This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Liberalism and Communitarianism: An Abstract Debate Multiculturalism/Identity Politics: Non‐Neutrality and Structural Injustice Liberal Individuals and Their Identities Liberal Rules and Structural Injustices: Rules‐and‐Exemptions Liberal Toleration and Structural Injustice: Equality as Recognition Structural Injustice and Jurisdictional Authority Conclusion Notes.

There are at least three reasons why present circumstances favor a renewal of dialogue on Hegel’s political philosophy. First, it seems increasingly clear that the collapse of the “big left” over the past two decades has produced a crisis of imagination in political theory and practice. Debate in North America particularly has polarized—on one side the splintering and perhaps ultimately cynical forces of postmodernism, on the other, the triumphal indifference of corporate capitalism. Since most thoughtful people reject both alternatives, (...) the post-Cold War years, their promise and opportunity notwithstanding, have been marked by an ethos of political disenfranchisement and the growing desire for other options. Secondly, the recent attacks on American targets and the subsequent mobilization of military/propagandist might in the war on terrorism have made evident the necessity of rethinking geopolitical paradigms. In the past year especially, the consequences of the West’s essentially colonial foreign policy in the Middle East, Africa, the Pacific Rim and elsewhere have become frighteningly evident. Instead of surveying unsatisfying but comparatively harmless theoretical options we have seen concrete political activity around the globe becoming reduced to the dilemma of terror or armed intervention. This reduction, in turn, has exposed mere languishing in desire for other options as a species of moral cowardice. The situation now demands a positive counterproposal. Finally, and almost paradoxically, recognition of the fact that Western institutions stand under threat, that besieged by forces within and without they could fail, has produced across the political spectrum a new determination to defend them. As if danger itself were a reminder that the structures we have been descrying from the left or the right as politically compromised are nevertheless essential to the accommodation of human freedom. I can think of no time since the end of the Second World War more ripe for reflective engagement of the possibility of an autonomy won through and vouchsafed in an authentically rational state and its institutions. (shrink)

The ‘liberal-communitarian’ debate arose within anglophone political philosophy during the 1980s. This essay opens with an account of the main outlines of the debate, showing how liberals and communitarians tended to confront each other with opposing interpretations of John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1999; originally published in 1971) and Political Liberalism (2005; originally published in 1993). The essay then proceeds to discuss four forms of ‘liberalism after communitarianism’: Michael Freeden’s account of liberalism as an (...) ideology; Joseph Raz and Will Kymlicka’s perfectionist liberalisms; the liberalism of value pluralists such as Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams; and Judith N. Shklar’s liberalism of fear. It concludes with the suggestion that there are times when liberals of every kind should set aside their ideology, even if only temporarily, in order to listen to their interlocutors with truly open minds. (shrink)

The problem of the nation is articulated as the philosophical problem of the relation between the political and the non-political in the context of modernity. When the political relevance of traditional non-political bonds is removed, a new cohesion needs to be found between free and equal individuals. Three solutions are possible. The liberal-universalistic solution claims that there is no other source of unity than the political process itself; it finds the ingredients of political loyalty in the common rational agreement upon (...) principles of democracy. The nationalistic solution is an attempt to find those ingredients in particularistic allegiances of a non-political, ethnic-cultural nature. Both solutions, present in the old French-German debate on the nation, as well as in recent debates between liberalism and communitarianism, are criticized. Their revival in recent times is explained by the fact that they both represent an erosion of the political sphere that is characteristic for a post-ideological society. The first neglects the specific determinateness of the political, reducing it to the internationality of the market or to the moralism of rights. The second neglects the political nature of democratic legitimation by founding it on the claim to embody a particular culture or „Volk”. — In a discussion with Sandel, it is agreed that the political dimension needs a determinate form of collective identity and a non-contractual form of foundation. This form should not be situated however in the imaginary givenness of an ethnic-cultural context, but in the common undertaking of the moral task of institutionalizing ideals of liberty. These ideals are not an abstract set of principles, but are necessarily mediated by a particular common heritage or a political culture. Finally it is shown that such interpretation of nation or national citizenship is parallel to recent philosophical endorsement of ideals of civic republicanism or constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

Leader and Garzón Valdés are correct to link toleration to democracy rather than liberalism. However, it is the democratic character of society and the process of democratic decision‐making that give rise to a genuine practice of tolerance, not an abstract and regulative ideal of democracy, such as they appeal to. Whereas the latter approach collapses into the standard liberal accounts of toleration both rightly find wanting, the former fits with a republican notion of deliberative democracy. This perspective corresponds (...) to the circumstances of toleration and promotes tolerance as a virtue that is intrinsic both to the nature of democratic debate and to the securing of uncoerced agreement amongst people possessing different beliefs and values. As such, it proves more compatible with pluralism, and hence with toleration, than liberalism. (shrink)

Was liberalism really an outdated ideology in post-1945 European political systems, as claimed by some scholars? The great success of socialism on one side and various forms of Christian Democracy on the other could make that claim appear reasonable. In fact a closer view shows how postwar constitutions in some countries (Italy, France and Germany) presented once again fundamental liberal values, reformulated in different words. One of the roots of that difference is the gap between the Anglo-Saxon approach to (...) liberalism, which takes into account history and communities, and the continental tradition of liberalism, linked to an abstract philosophical approach and highly dependent on long-standing struggles between Churches and the body politic. (shrink)

Universalism vs. Communitarianism focuses on the question, raised by recent work in normative philosophy, of whether ethical norms are best derived and justified on the basis of universal or communitarian standards. It is unique in representing both Continental and American points of view and both the older and a younger generation of scholars. The essays introduce the key issues involved in universalism vs. communitarianism and take up ethics in historical perspective, practical reason and ethical responsibility, justification, application and (...) history, and communitarian alternatives. Based on a special issue of the Journal Philosophy and Social Criticism, the book includes two additional essays by Chantal Mouffe and by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. David Rasmussen is Professor of Philosophy at Boston College and editor of Philosophy and Social Criticism. Contents: introduction, David, Rasmussen. Universalisms: Procedural, Contextualist, and Prudential, Alessandro Ferrara. Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism: Toward a Critical Theory of Social Justice, Gerald Doppelt. The Liberal/Communitarian Controversy and Communicative Ethics, Kenneth Baynes. Discourse Ethics and Civil Society, Jean Cohen. Equality, Political Order and Ethics: Hobbes and the Systematics of Democratic Rationality, Rolf Zimmermann. Atomism and Ethical Life: On Hegel's Critique of the French Revolution, Axel Honneth. The Gadamer-Habermas Debate Revisited: The Question of Ethics, Michael Kelly. What Is and What Is Not Practical Reason? Agnes Heller. Adorno, Heidegger, and Postmodernity, Hauke Brunkhorst. Impartial Application of Moral and Legal Norms: A Contribution to Discourse Ethics, Klaus Günther. An Ethics, Politics, and History, Jürgen Habermas in an interview conducted by Jean-Marc Ferry. Rawls: Political Philosophy without Politics, Chantal Mouffe. What Is Morality: A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical Expertise, Hubert L Dreyfus, Stuart E. Dreyfus. Universalism and Communitarianism: A Bibliography, Michael Zilles. (shrink)

It is a commonplace amongst communitarians, socialists and feminists alike that liberalism is to be rejected for its excessive ‘individualism’ or ‘atomism,’ for ignoring the manifest ways in which we are ‘embedded’ or ‘situated’ in various social roles and communal relationships. The effect of these theoretical flaws is that liberalism, in a misguided attempt to protect and promote the dignity and autonomy of the individual, has undermined the associations and communities which alone can nurture human flourishing.My plan is (...) to examine the resources available to liberalism to meet these objections. My primary concern is with what liberals can say in response, not with what particular liberals actually have said in the past. Still, as a way of acknowledging intellectual debts, if nothing else, I hope to show how my arguments are related to the political morality of modem liberals from J.S. Mill through to Rawls and Dworkin. The term ‘liberal’ has been applied to many different theories in many different fields, but I’m using it in this fairly restricted sense. First, I’m dealing with a political morality, a set of moral arguments about the justification of political action and political institutions. Second, my concern is with this modem liberalism, not seventeenth-century liberalism, and I want to leave entirely open what the relationship is between the two. It might be that the developments initiated by the ‘new liberals’ are really an abandonment of what was definitive of classical liberalism. G.A. Cohen, for example, says that since they rejected the principle of ‘self-ownership’ which was definitive of classical liberalism, these new liberals should instead be called ‘social democrats.’My concern is to defend their political morality, whatever the proper label. (shrink)

Over the past decade or so the term ‘communitarianism’ has been applied to a wide range of positions with great variation between them. This is not in itself an objection to its continued use, for a concept may be coherent and illuminating even though it shelters considerable diversity. What is troubling about the body of literature now labelled as communitarian is that it frequently appeals to images of community without giving the notion the analytical attention it deserves and that (...) we have come to expect in relation to other central political concepts such as ‘liberty’ and ‘justice.’ What I propose to do in this paper is to focus on a particular understanding of community which I think has been neglected in recent discussions, largely because it has not been sufficiently distinguished from others, and then to raise a question in the light of it which has been at the forefront of the debate: viz., can liberalism in its currently dominant form truly respect the value and importance of community? Several writers have responded to the critiques of liberalism develoged in the work of those such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair Macintyre by arguing that the basic framework of liberal thought is fully compatible with a due appreciation of community. Joel Feinberg, for example, attempts to show that ‘one can preserve one’s allegiance to personal autonomy in the way that liberalism requires while fully acknowledging the central and indispensable importance of community in human lives.’ I shall register some doubts about whether liberalism can show proper respect for community when ‘community’ is understood in the way I describe. (shrink)

The primary concern of this essay is with the question “What is a political community?” This question is important in its own right. Arguably, the main purpose of political philosophy is to provide an account of the nature of political association and, in so doing, to describe the relations that hold between the individual and the state. The question is also important, however, because of its centrality in contemporary debate about liberalism and community.

In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function as reasons for action (...) presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’ presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. (shrink)

Summary This article is concerned with recent attempts to balance the claims for political citizenship in a liberal democracy (liberalism) with competing claims for cultural identity within traditional non?liberal communities (communitarianism). Claims of the first kind are usually seen as universal in that they are based on what it is to be human, while claims of the second kind are seen as particular in so far as they relate to membership of a specific culture. Singh (1997) argues for (...) discussion method as a means of reconciling the claims of democratic citizenship with those of cultural attachment in non?liberal communities. In an earlier and related paper, Singh (1995) also seeks an accommodation between shared and particular values in a multicultural society. Halstead (1997) is concerned about the dilemmas faced by liberal educators and by Muslims with regard to the sex education curriculum and Muslim pupils. In an earlier paper, Halstead (1995) makes proposals for a curriculum which combines a communitarian commitment to the cultural integrity of non?liberal communities with active participation in the life of a liberal democracy. I will argue that whether we begin from a liberal commitment to individual autonomy (Singh) or from a concern for the cultural integrity and survival of non?liberal communities (Halstead), there are very real difficulties in achieving a reconciliation between liberal and communitarian perspectives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Egalitarian Liberalism Revisited: On the Meaning and Justification of Social Justice by Per SundmanBharat RanganathanEgalitarian Liberalism Revisited: On the Meaning and Justification of Social Justice Per Sundman uppsala, sweden: uppsala universitet, 2016. 242 pp. $72.50Across a range of contemporary disciplines, discussions about justice abound. Despite the prevalence of these discussions, however, there is little consensus about what justice is and whether (and, if so, how) (...) appeals to it should be made. Moreover, if the interconnectedness and pluralism that obtain in our rapidly globalizing world are taken seriously, concerns about the content, meaning, and use of justice are amplified. Against this backdrop, Per Sundman aims to explicate and evaluate one particular form of justice: egalitarian liberalism. On his definition, egalitarian liberalism is "best understood as a triune conjunction of equality of opportunity, desert and self-ownership" (10). Over the course of eight substantive chapters, Sundman labors to show how these criteria both reinforce and don't contradict each other, aiming to clarify the meaning of social justice while considering known alternatives.To develop this argument, Sundman covers a truly impressive range of topics in contemporary debates about justice, including consequentialism and deontology, equality of opportunity and equality of resources, capabilities and rights, corrective and distributive policies, the natural and social lotteries, status in moral and political communities, and the politics of recognition and misrecognition. On the whole, covering such a range of topics proves to be a strength. Sundman introduces the reader to a number of important topics and how several important thinkers have treated those topics, and his discussion of these topics and thinkers is evenhanded and insightful. If you're familiar with (and interested in) one or more of these debates, you will be delighted to find a theological ethicist engaging in them. There's also a further reason for delight: Sundman enters and engages in these debates without bringing the all-too-frequent (and oftentimes empty) charge that liberalism is "impoverished"—a point to which I'll return. But depending on your level of familiarity with recent debates in moral and political philosophy, you may be left unsatisfied with some aspects of Sundman's discussion. Specifically, some of these topics and thinkers deserve further attention and scrutiny than Sundman provides, especially important given Sundman's stated desire to navigate alternative understandings. [End Page 189]I do want to draw the reader's attention to the penultimate chapter of Sundman's book, "Save Us from Liberalism." But first I want to make a larger point. I mentioned what I think is an all-too-frequent charge made in theological ethics: namely, that liberalism is impoverished. Sometimes, this charge is entirely warranted. But oftentimes, at least in my experience, it is empty: the person bringing the charge neither distinguishes among the diversity that obtains within liberalism nor charitably reads and represents the thinker with whom they are trying to engage. Given this disciplinary shortcoming, Sundman is to be commended for turning to Christian critiques of liberalism only after he's carefully worked (and guided the reader) through the myriad topics and thinkers that constitute egalitarian liberalism writ large.So what about this chapter in particular? Focusing on Christian communitarians—for example, Stanley Hauerwas and John Milbank—Sundman explores whether authentic Christian ethics contradicts and is superior to egalitarian liberalism. In the first half of the chapter, he examines the different ways in which Christian communitarians understand obedience to God's commands and have criticized the putative liberal obsession with "autonomy." Following an important discussion where he contrasts Christian and liberal understandings of the circumstances of justice, the second half of Sundman's chapter argues briefly but persuasively against Christian exclusivity (e.g., the recently popular Benedict Option) and for Christians to act out of love, for justice, and in the world.There is much to recommend about this book. Both substantively and structurally, it is admirable and instructive.Bharat RanganathanUniversity of Notre DameCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This textbook reflects the buoyant state of contemporary political philosophy, and the development of the subject in the past two decades. It includes seminal papers on fundamental philosophical issues such as: the nature of social explanation distributive justice liberalism and communitarianism citizenship and multiculturalism nationalism democracy criminal justice. A range of views is represented, demonstrating the richness of the philosophical contribution to some of the most contested areas of public policy and political decision making. Each section has an (...) introduction by the editors that situates the papers in the ongoing debate. Further Reading sections feature at the end of each chapter. Readings from the following thinkers are included: Steven Lukes, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Bhikhu Parekh, Antony Duff, G.A. Cohen, Derek Parfit, Roger Scruton, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntrye. _Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy_ will be a valuable resource for upper-level students interested in current thinking in this area. (shrink)

_Contexts of Justice,_ highly acclaimed when it was published in Germany, provides a significant new intervention into the important debate between communitarianism and liberalism. Rainer Forst argues for a theory of "contexts of justice" that leads beyond the narrow confines of this debate as it has been understood until now and posits the possibility of a new conception of social and political justice. This book brings refreshing clarity to a complex topic as it provides a synthesis (...) of traditions and theories that leads to a truly original approach. Forst makes a four-part distinction to decipher the debate between communitarianism and liberalism. These four parts concern the constitution of the self, the neutrality of law, the ethos of democracy, and the opposition between universalism and contextualism. He shows that a comprehensive theory of justice needs to take these different contexts adequately into account. He discusses recent debates about discursive democracy and feminist critiques of liberalism, and addresses such topics as multiculturalism and civil society. (shrink)

Many have criticized liberalism for being too individualistic, but few have offered an alternative that goes beyond a vague affirmation of the need for community. In this entertaining book, written in dialogue form, Daniel Bell fills this gap, presenting and defending a distinctively communitarian theory against the objections of a liberal critic. Drawing on the works of such thinkers as Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Alasdair MacIntyre, Bell attacks liberalism's individualistic view of the person by pointing to our (...) social embeddedness. He develops Michael Walzer's idea that political thinking involves the interpretation of shared meanings emerging from the political life of a community, and intelligently rebuts criticism that this approach damages his case by being conservative and relativistic. Communitarianism and Its Critics is a provocative defense of a distinctly communitarian theory which will stimulate interest and debate among scholars and students of political theory as well as those approaching the subject for the first time. (shrink)

_Contexts of Justice,_ highly acclaimed when it was published in Germany, provides a significant new intervention into the important debate between communitarianism and liberalism. Rainer Forst argues for a theory of "contexts of justice" that leads beyond the narrow confines of this debate as it has been understood until now and posits the possibility of a new conception of social and political justice. This book brings refreshing clarity to a complex topic as it provides a synthesis (...) of traditions and theories that leads to a truly original approach. Forst makes a four-part distinction to decipher the debate between communitarianism and liberalism. These four parts concern the constitution of the self, the neutrality of law, the ethos of democracy, and the opposition between universalism and contextualism. He shows that a comprehensive theory of justice needs to take these different contexts adequately into account. He discusses recent debates about discursive democracy and feminist critiques of liberalism, and addresses such topics as multiculturalism and civil society. (shrink)

The debate over press liberty before and during the pre-Revolutionary era (1763-1775) in America reveals how a once-unified, if rudimentary, tradition gave rise to two sophisticated and contrary doctrines, aspects of which continue to infuse current free speech discourse. The vague, republican and liberal discourse of the `free and open' press bifurcated as a result of the competing political and ideological forces involved in the pre-Revolutionary crisis. Through an examination of this historical debate over press liberty, this essay (...) seeks to recast two current scholarly debates . First, this study undermines the polarized debate over early American political thought and substantiates recent abstract attempts to demonstrate the complex relationship between republicanism and liberalism. Second, this interpretation uncovers a central dynamic in the development of the American tradition of press liberty, thus calling into question a wide variety of previous studies that ignore this crucial feature. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo argumenta que, contrario a lo que sostiene el neoliberalismo contemporáneo, lo individual y lo colectivo no constituyen los extremos de una antítesis ante la que estemos obligados a elegir. Se examina el debate político de la segunda mitad del siglo victoriano sobre la pertinencia y los límites de la intervención estatal. Tomando como pretexto la obra de un pensador cuya posición sobre la libertad negativa marcará la historia del liberalismo positivo y del colectivismo, se concluye que (...) la ideología que hereda y continúa la tradición del liberalismo político europeo no es el neoliberalismo, sino el socialismo. ABSTRACT The article argues that, contrary to what contemporary neoliberalism holds true, the individual and the collective are not the extremes of an antithesis that requires us to choose one or the other. It examines the political debate of the second half of the Victorian Era regarding the pertinence and limits of State intervention. On the basis of the work of a thinker whose position on negative freedom will mark the history of positive liberalism and collectivism, the article concludes that the ideology inherited and continued by the tradition of European political liberalism is not neoliberalism, but rather, socialism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The New Liberalism of L. T. Hobhouse and the Reenvisioning of Nineteenth-Century UtilitarianismDavid WeinsteinIn the eyes of some, modern liberal theorizing has fallen victim to tyrannizing conceptual dualisms that have rendered it a tedious dialogue of predictable positioning and strident partisanship. On the one hand those who dream the dream of unencumbered selfhood are said to be locked in a bitter struggle with those who long for (...) the rebirth of encumbering community. On the other hand and in a not wholly unrelated way, Kantians are supposedly and forever beating back the phoenix of consequentialism. In short, the tyrannizing dualisms of individualism vs. communitarianism and Kantianism vs. consequentialism allegedly and detrimentally channel much modern liberal theorizing.But such rivalries, however real or fanciful, need not be philosophical liberalism’s singular fate. Nor do these rivalries exclusively characterize its variegated past. My aim is to challenge the cogency and expose the historical limitations of one of these tyrannizing dualisms, namely that between Kantianism and consequentialism, by way of examining L. T. Hobhouses’s new liberalism. In my view this seeming rivalry within liberalism is a convenient straw man readily weakened by more scrupulous attention to liberalism’s new liberal past. 1 [End Page 487]Principally, I hope to show that Hobhouse’s rendering of liberalism privileged good but not at the price of stultifying welfare pooling, individuality but not at the cost of pitiless individualism. Hobhouse’s version of new liberalism may not have been quite utilitarian, but it nevertheless took maximizing good seriously while retaining a firm commitment to strong moral rights and the flourishing of individuals as ends. Hobhouse’s new liberalism, then, was as robustly juridical and as authentically liberal as it was fundamentally consequentialist.The Rational Good and Moral PersonalitySelf-realization was the normative hinge of Hobhouse’s new liberalism. Self-realization, in turn, can not be understood without examining Hobhouse’s notion of the rational good. Hence, The Rational Good, published later in his life in 1921, occupies a vital position in his thought though recent scholarship has all but ignored this work. 2In this work Hobhouse begins by asking “whether there is a Rational, and therefore demonstrable, standard of values to which the actions of man and the institutions of society may be referred for judgment.” 3 For Hobhouse, such a standard exits and the remainder of the book endeavors to persuade us accordingly.In a chapter entitled “The Good,” Hobhouse claims that the proposition that something is good expresses a “disposition” and asserts a “fact.” The disposition consists of a favorable “practical attitude” towards pleasurable feelings, which certain (self-realizing) experiences invariably entail. In Hobhouse’s words “the judgment ‘This is good’ is not only the expression of an attitude but also the assertion of a fact, and the fact which it asserts is a harmony between an experience and a feeling.” 4 Hence, we deem good only those self-realizing experiences that are harmonious in the sense that they generate feelings of pleasure. A pleasure-producing experience is a harmonious experience and, assuming that it is also self-realizing, we are disposed to pronounce it “good.”Now separate harmonious experiences, unless rationally coordinated, will likely clash, thereby generating overall disharmony or pain. Experiences which we separately judge as good may turn out to be bad on the whole. A good life, therefore, is a satisfying coherent life. Only a rationally coherent life is fully self-realizing and constitutes the rational good. In short “that what we reasonably call good or what is really good must be a harmony of the [End Page 488] totality of feeling with the totality of experience so far as it affects feeling. Thus, Practical Reason is the effort of the mind towards harmony within itself, and with nature.” 5But if, for Hobhouse, practical reason is an ongoing “effort” in coordination, then the fully rational good is a formal ideal which actual lives succeed more or less skillfully in realizing. Hence, Hobhouse also introduces the “realized good” as the practically possible good, and the distance one goes in realizing his or her own good is, as Hobhouse says, “what we call character.” 6 To... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 721-743 [Access article in PDF] Virtue, Commerce, and the Enduring Florentine Republican Moment: Reintegrating Italy into the Atlantic Republican Debate Mark Jurdjevic Republicanism has dominated the historiographies of English and American political thought for the past two decades. 1 Its success derives principally from J. G. A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment, which presents a sweeping vision of an ancient (...) Aristotelian republican language that persisted for centuries in the mental landscape of the western world. Resurrected in Renaissance Florence, the language of republicanism continued to resonate powerfully in Stuart and Hanoverian Britain and colonial America. Pocock and those sympathetic to his work attributed the power and significance of republicanism to its internal discursive coherence over time; because of its deep roots in the European classical and Renaissance past, republicanism--not liberalism--provided the intellectual weapon with which the English and the Americans rebelled against the Stuart and Hanoverian monarchies. Pocock's provocative repudiation of the significance of John Locke and liberalism, as well as his suggestion that the revolutions of 1641, 1688, and 1776 were animated not by a utopian, forward-looking political ideology but by a backward-looking desire to restore a classical political order, generated a still-ongoing academic debate. 2 [End Page 721]This debate has not appreciated a crucial point: Pocock misunderstood Florentine political thought and mischaracterized its central tenets. 3 Unnecessary confusion has been generated by the lack of communication between specialists in Renaissance political thought and historians of English and early American political thought, as well as by the total dependence of English and American historians on Pocock for their understanding of "civic humanism." 4 Most historians of England and America skeptical of Pocock's argument have shown that republican language, where it did occur in England and America, differed in substantial and significant ways from the Florentine variety. 5 What they have actually shown, I hope to make clear, is that manifestations of republicanism in England and America differed only from Pocock's misunderstanding of the Florentine variety; Florentine republican language echoes strongly in the English and American republicanism that recent scholarship emphasizes.In this essay I seek to reintegrate Italy into the republican debate and, by doing so, to revitalize the argument that structural linguistic similarities pervaded the republicanism of Florence, England, and America. 6 I concentrate on the most important and contested point in English and American revisionism, the dialectical engine of TheMachiavellian Moment: the alleged incompatibility between virtue and commerce in "classical" republican theory. Pocock asserted that Florentine republicans mistrusted commerce and private wealth as corrupting forces in public life and he employed this perceived virtue-commerce antipathy as the link between his republican moments.The most leveling critiques of Pocock's republican tradition have rejected it on this point. Recent research on the relationship between commerce and virtue in the English and American republican contexts has reached a quite different conclusion: that republican theory was frequently elaborated in harmonious conjunction with a new ideology of commercial society. [End Page 722]Pocock, however, misunderstood civic humanism and the role of commerce in Renaissance republicanism. Florentine humanists believed that commerce and the private pursuit of wealth made possible the survival and integrity of the republic. Florentine republicanism of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was the ideology of an ascendant merchant elite; it provided a political language that integrated republican virtue with the habits, values, and mentality of the merchant. We should not therefore be surprised to see republicanism flourishing in later commercial societies. Although the virtue-commerce relationship in Renaissance republicanism was precisely the opposite of Pocock's claim, it directly anticipates the commercial element of republicanism that recent English and American scholarship emphasizes.I undertake three tasks; first, I survey and compare recent work on republicanism in America, England, and Italy; second, I show how Pocock selectively read the primary and secondary sources on Renaissance Florence; third and most importantly, I analyze the economic attitudes of Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini, Girolamo Savonarola, and Florentine... (shrink)

Current debates surrounding liberalism and communitarianism, modernity and postmodernity, ethical theory and narrative ethics fail to account for shifting foundations of personal identity in an increasingly computer‐mediated era of human communication. This paper aims to examine some of the conceptual assumptions about identity and community which are being radically undermined by rapidly evolving information networks and are therefore in need of redefinition. Additionally, I argue for an expansion of the literary imagination to include virtual, coauthored fiction sites where (...) exploration of personal identity will bear upon future ethical and political decision‐making. (shrink)

Modern democracy and human rights constitute an indissoluble unity. Liberalism and communitarianism open new discussions about the significance of justice in the current legal situation. State etatism is impossible to question. The question is to what extent it can be allowed in social and also economic spheres of everyday life. These very questions separate the politics, philosophy of justice and ethics of the 20th Century. Communitarianism judges and critically checks the fundamental ideas of liberalism. The dispute’s (...) meaning between liberals and communitarians is one of political and moral philosophy. Communitarians assume that strong individualism is an obstruction to effective operation of free society and accordingly also the legal state. Immoderate perception of the subject’s role signification, one’s own functioning in society and exaggerated effort of the realisation of one’s own rights obstruct liberals from constituting an effective and justly operated legal state. The topicality of human rights theory in the context of ongoing discussions in the area of moral philosophy can also enrich other themes and problems which are found in current ethical thinking. One of the recurring themes in present day moral philosophy concerns comprehension of the human person’s personhood. A more fundamental principle of individuation is my selection for the other and that is inherent to the ethical relationship to the other. The worth of my personhood is an important assumption for an authentic understanding of human rights. Personhood connected with freedom and the challenge to justice is that which express fundamental human rights. (shrink)

Resumen: España fue el último de los viejos imperios coloniales en abolir el comercio de esclavos. Inglaterra, una de las naciones más beneficiadas por el tráfico de personas, lo hizo en 1807. Con todo, desde primeros de siglos, surgió en España, en el seno del primer liberalismo, un inicial movimiento en favor de la abolición del comercio de negros. Este artículo trata de tres hitos: la defensa de la abolición del comercio negrero por parte de Isidoro de Antillón en su (...) Disertación, leída en Madrid en 1802; los debates de las Cortes de Cádiz sobre la esclavitud, principalmente, el de la sesión del 2 de abril de 1811; finalmente, de la aportación a la discusión de José Mª Blanco White y la publicación en 1814 de su Bosquejo del comercio de esclavos. Abstract: Spain was the last of the old colonial empires to abolish the slave trade. England, one of the nations that most benefited from trafficking, did so in 1807. However, since the early century XIX, within the first liberalism an initial movement for the abolition of the slave trade emerged in Spain. This paper focuses on three milestones: the defense of the abolition of the slave trade by Isidoro Antillon in his Disertación, read in Madrid in 1802; the Cortes de Cadiz debates on slavery, mainly the session of April 2, 1811; finally, José María Blanco White's contribution to the discussion and the publication in 1814 of his Bosquejo del comercio de esclavos. (shrink)

Theories of Justice would be understand as a subject that dealt with liberalist view, based on methodological abstraction. But Michael Walzer tried to approach Justice in view of equality in accordance with shared cultural background of certain community. Methodological abstraction of John Rawls has internal difficulties such that the concept of value or properties which is separated from social context of community, and that the hardship of reflecting democratic ideas of the society’s actual members. Thus, Michael Walzer’s Complex Equality or (...) Egalitarianism focuses on multiple ways of various cultures’ various value system and distributive principle that composes their own society. Based on this, Walzer insists that formulation and creation of values takes priority and controls its distribution. According to Walzer, separated values could exclusively occupied but could not shifted other types of values in the Society of Complex Equality. Spheres of Complex Equality defines the range of sharing social communication or meaning, and its fundamentals are free exchange, desert, and need. This principles would be approved as an exclusive rules of each own, or suggested as the same dominant principles side by side. Complex Equality or Egalitarianism could be a logical basis of critical socialization, for it rejects and criticizes tyranny. It also formulates motivation of moral practice for social participation or interpersonal competence, by defining the Domain of Justice and trying to apply the Principle of Distribution which characterizes Complex Equality or Egalitarianism. (shrink)

The debate on the role and identity of Christian social ethics in liberal democracy touches upon the question about the relationship between universality and specificity. Rather than argue for the difference between these approaches, it can be argued that they are to be understood in a differentiated unity with each other. This idea can be substantiated by a figurative appropriation of a Chalcedonian Christology, particularly the communicatio idiomatum . The communicative dimension of this concept has been found to be (...) useful for a reinterpretation of the idea of responsibility. By engaging contemporary positions of communicative ethics, H. Richard Niebuhr's understanding of responsibility as responsiveness, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Christological concept of responsibility in a constructive dialogue with each other, the article has attempted to outline main tenets of a responsive concept of responsibility based on a broadly conceived Chalcedonian Christology. This responsive understanding of responsibility serves as the foundation of a third position beyond the futile antagonism of liberalism and communitarianism. Hereby it maintains the reasonableness of a liberal democratic assertion of a common political discourse, and yet it also contends the necessity of authentic particular worldviews and outlooks. In its argument for such a third-way thinking it hopes to contribute with an understanding where these positions are seen in a constructive relationship – rather than in contrast – with each other. (shrink)

Although Roberto Unger is sometimes described as a communitarian critic of liberalism, his recent three‐volume work on Politics disavows the major tenets of contemporary communitarianism—for example, the “embedded self,” the critique of rights, the rejection of universalizing theory. Instead, Unger's aim is to criticize liberalism from the perspective of a “superliberalism"—a perspective which takes the original liberal desire to emancipate individuals from the chains of social custom and hierarchy and rids it of the stultifying economic and political (...) institutions within which liberals have sought to contain it. Three main components of Unger's theory are analyzed: the idea of “negative capability,” or the power of individuals to revise and transcend their social contexts; the idea of an “empowered democracy,” which seeks to open up all aspects of society to the collective exercise of negative capability; and the idea of “immunity rights,” which seek to protect individuals from the potential risks of radical democracy. I argue that all three underestimate the risks to individual liberty of the over‐politicization of social life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The “Figure” of God and the Limits to Liberalism: A Rereading of Locke’s Essay and Two TreatisesVivienne BrownI. A current interpretative issue in reading John Locke’s texts is the relationship between Locke’s theology and political philosophy. 1 Reacting against the secular interpretations of C. B. Macpherson and Leo Strauss, John Dunn argued that Locke’s theology was axiomatic for the political philosophy of the Two Treatises of Government (...) in that Locke’s liberalism was based on a religious individualism. 2 Dunn thus decisively reoriented Lockean scholarship away from seeing Locke as an apologist for a new capitalist economic order, and James Tully and Richard Ashcraft have since substantiated the view that theological presuppositions were foundational for Locke’s political writings but they emphasized the radical nature of Locke’s political position. 3 This view has in turn been challenged by more recent contextual studies of the development of Locke’s thought. John Marshall has argued that the political argument in the Two Treatises of Government is not dependent on religious individualism in [End Page 83] that Locke’s natural theology was itself driven by epistemological investigations, and that it was this epistemological impetus which inclined the Christian Locke towards the Socinian tendencies of his later years. 4 Ian Harris accepts that theological explanation was central to Locke’s writings in ethics and government, but he also emphasizes the reverse process of determination where Locke’s theology, particularly with respect to revealed religion, is in turn reliant upon Locke’s broader thinking. Harris argues therefore that there is a continuity of substantive thought such that theological concerns mesh into, rather than exclusively determine, the broader pattern of Locke’s political and moral ideas. 5 Recent studies thus share a considerable common ground in their recognition of the importance of the relationship between Locke’s theology and political philosophy, but disagreements remain over the precise nature of this relationship and its implications for Locke’s writings.This paper will address the question of the relationship between Locke’s theology and political philosophy by examining the figurative expressions by means of which God is represented in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Two Treatises of Government. 6 The paper will argue that the ways in which this metaphorical “figure” of God is inscribed in Locke’s epistemology and political philosophy 7 suggest a different approach to reading the intricate relationship between God and mankind, and that this casts doubt on the widely-received understanding of Locke’s contribution to classic liberal arguments within political philosophy. It will be argued further that the different formulations of the figure of God in these two texts result in problematizing the historiographic notions of theoretical determination and historicized authorial intent which have so far largely informed the interpretative debate in this area. 8 [End Page 84]II. In the Essay it is argued that mankind has no knowledge of real essences, even of such a simple thing as a pebble or a fly, and certainly cannot know the real essence of God which is immeasurably more inaccessible. 9 Descriptions of God in the Essay are not, therefore, literal statements of God’s characteristics but necessarily inadequate attempts to conceptualize him from within the linguistic and mental constraints of the finite world of men. Two possibilities are available to mankind in its attempt to mediate this fundamental state of ignorance. One is to try to form a complex idea made up of the simple ideas received from sensation or reflection upon itself and then to magnify this to an infinite degree:And even the most advanced Notion we have of God, is but attributing the same simple Ideas which we have got from Reflection on what we find in our selves, and which we conceive to have more Perfection in them, than would be in their absence, attributing, I say, those simple Ideas to him in an unlimited degree. 10God’s postulated qualities are thus valued human qualities writ infinitely large, even though elsewhere the anthropomorphism of the “ignorant and uninstructed” is rejected: 11[H]aving from what we experiment in our selves, got the Ideas of Existence and Duration; of... (shrink)

"Contexts of Justice is a study that covers and definitely exhausts the whole range of ten years of one of the most important recent philosophical discussions, that between liberals and communitarians."--Jurgen Habermas, author of Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere "Forst addresses with great insight and acuity the debates over justice between liberals and communitarians that animated the late '80s and '90s...He uses no jargon, he reasons well, his arguments are strong, clear, and accesssible, and he avoids political correctness as (...) well as its opposite."--Andrew Arato, author of Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of Right was his last systematic work and the most complete statement of his mature views on ethical and political philosophy. It explores the relationships between three distinct conceptions of human freedom: persons as possessing contract rights, subjects as reflective moral agents, and individuals as members of an ethical community. It strongly influenced the early Marx and with the rise of debates over liberalism and communitarianism in the latter half of the twentieth century. In this volume (...) an outstanding line up of contributors examine the nature and impact of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. A diverse array of topics is examined, ranging from Hegel's account of rights, freedom, the state and history to some hitherto relatively overlooked topics such as Hegel and Luther, art and nationality and Hegel and the market. Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Critical Perspectives on Freedom and History will be valuable reading for scholars of Hegel, nineteenth-century German philosophy, political philosophy and history of political thought. (shrink)

Are there universally valid moral principles that dictate what's right regardless of what the consensus is within a particular society? Or are moral judgments culturally relative, ultimately dictated by conventions and practices which vary among societies? Practices and Principles takes up the debate between cultural relativists and universalists, and the related debate in political philosophy between communitarians and liberals, each of which has roots in an earlier debate between Kant and Hegel. Rejecting uncritical deference to social practice, (...) I acknowledge the need for standards for judging existing practices; but, I argue, the fact that there are principles we can use to criticize practices does not mean we can ignore social practice when making ethical and legal judgments. While defending principled criticism,I show the important role social practices have both in selecting and applying principles. I show precisely how both principles and practices interact through three case studies: promises, contract law, and the fourth amendment issue of whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable. When we turn to particular instances of ethical and legal judging we find that it is appropriate sometimes to appeal to principles that seem foreign to a culture to criticize aspects of that culture, sometimes to appeal to principles immanent in a culture and its practices, sometimes to defer to expectations arising from practices without subjecting the practices to critical scrutiny. I reject simplifying dichotomies that force us to choose between either practices or principles, universalism or relativism, and liberalism or communitarianism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 124-137 [Access article in PDF] Katz's Problematic Dualism and Its "Seismic" Effects on His Theory Wayne Ouderkirk There is much to admire in Eric Katz's Nature as Subject. 1 Many aspects of his theory strongly resonate with dominant themes in environmental ethics and with my own theoretical predilections. In addition, he applies his theory to several major environmental issues (ecological restoration and (...) the Amazon rainforest, to name two), simultaneously testing it against other views and tracing out its implications. Impressive, non-ivory tower philosophizing. The array of issues he covers is impressive too, from the place of animal rights in an environmental ethic to the relation between environmental destruction and genocide; from the tension between holism and the rights of individuals to intrinsic value; from anthropo- centrism to Judaism and the environment; from the history of environmental thought to the convergence hypothesis. And more.In light of this tremendous range and of my own attraction to such of his major themes as ecocentrism, it might seem unappreciative to criticize, [End Page 124] to dissent. But despite all the positives I find in Katz's writings, I also find faults there, faults which, when pressed, cause major fissures in the whole. The central, major problem is Katz's dualism; and I think it ultimately undoes his whole theory, since it is so intimately connected with the other parts. Within Katz's own essays, there are, I think, resources to begin a reconstruction; but as with any other such effort, the first task is to discard the parts that are no longer useable. Before doing so, however, I want to review some positive aspects of Katz's theory, lest I convey the mistaken impression that my initial praise for his work is mere courtesy. The Solid Geological Features To begin with the most general: Katz's concern for, commitment to the natural world is obvious to any reader. He suffuses every essay with a determination to seek out clear and cogent philosophical rationales for its protection. More important perhaps is his obvious personal connection to that world. His references to Fire Island's deer and beaches, for example, amply demonstrate what the rest of his writings imply: that his theoretical efforts are more than armchair musings about a current philosophical issue. Katz's efforts are both professional and passionate.On a more specifically philosophical level, I regard his anti-anthropocentrism as a significant strength. Though one can, of course, be an anthropocentrist and be an environmental philosopher—Bryan Norton (1984) and Eugene Hargrove (1989) come to mind—I think Katz's arguments showing that anthropocentric views can only offer contingent justifications for protecting the environment are cogent and valid (3-11). An important part of those arguments is Katz's demonstration that different theories in environmental philosophy do indeed result in different environmental policies. In other words, Katz offers a strong counterargument to Norton's convergence hypothesis (Norton 1991), the idea that, given environmentalists' shared commitment to the environment, the various philosophical theories offered in justification of that commitment will converge on similar policy recommendations (149 ff.). I agree with Katz's refutation of that hypothesis, and I offer my critique of his theory because I think that theory's faults will ultimately undermine sound policies.Another big asset of Katz's theory is his communitarianism, the idea that we are part of an ecological community, an ecosystem, to which we have moral obligations. Not surprisingly to anyone familiar with environmental ethics, the source of this idea is Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic (Leopold 1966), [End Page 125] which has been debated, analyzed, praised, and critiqued more than extensively in the literature. Katz pretends to no originality here; he simply adopts and vigorously defends an ecocentric ethic that counts the integrity, stability, and beauty of the system—including, not incidentally, abiotic components—as central criteria limiting human interference with nature. Unlike, for example, the total ecocentrism of J. Baird Callicott's (1980) early writing, however, Katz tempers his communitarianism with another dimension, qualifying his holistic... (shrink)

This paper examines assumptions concerning the relationship between citizenship, justice, and well-being, based on representative political philosophies, including egoism, utilitarianism, libertarianism, liberalism, and communitarianism. A previous paper raised the possibility of an inter-disciplinary framework for collaboration between psychology and political philosophy. This study picks up that thread and attempts to actualize a collaborative research effort based on a framework grounded in positive political psychology. The first part of this study reflects on the methodology situated between empirical psychology and (...) philosophy in reference to the debates caused by psychological and philosophical situationism. In response to its criticism against virtue ethics, the possibility of reconstructing it on empirical psychology has paradoxically emerged. Similarly, this study validates assumptions on political philosophies employing the psychological method concerning well-being. Accordingly, the central part examines the plausibility of the assumptions by empirical evidence obtained from two internet surveys in Japan. The relationships between citizenship, justice, and well-being are the most substantial in the communitarian assumption. The exploratory factor analysis of the two surveys illuminates that the correlations between citizenship, justice, and well-being are substantial. This relationship denies the egoism assumption. Moreover, almost all correlations between the three are higher based on virtue-related indicators than hedonic ones. These findings are not in tune with the utilitarian assumption and are most congruent to the communitarian assumption. In addition, citizenship and justice correlate more with political well-being than overall well-being. As these are more directly associated with political well-being in the communitarian assumption, this result aligns with the assumption. Furthermore, the positive relationship between disparity elimination and well-being fits the liberal rather than the libertarian assumption. Nevertheless, the substantial correlation between ethical justice and well-being is higher by virtue-related indicators than hedonic indicators, suggesting distributive justice is associated with the ethical dimension. Again, this fits the communitarian assumption rather than the liberal assumption. Thus, philosophical psychology empirically verifies the interdependence of the three conceptions and the relative plausibility of the communitarian assumption. Moreover, as the relationship between the three is essential for political philosophies, the result increases the reliability of communitarianism. (shrink)

How far should we go in protecting and promoting public health? Can we force people to give up unhealthy habits and make healthier choices, or does everyone have the right to decide their own lifestyle? Should we stop treating smokers who refuse to give up smoking? Should we put a tax on fatty foods and ban vending machines in schools to address the obesity epidemic? Should parents be required to have their children vaccinated? Are some of our screening programmes unethical (...) Downs syndrome screening, for example or should we be screening people for more conditions, such as Huntington disease? Such questions are at the heart of public health ethics. Holland shows that to understand and debate these issues requires philosophy: moral philosophies, such as utilitarianism and deontology, as well as political philosophies such as liberalism and communitarianism. And philosophy informs other aspects of public health, such as epidemiology and health promotion. The aim of this book is to provide a lively, accessible and philosophically informed introduction to such issues. It is an ideal textbook for students taking courses in public health ethics. And since this book develops systematic discussions of issues in public health ethics, there is also much here to engage and challenge the more advanced reader. (shrink)

Recent claims that civic republicanism can better address contemporary political problems than either liberalism or communitarianism are generating an intense debate. This is a sharp insight into this debate, confronting normative theory with historical and comparative analysis. It examines whether republican theory can address contemporary political problems in ways that are both valuable and significantly different in practice from liberalism. These expert authors offer contrasting perspectives on issues raised by the contemporary revival of republicanism and (...) adopt a variety of methodological approaches to address the practical implications of republican thought within a coherent thematic framework. This book also *clarifies core themes and contested areas of republican thought, especially the notion of liberty, the specific political institutions needed to realize it, and the nature of solidarity among citizens. * shows how republicanism continued to influence the development of liberal thought in nineteenth century Britain * examines the development of alternative republican discourses, including the established political practice and ideology of the French republican tradition * applies republican perspectives to contemporary political concerns such as the creation of social trust and the expansion of public accountability * explores the implications of republican theory for policy areas including houses, education and marriage in diverse multicultural societies This book will be of great interest to researchers and students studying republicanism in political science history, social policy and education. In addition, it is a valuable resource for those concerned with citizenship, democratic theory, multiculturalism, nationalism and patriotism, and politics beyond the nation-state. (shrink)

Questions about the relevance and value of various liberal concepts are at the heart of important debates among feminist philosophers and social theorists. Although many feminists invoke concepts such as rights, equality, autonomy, and freedom in arguments for liberation, some attempt to avoid them, noting that they can also reinforce and perpetuate oppressive social structures. In Challenging Liberalism Schwartzman explores the reasons why concepts such as rights and equality can sometimes reinforce oppression. She argues that certain forms of abstraction (...) and individualism are central to liberal methodology and that these give rise to a number of problems. Drawing on the work of feminist moral, political, and legal theorists, she constructs an approach that employs these concepts, while viewing them from within a critique of social relations of power. (shrink)

The debates between liberalism and the New Left, which broke out in the middle of the 1990s, are a phenomenon rarely seen among mainland Chinese intellectuals since 1949. They are large-scale, spontaneous debates without official manipulation or ideological constraint. The debates involve Chinese scholars on the mainland and overseas, and have drawn the attention of Hong Kong and Taiwan intellectuals. Several collective papers on the debates have been published, and other selected papers are in the process of being compiled (...) and published. The debates are continuing. As an active participant in the debates and as a researcher in the history of Chinese thought in the 1980s and 1990s, I would like to summarize the main issues of the debates and to analyze why liberalism and the New Left emerged in the 1990s. (shrink)

In this essay, an attempt is made to re-present African Communitarianism as a discursive formation between the individual and community. It is a view which eschews the dominant position of many Africanist scholars on the primacy of the community over the individual in the ‘individual-community' debate in contemporary Africanist discourse. The relationship between the individual and community is dialogical for the identity of the individual and the community is dependent on this constitutive formation. The individual is not prior (...) to the community and neither is the community prior to the individual. Contemporaneity explains this dialogic relationship and to argue otherwise threatens the individual's subjectivity to a vanishing point, or simply, to deny the individual a presence. On this trajectory, the politics of common good within the African value system can neither be described nor represented through consensus or unanimity but through a realist perspectivism or a worldview not held in abstraction from living traditions, cultures, and values that characterize the people of sub-Saharan Africa. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27 2008: pp. 386-399. (shrink)

Abstract.The legitimate impact of common morality on legal restrictions has been continuously discussed within the Western philosophy of law since Lord Patrick Devlin in the late 1950s presented his moralistic arguments against some liberal conclusions drawn by the English Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution in their public report. Devlin's arguments were subsequently identified and refuted by Richard Wollheim, H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, but in a way that later provoked further argument. In particular the attack against (...) anti‐moralistic principles set forth by Simon Lee (1986) owes much to the rather naive liberalism represented by the opponents of Devlin. The battle over liberalism and moralism from the Hart‐Devlin debate to the present day is reviewed. In addition to the discussion of the philosophers mentioned above, a potential flaw in the argumentation of Joel Feinberg (1986) is considered. (shrink)

Every theory of justice presupposes a theory of agency which specifies the nature, capacities, and needs of the agents to whom it applies. Likewise, every theory of agency can serve as the basis for a theory of justice which specifies the social conditions in which persons can develop and exercise their capacities for agency. Contemporary liberal, communitarian, and feminist theories of justice all share an abstract understanding of agency as involving the capacity to pursue a conception of the good (...) and the capacity to fit that pursuit into a moral vision. Liberalism, communitarianism, and feminism do not differ primarily over what agency amounts to or whether agency is morally valuable, but over what social conditions persons require in order to develop and exercise their capacities for agency. ;I develop analytic models of a liberal and a communitarian theory of social justice, and I derive from each of these an analytic model of the theory of agency on which it tacitly depends. I show that neither the liberal nor the communitarian theory of agency can accommodate the needs of subordinate social groups such as African-Americans, women, and lesbians for a society in which denigrating racist, sexist, and homophobic cultural images are absent and in which the different needs for agency of members of different social groups can be addressed. ;I also develop a feminist dialogical theory of justice which leaves the demands of justice open to determination by an open, ongoing, egalitarian social dialogue about the social conditions required for agency. I then derive from it a theory of agency which is, I argue, better able to meet the differing needs for agency of members of different social groups, to uncover hidden forms of injustice, and to address changes in prevailing forms of domination and oppression over time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:China and Contemporary Millenarianism—Something New under the SunBenjamin I. SchwartzOne of the most obvious remarks one can make about contemporary China is that China has no reason to be excited about contemporary Western millenarianism. If by "millenarianism" one refers to an apocalyptic transformation of the entire human condition based on the Christian calendar, then there is no reason for Chinese, Jews, and Moslems, who have their own historic (...) visions, to find any significance in the history of the last millennium. At the end of the first millennium or the beginning of the second, China was at a high point in its civilization. To the extent that apocalyptic tendencies could be found in either its high or its popular culture, these tendencies were the focus of Buddhism or religious Daoism. They were not tied to specific calendars, and in an Indian spirit they spoke in terms of "kalpas," which might last for hundreds of millions of years—or might occur next week.In addition, it should be noted—as has been pointed out by Professor Landes and others—that the notion that there was an all-consuming preoccupation with an impending apocalypse in the year A.D. 1000 is highly debatable. Among the more scholarly members of the clergy in medieval times there were already modes of thinking that, under the influence of Islamic and Jewish philosophers, were pointing in the direction of a non-apocalyptic scholastic philosophy.In all cultures down through the ages, an apocalyptic vision of deliverance has promised relief from the vast burden of human suffering and despair—a vision that would be recognized as such even by those who sought no apocalyptic solutions and who continued to believe that our this-worldly life still promised compensatory satisfactions, limited as these might be. They would not accept the Theravada/ Hinayana Buddhist belief that even what we call our individual pleasures are a function of our individual sufferings. According to that belief, our love of our children or our wives is poisoned by our acute awareness of the transient nature of their existence. Release from the world of samsara can be attained only by escaping the world of individuated samsara into the ineffable world of Nirvana.Turning to the book of Ecclesiastes in the Old Testament, we find that the author, who represents an amalgam of Greek and Hebrew wisdom, is not an apocalyptist and still hopes that we will garner certain satisfactions from our lives as individuals in this mundane existence. Yet his disappointment, suffering, and exasperation over human vanities and duplicities often correspond to the catalogue of sufferings in the Theravada scriptures. But, like the Theravada Buddhists, he believes that in this world of ignorance (avidya) there is also "nothing new under the sun." In the endless generations of individual human lives, every mode of human ignorance and suffering has certainly existed in the endless cycle of samsara. It is nevertheless true that in the total attention on every aspect of human life from the techno-economic side, [End Page 193] we find a totally new way of neutralizing the age-old causes of human suffering. Gautama Buddha regarded our ordinary individual pleasures as poisoned by suffering, by the realization that individual pleasures soon fade away. Yet Prozac seems to continue to work without producing anxiety. Here, indeed, we have something new under the sun!In fact, the new technological-economic millenarianism does indeed represent something different from the nineteenth- and twentieth-century technological and economic transformations that seemed to offer the possibility of a steady amelioration of the human condition. Nineteenth-century technological and economic meliorism could be related to older forms of what might be called "materialistic" improvement. Yet nineteenth-century materialistic progressivism continued to be linked to other ethical concerns not only by Christian beliefs but also by many of the secular ideologies of nineteenth-century Europe. There were entire ideologies of socialism, liberalism, anarchism, romanticism, nationalism, et cetera, which continued to be deeply distressed by the non-"materialistic," ethical consequences of techno-economic progress. Techno-economic progress has not, after all, prevented the Holocaust, the Gulag, and the horrors of two world wars. On the contrary, it has raised... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.4 (2000) 617-634 [Access article in PDF] Edmund Burke and Reason of State David Armitage Edmund Burke has been one of the few political thinkers to be treated seriously by international theorists. 1 According to Martin Wight, one of the founders of the so-called "English School" of international theory, Burke was "[t]he only political philosopher who has turned wholly from political theory (...) to international theory." 2 The resurgence of interest in Burke as an international theorist has not, however, generated any consensus about how he might be classified within the traditions of international theory. Wight variously divided thinkers into trichotomous schools of Realists, Rationalists, and Revolutionaries, Machiavellians, Grotians, and Kantians, or theorists of international anarchy, habitual intercourse, or moral solidarity; 3 more recent international theorists have refined or supplemented these categories to construct similar trinitarian traditions of Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, and of Empirical Realism, Universal Moral Order, and Historical Reason. 4 Burke's place within any of these traditions remains uncertain. Debate over whether he was a realist or an idealist, a [End Page 617] Rationalist or a Revolutionist, has concluded variously that he was a "conservative crusader" or an "historical empiricist," a belated dualist or a Cold Warrior before the fact, or, most egregiously, "a proto-Marxist, or more precisely proto-Gramscian" theorist of hegemony. 5 The fact that Burke so obviously eludes definition may put in doubt the analytical utility of closely-defined "traditions" of international theory. 6Burke's relationship to conceptions of reason of state provides a more precise example of the confusion within such taxonomies. According to one recent historian of international theory, Burke "laid the foundations" of the "conservative approach to International Relations informed by the two modern notions of state interest and necessity, by raison d'état"; however, in the words of another, "Burke... was vehemently opposed to the idea of Reason of State and did not subscribe to the view that national interests override moral laws." 7 The assumptions on which each of these judgments rests are clearly incompatible: on the one hand that a "conservative approach" in the realm of foreign affairs implies an espousal of reason of state defined as the primacy of "state interest and necessity," that Burke did indeed acknowledge; on the other hand that reason of state is defined more exactly as "the view that national interests override moral laws" and that Burke did not hold such a view, so could not be defined as a reason-of-state theorist. It might of course be possible that Burke held various views on such matters at various points in his long literary and political career or that he argued for differing conceptions of reason of state in differing contexts. To test such a hypothesis demands a historical account of Burke's relationship to the theories of reason of state held by his contemporaries and predecessors. [End Page 618]To place Burke within traditions of reason of state might seem to be a simple category error. After all, he famously scorned "dashing Machiavellian politicians," deplored "the odious maxims of a Machiavellian policy," condemned "the dreadful maxim of Machiavel that in great affairs men are not to be wicked by halves," and identified the Discorsi as the inflammatory textbook of French republicanism. 8 His strictures on Machiavelli and Machiavellianism affirmed avant la lettre the classic modern account of reason of state offered by Friedrich Meinecke, which counterposed "raison d'état on the one hand, and ethics and law on the other" and traced the emergence of this separation to the heathen Florentine who had given the tradition its familiar nickname. 9 Such accounts of reason of state and of Machiavelli reinforced the long-standing interpretation of Burke as the last of the medieval theorists of natural law, for whom no merely human calculations of advantage or interest could override the dictates of divine reason. If reason of state represented the doctrine that political expediency should supersede moral law, then Burke could only have been its (and Machiavelli's) enemy: his "politics... were grounded... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Karl Popper, the Vienna Circle, and Red ViennaMalachi H. Hacohen*A stranger in his homeland even before emigrating in 1937, the philosopher Karl Popper is rarely considered an Austrian. Although he was born in Vienna in 1902 and buried there in 1994, he is known as an Atlantic intellectual and an anti-Communist prophet of postwar liberalism. He first became famous for The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945). (...) 1 He wrote the book during World War II in his New Zealand exile, intending it as a defense of democracy against fascism. The defeat of Austrian socialism and the collapse of Central European democracies were the major experiences informing his analysis. But The Open Society quickly became, with Popper’s full support, a charter of Atlantic Cold War liberalism. His philosophy of science, exemplified best in Logik der Forschung, went through a similar transformation. 2 To be sure, it is commonly debated in the context of logical positivism and the Vienna Circle; but the circle’s emigration and the postwar triumph of analytic philosophy in the Anglo-American academy transformed positivism, too, into an Atlantic philosophy. The “fugue of exile’s disruptions” severed the thread connecting Popper to Austria. 3Yet Popper was the foremost philosopher to carry the progressive Viennese legacy into the postwar era. In his critiques of the Vienna Circle and Red Vienna he confronted the philosophical and political problems of Viennese late enlightenment [End Page 711] and the interwar crises of scientific reason and Central European democracy. Refashioning the fin-de-siècle progressive legacy, he drew novel visions of liberal science and politics, imagining utopian scientific and political communities that were engaged in the pursuit of truth and reform. He made critical debate the acid test of political and scientific rationality, the center of a new liberalism. Establishing a free public sphere as the sine qua non of the Open Society, he innovated on a familiar liberal motif, shared by thinkers as different as Kant, De Staël, Guizot, Mill, and Habermas.In The Open Society Popper also wrote the political platform of the postwar Social-Democratic Consensus that legislated for the welfare state and mobilized against Communism. During World War II he opted for a liberal-socialist alliance that would contain postwar Central European fascism. Instead, his “Popular Front” platform proved adaptable to postwar anti-Communism. He made a few naïve pronouncements on deterrence and the free world during the Cold War. 4 They reflect badly on his political philosophy. Yet disentangled from its Cold War associations, his liberalism contains an abiding cosmopolitan vision for an age that is looking beyond the nation-state. His cosmopolitanism originated as a solution to dilemmas of ethnic identity faced by the assimilated-Jewish Viennese intelligentsia. His Open Society expressed their dream of integration into a community that discounted religion, ethnicity, and nationality. 5 He refused to give up on cosmopolitanism in the bipolar world when Machtpolitik seemed the order of the day. Almost alone among postwar liberals, he retained a belief in an international legal order and challenged national self-determination. His vision has regained relevance today. Cosmopolitanism and critical debate provide a starting-point for renegotiating liberal dilemmas.“My theory of knowledge, my philosophy of science and my political philosophy are original only in their interdependence,” stated Popper in a 1976 interview. 6 His epistemology has major political and scientific significance. Well before cultural studies began deconstructing science, Popper countered philosophers’ and scientists’ claims of expertise. There is no philosophical method. Every person is a problem-solver, and so every person is a philosopher. “Science is nothing but enlightened and responsible common sense—common sense broadened by imaginative critical thinking.” 7 Demystifying science, he never gave up on the growth of knowledge. He conceived of science as an unending quest for uncertain but growing knowledge. A non-foundationist, [End Page 712] he insisted that objectivity meant intersubjectivity. Rationality was a product of critical debate. In today’s intellectual world, devoid of certainty, where systems of knowledge and identities have been thrown into flux, Popper’s unique synthesis of contingency, convention, and change with logical certainty, objectivity, and tradition suggests a promising direction in the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Romanian Cultural and Political IdentityDonald R. KelleyThe Journal of the History of Ideas, in collaboration with other institutions, including the Universities of Bucharest and Budapest and the Soros Foundation, recently sponsored the second in a series of international conferences being planned on topics in current intellectual history. (The first, “Interrogating Tradition,” was held at Rutgers University, 13–16 November 1997.) The Romanian conference, which was held in the Elisabeta (...) Palace in Bucharest (27–31 May 1998), was devoted to “Culture and the Politics of National Identity in Modern Romania.” Over forty scholars, mainly from Romania but some also from the U.S., France, Germany, and Hungary, gathered to discuss a variety of questions about Romanian society, past, present, and speculative future; and they were joined by at least as many visitors, especially students, from the local area and beyond.Topics discussed included politics, language, economics, historiography, religion, education, philosophy, ideologies, intelligentsia, particular intellectuals, minorities, and women (though not Gypsies or gays). Under this riot of rubrics a wide range of questions were posed in interdisciplinary fashion, with frequent, sometimes impassioned interventions. What is—was, might have been, can be—Romania? Who is a Romanian (and who not)? What is Romania’s relation to the West and the East? (And what are the “West” and the “East”?) To modernity, to modernism, to modernization? What is—has been, should be—the function of intellectuals, of political and cultural elites, in understanding the Romanian past and in setting a course for the future? What, more generally, is the role of history in answering such questions? Or is history perhaps (as Karl Krause remarked of psychoanalysis) the disease for which it claims to be the cure?Keith Hitchens’s keynote address suggested that rehashing old essentialist debates might not be productive at millennium’s end, but the conference itself could not avoid some excursions down the paths of memory and myth. For historians, Western historians anyway, Romania seems to have too many pasts. Located at the juncture of four previous empires, Romania is a mosaic, or perhaps a pandemonium, of ethnic, religious, economic, and ideological groups that can only imagine, or invent, a nationality. Geographically (and in many ways culturally) remote from the West, Romania for a long time (as Sorin Antohi remarked) lacked both a public sphere and a civil society; and suffering “a Counter-Reformation without a Reformation” (Alexandru Dutu’s phrase), it has not enjoyed a tradition of religious or ethnic toleration. Nor have either the Germans or the Jews (as Glass said) found their own unity within the changing borders of the modern Romanian state. Not until the nineteenth century did Romania develop, out of its Boyar background (as Siupiur argued), an intellectual elite that could create a modern national history and help turn “peasants into Romanians” (Antohi’s phrase); and even then this elite seemed more attracted to conservative [End Page 735] (Herder, Savigny, Burke) than to liberal views of autochthonism. Many features of Western modernity, such as Newtonian science, reached Romania late, and indeed there was a retrograde movement against liberalism under the aegis by orthodox religion. In any case this intelligentsia has been as fragmented and multiform as the Romanian past itself. True, some Romanian scholars like to posit a mainstream tradition, “excesses aside,” as one speaker put it—but how, asked another, can historians put “excesses” aside from the devastating perspective of this century?Political and cultural self-examination was the dominant theme of this conference. Nationality, said Pippidi, depends on three factors, viz., name, language, religion, and territory. The Romanian name dates from the tenth century, indicating a separation of the Roman from the Greek tradition in Wallachia; and from the seventeenth century the idea of a mainly Roman provenance was given privilege. As a language, “Romanian” was spoken in the late Middle Ages, but the first written document is dated 1521. The principal religion in Romania was and is Greek orthodox, although there are also Roman Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, and German Protestant communities, as well as the Uniate church created in the eighteenth century. As for the territory, this has been a matter of change, conflict, and confusion throughout the tragic course... (shrink)

Rousseau’s project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have (...) seen Rousseau’s ideas as a prelude to communitarianism or authoritarianism, we should instead see his project as articulating an alternative model of moral-cognitivist reasoning. In order to provide a framework for this interpretation, I propose reading his conception of the general will through the theory of collective intentionality and social ontology. I end with a consideration of how this interpretation of the general will can provide a more satisfying understanding of political and practical rationality contemporary debates over republicanism and liberalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Human Rights, China, and Cross-Cultural Inquiry:Philosophy, History, and Power PoliticsRandall PeerenboomStephen Angle's Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) is a wonderful book that combines philosophically sophisticated discussions of controversial human-rights issues with a detailed intellectual history of the evolution of human-rights discourse in China over the last several hundred years. I will use Angle's book as a platform for consideration of (...) a number of issues regarding the role of philosophy, history, and power politics in relation to human rights in China and elsewhere.Angle focuses his discussion on two claims: first, that countries have different concepts of human rights, and second, that we ought not demand that countries comply with human-rights concepts different from their own.1 These two claims (or something similar) are central to China's official position on rights and to humanrights debates more generally, including the debate about values in Asia.2Angle's response, in short, is that there are distinctive concepts of human rights in China, and that "there have been both continuities and changes in the ways that rights have been conceptualized over the course of China's rich and distinctive rights discourse" (p. 250). However, the only way a community can unilaterally declare its values and practices immune from the scrutiny of others is through "parochialism," which, according to Angle, cuts off that community from making legitimate demands on others. Rather, he suggests, we "should seek an accommodation of differences with one another in the spirit of toleration, and on that basis engage one another on as many levels as possible" (pp. 250-251).One of the many great strengths of this book is that Angle grounds his responses in an interesting and insightful discussion of contemporary philosophers, assessing along the way the contributions and limits of MacIntrye, Rawls, Dworkin, Raz, Walzer, and especially Brandom, among others, to this cross-cultural inquiry of human rights. It might seem, given this list of luminaries, Angle's own training in Western analytic philosophy, and his position in the philosophy department of an American university, that Western philosophy is driving the debate and dictating the fundamental terms and parameters of the inquiry.3 This, of course, is precisely one of the complaints of non-Westerners such as Liu Huaqiu, who argue that they are being measured by Western standards, that rights are concepts grounded in historically contingent modern Western philosophical traditions, and that the rights movement is biased in favor of secular liberalism, which is at odds with and may preclude states based on religious worldviews and communitarian or collectivist [End Page 283] points of view that do not privilege autonomy, choice, and individual interests to the extent that liberals do.Angle's response is twofold. First, he argues, sensibly enough, that we cannot and need not set aside or escape our traditions and value systems. Cross-cultural inquiry must begin from somewhere. But we must remain open-minded and willing to continue the conversation, at least for a considerable while and in most cases indefinitely, even if in some cases we simultaneously must rely on coercion and repression.4 As discussed below, Angle endorses a limited moral pluralism that tolerates some differences while not providing an excuse for appeasing dictators or turning a blind eye to genocide and other atrocities.Second, Angle is not out simply to measure China by the standards of contemporary Western philosophers. Rather, he wants to show that China has its own distinctive discourse on rights, and that this discourse is multifaceted and constantly evolving. According to Angle, "Chinese rights discourse should be seen as an ongoing creative achievement, rather than a reaction to or misunderstanding of Western ideas and institutions" (p. 2).5 He shows this by providing a detailed intellectual history of Chinese rights discourse, another great strength of the book. His primary focus is on several prominent Neo-Confucians and pre-1949 debates, although he also considers some contemporary debates.6 Angle is clearly successful at demonstrating that Chinese thinkers have advanced a number of different views and that rights discourse over the last century and a half has been... (shrink)

Who protects individual liberties and human dignity from domination by the State, by Civil Society or by individuals is a question under debate in China as well as the West, not from the point of view of Liberalism, but from the point of view of ‘Relationality’. Liberalism posits the individual as the measure of these matters but the ‘individual’ in question is an abstraction. Relationality posits social relations as the measure of these matters. Persons are not abstractions. (...) They combine several different social ‘roles’, and each role includes obligations as well as rights. These roles limit the individual’s freedom of action. There are no unipersonal societies. Liberalism also posits rights as an abstraction: ‘All men are created equal’. Relationality posits rights in a context of mutual recognition of rights and responsibilities. Rights only exist if they can in fact be exercised. From the point of view of Relationality, therefore, a person’s ability to exercise her or his rights must be seen in the light of a concept of Justice and there must be an agency that can guarantee this Justice, the exercise of these rights, while it guarantees the fulfilment of social obligations. Is this the role of the State? of Civil Society? of the Market? To truly discuss these matters in a transcultural context, we would need to look for common ground, not take as ‘self-evident’ the classical Liberal perception of the individual. Understanding the underlying political philosophy of China’s concept of ‘responsive authoritarianism’ does not mean endorsing it. But understanding this idea and its ramifications does provide room for amplifying the basic question of who protects individual liberties and human dignity. (shrink)

The contest between “Lockeian liberalism” and “classical republicanism” as explanatory frameworks for the intellectual history of the American Revolution, and therefore of the present-day United States, has been one of the longest running and most distinguished in recent U.S. historiography. It also has major implications for the history of political thought in the North Atlantic Anglophone world more widely. Yet this debate was merely suspended when it was held to have ended in an ill-defined compromise. Although some U.S. (...) historians expressed doubts and qualifications, attention in U.S. historiography moved on to other themes while leaving the initial problem unsolved. This article reopens the question; it suggests that a historicization of both these two categories is now both possible and necessary, and that their supersession will advance understanding of the Revolution. It seeks to help solve this problem by the same means that the debate began: that is, by re-establishing a link between U.S. and U.K. historiographies. (shrink)