertheless, AI is potentially more disruptive to Art than to any other field. If AI becomes the dominant producer of art, this could lead to a sort of consensus trance with a generation of people consuming “art” that does not inspire questioning and new understandings of the world we live in. For centuries, the term “computer” referred to living, breathing humans. Today, no person can claim the title. Is this the fate of “artist”? By problematizing the ways we use AI, artists can help address the problem of how we as a culture should engage with it. (shrink)

Citing works by Marcel Duchamp and others, this article argues that the transformation of what Danto termed a mere real thing into an artwork, and of an artwork into a mere real thing, are not symmetrical operations. It argues that mere real things and artworks not only belong to different categories, but that these categories are themselves of different kinds—the former being closed, and the latter open. Viewing mere real things through the lens of art leads to confusion. Amending Goodman’s (...) question, ‘When is art?’, this article suggests that one can only arrive at working definitions of what constitutes both an artwork and a mere real thing on the basis of contingent function. The adequate analysis of any given thing or action necessitates viewing it in accordance with an appropriate paradigm, whether that of an artwork, a thought experiment, or even a prank. Adequate analysis requires disciplinary dexterity, deference when appropriate, and multi-disciplinary attention best achieved through collaboration. (shrink)

Frequently, moreover, the essence sought for has been supposed to be nothing objective; those who have asked the question have supposed, rather, that the property in which the essence of works of art consists must somehow involve human negotiation with something. A work of art is a creation by, and a cherished object in, the life of humanity; and to suppose that the essence of such works is some property common and peculiar to them but exclusive of human interests, (...) would be as foolish as to suppose that a description of disease, in exclusively biochemical terms, with no mention of its misery and pain, could reveal the essence of such disorders. The question, "What is a work of art?" like the question, "What is a disease?" may be interpreted as asking for the essence of works of art, on the assumption that human activities are the realizations of dispositions toward them; that to each, there corresponds a prior mental readiness which when activated leads naturally into it. Thus interpreted, the question inquires after the essence of works of art; and it presupposes that in that essence will be found some posture of the mind, i.e., that if anything is a work of art, someone has a mental disposition of some kind toward it. (shrink)

From a Benjaminian point of view, AI-generated art is distinct from both ‘traditional’ art and technologically enabled reproduction, for example, photography and film. Instead of mere mechanical representation of the world as it is presented to a device, AI-generated art involves identification and inventive representation of data patterns. This specific mode of data-based generation exceeds mere surface-level mimicry and enables deeper meaning, namely, an insight into the collective unconscious of the society. In this way, AI-generated art is never detached from (...) society and the predominant social conditions while also reflecting the technology-induced transformations that today’s societies are undergoing. Thus, AI-generated art can be seen as capable of partly reversing the loss of auratic capacities that hand ensued with mechanical reproduction. Still, as a matter of continuity, AI-generated works enable the maximisation of exhibition value and capacity for audience enjoyment, rendering AI-generated art perfect for the age of increasing distraction. (shrink)

The article investigates how and why we treat works of art as persons. From rhetoric to jurisprudence, various disciplines have dealt with the practice of attributing human features and abilities to insensate objects. The agency of works of art acting as fictitious persons is not only rec­ognized at the level of aesthetic experience, but also outside it, because there have been cases in which they were subject to legal liability. Per­sonhood is not reducible to individual human beings. However, since works (...) of art lack senses and consciousness, there is ultimately a limit to the personifying metaphor. (shrink)

This paper investigates the transformative influence of generative AI on the arts, connecting it with Walter Benjamin's insights regarding the aura of art in the mechanical reproduction era. It scrutinizes how generative AI not only redefines art's traditional aura but also introduces a dynamic interplay between technological liberation and dependency. The analysis extends to the democratization of artistic expression and its broader societal impacts, highlighting a shift in art creation, perception, and interpretation in the digital age. This research encapsulates the (...) evolving nature of authenticity, creativity, and human–machine collaboration, marking a significant paradigm shift in art's conception and its role in society. (shrink)

Total work of art in an age of mechanical reproduction -- Total stage: Wagner's festspielhaus -- Total machine: the Bauhaus theatre -- Total montage: Brecht's reply to Wagner -- Total state: Riefenstahl's triumph of the will -- Total world: Disney's theme parks -- Total vacuum: Warhol's performances -- Total immersion: cyberspace.

Interested in art, we tend to be interested in works of art. We seem to encounter works of art all the time, and—setting aside certain relatively abstruse problems in ontology—we seem to have little difficulty in recognizing them for what they are. That there are works of art seems obvious and unproblematic. Quite so, I think. But reflection on what has to be the case if there are to be works of art shows that some quite demanding conditions have to (...) be met. Some will find those conditions too demanding: if I am right, that means that they should not admit that there are any works of art, and they will have to give some other account of what might be involved when we think we are dealing with a work of art. For myself, I think the conditions are not too demanding: their interest comes in what they show us about the nature of artistic ‘media’, and about what is involved in being a great artist. (shrink)

For almost two years now the COVID-19 pandemic impacted in most different forms habits, models of organization, socio-political dynamics and economic assets. Arrangements and orders taking decades to reach stabilization have demonstrated an unsuspected precarity, demanding a profound reorganization of dynamics we had been long accustomed to. As the distant, sanitized character of interaction, transmission, fruition and creation processes has turned from a contingent measure into the unamenable norm of these days’ routine, every aspect of social interaction is changing accordingly. (...) “Contact”, “contagion”, “proximity” and “distance” are not features of a transient period anymore: they are keywords of today’s experience. Indeed, while these concepts were already at stake in masscommunication and social media, it was not before nowadays that their precipitate on art forms could be taken into account more pristinely, for especially performative arts never had to amend their “familiar ground” in order to pursue their goals. Hence, how did artforms adjust themselves to wholly new forms of participation? What are we supposed to expect next? The main aim of this paper is to sketch out, relying on some classical loci of the history of Western aesthetics such as Plato, Aloïs Riegl, Walter Benjamin, this new, re-configured notion of aesthetic and artistic experience in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

The emergence of complex deep-learning models capable of producing novel images on a practically innumerable number of subjects and in an equally wide variety of artistic styles is beginning to highlight serious inadequacies in the ethical, aesthetic, epistemological and legal frameworks we have so far used to categorise art. To begin tackling these issues and identifying a role for AI in the production and protection of human artwork, it is necessary to take a multidisciplinary approach which considers current legal precedents, (...) the practice of software engineering, historical attitudes towards technological innovation and a sustained technical analysis of the models themselves. This paper queries the location and nature of substantive artistic work in the developmental stages of an AI-generated image, offering critiques of existing assumptions and posing questions for future research. The emergence of convincing AI creative output, artistic or literary, has significant long-term implications for the humanities, including the need for re-appraisal of foundational ideas about authorship and creativity in general. The effects of artificial intelligence, whether generalised or task-specific, cannot be ignored or displaced now that easy-access, scalable image and text production is a reality. (shrink)

In this groundbreaking book David Roberts sets out to demonstrate the centrality of the total work of art to European modernism since the French Revolution.

The history of philosophy is rich in diverse and sometimes directly contradictory views on the character of the relation between science and art. There have been times when art was proclaimed as lower than science, as an inadequate form of assimilation of reality by man, while at others it was seen as the sole means of adequate reflection of the world hidden "behind Maia's mysterious veil." And although today we are far from overestimating or underestimating either of the ways in (...) which man perceives reality, the fact is that the problem of the relationship between science and art remains quite acute, as is shown in particular by the broad discussion on this question that has arisen in the pages of Problems of Philosophy [Voprosy filosofii] during the last three years. The present article is an attempt to treat yet another facet of the relationships between science and art, taking as point of departure the capacity of art to model not only certain aspects of reality but human reality itself, including that of scientific theory. From this standpoint art, as a meta-activity as it were, relates to positive cognition such as philosophy not so much "horizontally" as "vertically.". (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to determine the nature of the artwork and the scope of the world revealed therein. the artwork is that by which art becomes actual. it is that in which art is expressed. however, it is more than an object of aesthetic experience. it is the revelation of a people's world. here the world means the world of a particular people at a particular time, the cultural and "intellectual atmosphere" of a historical people. a people's (...) world is their being, therefore, artwork is an epochal manifestation of a people's openness to being. (shrink)

Though it is inter-disciplinary in scope, situated as it is on the borderlines of ontology and logic, philosophy of literature and theory of language, Ingarden's work has a deliberately narrow focus: the literary work, its structure and ...

"The texts published here reproduce, with some variation, those of five lectures held at the Mendrisio Academy of Architecture between October 2012 and April 2013.".

Professor Max Charlesworth and I worked, at Deakin University, on a course, 'Understanding Art'. Max was interested in the Social History of Art and in art as: 'giving form to mere matter'. Here 'form' might be read as 'lucid', 'exemplary', 'beautiful' etcetera. I am an Aristotle Poetics 4 man '… imitating something with the utmost veracity in a picture', and an Aristotle and John Cage man: 'Art is the imitation of nature in the manner of operation. Or a net'. (Cage) (...) (See Aristotle Meteorologica, 381b Book iv.) I was invited by the University of Melbourne to lecture on The Philosophy of Art, which I did for five delightful years. There I included the Heidegger essay, giving it as favourable a reading as I could. Unfortunately I have mislaid my marked-up copy and was forced to re-visit the essay, cold. My new reading lacks - in most respects - my former geniality. Kant's Aesthetic Ideas give us more than Heidegger does. So: I stuck with Aristotle, Cage and Kant. (shrink)

John Dewey puts aesthetic experience at the center of his reflection on art and beauty, reconsidering it dynamically. Nowadays, this view opened the path to somaesthetics, a term coined by Richard Shusterman, and aesthetic anthropology. Here, it is argued that the contribution of pragmatist aesthetics could be further developed by exploring its analogies with techno-aesthetics, a paradigm proposed by French philosopher Gilbert Simondon in the early 1980s. Art occupies accordingly a special place within the different forms of aesthetic experience, being (...) considered as a way of experimenting the impact of new technologies in the human experience. It is a process by which technologies create ‘devices’ for experimenting perception and reflection: namely, ways of reconstructing the nature of the human mind in-between body and technology, and by means of their interaction. Cinema reconsidered after Dewey’s fellow George H. Mead, offers an exemplary case as both artistic and technological devices. (shrink)

A work of art can be defined as a section of space that has been assigned a particular status. It is not our intention to define this status—philosophical aesthetics has been addressing this issue for centuries. Rather, we aim to pinpoint the mechanisms in virtue of which this section of space is isolated and bestowed with the status in question. Such a move requires the action of a certain instance—hence the emphasis we put on the interactive character of the (...) process. We shall pay particular attention to the type of sign called ‘index,’ which plays a pivotal role in this affair. (shrink)

This article examines the symbolism contained in the works of Jianzhi art. As a simple folk art, papercutting in Jinzhou has its own aesthetic and educational style that penetrates the hearts of people and raises them to a higher spiritual level. Jianzhi can represent the spiritual worldview of a certain era in the region. Among the symbolic images, images of animals, plants, figures, objects, hieroglyphs and patterns were studied. Jianzhi's works of art are combinations of various patterns, shapes and motifs (...) that contain deep symbolism. The study of images and symbolic meanings will expand knowledge about the culture and customs of the region, as well as create opportunities for the preservation of this unique art form containing the intangible cultural heritage of China. The article concludes about the uniqueness of the stylistics and symbolism of this art direction in the described region. It is claimed that Jianzhi's works reflect the culture, customs and peculiarities of the Jinzhou district society. From the point of view of intangible cultural heritage, the art of paper cutting in Jinzhou is the artistic embodiment of the material and spiritual culture of the people. It is concluded that it is necessary to preserve this kind of art and the subsequent study of its symbolism in order to preserve the intangible national heritage of China. (shrink)

In this essay I call attention to the fact that there is a work of art in Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art,” and yet almost no one talks about it: the C. F. Meyer poem “Roman Fountain.” This critical silence is all the more ironic, since (1) it is a self-sufficient artwork, and not just described or mentioned in the text; and (2) the poem’s fountain, as man-made spring, seems to speak to—if not speak of—Heidegger’s (...) thesis concerning the Ur-sprung of the artwork itself. I argue that the poem illuminates a central problem or question concerning the status of art as mimesis, and I suggest that the reason why this poem tends to be overlooked amid the “obsessive” critical attention that it otherwise attracts can be found within the essay itself. (shrink)

: This essay analyzes the relation between nothingness and the work of art, where negation appears as a fundamental element of art. Starting at a discussion of the concept of nothingness in existential phenomenology, it points to the limitations of Heidegger’s notion of nullity and negation, which spring from the denial of the dimension of consciousness to his Dasein. Although Sartre recovers that dimension in his portrayal of the pour-soi, now the idea of nothingness is not taken to its (...) ultimate consequence, where art would appear as a product of consciousness that is entrenched in nothingness. Only through an enlarged notion of consciousness, one that allows the perception of negative experience as intrinsically related to poiesis, will the work of art appear ontologically grounded in a form of Being that searches for its own contradiction. Such an enlarged notion of consciousness appears in the thought of Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō , where concepts such as ‘‘the place of nothingness’’ and ‘‘pure experience’’ can serve as ground to an analysis of the relation between nothingness and the work of art. (shrink)

Some years ago I came across the following question thrown out almost casually in the course of discussion: How many of us, it was asked, want to call a ‘bad work of art’ a ‘work of art’? The question was clearly rhetorical; the author quite obviously did not consider that anyone in his right mind would suggest that a bad work of art was a work of art. This struck me as rather odd. Surely there can (...) be good and bad works of art, just as there can be good and bad apples or good and bad men. An apple does not cease to be an apple just because it is bad, unless perhaps it has become thoroughly rotten; but the gardener who says ‘The Coxes are bad this year’ does not mean that they have grown rotten on the trees, much less that they are not apples at all. Moreover, if so-called bad works of art are not works of art, what are they? You may not think highly of the works in the Royal Academy Summer Exhibition but they are not totally dissimilar to some works in Bond Street next door which are highly regarded. (shrink)

This long-awaited translation of Das literarische Kunstwerk makes available for the first time in English Roman Ingarden's influential study. Though it is inter-disciplinary in scope, situated as it is on the borderlines of ontology and logic, philosophy of literature and theory of language, Ingarden's work has a deliberately narrow focus: the literary work, its structure and mode of existence. The Literary Work of Art establishes the groundwork for a philosophy of literature, i.e., an ontology in terms of (...) which the basic general structure of all literary works can be determined. This "essential anatomy" makes basic tools and concepts available for rigorous and subtle aesthetic analysis. (shrink)

In keeping with the general theme of the General Assembly of CIPSH in Beijing, 2004, in this article I emphasize the potential of the internet to impact the use of works of art in public and private museums for study and research, and for the publication of research. The possibility exists nowadays of creating a hyper-real ‘musée imaginaire’ or ‘museum without walls’ to use André Malraux's phrase of more than fifty years ago. It is hard to see how it could (...) be anything but a benefit to human knowledge to have images of all works in the public domain (that is, for which the creator's copyright has expired) available on the world wide web. Under US law this year (2006) that would mean all works created before 1911. There are encouraging developments in that direction, but there is also constant legal wrangling. And I have to admit there are sometimes two sides to the question, even if I think one argument is far stronger than the other. (shrink)