필자들은 수형자들이 스스로 덕성을 회복해 갈 수 있도록 돕기 위하여 유가철학의 인성론과 덕론을 중심으로 수형자들에게 3회기의 덕성교육을 실시하였다. 3회기의 덕성교육은 우주자연의 원리인 원형이정의 천덕(天德)과 인간에게 선천적으로 부여되어 있는 인의예지의 인성(人性=人德)을 인지시키고, 4덕의 실마리인 4단(四端)의 순수도덕정감을 체험하게 하여 본래의 참자기를 회복하도록 하는 내용으로 구성하였다. 곧 1회기는 천지의 운행 작용과 천지의 마음인 4덕, 2회기는 인간의 존재구조와 인간의 마음인 4덕, 3회기는 순수도덕정감의 자각(구방심)으로 구성되었다. 1회기의 시간은 90분이었다. 대상은 총 66명이었으며 세 집단으로 구성되었다. 한 집단은 약 20명씩 이었다. 자료수집 방법은 수형자들에게 3회기의 덕성교육을 실시한 (...) 후 그들이 덕성교육을 통해 체험한 것을 기록한 기록지를 수집하였다. 자료 분석 방법은 수형자의 개인적인 속성보다는 전체 수형자의 공통적인 속성을 도출해 내어 체험의 본질적 의미와 구조를 밝힐 수 있는 Colaizzi의 방법을 사용하였다. 필자 등은 수형자들이 덕성교육을 통해 체험한 결과를 분석 검토하여 덕성교육의 본질적 의미와 구조를 밝힘으로서 인성교육을 위한 자료로 활용하고자 하였다. (shrink)

Given the instrumental value of good collaborations for societal flourishing, educating for good collaborators (viz., agents who have the motivation and ability to collaborate with others) should be one of the fundamental goals of contemporary education. Still, fostering the growth of dispositions needed for successful collaborations is not explicitly considered to be a first-rate pedagogical goal in most contemporary virtue education programs. To remedy this omission, I propose a virtue-based method for developing good collaborators through an education (...) that involves a mixture of three complementary educational techniques: i) collaborative problem-based learning, ii) physical education, and iii) direct teaching. Learning through collaborative problem-based learning educates students on the motivations and abilities needed to be good collaborators in epistemic pursuits, whereas physical education teaches learners how to be good collaborators in non-epistemic endeavors, whilst direct teaching ties everything together by giving learners an explicit understanding of the value of good collaborations. (shrink)

In this chapter I want to take up the specific question of the relationship between moral education and empirical findings in psychology. I will argue that moral education programmes are theoretically possible and would benefit in their practical application from empirical research already in existence in psychology. I will argue that situationism does not pose a threat for moral education, properly conceived, and that, in fact, educators can and should make use of situational factors. It strikes me (...) that much of the debate in this field is hampered by incomplete or partly inaccurate understandings of the main concepts, in addition to conflicting versions of what it is that we should be aiming for in the first place. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Initiatives to cultivate character and virtue in moral education at school continue to provoke sceptical responses. Most of those echo familiar misgivings about the notions of character, virtue and education in virtue ? as unclear, redundant, old-fashioned, religious, paternalistic, anti-democratic, conservative, individualistic, relative and situation dependent. I expose those misgivings as ?myths?, while at the same time acknowledging three better-founded historical, methodological and practical concerns about the notions in question.

This is a review of a book entitled "Virtues and Virtue Education in Theory and Practice: Are Virtues Local or Universal?", edited by Catherine A. Darnell and Kristján Kristjánsson.

This essay develops a new conceptual framework of science and engineering ethics education based on virtue ethics and positive psychology. Virtue ethicists and positive psychologists have argued that current rule-based moral philosophy, psychology, and education cannot effectively promote students’ moral motivation for actual moral behavior and may even lead to negative outcomes, such as moral schizophrenia. They have suggested that their own theoretical framework of virtue ethics and positive psychology can contribute to the effective promotion of motivation for (...) self-improvement by connecting the notion of morality and eudaimonic happiness. Thus this essay attempts to apply virtue ethics and positive psychology to science and engineering ethics education and to develop a new conceptual framework for more effective education. In addition to the conceptual-level work, this essay suggests two possible educational methods: moral modeling and involvement in actual moral activity in science and engineering ethics classes, based on the conceptual framework. (shrink)

In his 1993 book, Hare asks “What Makes a Good Teacher?” In this paper we ask, “What makes a good education researcher?” We begin our discussion with Richard Rudner's classic 1953 essay, The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments, which confronted science with the internal subjectivity it had long ignored. Rudner's bold claim that scientists do make value judgments as scientists called attention to the very foundations of scientific conduct. In an era of institutional research ethics, like the Tri-Council’s (...) ethics policy, Rudner's call for an approach to these value judgments is even more relevant. The contemporary education researcher primarily engages with ethics procedurally, which provides a certain level of consistency and objectivity. This approach has its roots in principle-based theories of ethics that have long been dominant in Western universities. We argue that calls, like Rudner's, for an objective science of ethics, are at the root of this dominant institutional approach. This paper critiques the suitability of such principle-based ethics for solving Rudner's concerns, and posits that educational research ethics is better understood as a matter of character and virtue. We argue that, much like the ethical teacher, the ethical education researcher is a certain kind of person. (shrink)

Questioning is a familiar, everyday practice which we use, often unreflectively, in order to gather information, communicate with each other, and advance our inquiries. Yet, not all questions are equally effective and not all questioners are equally adept. Being a good questioner requires a degree of proficiency and judgment, both in determining what to ask and in deciding who, where, when, and how to ask. Good questioning is an intellectual skill. Given its ubiquity and significance, it is an intellectual skill (...) that, I believe, we should educate for. In this paper, I present a central line of argument in support of educating for good questioning, namely, that it plays an important role in the formation of an individual’s intellectual character and can thereby serve as a valuable pedagogical tool for intellectual character education. I argue that good questioning plays two important roles in the cultivation of intellectual character: good questioning stimulates intellectually virtuous inquiry and contributes to the development of several of the individual intellectual virtues. Insofar as the cultivation of intellectually virtuous character is a desirable educational objective, we should educate for good questioning. (shrink)

It is widely thought that moral education is not compatible with the mission of higher education. In this article, I point out that the issue is a bit more complicated. There are some virtues, like honesty, that play a key role in university life, making it possible that other moral virtues like justice and compassion might also be important for helping students succeed at their colleges and universities.

The virtues have been a neglected aspect of morality; only recently has reference been made to their place in professional ethics. Unfashionable as Florence Nightingale is, it is nonetheless worth noting that she was instrumental in continuing the Aristotelian tradition of being concerned with the moral character of persons. Nurses who came under Nightingale’s sphere of influence were expected to develop certain exemplary habits of behaviour. A corollary can be drawn with the current UK professional body: nurses are expected (...) to behave in certain ways and to display particular kinds of disposition. The difference lies in the fact that, while Nightingale was clear about the need for moral education, current emphasis is placed on ethical theory and ethical decision-making. (shrink)

This paper applies a virtue epistemology approach to using the Internet, as to improve our information-seeking behaviours. Virtue epistemology focusses on the cognitive character of agents and is less concerned with the nature of truth and epistemic justification as compared to traditional analytic epistemology. Due to this focus on cognitive character and agency, it is a fruitful but underexplored approach to using the Internet in an epistemically desirable way. Thus, the central question in this paper is: How to use the (...) Internet in an epistemically virtuous way? Using the work of Jason Baehr, it starts by outlining nine intellectual or epistemic virtues: curiosity, intellectual autonomy, intellectual humility, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual thoroughness, open-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual tenacity. It then explores how we should deploy these virtues and avoid the corresponding vices when interacting with the Internet, particularly search engines. Whilst an epistemically virtuous use of the Internet will not guarantee that one will acquire true beliefs, understanding or even knowledge, it will strongly improve one’s information-seeking behaviours. The paper ends with arguing that teaching and assessing online intellectual virtues should be part of school and university curricula, perhaps embedded in critical thinking courses, or even better, as individual units. (shrink)

올바른 입법의 목적이 무엇인지를 탐구하는 『법률』의 논의 중 주연 제도에 대한 아테네 인의 설명은 1, 2권의 대부분의 분량을 차지할 정도로 방대하다. 그럼에도 기존 『법률』 연구에서 주연 제도에 대한 논의는 마땅한 주목을 받지 못했다. 이 글에서는 주연 제도가 ‘공동체의 자발적인 조화’(symphōnia)라는 입법의 목표를 위해 법률이 교육의 기능을 한 다는 점을 명시적으로 보여주는 예증이라고 주장한다. 플라톤은 주연 제도를 통해 법률이 교육의 역할을 해야만 한다는 점과 함께 그 역할이 어떻게 수행되는지는 물론, 공동체의 조화와 우애라는 입법의 목표가 성공적으로 수행될 수 있음을 보여준다. 이때 ‘교육’의 (...) 의 미는 우리가 익히 알고 있는 『국가』에서의 ‘혼의 전환’으로서의 통치자 교육이 아닌, ‘전체 적인 덕’의 추구를 위한 교육이며, 이는 다름 아닌 법률의 내용을 따르는 것이 좋음을 아 는 것, 즉 절제(sōphrosynē)의 함양을 위한 교육이다. 시민들은 현명한 통솔자가 감독하 는 주연에서 술에 취함(methē)이라는 사태를 통해 고통과 쾌락을 이겨내는 경험을 해볼 수 있는데, 이러한 안전한 훈육을 통해 입법가들은 법률의 가르침을 전달한다. 디오니소스 제전 중에 열리는 주연은 특히 나이가 들어 법률의 설득으로부터 멀어지게 되는 시민들을 다시금 훈육하는 기능, 즉 ‘올바른 교육의 보존’이라는 기능을 갖는다. 주연의 참석자들이 술을 마심으로써 경직된 혼의 상태로부터 벗어나 기꺼이 통솔자의 가르침을 따르게 되어 모임이 성공적으로 이루어지면, 전체 구성원들 간에 한마음 한뜻(homonoia)이 이루어지 며 결과적으로 친애(philia)가 생기게 된다. 마치 주연의 구성원들이 현명한 통솔자를 자발 적으로 따라 주연이 성공적으로 행해지는 것처럼, 나라의 구성원들도 법률을 자발적으로 따르면 전체 시민들 사이에는 평화와 우애가 생기게 될 것이다. 따라서 주연 제도는 법률의 교육 기능이 작용하는 방식을 보여줌과 동시에 입법의 목표가 성공적으로 이루어지는 경우를 보여준다는 점에서 『법률』 전체 논의에서 중요한 역할을 한다. (shrink)

This book argues that pre-modern societies were characterized by a common quest for human flourishing or excellence, i.e. virtue. The history of virtue is a particularly fruitful approach when studying pre-modern periods. Systems of moral philosophy and more day-to-day moral ideas and practices in which virtue was central were incredibly important in pre-modern societies within and among diverse scholarly, literary, religious and social communities. Virtue was a cornerstone of pre-modern societies, permeating society in many different ways, and on many different (...) levels, and it was conveyed in erudite and pedagogical texts, ritual, performance and images. The construction of virtues such as wisdom, courage, and justice helped shape identities and communities, but also served to legitimize and reinforce differences pertaining to gender, social hierarchies, and nations. On a more fundamental level, studying the history of virtue helps us understand the guiding principles of historical action. Thus, we believe that the history of virtue is central to understanding these societies, and that the history of virtue, including criticisms of virtue and virtue ethics, tells us important things about how men and women thought and acted in ages past. (shrink)

How should we assess programs dedicated to education in virtue? One influential answer draws on quantitative research designs. By measuring the inputs and processes that produce the highest levels of virtue among participants according to some reasonable criterion, in this view, we can determine which programs engender the most desired results. Although many outcomes of character education can undoubtedly be assessed in this way, taken on its own, this approach may support favorable judgments about programs that indoctrinate rather (...) than educate, because education in character entails teleological thinking that is volitional not merely determined. I argue instead that proper assessment of virtue requires an expansive view of character education in both particular and common goods that avoids the tendency to indoctrinate and an inclusive conception of measurement that takes into account qualitative in addition to quantitative methodologies. (shrink)

Character Education juxtaposes John Dewey's philosophy of the person and values education with Alasdair MacIntyre's treatment of Aristotle's virtue theory in order to highlight the importance of virtue in developing good character.

With its focus on intellectual virtues and their role in the acquisition and transmission of knowledge and related epistemic goods, virtue epistemology provides a rich set of tools for educational theory and practice. In particular, characteristics under the rubric of "responsibilist" virtue epistemology, like curiosity, open-mindedness, attentiveness, intellectual courage, and intellectual tenacity, can help educators and students define and attain certain worthy but nebulous educational goals like a love of learning, lifelong learning, and critical thinking. This volume is devoted (...) to exploring the intersection between virtue epistemology and education. It assembles leading virtue epistemologists and philosophers of education to address such questions as: Which virtues are most essential to education? How exactly should these virtues be understood? How is the goal of intellectual character growth related to other educational goals, for example, to critical thinking and knowledge-acquisition? What are the "best practices" for achieving this goal? Can growth in intellectual virtues be measured? The chapters are a prime example of "applied epistemology" and promise to be a seminal contribution to an area of research that is rapidly gaining attention within epistemology and beyond. (shrink)

Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011) – is that it must provide regulative normative guidance for good thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists (most notably Baehr, 2013) have held that virtue epistemology not only can provide regulative normative guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the primary epistemic aim of all education (...) as the inculcation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr’s picture contrasts with another well-known position – that the primary aim of education is the promotion of critical thinking (Scheffler 1989; Siegel 1988; 1997; 2017). In this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both philosophy of education and epistemology and, a fortiori, epistemology of education – we challenge this picture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of education must meet and hold that it is the aim of critical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellectual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis, we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epistemology, next to the well-known empirically-driven ‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues approach does not have available a suitably effective pedagogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue as the primary aim of education. This is because the pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach (borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, without much further development in virtue-based theory, logic and critical thinking must still play the primary role in the epistemology of education. (shrink)

This book takes a major step in the philosophy of education by moving back past the Enlightenment and reinstating Aristotelian Virtue at the heart of moral education.

This paper confronts Zagzebski’s exemplarism with the intertwined debates over the conditions of exemplarity and the unity-disunity of the virtues, to show the advantages of a pluralistic exemplar-based approach to moral education (PEBAME). PEBAME is based on a prima facie disunitarist perspective in moral theory, which amounts to admitting both exemplarity in all respects and single-virtue exemplarity. First, we account for the advantages of PEBAME, and we show how two figures in recent Italian history (Giorgio Perlasca and Gino (...) Bartali) satisfy Blum’s definitions of ‘moral hero’ and ‘moral saint’ (1988). Then, we offer a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of heroes and saints with respect to character education, according to four criteria derived from PEBAME: admirability, virtuousness, transparency, and imitability. Finally, we conclude that both unitarist and disunitarist exemplars are fundamental to character education; this is because of the hero's superiority to the saint with respect to imitability, a fundamental feature of the exemplar for character education. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Education in the Virtues: Tragic Emotions and the Artistic ImaginationDerek L. Penwell (bio)IntroductionThe profoundly thoughtful—not to mention extensive—character of the scholarship historically applied to the nature of the difference between Plato and Aristotle on the issue of the tragic emotions raises the obvious question: What new is there left to say? In this article I seek to hold together two separate issues that have occupied much of (...) the scholarship on this topic but that typically have not been considered together: (1) What is the moral value of the tragic emotions? and (2) If the tragic emotions are morally significant, how can we engage tragedy without viewing it instrumentally? By approaching the tragic emotions in this way, I hope to suggest an Aristotelian analysis of tragedy that appreciates tragedy's ability to expand our resources for confronting an often chaotic world, while at the same time avoiding the notion of art as merely useful in the pursuit of larger moral projects.Plato, in Republic X, offers his seminal critique of art and the artist in relationship to the ideal republic. In particular, poetry comes under harsh criticism for encouraging emotions, which, according to Plato, ought to be kept under strict control. In the end, Plato reluctantly declares that poets must be banished as a way of preserving the order and moral integrity of the republic. Poetry, if permitted, will make "pleasure and pain the twin kings in your city in place of established custom and the thing which has always been generally accepted as best—reason."1Aristotle challenges his old teacher, Plato, in his treatise on tragedy in the Poetics. To say that Aristotle challenges Plato, however, is not say that he confronts Plato directly; rather the scope of Aristotle's argument addresses the issue of poetry, which Plato had denounced in the Republic. Specifically, Aristotle calls into question Plato's account of the value of the emotions. [End Page 9] Whereas Plato contends that emotions are a potentially disruptive force, the power of which must always be controlled by reason, Aristotle maintains, as I will argue, that the cultivation of the appropriate emotional response (that is, the correct emotional response at the correct time) is essential to the development of virtue. Moreover, according to Aristotle's view, the cultivation of appropriate emotional response has implications not only for the development of individual virtue but also for the health of the body politic.I must be careful to point out that I am not attempting to elicit Aristotle's endorsement for a view that says reason is not somehow responsible for properly informing the emotions. Aristotle's position with respect to emotions—while different from Plato's in the belief that emotions can be educated—still identifies reason both as the faculty that differentiates us as a species as well as the faculty that occupies the primary place in establishing knowledge and directing action. My goal in the first section of this article is much more modest: I only wish to argue that an Aristotelian critique of Plato on emotions suggests the beginnings of a way of viewing emotions, such that emotions have a significant role to play in moral development.2However, the nature of Aristotle's argument in his implicit response to Plato raises the important question of whether the view of art he advances (in particular, of tragedy) is purely an instrumental one—a question to which I will attend in the second section. Does Aristotle understand art as a tool in the service of some higher good, such as moral education? Art, if this is the case, loses its integrity as an end in itself. Inasmuch as Aristotle believes that art is conducive to moral education, he is in danger of being charged with inhabiting the dubious aesthetic stance that art is always the means to some higher end. That is to say, it could be argued that the theory of art that Aristotle places on offer is what R. W. Beardsmore calls moralism3 and what Berys Gaut calls ethicism.4 Moralism at its most radical is the aesthetic position that finds art as merely a useful tool in dressing... (shrink)

Compared to other approaches, it is virtue ethics that puts greatest emphasis on moral education. This results from its focus on moral agent and his or her moral condition as the main object of ethical enquiry. The aim of this paper is to outline the moral education within the framework of virtue ethics. I intend to explain how such education embraces the cognitive, affective, and behavioral elements. In the first part of the article, I present the concept (...) of ethical virtue to contrast it with certain misunderstandings which might lead to unnecessary fear of introducing the category of virtue into moral education. In the second part, I respond to various objections raised against virtue ethics, the most important being the objection of indoctrination and undermining autonomy of the educated. Another objection to which I pay special attention is the objection that there is no one catalogue of virtues but many different catalogues praised by different cultures, which especially poses a problem in multicultural societies. I am also trying to show the advantages of virtue education over other, nondirective approaches to moral education. (shrink)

The incessancy of the educational reforms of recent decades in Western countries, and their prominent association with conceptions of quality drawn from industry and commerce, tend to becloud the lack of educational substance at the heart of many of the more influential of the reform patterns. This lack betokens something of a sophisticated renaissance of the late nineteenth-century mentality of payment-by-results. Exploration of the reforms also reveals a preoccupation with performance which bypasses the central concerns of education itself. Quality, (...) in short, becomes redefined by a privative rationality, which then furnishes the conceptual arena and the predominant language for decision-making in matters educational. Writings of two influential contemporary thinkers -- MacIntyre and Lyotard -- are reviewed to illustrate the nature and significance of what the reforms have neglected. These thinkers' contrasting analyses reveal how intricate the contexts of educational policy and practice have become in the pluralist circumstances of late modernity. Where MacIntyre adopts a largely traditionalist stance and Lyotard a largely dismissive one in the face of the competing inheritances which battle for the minds and hearts of learners, this paper suggests not a middle way, but a different way. This pursues a kind of thinking which is itself educational more than political, self-critical more than adversarial. Declining the path of self-assured advocacy it concentrates instead on opening up an educational issue which is more often overlooked, or busily bypassed, than understood: What actually befalls the experience of teachers and learners in the practical conduct of education? How can that experience benefit best as teaching and learning are defensibly practised? A range of communicative rather than combative virtues is identified in this connection and their promising import is briefly explored. (shrink)

Character education is an increasingly discussed topic drawing upon virtue ethics as a moral theory. Scholars have predominantly understood educating character as a process that entails the formation of certain distinct character traits or functions through practice and habituation. However, these approaches present some problems. This paper explores the educational implications of various accounts focusing on the relationship between _phronesis_ and other virtues. In particular, our focus will be on those that Miller ( 2023 ) has classified as (...) Standard Model and Eliminativist Model of practical wisdom. Starting from these accounts, we will outline three specific problems that the latter models appear to generate at a theoretical level in character education. Finally, we will address the task of demonstrating why the monist account of moral virtue recently proposed by the Aretai group—which conceives being virtuous in possessing _phronesis_ understood as ethical expertise—might offer a refined response to these challenges. In addition, we will illustrate three educational pathways that can emerge from the same model. (shrink)

I suggest that shaping knowers of facts implies the teaching of intellectual virtues. To justify this claim, I do not appeal to the intrinsic value of epistemic goods such as truth or knowledge. Instead, I suggest that we have political reasons to teach intellectual virtues to high school and college students. The current epistemic environment – especially that found on social media – is not conducive to good democratic decision-making, but acquiring intellectual virtues can prepare students to (...) make good political decisions and increase the epistemic potential of democracy. For this reason, we should envision intellectual virtues as civic virtues, that is, excellencies that relate to the democratic process and that can help individuals become good citizens. (shrink)

This dissertation offers an interpretation of moral knowledge and moral education in Plato's Protagoras. The dialogue develops the deeply antagonistic views of Protagoras and Socrates about these and related topics. I examine their competing views about several important questions, including: What is moral wisdom, and how is it related to the other parts of virtue? Can arete be taught, and if not, how else might it be acquired? Is the good reducible to natural human desires, or does it in (...) some way transcend the natural world? The dissertation includes a detailed analysis of all sections of the dialogue, as well as of relevant sections of the Theaetetus. In the Introduction and Conclusion I also compare Protagoras' and Socrates' views to those of other moral philosophers. ;I argue that for Protagoras, arete is the ability to plan well and to exert control over external circumstances in order to promote one's own survival and pleasure. Moral reasoning is a techne, a tool for maximizing human desires. An analysis of the Great Speech shows that Protagoras is an ethical naturalist: the good is survival. Justice and shame are valuable in that they promote this end. Socratic dialectic reveals that, for Protagoras, wisdom has priority over any virtues with which it conflicts. Socrates' analysis of hedonism elicits Protagoras' assumption that pleasure is the good, an assumption inconsistent with Protagoras' view that courage is a virtue. ;Socrates, by contrast, is not an ethical naturalist; the good is not an object of the natural world. Moral knowledge is not technical, for it requires self-knowledge. While arete depends upon moral knowledge, our knowledge is always incomplete: we may progress towards excellence, but can never fully attain it. The human soul has an openness to the good, but we must articulate and test our intuitions through conversation with others. Moral teaching, understood as the simple transmission of knowledge, is impossible, but moral learning through philosophical exploration of moral intuitions and their limits is possible. Philosophy, so understood, better preserves ordinary moral experience than does Sophistry. (shrink)

The recent literature has seen a burgeoning discussion of the idea that the overarching epistemic goal of education is the cultivation of the intellectual virtues. Moreover, there have been attempts to put this idea into practice, with virtue-led educational interventions in schools, universities, and even prisons. This paper explores the question of whether—and, if so, to what degree—such intellectual virtue-based approaches to education are essentially social. The focus in this regard is on the role of intellectual exemplars (...) within this approach, and in particular the extent to which direct social interaction with such exemplars is crucial to the implementation of this educational methodology. (shrink)

Despite much recent concern with the possibilities of moral character education in elementary schooling and professional training, the university and higher educational prospects of such education have only lately received much attention. This paper begins by considering – and largely endorsing – the general case for character education in contexts of pre-adult schooling and adult professional and vocational training. However, it proceeds to argue that the case for intervention in character formation in some educational contexts is not (...) generally applicable to university and higher education. Key points are that there can be no clear normative warrant for such intervention in the case of learners who are: (i) beyond the age of majority and (ii) voluntarily engaged in study wherein significant professional or public implications of personal character development are not a pressing concern. In short, while good moral character is clearly of general human importance, its deliberate or explicit promotion may not be equally warranted in all educational contexts. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHow do different forms of education contribute to value preferences? Clearly, informal education through personal experiences that shape one’s sense of identity and frame cultural expectations and opportunities, non-formal education through religious traditions and formal state-mandated education all contribute to value preferences in culturally-specific ways. However, wisdom should allow people to coordinate culturally-specific education in ways that promote prosocial values. Our study considered the relative strength of four value-orientations from Schwartz’s Personal Values Questionnaire and of (...) 15 core virtues among 189 participants from Canada and South Korea; half were older and half younger adults. 101 were emerging adults and 88 were retired older adults. Multivariate regression analyses show that, although all three forms of education influenced value orientation in culture-specific ways in both Canada and South Korea, formal education was critical to cultivating the wisdom needed to coordinate and adjudicate between different values so as to live well. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between intellectual virtues and critical thinking, both as such and as educational ends worth pursuing. The first half of the paper examines the intersection of intellectual virtue and critical thinking. The second half addresses a recent argument to the effect that educating for intellectual virtues (in contrast to educating for critical thinking) is insufficiently action-guiding and therefore lacks a suitable pedagogy.

This article initially provides a brief overview of virtue epistemology; it thereafter considers some possible ramifications of this branch of the theory of knowledge for the philosophy of education. The main features of three different manifestations of virtue epistemology are first explained. Importantly, it is then maintained that developments in virtue epistemology may offer the resources to critique aspects of the debate between Hirst and Carr about how the philosophy of education ought to be carried out and by (...) whom. Wilfred Carr's position—that educational practitioners have privileged access to philosophical knowledge about teaching practice—will in particular be questioned. It will be argued that Carr's view rests on a form of epistemology, internalism, which places unreasonably narrow restrictions upon the range of actors and ways, in which philosophical knowledge of and/or for education might be achieved. In declaring that practical wisdom regarding teaching is ‘entirely dependent’ on practitioner reflection, Carr not only radically deviates from Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom, he also, in effect, renders redundant all philosophical research about education that is not initiated by teachers in this manner. It is concluded that Aristotle's general approach to acquiring information and knowledge about the world might yet still offer a foundation for a more comprehensive philosophy of education; one that makes clear that the professional testimony and reflection of teachers, observation of teaching practice, and already existing educational philosophy, theory and policy can all be perceived as potentially valuable sources of philosophical knowledge of and for education. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an increased interest in the application of Aristotelian virtue to business ethics. The objective of this paper is to describe the moral and intellectual virtues defined by Aristotle and the types of pedagogy that might be used to integrate virtue ethics into the business curriculum. Virtues are acquired human qualities, the excellences of character, which enable a person to achieve the good life. In business, the virtues facilitate successful cooperation and enable (...) the community to achieve its collective goals. The cultivation of virtue in students requires imparting knowledge about virtue and training students to be virtuous. A variety of instructional techniques are discussed including using case studies, collaborative and cooperative learning, role-playing, and video presentations. Business educators should emphasize to students that virtue considerations apply both to possible actions they may take and to themselves as moral agents. Since faculty may be viewed as role models, it is especially important that they set proper standards of behavior for students to emulate. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This book investigates the ubuntu theory-based conception of virtue and moral character formation in the northern, western, and eastern regions of Africa, suggesting a critical reconstruction of ubuntu by conceptualising the four different forms of practices in moral character formation. Arguing for the critical reconstruction of ubuntu virtue theory as more nuanced than simply the standard ubuntu normative virtue theories (which give priority to the community as the sole locus for understanding virtues and character formation in Africa), the book (...) builds a comprehensive model of virtue and moral character formation that draws insights from the reconstructed notion of ubuntu and other theories within and beyond the African thought. Chapters feature experience from across Africa including Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa, and centre on topics such as traditional cultural views and practices, political systems in various nations, neoliberalist thought, and primary, secondary and tertiary education systems in Africa and further afield. This is a valuable resource for scholars, academics, and postgraduate students, working in the fields of moral and values education, philosophy of education, and the theory of education more broadly. Those also interested in educational psychology may also find the volume of interest. (shrink)

In this paper I shall first examine an apparent paradox in Confucius? view on whether everyone is perfectible through education: on the one hand, he states that education should be provided to all, on the other hand, he says that common people cannot be made to know things. To understand this apparent paradox, I shall argue that education for Confucius is primarily moral education, as he teaches his students to become virtuous persons. So the apparent paradox (...) is really one about whether virtue can be taught. I shall argue in the last section that while Confucius? answer to the question is affirmative, he does not think that virtue can be taught in the same way as theoretical knowledge or technical skills are taught. For Confucius, the most effective way to teach people to be virtuous is through personal example. (shrink)

After a brief overview of what intellectual virtues are, I offer three arguments for the claim that education should aim at fostering ‘intellectual character virtues’ like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty. I then go on to discuss several pedagogical and related strategies for achieving this aim.

I offer an overview of Alessandra Tanesini’s discussion of how best to educate for intellectual virtue in the final chapter of her book The Mismeasure of the Self. I identify the unifying theme behind most of her objections to existing approaches, namely that they fail to instil the proper motivations for intellectual virtue, and I raise an issue about whether Tanesini’s preferred approach, self-affirmation, avoids this worry. I argue that it is not clear that it does; in particular, it’s left (...) unclear how self-affirmative interventions are meant to encourage a person’s evaluations of their own intellectual achievements and capacities to be motivated by accuracy or knowledge, as Tanesini requires them to be if they are to be intellectually virtuous rather than vicious. (shrink)

That only those who have mastered language can be virtuous is something that may strike us as an obvious truism. It would seem to follow naturally from, indeed simply restate, a view that is far more commonly held and expressed by philosophers of the virtues, namely that only those who can reason can be virtuous properly said. My aim in this paper is to draw attention to this truism and argue its importance. In doing so, I will take the (...) starting point for my reflections from a couple of concrete occasions in which the desire to offer a foothold to the language of the virtues encounters an obstacle that might be described as a recalcitrance of language: certain intuitions that seem decidedly linguistic get in the way to suggest that this vocabulary is out of place or out of order. Taking my cue from the discomfort of our linguistic intuitions, what I will be suggesting is that certain difficulties do indeed attend our use of the vocabulary of the virtues, and that there is a particular way of understanding their inevitability, one which is closely connected to the context of moral education. My hope is that reflecting on these difficulties and on the task of moral education with which they are associated can help us illuminate and recover the insight that a mastery of language may be indispensable for a mastery of virtue. (shrink)

According to virtue epistemology, the main aim of education is the development of the cognitive character of students (Pritchard, 2014, 2016). Given the proliferation of technological tools such as ChatGPT and other LLMs for solving cognitive tasks, how should educational practices incorporate the use of such tools without undermining the cognitive character of students? Pritchard (2014, 2016) argues that it is possible to properly solve this ‘technology-education tension’ (TET) by combining the virtue epistemology framework with the theory of (...) extended cognition (EXT) (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). He argues that EXT enables us to consider tools as constitutive parts of the students’ cognitive system, thus preserving their cognitive character from technologically induced cognitive diminishment. The first aim of this paper is to show that this solution is not sufficient to solve the TET. Second, I aim to offer a complementary and more encompassing framework of tool-use to address the TET. Then, I apply it to the educational uses of ChatGPT as the most notable example of LLM, although my arguments can be extended to other generative AI systems. To do so, in Sect. 1.1, I present Pritchard’s framework of cognitive character and virtue epistemology applied in education, to which I am committed in this treatment. In Sects. 2 and 3, I respectively illustrate Pritchard’s (2014) solution to the TET, and I highlight the general limitations of his proposal. Thus, in Sect. 4.1 I characterize ChatGPT as a computational cognitive artifact using Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts. In Sect. 4.2, I introduce my proposal, which combines Pritchard’s account of virtue epistemology with Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts to address the TET. Finally, in Sect. 5.1, I present some epistemically virtuous uses of ChatGPT in educational contexts. To conclude, I argue in favor of a multidisciplinary approach for analyzing educational activities involving AI technologies such as ChatGPT. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism has become an influential theory in both political and, increasingly, educational discourse. In simple terms cosmopolitanism can be understood as a response to the globalised and diverse world in which we live. Diverse in nature, cosmopolitan ideas come in many forms. The focus here is on what have been termed 'strong' ethical forms of cosmopolitanism; that is, positions which conceptualise moral bonds and obligations as resulting from a shared, common humanity. The view that pupils should be taught that all (...) human beings are equal and, crucially, that this entails a responsibility to take action when human equity is challenged or transgressed, is finding increasing expression within educational literature. The suggestion explored here is that strong forms of ethical cosmopolitanism are limited in ways which seriously restrict their educational worth. In the final section, it is argued that forms of cultural and political cosmopolitanism (which are part of the lived experiences of intra- and supra-national citizenship) are best responded to by developing the requisite virtues in pupils to engage with diverse and dialogic communities. (shrink)

A certain conception of the relevance of virtue epistemology to the philosophy of education is set out. On this conception, while the epistemic goal of education might initially be promoting the pupil's cognitive success, it should ultimately move on to the development of the pupil's cognitive agency. A continuum of cognitive agency is described, on which it is ultimately cognitive achievement, and thus understanding, which is the epistemic goal of education. This is contrasted with a view on (...) which knowledge is the epistemic goal. (shrink)

Argues that Plato's dialogues contain a surprisingly neglected account of Socrates' education about the love of noble virtue and that recovering this education could help broaden and deepen liberalism's moral and political horizon.