This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction A Brief Historical Note Failed Shortcuts Looking Deeper The Richness of Biology The Persistence of Design Real Design? Conclusion Postscript: Counterpoint Notes References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction A Brief Historical Note Failed Shortcuts Looking Deeper The Richness of Biology The Persistence of Design Real Design? Conclusion Postscript: Counterpoint Notes References.

Nowhere does the theory-laden character of Husserl’s phenomenological intuitions become as apparent as in his reflections on cultural philosophy. It is his theory that the qualification of one‘s own tradition as one of many manifestations of something valid in itself and binding for all is a unique achievement of Greek-European philosophy. However, that conviction can be found equally in South Asian “doctrines of Oneness” as well as in East Asian instances of the “Golden Rule”. Every person with (...) a command of a natural language is capable of such an insight.The most appropriate model for individual civilizations is not the sphere metaphor, which draws on a Platonic idea of organism, the model that Husserl adopted for his conception of “home” and “foreign worlds”, but rather the image of tinkering introduced by Claude Lévi-Strauss for illiterate societies and used by François Jacob to illustrate the present biological concept of organism.Regarding cultural universals, Husserl also relies on classical ontological reflections rather than on recent biological models. The most inter-esting anthropological universals from the point of view of cultural philosophy are, however, not essential, but contingent universals.En ninguna parte el carácter cargado de teoría de las intuiciones fenomenológicas de Husserl se vuelve tan aparente como en sus reflexiones sobre la filosofía cultural. Según su teoría, la calificación de la propia tradición como una de las muchas manifestaciones de algo válido en sí mismo y vinculante para todos es un logro único de la filosofía greco-europea. Sin embargo, esa convicción se puede encontrar igualmente en las "doctrinas de la unidad" del sur de Asia, así como en las instancias del este asiático de la "regla de oro". Cada persona con un dominio de un lenguaje natural es capaz de tal idea.El modelo más apropiado para las civilizaciones individuales no es la metáfora de la esfera, que se basa en una idea platónica del organismo —el modelo que adoptó Husserl para su concepción de "hogar" y "mundos extranjeros"— sino la imagen de retoque introducida por Claude Lévi Strauss para las sociedades analfabetas y utilizado por François Jacob para ilustrar el concepto biológico actual del organismo.Con respecto a los universales culturales, Husserl también se basa en reflexiones ontoló-gicas clásicas más que en modelos biológicos recientes. Sin embargo, los universales antropológicos más interesantes desde el punto de vista de la filosofía cultural no son esenciales, sino universales contingentes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Underplayed Ethics and the Dilemmas of Psychiatric CareChong Siow Ann and Tamra LysaghtThe practice of psychiatry is fraught with uncertainty. The exact causes and the biological substrates underlying mental disorders remain to be elucidated; even the diagnosis of these disorders is descriptive and not based on an etiological understanding and no biological diagnostic markers have been validated. The manifestation of almost all mental disorders results from a complex interaction (...) of biological and environmental factors which encompasses the patient’s unique life history, experiences and relationship with others and the community. In the face of such uncertainties — at times extending to the types of treatment (psychiatry is generally acknowledged not be an exact science) — it has been argued that adopting a pragmatic approach is necessary.1 Accordingly, this approach necessitates high ethical standards among mental health practitioners.Some mental illnesses are associated with varying degrees and types of cognitive impairments. Others have certain symptoms like auditory hallucinations and delusions that might severely compromise the patients’ autonomy, distort their sense of reality, increase the risk of harm to themselves or others and render them incapable of making informed decisions in their treatment and participation in research.Consequently, there are issues that are particular to the provision of mental healthcare. These include the need for enforced involuntary treatment with the corollary of depriving a patient of his personal liberty even [End Page 173] though it is often justified on the grounds that it is in the patient’s best interests. However, at times, it is the legal and societal obligation of mental health practitioners to protect those who might be harmed from the patient’s action that might seem to be more pressing. In this situation of double agency, lies the tension of providing confidential care for patients and acting as “an agent of the state” where that patient’s confidentiality might be breached and his liberty infringed upon. This situation is further aggravated by the stigma that clings ever so tenaciously to those who suffer from mental disorders and where it is the norm to stereotype them as dangerous and unpredictable.Consideration of a patient’s autonomy is also challenged by characteristics that are unique to the practice of psychiatry. The prescription of certain psychotropic medications can alter how people think and feel, while psychotherapy works towards changing the patient’s views and values. The philosopher, Jennifer Radden, describes this process as “re-forming the patient’s whole self or character … akin to the responsibilities of raising children”.2 The psychotherapeutic relationship is thus particularly personal and intimate because patients are asked to provide information that often reveals their innermost feelings, fears and fantasies. This information is provided on the basis of trust and assurance of confidentiality, and with expectation of being helped.Jeremy Holmes and Gwen Adshead have elaborated on the vulnerability of patients seeking psychotherapy: they might be particularly susceptible to exploitation because their past experiences of being exploited have led to their distress and help seeking — their dependency and the extreme privacy of the therapeutic relationship make any transgression difficult to be uncovered.3 There is a calamitous combination of the “unconscious wish in the patient to be used” with the complicity of an unethical therapist seeking to fulfil his own interests.4As in any other doctor-patient relationship, the relationship between the mental healthcare practitioner and the patient is one of unequal power where the former is ascendant. While that power should be exercised to heal and to relieve suffering, it also gives the practitioner tremendous power “to harm, reject, misunderstand, or exploit patients who struggle with the experience of mental illness, which itself may generate helplessness, despair, distress, and exceptional dependence on the clinician”.5 Given the potential of doing good and harm coupled with the likelihood of being so significant in the life of the patient,6 providing care for those with mental disorders and distress is necessarily ethically exacting — arguably more so than in other medical practice settings. [End Page 174]This precariousness has led to the suggestion that ethics in psychiatry should have a special status and that the more general principles of biomedical ethics are too limited in scope to... (shrink)

The materialist approach to the body is often, if not always understood in ‘mechanistic’ terms, as the view in which the properties unique to organic, living embodied agents are reduced to or described in terms of properties that characterize matter as a whole, which allow of mechanistic explanation. Indeed, from Hobbes and Descartes in the 17th century to the popularity of automata such as Vaucanson’s in the 18th century, this vision of things would seem to be correct. In this (...) paper I aim to correct this inaccurate vision of materialism. On the contrary, the materialist project on closer consideration reveals itself to be, significantly if not exclusively, (a) a body of theories specifically focused on the contribution that ‘biology’ or rather ‘natural history’ and physiology make to metaphysical debates, (b) much more intimately connected to what we now call ‘vitalism’ (a case in point is the presence of Théophile de Bordeu, a prominent Montpellier physician and theorist of vitalism, as a fictional character and spokesman of materialism, in Diderot’s novel D’Alembert’s Dream), and ultimately (c) an anti-mechanistic doctrine which focuses on the unique properties of organic beings. To establish this revised vision of materialism I examine philosophical texts such as La Mettrie’s Man a Machine and Diderot’s D’Alembert’s Dream; medical entries in the Encyclopédie by physicians such as Ménuret and Fouquet; and clandestine combinations of all such sources (Fontenelle, Gaultier and others). (shrink)

The above arguments have not conclusively demonstrated the existence of value; nor have they sought to. Rather, they have focused primarily on value-language itself: what it is, what it means, and how men use it. In value-judgements, men intend to speak about reality, and not merely to manifest their feelings to influence others. The conceptual character of value-words gives them a formal objectivity lacking in mere manifestations of feeling; the meaning of value-words contains a “claim to objectivity” arising (...) from the “ontological claim to objectivity” of value itself.These facts demonstrate conclusively that value-language differs essentially from emotive manifestations of feeling. Therefore, and in contradiction to both Ayer and Stevenson, even the most abstract of value-words can be used to form legitimate, conceptually meaningful value-judgements. As judgements, value-judgements can be true or false, not because of any “factual” content, but specifically as conceptually meaningful, pure value-judgements.I have deliberately restricted these investigations to consideration of language, without seriously arguing the ontology of value itself. Thereby, I have met the emotivists on their own ground. Even without demonstrating the existence of value, I have shown their analysis of value-language to be flawed. Further, I have identified a unique “claim to objectivity” in value-language which argues strongly in favor of the real existence of value as its ultimate foundation.For the simplest, most obvious explanation of this “claim to objectivity” is that it refers to value, which actually exists. That proof is logically the next step in my argument. A good place to begin would be a more careful, detailed analysis of the structure of human responses such as admiration, love, enthusiasm, etc., seeking to determine what they ontologically presuppose. Von Hildebrand proceeds in this way in his Ethics. See note 17, above.Proof of the real existence of value would demonstrate the ontological grounds for the “claim to objectivity” of value-language. It would show that value-language is rooted in the real world, speaking of reality as it is. This would be the last, and most important sense in which value-language is meaningful and objective. (shrink)

I argue that there are at least four different ways in which the term ‘function’ is used in connection with the study of living organisms, namely: function as activity, function as biological role, function as biological advantage, and function as selected effect. Notion refers to what an item does by itself; refers to the contribution of an item or activity to a complex activity or capacity of an organism; refers to the value for the organism of an item having (...) a certain character rather than another; refers to the way in which a trait acquired and has maintained its current share in the population. The recognition of a separate notion of function as biological advantage solves the problem of the indeterminate reference situation that has been raised against a counterfactual analysis of function, and emphasizes the importance of counterfactual comparison in the explanatory practice of organismal biology. This reveals a neglected problem in the philosophy of biology, namely that of accounting for the insights provided by counterfactual comparison. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

Since antiquity, scholars have observed a structural tension within Plato’s Phaedrus. The dialogue demands order in every linguistic composition, yet it presents itself as a disordered composition. Accordingly, one of the key problems of the Phaedrus is determining which—if any—aspect of the dialogue can supply a unifying thread for the dialogue’s major themes (love, rhetoric, writing, myth, philosophy, etc.). My dissertation argues that “soul-leading” (psuchagōgia)—a rare and ambiguous term used to define the innate power of words—resolves the dialogue’s structural (...) tension. I clarify the conceptual and dramatic features of soul-leading by focusing on the dialogue’s uniquely prevalent use of the semantic network of “leading” and “following.” By continuing to foreground the language and drama of leading and following, I offer a new interpretation of the dialogue as a whole: the Phaedrus is Plato’s articulation of how the soul can be led into communion with reality. Chapter 1 discusses scholarly disputes about the unity of the Phaedrus and proposes that soul-leading adequately satisfies the criteria put forward for what would count as a unifying element. I argue that soul-leading unifies the dialogue both thematically and non-thematically; moreover, soul-leading is a theme capacious enough to account for the other principal contenders for unity put forward. Chapter 2 develops the ambiguous character of soul-leading by examining how the dialogue showcases dangerous forms thereof. Love and language are dangerous when they lead the soul toward goods which can never truly fulfill it. In order to clarify how love and language can mislead the soul, Socrates develops a set of accounts of how the soul is led, both internally and externally, in the three speeches on love. If the soul is to be led into communion with reality (the proper end of soul-leading), it must be led internally by the right part of the soul and externally by the right object of desire. Chapter 3 argues that all souls can, in principle, be harmonized and directed in the way that Chapter 2 requires. I show that Plato’s view of philosophy is neither elitist (i.e., some are intrinsically incapable of philosophy) nor naively essentialist. All can come into communion with reality because all are by nature equipped to do so. While Plato recognizes that there are forces which tend to prohibit one from exercising one’s capability of being rightly led, none of them are intrinsic to human nature. Chapter 4 argues that successful soul-leading require neither the leader nor the follower to be already well-disposed to what’s ultimate in order for the pair to come to a communion with what’s ultimate. Plato’s depiction of soul-leading love shows that love can itself promote the formation needed for both leader and follower to come into contact with reality. Love can do so because it is always already bound up reality in its responsiveness to beauty. Beauty itself calls the lover to itself by shining through the beautiful beloved, who acts as a reminder of transcendent Beauty. The lover mediates this same experience for the beloved. Each comes to desire the other as well as Beauty itself. Chapter 5 argues that the drama of the lovers’ formation mythically depicted in the Palinode (Chapter 4) is written into the drama of the dialogue as a whole. In the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, we see an enactment of love’s formative role. Likewise, in the relationship between Phaedrus and Lysias, we see an enactment of the dangerous soul-leading discussed in Chapter 2. My focus on leading and following also allows me to show the thematic significance of the drama’s setting. Chapter 6 articulates the metaphysical conditions under which one can be led into communion with reality. Transcendent Beauty invites us into communion with itself and makes possible our ascent by providing us with divine guides and images which can transport us from our ordinary experiences to the true beings. Beauty accomplishes its work—leading us in a “divine dance” where we follow the gods up to Beauty and back down to each other—through images. When we handle images of reality rightly, they lead our souls into communion with reality. Further, when we have come into communion, we’ll be inspired to be co-workers of Beauty’s soul-leading work. When we articulate reality in language, we create new images that can serve to lead others toward reality. (shrink)

The original, prescientific Western belief that the mantis is a pious, helpful creature became a widely held explanation for the mantid's unique resting posture, and for one of its cryptic displays. This belief was a characteristic part of a broader discourse about nature in which ancient authority, religious beliefs, and superstition, but few original observations, mixed freely. Gradually, the belief in mantid gentleness and piousness became a commonplace through the continual retelling of the myths and superstitions surrounding this fascinating (...) insect.By the seventeenth century, a growing interest in observation had begun to replace blind reliance on established wisdom and ancient authority. However, the various young sciences to which the period gave rise did not progress equally, and neither did the subdisciplines within each scientific field; biology, especially entomology, was particularly slow to free itself from past beliefs and contemporary superstitions. In the specific case of the praying mantis, the situation may have been at its worst.Early observers of nature found evidence that seemed, at first, to disconfirm the well-established belief that mantids are gentle creatures. These few observers, faced with startling firsthand information about mantid voraciousness, created a new characterization of mantids as merciless predators and then often juxtaposed the two images in their descriptions. However, it was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that the two characterizations-gentleness versus cruelty— became reconciled.An amalgamation of these seemingly mutually exclusive characterizations was achieved by an interesting accommodation of each to the other. That is, while it could no longer be maintained that mantids are simply gentle insects, neither could it be accepted that they are all cruelty and viciousness. The melding of the two characterizations yielded a hybrid explanation which claimed that the praying mantis actually hastwo sides to its character! On the one hand, and like other creatures, mantids must nourish themselves, and do so quite reasonably by capturing small insects for food. However, even when “well nourished,” and without “the excuse of hunger,” their other, vicious side may surface; when this happens, the darkest of behaviours, cannibalism, is the result.To understand the remainder of the story one must pause to consider what had happened in the other sciences up to this point. In the mid-seventeenth century, professional scientific societies were established throughout Europe. The societies, and the various journals and periodicals that they produced or encouraged, represented an institutionalization of both science and its special, structured discourse. However, as we have stated, entomology lagged behind; and in the case of some insects, superstitions and anthropomorphisms did not fade from descriptions of their behavior for centuries to come.By the time the new scientific discourse was applied to mantids the creatures were already firmly shackled with a dual personality, and this assumption was never challenged. In fact, it was functionally impossible to disconfirm. Captures of small prey were considered part of the mantid's normal side; captures of large prey were considered part of the mantid's abnormal side. There was no alternative explanation.As luck would have it, by the time that the strictures of scientific discourse had tightened sufficiently to disallow the use of anthropomorphisms in the explanation of insect behavior, another acceptable explanation of mantid cannibalism became immediately available: cannibalism became part of mantid mating behavior. That is, the fundamental explanatory model remained unchanged; it was merely couched in more appropriate terms. The acceptance of this new explanation for cannibalism was virtually immediate and complete. For instance, no one ever asked the following questions: If the headless male remains able to mate as a putative precaution against female cannibalism, for what reason does the headless female remain able to fashion “a perfectly constructed ootheca”? Or: If female-on-male cannibalism plays a role in mating behavior, what role is played by genderindifferent cannibalism, especially that among immature mantids? The latter phenomena were simply ignored — they were just uninteresting artifacts of insect life. However, the grand logic of nature was immediately apparent in the headless male's ability to mate. The ruling theory, to use Chamberlin's term, had been able to accommodate itself to, and assimilate, the new scientific discourse. It remained unscathed.A persistent question posed by several historians of this particular topic has been, Why did not the results of Ken Roeder's experiments debunk the myth that males are regularly cannibalized by the females with which they mate? The reason, which we hope is now clear, is that there were two interdependent ruling theories operating here. If one accepts the argument that mantids' cannibalism is simply a normal part of their prey-catching behavior, then one attacks not only the theory that mantids have two separate predatory strategies, but also the more recent theory that mantids have evolved to be the ideal fly-catching machines. This second theory found its first confirming support in the centuries-old practice of feeding flies to captive mantids. Again, the disconfirming evidence of mantids eating prey of various sizes had no impact on the theory. Confirming observations were accepted: disconfirming observations were seen as anomalies.Additional confirmation of both ruling theories was garnered in experiments done in the mid-twentieth century. These experiments were based on the assumption that the original conceptualizations were correct, and consequently they did not test other hypotheses. The combined strength of the two theories is evidenced especially in the Raus' failure to account for the fact that their empirical observations were at odds with many of the conclusions that they drew, and in the fact that Roeder's work is still used to support the belief in the regularity of mating-related cannibalism despite the fact that Roeder, himself, argued the opposite. with both theories well entrenched, it is virtually impossible to promote an alternative theory of mantid behavior: namely, that mantids are generalized, opportunistic predators that manage to survivein spite of the fact that cannibalism sometimes occurs. (shrink)

This paper outlines the unique features of Daoist thought that comprise the inherent spirit and substance of Daoist thought and style, and analyses the formation of the Daoist character from its remote social roots. Three points are made: The heretical spirit of "being clad in rough serge but holding a pearl" is an important feature of Daoism; The objectivity of the "Way which imitates what is so of itself" is the core of Daoist reasoning, which is more (...) rational and closer to scientific wisdom than the Confucian restriction of the Way to moral norms; and Daoism's specific cultural attitude and style embody a tolerance of all things based on the premise that all are equal. Concrete examples of Daoism's openness, tolerance, and character are given and it is concluded that these features are a valuable philosophical inheritance. (shrink)

In this work, it is made clear: -/- (1) What it is to rationalize and how rationalization is possible; (2) What it is to repress and how repression is possible; (3) How internal conflict is possible, how it is related to anxiety and other affective states, and how internal conflict causes blindness; (4) Why it is that conceptualized self-awareness is repression-resistant (though not repression-proof) and non-conceptualized self-awareness is not repression-resistant; (5) How rationalization is necessary for repression and vice versa; (6) (...) Why rationalization is not in and of itself pathological and why, in addition, rationalization is within limits a biological necessity; (7) Where exactly the cut-off line is between morbid and healthy rationalization; (8) How compartmentalization and repression depend on each other, how they are similar, and how they are different; (9) Why even though mental events are presumably mediated by physical (physiological, neural) events, psychology is not low-resolution physiology; (10) Why, by virtue of being the one discipline whose data are themselves data, the logical structure of the discipline of psychology is unique; (11) Why notwithstanding the last point two points, Dilthey's 'empathy-based' approach to psychology is wrong and why Hempel's narrowly positivistic analysis of psychological explanation is no less wrong, (12) What is involved in reducing one discipline to another; (13) What the differences are between 'access-conscious' (Freud's 'topographical' unconscious) and 'access-unconscious' (Freud's 'dynamic', i.e. repression-based, unconscious); (14) How rationalization is involved in character-remodeling and character-degradation; (15) What it is to sociopathize; (16) What the differences are between the psychopath, the sociopath, and criminal; (17) How criminosis may safeguard (while, it is true, causing some degradation of) one's personality-architecture against forces that would otherwise lead to sociopathogenesis; (18) How Nietzsche's ethical egoism is an oblique way of saying, correctly, that unless one is true to oneself, one's morality is sham-morality and how this prima facie ethical claim is a demonstrably (and demonstrably correct) non-normative, psychological claim; (19) What the relationship is between psychological integrity and moral integrity; (20) Why those lacking psychological integrity can be anything more than 'reflex machines', to use Checkley’s term; (21) What intentions are, why intentions are not identical with desires; (22) Why Davidson's 'interpretivism' is spurious and why the same is true of all forms of functionalism; (23) Why the Computational Theory of Mind is spurious; (24) Why many a psychopath is regarded as a person of merit; (25) Why some alleged solutions to the mind-body problem are non-solutions and what the merits and demerits are of Descartes' conceivability-argument for mind-body dualism. (shrink)

The unique character of the socio-economic negociations in Belgium has lost much of its glamour and prestige during the last quarter of the 20th century. While before 1975, there was more or less agreement among the social partners to redistribute welfare to the whole society, after the first oil crisis employers tended to see themselves in competition with other employers, with the trade unions and with the state. Both employers' organisations as trade unions wanted to safeguard their own (...) priorities, respectively the competitiveness of the enterprises and the system of indexation. As a consequence, it became very difficult to reach agreements and hence, there have been no or only very small interprofessional agreements signed since 1975.The role of the government in this period evolved from the role of host for the negociations to that of co-actor and finally to director. When no agreement was possible between the social partners, the govenrment itself took the initiative and both trade unions and employers' organisations tried to lobby the government rather than being partners in negociations. The measures of the government, especially those taken with extra-ordinary powers, were often beneficial for the employers. Despite the emphasis by the trade unions on employment, their efforts beared not much fruit. The first priority of both the government and the employers was the enhancement of the financial and the economic situation of the country. Since the interprofessional agreement of 1999-2000, a new period bas begun. Trade unions and employers' organisations are constrained by what happens in the rest of Europe. Between these constaints, they can negociate and conclude agreements on the basis of freedom and responsibility.The level of negociations shifted in this period from the interprofessional level to the level of the sector or even to the level of the enterprise. Another trend is the creation of an institutional framework for social talks on the Flemish level.The challenges for the future are the installation of a European or even an international world-wide institutional framework for social negociations and the development of themes as permanent education, quality of life and work and the enhancement of the socio-economic democracy. (shrink)

Living systems are characterized as self-generating and self-maintaining systems. This type of characterization allows integration of a wide variety of detailed knowledge in biology.The paper clarifies general notions such as processes, systems, and interactions. Basic properties of self-generating systems, i.e. systems which produce their own parts and hence themselves, are discussed and exemplified. This makes possible a clear distinction between living beings and ordinary machines. Stronger conditions are summarized under the concept of self-maintenance as an almost unique (...) class='Hi'>character of living systems. Finally, we discuss the far-reaching consequences that the principles of self-generation and self-maintenance have for the organization, structure, function, and evolution of single- and multi-cellular organisms. (shrink)

This article covers issues illustrating determining significance of philosophy as a theoretical reflection over the utmost bases of culture as well as processes, conditioned by phenomena of alienation and self-alienation of culture, resulting in its integrity, uniqueness and originality demolition. This, in its turn, definitely leads to various kinds of deformation of philosophic reflection. The most important tendency in subduing the crisis of culture and philosophy is to project a new type of philosophizing, represented in the critical philosophy of “Frankfurt’s (...) School”, and other trends, which emphasize ideas of correlation between philosophy, science, art and morality, and transforming its former states into the new stream of philosophizing and questioning. Variety of philosophic trends, originality of its approaches, variety of its ”images” is determined, to a considerable extent, not only by contradiction of philosophic process, but also by the status of culture, its deformations, its former values devastation as well as forming new ones, decaying of its integrity, embodied in the form of alienation and self-alienation of culture.Self-alienation of culture only reveals alienated character of society itself, both its creators and its consumers, dividing and studying cultural values. Transformations of philosophic ideas appear not only in the form of reconsidering for historic and philosophical process achievements, but also in the form of new forms of society and culture reconsidering, appealing to the future in the outline of its humanitarian development. (shrink)

Evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) has undergone dramatic transformations since its emergence as a distinct discipline. This paper aims to highlight the scope, power, and future promise of evo-devo to transform and unify diverse aspects of biology. We articulate key questions at the core of eleven biological disciplines—from Evolution, Development, Paleontology, and Neurobiology to Cellular and Molecular Biology, Quantitative Genetics, Human Diseases, Ecology, Agriculture and Science Education, and lastly, Evolutionary Developmental Biology itself—and discuss why evo-devo is (...) uniquely situated to substantially improve our ability to find meaningful answers to these fundamental questions. We posit that the tools, concepts, and ways of thinking developed by evo-devo have profound potential to advance, integrate, and unify biological sciences as well as inform policy decisions and illuminate science education. We look to the next generation of evolutionary developmental biologists to help shape this process as we confront the scientific challenges of the 21st century. (shrink)

The concepts expressed by social role terms such as artist and scientist are unique in that they seem to allow two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is inherently normative. This study presents and tests an account of the content and structure of the normative dimension of these “dual character concepts.” Experiment 1 suggests that the normative dimension of a social role concept represents the commitment to fulfill the idealized basic function associated with the role. Background information (...) can affect which basic function is associated with each social role. However, Experiment 2 indicates that the normative dimension always represents the relevant commitment as an end in itself. We argue that social role concepts represent the commitments to basic functions because that information is crucial to predict the future social roles and role-dependent behavior of others. (shrink)

A theory in natural science is a comprehensive formula or doctrine which describes and correlates in a unified abstract form of statement the general determining factors of some special group of natural facts. It is at once inclusive, realistic and understandable. If a theoretical statement holds good, the existence and characteristics of many individual events can be inferred deductively from it. It thus gives a logical basis for empirical fact. But it is based on experience of nature, and must conform (...) to the facts of nature; these are primary, and a valid theory, no matter how broad it may be, is to be considered as itself a statement of fact, i.e., a true description of some condition which has a real and stable existence in the natural world. In its scientific usage, the term “fact” refers primarily to some datum of experience having the special character of permanence or regular recurrence; this is why scientific facts are verifiable; in this respect they differ from the passing individual events of history. Any scientific theory presupposes the stability and unequivocality of the natural facts. Hence if a theory is sound, it furnishes a reliable basis for prediction, discovery and invention. Scientific or technological creation then becomes possible; modern engineering and medicine could never have become what they are without a background of theoretical physics and biology. Obviously any natural science must always have at its disposal an ample body of observational and experimental data, but in most cases the work of collecting and verifying these is carried out under the guidance of theory. (shrink)

In this paper, we present an argument showing why the general properties of a self-organizing system (e.g. being far from equilibrium) may be too weak to characterize biological and proto-biological systems. The special character of biological systems, tell us that its distinctive capacities could have been developed in pre-biotic times. In other words, the basic properties of life would be better comprehended if we think that they were much more likely early in time. We developed a conceptual proposal on (...) the origins of pre-biotic world, a kind of protocellular system which is made up of simple molecular compounds interconnecting three different types of processes. The interrelation of these processes characterizes the “Informational Dynamical System” (our conceptualprotocell proposal) as an autonomous dynamical system that can maintain by itself in far from equilibrium state, as opposed to those that depend on external causes. Consequently it follows that, in the dawn of pre-biotic world, there was no DNA or RNA or proteins to begin with. As well, our proposal implies the separation of biological evolution from the kind of open-ended evolution that gave rise to first breed of animate matter. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Nancy'sOn the Commerce of Thinkingconcerns the particular communication of thoughts that takes place by means of the business of writing, producing, and selling books. His reflection is born out of his relation to the bookstore, in the first place his neighborhood one, but beyond that any such "perfumery, rotisserie, patisserie," as he calls them, dispensaries "of scents and flavors through which something like a fragrance or bouquet of the book is divined, presumed, sensed."On the Commerce of Thinking is thus (...) not only something of a semiology of the specific cultural practice that begins with the unique character of the writer's voice and culminates in a customer crossing the bookstore threshold, package under arm, on the way home to a comfortable chair, but also an understated yet persuasive plea in favor of an endangered species. In evoking the peddler who, in times past, plied the streets with books and pamphlets literally hanging off him, Nancy emphasizes the sensuality of this commerce and reminds us that this form of consumerism is like no other, one that ends in an experience-reading-that is the beginning of a limitless dispersion, metamorphosis, and dissemination of ideas. Making, selling, and buying books has all the elements of the exchange economy that Marx analyzedfrom commodification to fetishismyet each book retains throughout an absolute and unique value, that of its subject. With reading, it gets repeatedly reprinted and rebound. For Nancy, the book thus functions only if it remains at the same time open and shut, like some Moebius strip. Closed, it represents the Idea and takes its place in a canon by means of its monumental form and the title and author's name displayed on its spine. But it also opens itself to us, indeed consents to being shaken to its core, in being read each time anew. (shrink)

In a macroevolutionary timescale, evolvability itself evolves. Lineages are sorted based on their ability to generate adaptive novelties, which leads to the optimization of their genotype-phenotype map. The system of translation of genetic or epigenetic changes to the phenotype may reach significant horizontal and vertical complexity, and may even exhibit certain aspects of learning behaviour. This continuously evolving semiotic system probably enables the origin of complex yet functional and internally compatible adaptations. However, it also has a second, “darker”, side. (...) As was pointed out by several authors, the same process gradually reduces the probability of the origination of significant evolutionary novelties. In a similar way to the evolution of societies, teachings, or languages, in which the growing number of internal linkages gradually solidifies their overall structure and the structure or interpretation of their constitutive elements, the evolutionary potential of lineages decreases during biological evolution. Possible adaptations become limited to small “peripheral” modifications. According to the Frozen Evolution theory, some of the proximate causes of this “macroevolutionary freezing” are more pronounced or present exclusively in sexual lineages. Sorting based on the highest evolvability probably leads to the establishment of certain structural features of complex organisms, e.g. the modular character of their development and morphology. However, modules also “macroevolutionary freeze” whereas the hypothetical “thawing” of modules or their novel adaptive combinations becomes rarer and rarer. Some possible ways out of this dead end include the rearrangement of individual development, e.g. neoteny, radical simplification, i.e. sacculinization, and transition to a higher level of organization, e.g. symbiosis or symbiogenesis. The evolution of evolvability is essentially a biosemiotic process situated at the intersection of the genocentric modern synthesis and the evo-devo-centric extended synthesis. Therefore, evolvability may eventually connect these three not necessarily contradictory approaches. (shrink)

The basic thesis of Russell Powell’s Contingency and Convergence: Toward a Cosmic Biology of Body and Mind is that law-like evolutionary processes produce humanlike cognitive capacities, rendering such capacities common in the universe. There is an important caveat; key aspects of human cognition, those that undergird cumulative culture, are entirely contingent and likely very rare. To defend this thesis, Powell marshals a wealth of evidence from a variety of disciplines and develops some singular theoretical tools. Unfortunately, at a number (...) of key points in the book Powell simply ignores contradicting evidence and other plausible approaches to thinking about the history of life on our planet. Thus Powell’s argument is, at best, a weak how possibly argument—another Just-So story mixing science with speculation. Nonetheless, the flaws in the book are instructive. They exemplify how a kind of anthropocentrism continues to shape the philosophy of biology and, arguably, biology itself, placing humans at the apex of evolution and demanding that the study of life must ultimately be about us. In effect, Powell offers a rationalization for why we can treat humans as the measure of all things, asserting our continuity with the rest of life on the planet, while at the same time maintaining our uniqueness. Interrogating his argument proves a useful exercise in identifying why this kind of anthropocentrism is implausible. (shrink)

This essay investigates the little-known dialogue by Zacharias Scholasticus entitled Ammonius, a philosophical dispute over the creation of the world. It examines in particular Zacharias’ skill in portraying the character of Ammonius, a pagan teacher of philosophy in Alexandria. Even before illustrating his own eternalist theses, which are later refuted by Zacharias, Ammonius is introduced through subtle yet unequivocal allusions as a malus Socrates, i.e. a bad teacher who corrupts young people and alienates them from philosophy, while being well (...) received by the city in which he teaches. This reversal forms the broader plot that runs through the narrative framework of the dialogue, which is based on the borrowing – and inversion – of narrative schemes, mainly from Plato’s Phaedrus. The Ammonius will ultimately be presented as a paradigm of the appropriation of Plato not only on a superficial level (linguistic borrowings, the dialogue form itself), but also on a deeper and more structural level, i.e. as a remarkable case of borrowing Plato’s dramaturgy and irony. (shrink)

The diversity of bone proteoglycan (PG) structure and localisation (pericellular, extracellular in the organic bone matrix) reflects a broad spectrum of biological functions within a unique tissue. PGs play important roles in organizing the bone extracellular matrix, taking part in the structuring of the tissue itself as active regulators of collagen fibrillogenesis. PGs also display selective patterns of reactivity with several constituents including cytokines and growth factors, such as transforming growth factor‐β or osteoprotegerin thereby modulating their bio‐availability and (...) biological activity in the bone tissue. In this review, the complex PG composition in bone will be addressed together with the specific role played by PGs (or their GAGs chains) in bone biology, as regulatory molecules for bone resorption and their involvement in bone tumor development. These roles have been determined after modulation of PG expression or mutations in their corresponding genes, which revealed specific roles for these compounds in bone pathologies (e.g. perlecan or glypican‐3 mutations observed respectively in chondrodysplasia or dysmorphic syndrome). Finally, the potential therapeutic interest of PGs is discussed based on recent data, more particularly on bone tumor‐associated osteolysis as these molecules are involved both in bone resorption and tumor development. BioEssays 29:758–771, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the unique character of human nature. Personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to material and physical substance. The human person is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to free‐willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self‐consciousness. But since Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature. Historically, Thomas (...) Huxley, “Darwin's bulldog,” agreed with Darwin on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral behavior. Huxley's “saltationism” has recently been characterized by Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature? Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the human being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with their ancient roots? (shrink)

In this paper I outline Hans Jonas’s thesis of the “existential” character of biological life and compare it with statements made by the early Heidegger concerning the essential enworldedness of all living beings. I then critically examine this thesis in the light of Heidegger’s own later refutation of his views and consequent reversal of his former position on life. I argue that while both thinkers are correct to attribute a radical openness to organic life as such, Heidegger is correct (...) is restricting the existential dimension to specifically human life given certain logical constraints built into the concept of existence itself. (shrink)

Traditionally, it has been supposed that the central object of Biology are ‘organisms’. The expression “organism” is relatively recent in the use that it has nowadays –it was introduced by the authors of the German Idealism– but corresponds to a very traditional notion. An ‘organism’ is a substance composed by a plurality of materials organized by the same substance that acts upon itself to persist in time, in order to a finality that is the organism itself. To (...) make intelligible an organism seems indispensable its order to an end. This teleological perspective, nevertheless, is unacceptable for the reductivist perspective of Biology, prevalent since the triumph of what has been called the “Modern Synthesis” the first half of last century. It has been proposed, for that reason, to substitute the traditional idea of ‘organism’ by that of ‘Darwinian individual’ (cf. Godfrey-Smith, 2009), that could offer a more adequate perspective of the object of Biology. The object of this science could not be organisms, but individuals that can enter the Darwinian evolutionary drift. In this work it is explained why a hiatus persists between organisms teleologically oriented and a Darwinian individual. The Darwinian perspective leaves aside the central character of the object of Biology: life. (shrink)

This paper argues both that the decentralized and democratic context in the United States prior to World War II encouraged the development of diverse approaches, programs, and institutional supports for the biological sciences, and that the resulting pluralism is consistent with the complex and messy ways that science is used in a democratic society. This is not a claim that only U.S. science experiences such diversity, nor that the way science plays out in our American form of modified constitutional democracy, (...) are unique. Rather, my intention is to underline the particular character of the diversity and its implications for science and to begin further discussion of this phenomenon. I challenge others to pursue comparative analysis for other places and times, so that we can begin to explore more deeply what meaning this diversity — or the lack thereof - holds for science more generally. (shrink)

This paper challenges two main arguments often presented to show that cloning a human being would be morally wrong per se. These arguments are that human cloning would be intrinsically wrong 1) because it involves manufacturing a person rather than creating or reproducing one, and 2) because it violates some claim or right that individuals have to be biologically unique. I argue that while cloning may involve genetic selection, it need not always be a decision to select for a (...) certain type of individual. Furthermore, I contend that the notion of biological uniqueness is inadequate to ground either the idea that biologically non‐unique individuals are morally worse off than unique ones or that biological uniqueness itself constitutes a criterion of moral value or status. (shrink)

The theories of most writers on Ethics, with whose works I am acquainted, appear to be based upon the assumption of the unique character of goodness or The Good. By the word unique these writers mean, I think, among other things that goodness cannot be analysed into or described in terms of anything other than itself, that it can be and is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of some other thing which (...) is not goodness, and that the apprehension of or desire for goodness is a distinct and specific character of our mental states. By asserting, however, that the state of mind constituted by the apprehension of goodness, or that the state of emotion aroused by the desire for goodness, is distinguished by a specific and unique property, they do not, I think, necessarily mean that this property is the same as the specific property of goodness itself. Most writers on Ethics have also believed that man is free to desire goodness, and to act in accordance with his desire, that is to say, they have held in some form or other the doctrine of free-will. (shrink)

I defend the view that many biological categories are defined by homology against a series of arguments designed to show that all biological categories are defined, at least in part, by selected function. I show that categories of homology are `abnormality inclusive'—something often alleged to be unique to selected function categories. I show that classifications by selected function are logically dependent on classifications by homology, but not vice-versa. Finally, I reject the view that biologists must use considerations of selected (...) function to abstract away from variation and pathology to form a canonical description of a class of biological systems. (shrink)

Biological individuality is a notoriously thorny topic for biologists and philosophers of biology. In this paper we argue that biological individuality presents multiple, interconnected questions for biologists and philosophers that together form a problem agenda. Using a case study of an interdisciplinary research group in ecology, behavioral and evolutionary biology, we claim that a debate on biological individuality that seeks to account for diverse practices in the biological sciences should be broadened to include and give prominence to questions (...) about uniqueness and temporality. We show that broadening the problem agenda of biological individuality draws attention to underrecognized philosophical issues and discussions and thereby organizes and enriches the existing debate. (shrink)

This monograph suggests that theories of warfare and descriptions of the evolving character of war cannot be complete without first giving credit to the nature of war itself. Looking at varied portrayals of war from literary, academic, military, and civilian strategist perspectives, this monograph offers a redefinition of "war" as an investment in organized violence by parties interested in the extension, maintenance, or appearance of their power over an unspecified time, with an unknowable risk, for an uncertain reward. (...) In drawing an analogy to painting, it suggests that "choice" is the underlying axiomatic theme of war, and it that is replayed and adapted at every scale of warfare like a classical fugue. From there, this monograph pierces the interior of Clausewitz's "trinity" description of war, and proposes that there are still more universal ways to describe conflict's breadth, depth, and context. This argument concludes that war is better understood when it is described as a "clash of the trinities." An ecology of war is proposed, in which fundamental components comprising fuel, biology, and interactions constitute a network or system undergoing entropy. It is this sense of entropy (a tendency toward social and political discontinuity and disorder) that chiefly describes war in all its varied guises and explains the political, social, and military efforts to avoid them, corral them, plan them, or fight them. (shrink)

How the universe came to be what it is now is a key philosophical question. The hypothesis that it came from nothing or śūnya proves to be dissembling, since the quantum vacuum can hardly be considered a void. In modern science, it is generally assumed that matter existed before the universe came to be. Modern science hypothesizes that the manifestation of life on earth is nothing but a mere increment in the complexity of matter – and hence is an outcome (...) of evolution of matter following the Big Bang. After the manifestation of life, modern science believed that chemical evolution transformed itself into biological evolution, which then had caused the entire biodiversity on our planet. In the framework of materialism, the major attention is to find general organizational laws stimulated by physical sciences, ignoring the uniqueness of life. The main goal of materialism is to reduce consciousness to natural processes, which in turn can be translated into the language of math, physics, and chemistry. Following this approach, scientists have made several attempts to deny the living organism of its veracity as an immortal soul, in favor of genes, molecules, atoms, and so on. However, advancement in various fields of biology has repeatedly given rise to questions against such a denial and has supplied more and more evidence against the completely misleading ideological imposition that living entities are particular states of matter. In the recent past, however, the realization has arisen that cognitive nature of life at all levels has begun presenting significant challenges to the views of materialism in biology and has created a more receptive environment for the soul hypothesis :e1085138, 2015). Therefore, instead of adjudicating different aprioristic claims, the development of an authentic theory of origin of life and universe needs both proper scientific knowledge and the appropriate tools of philosophical analysis of life. This talk will highlight the uniqueness of biological systems that offers a considerable challenge to the mainstream materialism and proposes the Vedāntic philosophical view as a viable alternative for development of a theory worthy of origin of life and universe. (shrink)

: The article analyzes the features of the doctrine of the church of the outstandingProtestant theologian of the early XXI century Miroslav Volf. Volf's understanding of the church as a reality that preceded the emergence of the individual as a Christian means a radical break with liberal Protestant ideas of the church community as created by the voluntary decision of individuals. But Volf does not share the collectivist idea of ​​the church as an organism in which the individual is completely (...) subjugated to the whole. It is established that Volf creates a communitarian model of the church, in which the church community is understood as the unity of diversity. Unity itself has the character of interpersonal relations. Individuals with different charisms in the community interact with each other like the fellowship of the Three in God. Communitarianism in Volf's ecclesiology as a "middle way" between liberal individualism and total collectivism has all the hallmarks of postliberal theological theory. It is proved that Volf's communitarianism became a creative development of Christian personalism of the XX century with its emphasis on the existential freedom of the individual and the importance of interpersonal relations. Volf succeeded in building ecclesiological communitarianism not so much because of his many specific speculations about the organization of church communities, but because of his vision of personalism. Namely, as we noted above, Volf combines the idea of ​​personality as dependent on its relations with other personalities with the vision of personality as an apophatic secret that is higher than all its properties and charisma. Accordingly, a personality that exists in absolute openness to the influences of other personalities on the one hand, and is absolutely unique on the other, makes possible the existence of a communitarian church community. Volf emphasizes that the catholicity of the individual Christian personality is as necessary as the catholicity of the whole church community. The characterization of the individual as a conciliar presupposes not only the traditional ideal of the integrity of all faculties and the charisma of the individual in his intention to communicate with God, but also the vision of the legitimacy of the inner diversity of the individual. The possible complexity of the identity of the individual is almost infinite, and the willingness to accept it in the community - the main feature of Volf's communitarianism. Similarly, every ecclesial community must be ready to accept as Christian all other ecclesial communities, whatever the peculiarities of their identity. It is clear that such an understanding of catholicity is possible only in Protestantism. As Volf rightly points out, Catholicism presupposes that the ecclesial community must be the local embodiment of the common ecclesial identity of the whole structure, and Orthodoxy emphasizes that a separate community is necessarily identical in identity to the common identity of the church through the Eucharist. Volf's communitarianism allows us to describe church communities and their associations as network structures in which all individuals are active actors whose abilities and charisms are important for the constitution of communities. (shrink)

Many professionals, mainly scientists have told me that a divine being is not necessary to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Theology and even metaphysics are redundant disciplines, they say. To me to reject a discipline a priori is irrational, whereas the methodology of science itself is basically rational. Why do Newton's equations say time is symmetrical, Einstein's relativity and quantum mechanics say time is an illusion and now Smolin says time is reborn - the present moment (...) is a fundamental aspect of reality. Why has matter been the carrier of reality over centuries, then matter dissolves away becoming an ephemeral quantum activity and now information is the carrier of reality? The laws of physics were presumed to be eternal, now Smolin says they are evolving like in biology - natural selection. Why do cosmologists like Brian Greene and Leonard Susskind postulate that there are nearly infinite number of replicas of each and every one of us - doppelgangers - in an infinite number of universes when the gut feeling of each and every one of us that we are unique in this universe? For Newton, gravity was an instantaneous attraction between two masses, for Einstein it was an inherent potential even with a single mass. For Einstein, gravity acts at the speed of light. Plato says that what is observed is phenomena. Reality resides in Platonic Forms. Descartes says that knowledge is acquired through perception and deduction. No reality without the mind. Kant synthesized rationalism and empiricism. Knowledge can be derived without empirical observation. Free will touches almost everything that human beings value. But many scientists postulate that free will is an illusion. Christian theology posits that God created the universe out of nothing. Cosmologists also now say the same thing, but the definition of 'nothing' is disputed. Christian theology once postulated that there is no salvation outside the Church. Now it is not so. Why these confusions? Why these contradictions? On the present methodology of acquisition of knowledge, answers may never be possible. The Theory of Everything (TOE) is more a distant dream than reaching for the stars. However, the discipline of Zygology which is introduced into the academia, a rational explanation why this is not possible has been postulated. Knowledge is holistic - a seamless web runs through all disciplines. Necessity of a new epistemology of reality and existence is inevitable....Zygology may have the answers!". (shrink)

Understanding hunger is the key to understanding ourselves. While they seem the most obvious things about us, our hungers are also deeply mysterious, arising out of, and casting light on, the unique character of human consciousness. In humans, physiological need is transformed into a multitude of needs that are remote from organic necessity. Even first-level biological hunger is experienced differently in humans; and little in human feeding behaviour has any parallel in the animal kingdom.In this book, Ray Tallis (...) takes us through the different levels of our hunger. Out of our primary appetites arise a myriad of pleasures and tastes that are elaborated in second-level hedonistic hungers creating new values. The evolution of appetite into desire opens the way to social hungers such as the hunger for acknowledgement. Awareness of death awakens a further level of hunger for something that lies beyond the pell-mell of successive experiences leading towards extinction. The art of living is the art of managing our hungers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes on Psychodramatic Treatment of a Person with SchizophreniaJonathan D. Moreno, PhD (bio)I have enjoyed reflecting on Mr. Chapy’s account of work in psychodrama with a patient with schizophrenia.Although at one time many years ago I was interested in phenomenological psychiatry, and especially the writings of Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss, I am not an authority on dasein-analysis, so I have nothing to add to the discussion. I should (...) say, however, that my father had little interest in this approach, which was far too abstract for his taste. He proceeded from the standpoint of the theater, of action and enactment. He believed that the drama itself provided the insight.For the purposes of this response, I take it as a given that the patient in question has been accurately diagnosed, although in the description of the scene with his father he does not exhibit the usual symptoms, such as auditory hallucinations. People with schizophrenia often find it difficult to manage the voices they are hearing without substantial preparation for a psychodrama. According to psychodramatic method, one way to prepare them is to externalize the voices, allowing a different therapist to take the role of each one as the protagonist instructs them how to play that role. Chair may be set up so that each “voice,” personified by an auxiliary ego, can sit in each chair in an array. This preparation may require a number of sessions. If the scene is to be enacted with a significant other, like the father in this instance, the patient may not be able to warm up to a direct encounter, especially with all the different voices competing for his internal attention. So he may be directed to observe each voice in the encounter with his father, preferably played by a therapist of his choosing and trained for the role, usually by giving the father-player certain lines so that they can learn something about the father and the way he addresses his son.Or consider the patient whose illness manifests itself as delusions, often of a megalomaniac character. They may be a messiah, for example, or the rightful heir of a royal line whose identity is being suppressed by governmental forces. The patient might be invited to choose key therapists to play the roles of key members of their circle, [End Page 225] enacting critical scenes like the sermon on the mount or speeches to their oppressed followers. In this way the patient’s “act hunger” may be to some degree satiated and have a calming effect on their anxiety and irritation with the frustrating world around them that refuses to accept their “authentic” identity and belief system.In these ways, psychodrama therapy can take advantage of one of the remarkable advantages of this method for such patients, who are generally recalcitrant to talk therapy alone and for whom medication is at best modestly effective. Still, these disorders are among the most challenging for psychotherapists. Although the process of treating them may open up insights into the nature of the human mind, as Chapy has pursued in this paper, we await the neuroscience that can affect the kind of long-term remission they and their families so desperately wish. [End Page 226]Jonathan D. MorenoUniversity of Pennsylvania [email protected] D. Moreno Jonathan D. Moreno is a philosopher and historian who specializes in the intersection of bioethics, culture, science, and national security, and has published seminal works on the history, sociology and politics of biology and medicine. He is an elected member of the National Academy of Medicine.submitted on January 27, 2023Accepted on January 30, 2023Copyright © 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In this paper we argue that an operational organism concept can help to overcome the structural deficiency of mathematical models in biology. In our opinion, the structural deficiency of mathematical models lies mainly in our inability to identify functionally relevant biological characters in biological systems, and not so much in a lack of adequate mathematical representations of biological processes. We argue that the problem of character identification in biological systems is linked to the question of a properly formulated (...) organism concept. Lastly, we demonstrate how a decomposition of an organism into independent characters in the context of a specific biological process—such as adaptation by means of natural selection—depends on the dynamical properties and invariance conditions of the equations that describe this process. (shrink)

We provide a phenomenological interpretation of the rise of responsibility as a key concept of contemporary ethics. If we consider the philosophical tradition at large, responsibility has emerged as a concern, or even the center of attention, of ethical reflection only in relatively recent times. How can we account for this emergence? We argue that today’s pervasive concern with responsibility envisages a responsibility that is constitutively “social,” and that the thus understood responsibility traces back to a more original trait of (...) sense, which presently informs our relation to the world. This trait we call “responsive.” Hence, our contention is that, when in contemporary ethical discourse we speak of (social) responsibility, the latter has a fundamentally responsive character. The responsive character of the contemporary concept of responsibility is related to the appearance of a new kind of imperative, which we call “systemic.” Originating from the unique imperative of “the system of universal existence,” systemic imperatives have the form of factual urgencies, which, while demanding an urgent and effective response, exclude the scope of what traditional ethics conceives as the perfectibility of beings. Our diagnosis of responsive responsibility in the horizon of the systemic imperative is guided by the phenomenon of “original responsibility”, which we obtain from Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. “Original responsibility” refers to the relation between man’s being and being itself. The form of this relation is that man’s being consists in a (needed) response to being itself. Based on this hermeneutic framework, we show how the kind of threat which informs the systemic imperative (here exemplified by Hans Jonas’s “ecological imperative”) holds in store the expectability of a new “perfection” of beings. (shrink)

In this interview, Anne Fagot-Largeault discusses with Thierry Bardini her recollections of the life and work of French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1924–1989). The discussion covers Simondon’s theory of individuation and considers its influences on contemporary thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze and François Laruelle. Fagot-Largeault situates Simondon’s thinking within the broader context of 20th-century biological research and the development of life sciences. Informed by her personal association and experiences working with Simondon, her reminiscences shed light on the unique character (...) of Simondon as a person and as a thinker. (shrink)

This article demonstrates how Iranian classical music and Persian medieval poetry, taken as separate semiotic systems, form together, in certain contexts, a single hybrid semiotic system with overlapping structural features and shared aesthetic principles. Hjelmslev’s description of connotative semiotic systems serves as a theoretical framework to show the modalities of this hybridization. This phenomenon can be observed through comparative analysis of the interdependence of poetry and music in the Persianate World from a semiotic point of view. On the one hand, (...) the quantitative (chronemic) meter of the Persian classical versification, called ‘aruz, as well as its extraordinarily heavy use of rhyme display a formal structure that evokes that of a musical phrase. On the other hand, the dependence of the structure of the Iranian musical system upon the rhythmic structure of classical poetry suggests a unique character of which few examples exist. This interdependence manifests itself particularly in the mystic (Sufi) poetry of the medieval period, specifically in the work of such renowned poets as Rumi, Sa’di Shirāzi, and Hāfez, who are among the best-known in the West. Examples of their lyric works are examined here to demonstrate occurrences of the collusion between the two semiotic systems. (shrink)

Prior to the advent of evolutionary theory the Natural System was generally conceived as based on "distinctions of kind, not consisting in a given number of definite properties" (J.S. Mill). It was considered final and unique, to be arrived at by more than one approach. Evolutionary theory has shifted emphasis to different characters, yet explicitly or implicitly the belief in a final natural system in biology persists in many textbooks and taints research. Allegedly natural systems are shown to (...) be fundamentally arbitrary and artificial, dependent on numerous value judgments and intrinsically conflicting to varying degrees. Because of this and because it has turned into a bar to clear thinking, the adjective "natural" should be abolished. (shrink)

The Enlightenment commitment to reason naturally gave rise to a belief in the perfectibility of man. Influenced by John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, many eighteenth-century writers argued that the proper education and upbringing—breeding—could make any man a member of the cultural elite. Yet even in this egalitarian environment, the concept of breeding remained tied to theories of blood lineage, caste distinction, and biological difference. Turning to the works of Locke, Rousseau, Swift, Defoe, and other giants of the British Enlightenment, Jenny (...) Davidson revives the debates that raged over the husbandry of human nature and highlights their critical impact on the development of eugenics, the emergence of fears about biological determinism, and the history of the language itself. Combining rich historical research with a keen sense of story, she links explanations for the physical resemblance between parents and children to larger arguments about culture and society and shows how the threads of this compelling conversation reveal the character of a century. A remarkable intellectual history, _Breeding_ not only recasts the fundamental concerns of the Enlightenment but also uncovers the seeds of thought that bloomed into contemporary notions of human perfectibility. (shrink)

There is hardly any feature of Hegel’s philosophy whose current significance is greater, or more neglected, than the unique place given the analysis of thought. Unlike any other thinker before or after, Hegel begins his philosophical system with a logic conceiving categories without regard for their reference to reality or how a given knower might think them. He allows thinking itself to figure as an object of investigation only within the subsequent theory of reality comprising the philosophies of (...) nature and spirit. There Hegel treats thinking as a real activity of living individuals, inhabiting a common world of which they are conscious and able to speak. Consequently, thought becomes something properly analyzable only after not just categories, but nature and such worldly features of mind as consciousness, representation, and language have been determined. As unsurprising as this ordering may appear, it represents a fundamental break from ordinary philosophical practice, a break bearing crucial importance for the nonmetaphysical, antifoundational character of Hegel’s philosophy, as well as signaling the genuine alternative he provides to the dilemmas plaguing so much contemporary thought. (shrink)

Despite an initially warm reception, over the past two centuries assessments of the literary character of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations have gradually but unmistakably turned negative. This transformation in the public reception of Smith’s text began during his lifetime and culminated in Heilbroner’s assertion that Smith wrote with ‘an encyclopedic mind, but not with the precision of an orderly one’. However, where Heilbroner and many of his predecessors saw obscurity and tedious attention to minor detail, recent scholarship (...) has begun to perceive remarkable literary subtlety and nuance. This article continues and builds upon that project. It commences with an assessment of three competing explanations of Smith’s literary style and settles on a philosophic and pedagogic explanation of The Wealth of Nations’ distinctive composition. In discerning a unique heuristic strategy and philosophic object in the text, the article places particular emphasis on Smith’s employment of syntactic complexity, stylistic juxtaposition and elliptical citation. The article concludes, somewhat ironically, with the observation that The Wealth of Nations itself succumbed to the maladies of the emerging commercial world-view, in classroom and market place, that its careful construction aimed to ameliorate. (shrink)

The main goal of Henri Bergson’s philosophy of nature is to offer a dynamic understanding of living phenomena. It is in this context that we main­tain that the author left us a “bio-philosophy,” that is, an interpretation which, by adopting a positive model of biology as a cognitive paradigm, describes the essential character of living activity as time or duration (durée). Bergson’s posi­tive metaphysics, which brings science to the metaphysical field and provides an inner perspective of the vital (...) principle, consolidated itself in the study of evolutionary theories like Darwinism. However, the specificity of the perspective Bergson presents to us lies in the fact that he positions himself as a philosopher and not as a scientist: he does not seek a merely scientific explanation of reality, but an integral vision that allows us to give scientific evolution a metaphysical reading. Thus, when Bergson upholds the insufficiency of pure Darwinism, and proposes a true evolutionism, it is because he thinks that the only way to understand the evolutionary nature of life is by overcoming a strictly mechanistic perspective. For Bergson, such an interpretation results from the artificial way in which our intellectual functions deconstruct reality and lead to an incomplete and fragmented reading of the evolution of organisms. As a philosopher he seeks an explanatory level which, being scientifically based, is not restricted to the physico-chemical limits of reality. For that reason, Bergson claims that the inner cause of evolution is an activity where growth and division occur as a natural result of the divergence of life’s tendencies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ibsen's Drama of Self-Sacrifice William A. Johnsen Michigan State University Henrik Ibsen, like Flaubert, is a fundamental precursor of all subsequent modern literature. His development, which takes place over a lifetime of playwriting, is nevertheless only obscurely recognized in theories ofthe modern. Critics quarrel about his antecedents: Scribe, Feydeau, as well as Norwegian and Scandinavian dramatists and poets. Yet nothing in any of his predecessors could prepare one for (...) the great prose plays of the last twenty-five years of his career. How did he modernize himself? Ibsen said ofhis transition to prose, that he could no longer allow his characters to speak in verse, the language of the gods.1 It is tempting to begin reading Girard in here, because Ibsen offers us a fascinating variation on the historical moment ofcrisis represented by Flaubert, the moment of modernization itself, where the disintegration ofan accepted political and cultural aristocracy forced everyone to compete for prestige and for unique being in a common marketplace. In the case ofNorway during Ibsen's time, it is the crisis caused by the delegitimation ofDano-Norwegian as the uncontested literary language, in favor of competing versions of an emerging national language for a 1 Ibsen's famous comment is in a letter to Edmund Gosse, 15 January, 1874: "Speaking generally, the dialogue must conform to the degree of idealization which pervades the work as a whole. My new drama is no tragedy in the ancient sense. What I sought to depict were human beings, and therefore I would not let them talk the 'language of the Gods'" (Sprinchorn 145). 142William A. Johnsen uniquely national literature that provokes a rivalry for atavistic or nativist preeminence: Who is the most Norwegian ofall? Ibsen and Henry James (as well as Borges) do not choose chauvinist atavism, yet they also avoid becoming mere disciples of the dominant philosophical traditions which have marginalized them. They are more outspoken discussants of the significant historical and cultural developments analyzed in Girard's Deceit, Desire, and the Novel because they are from "new" countries, outsiders to European culture. It is here we must avoid the occupational hazard ofcritical theory: we must not permit a resemblance between a literary and a theoretical text to degenerate into a transcoding of the former into the latter, without ever considering that their resemblance means that each proposes some contribution to a converging theory ofhuman behavior. Critics who merely convert literature into the theories they already know contribute little to literary knowledge, and nothing to theory. Girard has insisted on the quasitheoretical potential of literary texts from the beginning. Only by staying as close to Ibsen as possible, can we ever hope to add to the considerable work that Girard's hypothesis has already achieved. If there is a general principal at stake in not prematurely transcoding the language of Ibsen's plays into theoretical language (not being prematurely theoretical for the sake of a more inclusive theory), there is also the specific risk of burying the peculiar diversity of his dramatic accomplishment. Ibsen is above all the playwright of complex characterization —no one before him was as subtle in motivating the ordinary characters ofeveryday life. Yet during his time, his plays were awaited for the intense discussions of ideas that they were certain to provoke. How is it that Ibsen is not considered the most theoretical and didactic of writers? Partly, the sheer number of controversial ideas and positions dramatized in play after play kept him from being seen (for very long) as the propagator ofany one ofthem. Michael Meyer reproduces in his biography ofIbsen a contemporary Norwegian political cartoon, which depicts Ibsen flailing first right, then left, then all (Meyer 447). More importantly, Ibsen, beginning with Samfundets Stotter (1877) [Pillars ofSociety], created a drama of ensemble theorizing conducted by characters themselves. Ibsen's work, beyond the creation ofcharacter, was to imagine the conditions and events that might make it possible for ordinary individuals to contribute discoveries about human behavior which, collectively, allow amplification and consolidation as a hypothesis. Ibsen 's Drama ofSelf-Sacrifice143 The mimetic hypothesis first found itself explaining the spectacular results of negative reciprocity in modern resentment, the unperceived commonality ofan isolation... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hunters, Cooks, and Nooks:Two Interpretations of the Tangled Relationship Between Philosophy and ScienceStefano Franchi (bio)Knowledge is the measure of all things.—Plato, Prot. 361b1Preliminaries: Double QuestioningWhen philosophers ask questions about science, they usually do so in the context of one specific discipline whose latest results or whose historical development seem to pose genuinely philosophical problems: for instance, the nature of space/time, the nature of intelligence, the nature/nurture debate. It is (...) rarer to hear a philosopher asking questions about the general relationship between philosophy and science, even when, as in the cases above, the answer to this question provides the necessary ground for any specific investigation of the allegedly genuine philosophical problems arising in physics, biology, or cognitive science.The main difficulty lies in the intrinsic ambiguity of the term "science." On the one hand, "science" can be considered as a descriptive term: it is the genus of the empirically given, scientific disciplines (the "sciences," in the plural). On the other hand, "science" (episteme, scientia, Wissenschaft) (always in the singular) is a theoretical term that denotes a form of knowledge. More precisely, it refers, as philosophers say, to a "conceptually unified body of objective knowledge." Traditionally, the latter meaning includes philosophy itself within its denotation. Thus, when both meanings of the term "science" are considered, to interrogate the relationship between philosophy and science is always, and preliminarily, to question the nature of philosophy itself, even when the question as such is not explicitly raised. In all these cases, a characterization of the nature of philosophy is presupposed by a philosophical analysis of scientific results.However, unless the specificity of concrete scientific investigations is denied from the outset, the questioning, even when conducted from a circumscribed philosophical standpoint, cannot be reduced to a single gesture that interrogates the scientificity of philosophy. On the contrary, it must also concurrently question the possibility of a specific relation between a determinate philosophical endeavor and specific scientific pursuits. Any questioning of the relationship between philosophy and science will always imply a double gesture: on the one hand, a question about what makes or does not make philosophy a science; on the other, what brings philosophy closer, or moves [End Page 98] it farther apart, from the sciences. Most often, philosophers focus their attention on just one aspect of this double question. In this paper, I would like to address both sides of the issue. In particular, I would like to examine the two very different answers to this general problem given by Plato and by Michel Foucault. Although their answers address fundamentally the same issue, they are so diametrically opposed, as I will show, that they may be considered as the external boundaries of a very broad range of possible responses.2SignpostsLet me begin with Plato. In a well-known passage from the Euthydemus, the main characters are discussing which kind of knowledge is required by wisdom. In this context, to the delighted although belated surprise of Crito, the young Cleinias introduces a crucial distinction between hunters and cooks: the former know how to find the prey, but only the latter know how to use it:No art of actual hunting, [Cleinias] said, extends any further than pursuing and capturing; whenever the hunters catch what they are pursuing they are incapable of using it, but they and the fishermen hand over their prey to the cooks. And again, geometers and astronomers and calculators (who are hunters too, in a way, for none of these make their diagrams; they simply discover those which already exist), since they themselves have no idea of how to use their prey but only how to hunt it, hand over the task of using their discoveries to the dialecticians—at least, those of them who are not completely useless [anoetoi].[290b–c]1Cleinias's account acknowledges the reality and value of the knowledge gained by the sciences, but denies that scientists have full awareness of what they are doing and of the implications of their own work. Scientific knowledge lacks both self-reflexivity and transparency: it does not have the ability to bring to full evidence the principles it rests upon... (shrink)