A wide range of more objectivist norms appear to leave uncharted an important part of normative space. In the beginning of this paper I briefly outline two broad ways of seeking more subject-directed norms: perspectivism and feasibilism. According to feasibilism, the ultimate reason why more objectivist norms are inadequate on their own is not that they fail to take into account the limits of an agent’s perspective, but that they are not sensitive to limits on what ways of choosing, acting, (...) and believing are feasible in a given situation. I think of these ways of choosing, acting, and believing in terms of an agent's dispositions. In this paper I focus on a knowledge-first implementation of feasibilism, a view in epistemology that supplements a knowledge norm with a norm urging one to manifest dispositions that are among the most knowledge-conducive feasible ones. A view with different norms that sometimes cannot be jointly satisfied raises questions about the status of these norms. By drawing on two general hypotheses about the relationship between succeeding (e.g. knowing) and manifesting dispositions conducive to success, I argue for a view on which the prescriptive and the hypological come radically apart. The result is that an epistemic analogue of a thesis that many have assumed to hold in the moral realm should be rejected. This thesis is Only Blameworthy for Wrongs: we can only ever be blameworthy for acts that are morally wrong. I argue that on the picture presented, we can be epistemically blameworthy for doxastic states that do not violate any prescriptive epistemic norms. I then generalise the considerations to the moral realm, arguing against Only Blameworthy for Wrongs. (shrink)

When new drugs are approved by the Food and Drug Administration, the default assumption is that they will be available by prescription only, safe for use exclusively under clinical supervision. The paternalism underlying this default must be interrogated in order to ensure appropriate respect for patient autonomy. Upon closer inspection, prescription requirements are justified when nonprescription status would risk harm to third parties and when a large segment of the population would struggle to exercise their autonomy in using a drug (...) safely and effectively on their own. Although these justifications can support prescription status for many drugs, we propose that reversing the FDA's current default to instead begin with a presumption in favor of over‐the‐counter status is the best way to avoid interference with valid claims of patient autonomy. Under this approach, a range of drug products could be considered for an OTC switch, including oral contraceptives, statins, and HIV‐prevention drugs. (shrink)

The Mīmā ṃ sā school of Indian philosophy elaborated complex ways of interpreting the prescriptive portions of the Vedic sacred texts. The present article is the result of the collaboration of a group of scholars of logic, computer science, European philosophy and Indian philosophy and aims at the individuation and analysis of the deontic system which is applied but never explicitly discussed in Mīmā ṃ sā texts. The article outlines the basic distinction between three sorts of principles —hermeneutic, linguistic and (...) deontic. It proposes a mathematical formalization of the deontic principles and uses it to discuss a well-known example of seemingly conflicting statements, namely the prescription to undertake the malefic Śyena sacrifice and the prohibition to perform any harm. (shrink)

Following an introductory classification of prescriptive language that emphasizes the parallel between imperatives and moral language, this chapter distinguishes between the indicative and imperative moods of language. It then dismisses various attempts to account for imperatives, particularly their reduction to indicatives as well as expressivist theories like Ayer's and Stevenson's.

Bioethical Prescriptions collects F.M. Kamm's articles on bioethics -- revised for publication in book form -- which have appeared over the last 25 years and which have made her among the most widely-respected philosophers working in this field.

Many pharmaceuticals are available to patients only with a physician’s prescription. Although it is often not recognized as such, this is a classic example of paternalism in public policy. Pharmaceuticals are often perceived as carrying dangerous side effects. Access is restricted to protect patients from their own bad decisions. This chapter explores the moral justification for such paternalism and finds it wanting. It raises the question of whether there is adequate justification for this restriction. Consistency requires that pharmaceuticals posing dangers (...) primarily to the individual be available to competent consumers and that even moderate risks to third parties be tolerated. The chapter begins by arguing that all drug usage involves evaluative judgments about the relative benefits and harms of the agents and that physicians must make value judgments in deciding whether to prescribe. (shrink)

In this Response to Professor Peters, Professor Greenawalt argues that prescriptive equality does have meaningful normative force. Prescriptive equality plays a reinforcing role when it agrees with nonegalitarian justice and is not incoherent when it pulls against nonegalitarian justice. Specifically, when one individual has been treated better than is required by nonegalitarian justice, a similarly situated and significantly related individual who is aware of that treatment may merit equivalent treatment because of widespread and deep-seated feelings about equality.

Background Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global threat to human and livestock health. Although AMR is driven by use of antimicrobials, it is often attributed to “misuse” and “overuse”, particularly for antibiotics. To curb resistance, there has been a global call to embrace new forms of moral personhood that practice “proper” use, including prescription, dispensing and consumption of antimicrobials, especially antibiotics. This paper seeks to reflect on complex questions about how morality has become embedded /embodied in the AMR discourse as (...) presented in the data collected on antimicrobial prescription, dispensing and use in human and livestock health in Tanzania, primarily focusing on antibiotics. Methods This reflection is anchored on Jarrett Zigon’s morality framework that is comprised of three dimensions of discourse; the institutional, public, and embodied dispositions. The data we use within this framework are derived from a qualitative study targeting human and animal health care service providers and community members in northern Tanzania. Data were collected through 28 in-depth interviews and ten focus group discussions and analysed through content analysis after translation and transcription. In addition, a review of the Tanzania’s National Action Plans on antimicrobial resistance was conducted. Results Application of the framework demonstrates points of convergence and divergence in the institutional morality discourse articulated by the Tanzania National Action Plans, the public discourse and the embodied dispositions/ lived experiences of human and animal health care service providers and community members. We demonstrate that AMR is not just associated with “inappropriate” behaviour on the part of drug prescribers, dispensers, and users but also with shortcomings in health systems and service delivery. Conclusion Antibiotic dispensing and use practices that may be associated with the development of AMR should not be viewed in isolation from the broader health context within which they occur. (shrink)

R. M. Hare has brought together in this volume the best of his uncollected essays in moral philosophy, several of them previously unpublished or revised for this collection. They span the whole range of his ethical interests, from the most abstract to the most down-to-earth. The volume provides a compelling demonstration of Hare's commitment to bringing together the theoretical and the practical in ethics.

The paper is devoted to the problem of formal representation of prescriptive obligation, i.e., the obligation concerning the way in which an action is to be performed. Improper representation of prescriptive obligation leads to Forrester's Paradox. In the paper I first present a new version of Forrester's Paradox that generalizes the observation on which the original version is based. Then I challenge the two existing solutions to the paradox. I reject the solution of H.-N. Castañeda and analyze problems to which (...) the solution of W. Sinnott-Armstrong leads. I conclude the paper with a proposal for how to improve Sinnott-Armstrong's solution. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that descriptive statements can be action-Guiding; that oughts and imperatives, If they are to be justified at all, Must be derived from statements of fact; that factual-Prudential moral reasoning is logically universalizable; and that the demand for universalizability, And thus ultimately for moral reasoning, Is itself only prudentially justifiable. These points are argued by way of an examination and criticism of hare's discussion of prescription and universalizability in moral reasoning.

Research on ethical norms has grown in recent years, but imprecise language has made it unclear when these norms prescribe “what ought to be” and when they merely describe behaviors or perceptions (“what is”). Studies of ethical norms, moreover, tend not to investigate whether participants were influenced by the prescriptive aspect of the norm; the studies primarily demonstrate, rather, that people will mimic the behaviors or perceptions of others, which provides evidence for the already well-substantiated social proof theory. In this (...) review article, we delineate three streams of norms research in business ethics: behavioral, perceptual, and prescriptive. We argue that by properly categorizing norms, and designing studies to investigate when prescriptions, more than mere mimicry, improve ethical outcomes in organizations, researchers can enhance managers’ efforts to promote ethical outcomes in organizations. (shrink)

Ethicism is the most comprehensively defended answer to the question regarding whether ethical properties determine aesthetic properties in artworks. According to ethicism, aesthetically relevant ethical flaws in artworks count as aesthetic flaws and aesthetically relevant ethical merits count as aesthetic merits. In this paper, I argue that ethicism’s most significant argument, the Merited Response Argument suffers from an ambiguity that makes it either unsound or uninteresting. Specifically, the notion of an artwork’s ‘prescribing’ a response, central to MRA, is ambiguous between (...) merely attempting to elicit a response from appreciators as appropriate to a work, and endorsing a response as appropriate to relevant parts of the actual world. While the first sense of ‘prescribe’ does the aesthetic work, the second does the ethical. (shrink)

Since the very emergence of the syncretic, sentient human species, it has been handicapped by numerous incipient, continuing and new limitations. Thus, we have not yet quite escaped the overwhelming tyranny of biological evolution with its constraining strait jacket of natural selection. At this threshold of knowledge and awareness, the mantle falls on the Homo sapiens of planet Earth to at least dream of, and formulate prescriptions for Utopias without the inane internecine conflicts, and physical as well as spiritual (...) carnages which continue unabated from the dawn of history to date, and which could now well aggravate towards inexorable total extinction. Channelisation of accumulated, collective wisdom, scienctific insights and technological skills towards universal humanistic rationality, emanicpation, and empowerment must be the primary edict of humankind. An equation incorporating Life, the human species, and various variables affecting these, is presented as a prescription for continuance and flowering of Life in the Universe. (shrink)

Nurses in all practice roles and settings need to understand the therapeutic use and potential for abuse of prescription drugs. Nursing roles, which include the administration and prescription of medication, health teaching and the implications of application, and the detection of drug-related problems, require that such education be timely and comprehensive. This paper discusses the state of knowledge dissemination about prescription drugs within the general context of nursing education. It highlights educational needs and explores the attitudinal factors and knowledge deficits (...) that influence the nursing practices of prescribing, pain management, nursing assessment, and care of persons with drug problems.Standard educational requirements in all nursing curricula undergird teaching about licit and illicit drugs and medication, as well as their therapeutic use, misuse, and abuse. It has been recognized widely since the early 1980s, however, that clinical experiences and didactic content on licit and illicit drugs presented in nursing programs is inadequate. (shrink)

There seems a potential tension between Hume's naturalistic project and his normative ambitions. Hume adopts what I call a methodological naturalism: that is, the methodology of providing explanations for various phenomena based on natural properties and causes. This methodology takes the form of introducing ‘the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’, as stated in the subtitle of the Treatise; this ‘experimental method’ seems a paradigmatically descriptive one, and it remains unclear how Hume derives genuinely normative prescriptions from this (...) methodology. In resolving this problem, I will argue that Hume's naturalistic methodology – that is, his ‘experimental philosophy’, or what has come to be known as his experimental method – consists of the systematization of phenomena pertaining to human nature. In applying his experimental method to normative subjects, Hume systematizes our normative judgements, deriving general principles of normative justification; he then reflexivel... (shrink)

Examines the ethics of euthanasia, and discusses capital punishment, organ donation, and the Hippocratic oath.

This paper seeks to uncover and rationally reconstruct four theoretical prescriptions that H. L. A. Hart urged philosophers to observe and follow when investigating and theorizing about the nature of law. The four prescriptions may appear meager and insignificant when each is seen in isolation, but together as an inter-connected set they have substantial implications. In effect, they constitute a central part of Hart's campaign to put philosophical investigations about the nature of law onto a path to a (...) genuine research program. The paper takes note of certain prevalent and robust trends in contemporary legal philosophy that detract its practitioners from the four prescriptions, and that have them revert to the some older modes of thinking from which Hart sought a decisive break. A number of contemporary legal philosophers' views and commitments are taken up and assessed, and in particular those of John Gardner and Leslie Green. ‘Yet the answer is a prosaic one: don’t ask what time is but how the word ‘time’ is being used’.Friedrich Waismann.I miss the future.Jaron Lanier. (shrink)

Exactly how do the sign/symbol/token systems of endo- and exo-biosemiosis differ from those of cognitive semiosis? Do the biological messages that integrate metabolism have conceptual meaning? Semantic information has two subsets: Descriptive and Prescriptive. Prescriptive information instructs or directly produces nontrivial function. In cognitive semiosis, prescriptive information requires anticipation and “choice with intent” at bona fide decision nodes. Prescriptive information either tells us what choices to make, or it is a recordation of wise choices already made. Symbol systems allow recordation (...) of deliberate choices and the transmission of linear digital prescriptive information. Formal symbol selection can be instantiated into physicality using physical symbol vehicles (tokens). Material symbol systems (MSS) formally assign representational meaning to physical objects. Even verbal semiosis instantiates meaning into physical sound waves using an MSS. Formal function can also be incorporated into physicality through the use of dynamically-inert (dynamically-incoherent or -decoupled) configurable switch-settings in conceptual circuits. This paper examines the degree to which biosemiosis conforms to the essential formal criteria of prescriptive semiosis and cybernetic management. (shrink)

The author re-examines Hare's multiple ways of connecting his metaethical with his normative doctrine, which is in formal sense determined as "Kantian utilitarianism", and in substantive sense as "preference-utilitarianism". Critical references to both dimensions of utilitarian doctrine aim at indication on scopes and limits of Hare's ambitious redefinition of the doctrine. Further on he discusses about so-called "necessary ingredient" of moral reasoning under the name of "sympathetic imagination", which Hare grasps in his developed theory not only as a normative demand (...) but also as a logical thesis. Finally, he considers kinds of preferences that can or cannot be recognized as morally relevant. Autor preispituje Herove visestruke pokusaje povezivanja metaetickog i normativno-etickog ucenja, koje je u formalnom smislu odredjeno kao "kantijanski utilitarizam", a u supstantivnom kao "utilitarizam preferencija". Kriticki osvrti na obe dimenzije utilitaristicke doktrine ciljaju na to da ukazu na domete i granice Herove ambiciozne redefinicije ove teorije. Potom se raspravlja o tzv. "nuznom sastojku" moralnog rasudjivanja pod imenom "simpateticka imaginacija", koju Her u svojoj razvijenoj teoriji poima ne samo kao normativni zahtev vec i kao izvesnu logicku tezu. I najzad, razmatraju se vrste preferencija koje, uz pomoc odredjenog niza kriterijuma, mogu ili ne mogu biti priznate kao moralno relevantne. (shrink)

_Aristotle on Prescription_ explores Aristotle’s deep reflections on rule-making as a process that is both distinct from that of particular deliberation and decision-making and fundamental to it, operating at the level both of the individual and of society as a whole.

Tom Campbell is well known for his distinctive contributions to legal and political philosophy over three decades. In emphasising the moral and political importance of taking a positivist approach to law and rights, he has challenged current academic orthodoxies and made a powerful case for regaining and retaining democratic control over the content and development of human rights. This collection of his essays reaches back to his pioneering work on socialist rights in the 1980s and forward from his seminal book, (...) The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (1996). An introductory essay provides an historical overview of Professor Campbell's work and argues for the continuing importance of 'democratic positivism' at a time when it is again becoming clear that courts are ineffective protectors of human rights. (shrink)

Izard (2010) did not seek a descriptive definition of emotion—one that describes the concept as it is used by ordinary folk. Instead, he surveyed scientists’ prescriptive definitions—ones that prescribe how the concept should be used in theories of emotion. That survey showed a lack of agreement today and thus raised doubts about emotion as a useful scientific concept.

Heroin prescription involves the medical provision of heroin in the treatment of heroin addiction. Rudimentary clinical trials on that treatment modality have been carried out and others are currently underway or in development. However, it is questionable whether subjects considered for such trials are mentally competent to consent to them. The problem has not been sufficiently appreciated in ethical and clinical discussions of the topic. The challenges involved throw new light on the role of value and accountability in contemporary discussions (...) of mental competence. (shrink)

Global Prescriptions scrutinizes the movement to export a U.S.-oriented version of the " rule of law," found in the activities of philanthropic foundations, the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and several other developmental organizations. Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth have brought together a group of scholars from a variety of disciplines--anthropology, economics, history, law, political science, and sociology--to create tools for understanding this movement. Comprised of two sections, the volume first develops theoretical perspectives key to (...) an understanding of the production and impact of new "global legal prescriptions." The second part shifts attention to the national importation of these legal orthodoxies. The scholars provide a diverse set of sophisticated approaches, both to the circumstances promoting the production of these prescriptions and to the limitations of the prescriptions in the different national settings. Thus, Global Prescriptions provides a unique treatment for readers interested in globalization generally or the potential spread of the "rule of law" in particular. This volume will intrigue scholars and students interested in a political science, economics, history, anthropology, law, and sociology. Contributors are Jeremy Adelman, Robert Boyer, Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Miguel Angel Centeno, Heinz Klug, Larissa Adler Lomnitz, John W. Meyer, Setsuo Miyazawa, Hiroshi Otsuka, Rodrigo Salazar, Kathryn Sikkink, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Catalina Smulovitz. Yves Dezalay is Director of Research, National Center for Scientific Research, Paris. Bryant G. Garth is Director of the American Bar Foundation. (shrink)

People’s beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people’s representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people’s notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people’s representations of what is (...) normal were found to be influenced both by what they believed to be descriptively average and by what they believed to be prescriptively ideal. This is shown across three domains: people’s use of the word ‘‘normal” (Study 1), their use of gradable adjectives (Study 2), and their judgments of concept prototypicality (Study 3). A final study investigated the learning of normality for a novel category, showing that people actively combine statistical and prescriptive information they have learned into an undifferentiated notion of what is normal (Study 4). Taken together, these findings may help to explain how moral norms impact the acquisition of normality and, conversely, how normality impacts the acquisition of moral norms. (shrink)

New technologies regularly bring about profound changes in our daily lives. Romantic relationships are no exception to these transformations. Some philosophers expect the emergence in the near future of love drugs: a theoretically achievable biotechnological intervention that could be designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships. We investigated laypeople’s resistance to the use of such technologies and its sources. Across two studies (Study 1, French and Peruvian university students, N after exclusion = 186; Study 2, Amazon Mechanical Turk (...) sample, N after exclusion = 693, pre-registered), we found that the use of love drugs designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships are considered as more morally problematic than psychological therapy with the same aim. In Study 2, we show that this last effect is partially due to the fact that the love resulting from the use of love drugs is perceived as less authentic, intense, and durable. We discuss the specific role of authenticity in the relative moral disapproval of love drugs. (shrink)

In my book God’s Call1 I gave an historical account of the debate within twentieth century analytic philosophy between moral realism and expressivism. Moral realism is the view that moral properties like goodness or cruelty exist independently of our making judgements that things have such properties. Such judgements are, on this theory, objectively true when the things referred to have the specified properties and objectively false when they do not. Expressivism is the view that when a person makes a moral (...) judgment, she is expressing emotion or desire or will. I used the term ‘orectic’ to refer to these mental states, because we do not have in English a sufficiently general term. In God’s Call, I started with a moral realist whom I called a ‘platonist’, G. E. Moore, and then I traced the argument through the emotivists, A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson, and the prescriptivist, R. M. Hare, and Iris Murdoch, whom I called a ‘humble platonist’, and J. L. Mackie’s ‘error theory’, and John McDowell, whose theory I call ‘disposition theory’, and David Brink, the ‘new-wave realist’, and Allan Gibbard, who calls his own theory ‘ norm expressivism ’. My project was to collect together the concessions that the two sides of the debate have made to each other over the course of this history, and then to construct a position which molds these concessions into a single coherent theory. I called this theory ‘prescriptive realism’. (shrink)

The prospects of enhancing cognitive or motor functions using neuroscience in otherwise healthy individuals has attracted considerable attention and interest in neuroethics (Farah et al., Nature Reviews Neuroscience 5:421–425, 2004; Glannon Journal of Medical Ethics 32:74–78, 2006). The use of stimulants is one of the areas which has propelled the discussion on the potential for neuroscience to yield cognition-enhancing products. However, we have found in our review of the literature that the paradigms used to discuss the non-medical use of stimulant (...) drugs prescribed for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) vary considerably. In this brief communication, we identify three common paradigms—prescription drug abuse, cognitive enhancement, and lifestyle use of pharmaceuticals—and briefly highlight how divergences between paradigms create important “ethics blind spots”. (shrink)

Pharmaceutical companies have long relied on direct marketing of their drugs to physicians through one-on-one meetings with sales representatives. This practice of “detailing” is substantial in its costs and its number of participants. Every year, pharmaceutical companies spend billions of dollars on millions of visits to physicians by tens of thousands of sales representatives.Critics have argued that drug detailing results in sub-optimal prescribing decisions by physicians, compromising patient health and driving up spending on medical care. In this view, physicians often (...) are unduly influenced both by marketing presentations that do not accurately reflect evidence from the medical literature and by the gifts that sales representatives deliver in conjunction with their presentations. (shrink)

In light of recent social psychological literature, I expand Miranda Fricker’s important notion of testimonial injustice. A fair portion of Fricker’s account rests on an older paradigm of stereotype and prejudice. Given recent empirical work, I argue for what I dub prescriptive credibility deficits in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners, thereby flouting prescriptive stereotypes. The notion of a prescriptive credibility deficit is not merely an (...) interesting conceptual addendum that can be appended to Fricker’s theory without need for further emendation. I develop the wider implications of prescriptive credibility deficits and argue that they pose a challenge to Fricker’s conception of the function of credibility assignments in conversational exchange and how a virtuous listener should respond to the potential threat of a prejudicial stereotype affecting her credibility assignments. (shrink)

Neuroscience and psychiatry -- Psychotherapy and psychiatry -- Diagnosis in psychiatry -- The boundaries of mental disorders -- Mood and mental illness -- Psychiatry's problem children -- Evidence-based psychiatry -- Psychiatric drugs: miracles and limitations -- Talk therapies: the need for a unified method -- Psychiatry in practice -- Training psychiatrists -- Psychiatry and society -- The future of psychiatry.

While the theory of relative plausibility is presented by Allen and Pardo as a descriptive theory of the proof process, this commentary discusses their theory as a possible starting point for a prescriptive theory of evidence assessment. Generally, naturalness and simplicity are necessary for the success of such a theory. The theory of relative plausibility is very promising in this respect, as its key concept is the straightforward and intuitive notion of explanation, according to which an explanation is an answer (...) to a “why” question. Still, both the explanatory and the comparative dimensions of relative plausibility are in need of elaboration if one wants to give advice on evidence assessment in terms of Allen and Pardo’s framework. For one thing, it is necessary to examine the epistemological status of the various explanatory criteria regarding their potential as guides to truth or likelihood. Only epistemic criteria should be included in recommendations to fact-finders. Moreover, given the author’s interpretation of the ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ standard, it is unclear what the comparative dimension amounts to in criminal trials. At least a comparison of the kind involved in the author's account of civil trials standards is absent in their interpretation of BARD. If the comparative dimension of relative plausibility is relevant at all in criminal trials, it must be clarified what is to be compared. (shrink)

Properly universal prescriptions (necessary in analysis of value-judgments) entail past-tense imperatives. does the unusability of the latter rule out the former? no, because there are many usable rules which entail past-tense imperatives. else we could not point to past breaches when teaching the rule, which remains the same throughout the teaching process, or punish for past breaches of the same rule which is still in force. similar problem about imperatives in other than the second person succumbs to kenny's distinction (...) between directives and fiats and that between different senses of 'the person commanded'. (shrink)

Prescription opioid policies too often reflect over a century's worth of moralizing about the nature of opioid use disorder, the value of pain, and the meaning of suffering. The social and legal penalties to prescribers run in one direction—avoid overprescribing, however defined, at all costs. The lack of shared definitions is problematic for formulating and evaluating opioid policy. For example, the variant definitions of “misuse,” “abuse,” and “addiction” complicate estimates of morbidity. There are also no widely accepted definitions of misprescribing (...) and overprescribing. I offer here a modest attempt at the categorization of misprescribing: inadvertent overprescribing, corrupt overprescribing, qualitative overprescribing, quantitative overprescribing, multiclass overprescribing, and underprescribing. (shrink)