Issues concerning patients' rights are at the center of bioethics, but the political basis for these rights has rarely been examined. In Bioethics in a Liberal Society: The Political Framework of Bioethics Decision Making , Thomas May offers a compelling analysis of how the political context of liberal constitutional democracy shapes the rights and obligations of both patients and health care professionals. May focuses on how a key feature of liberal society -- namely, an individual's (...) right to make independent decisions -- has an impact on the most important relational facets of health care, such as patients' autonomy and professionals' rights of conscience. Although a liberal political framework protects individual judgments, May asserts that this right is based on the assumption of an individual's competency to make sound decisions. May uses case studies to examine society's approach to medical decision making when, for reasons ranging from age to severe mental disorder, a person lacks sufficient competency to make independent and fully informed choices. To protect the autonomy of these vulnerable patients, May emphasizes the need for health care ethics committees and ethics consultants to help guide the decision-making process in clinical settings. Bioethics in a Liberal Society is essential reading for all those interested in understanding how bioethics is practiced within our society. (shrink)

Departing from the usual discussions of public morality, and considering the moral interests of the community as a whole, this book is a contribution to this intensely debated theme and considers how public morality can be justified in theory and accommodated in practice in a liberal society.

Matteo Bonotti’s book on Partisanship and Public Reason in Diverse Societies is grounded on a theory of partisanship that sees the demands of public reason as internal to the very definition of a party. Bonotti suggests that partisanship is not only compatible with but essential to the stability and legitimacy of a well-ordered liberal society. My paper aims to raise some questions internal to the liberal account of partisanship so as to probe the methodological foundations and plausibility (...) of the liberal framework taken as a whole. My argument is that the assumption of a sufficiently just liberal society on which the book grounds its defence of partisanship makes us ill-equipped to face some of the most critical challenges that liberal societies face in the world that we live. (shrink)

One of Max Charlesworth’s most important contributions has been to the development of contemporary bioethical thinking. In Bioethics in a Liberal Society, Charlesworth explores the consequences of the liberal commitment to the core value of autonomy across a range of areas beginning with the end of life. Focusing on just this latter issue, this contribution explores the question whether the principle of autonomy is indeed adequate to be the primary principle on the basis of which to address (...) the issues surrounding the end of life. Part of the underlying concern here is thus with the nature of our dying in a ‘liberal society’ of the sort Charlesworth describes. (shrink)

This article responds to the upswing in commentary on growing inequality around the globe, but especially in characteristically ‘liberal’ societies supposedly holding equality as a central ideal. To assess this situation, I argue that debates about equality and justice need to be complimented by a reformulation of the idea of the ‘balance of power’. Toward that end I propose that this idea needs to be liberated from its traditional context of international relations, and generalized to become an analytical tool (...) for social analysis at all levels: micro, meso and macro. I provide a sketch of how power is typically balanced at the meso-level of the liberal polity, arguing that these need to be understood as complex systems that both concentrate and distribute power. I then return to the problem of inequality and justice, arguing that regardless of what is fair, broad distributions of power (less inequality) are in our pragmatic self-interest because our autonomy and self-determination is more secure under these circumstances. But more deeply, a wide balance of power is fundamentally good, because it is the necessary preconditions for relations of trust, mutual recognition, respect and interdependence. (shrink)

I make a proposal for how one can continue to teach poetry through official channels in a liberal society, conceived as a set of rules for citizens who disagree on a lot of things, including the value of poetry. The proposal is to quote inspiring or relevant poems in textbooks for other disciplines.

Confucian scholars should satisfy two conditions insofar as they think their theories enable Confucianism to make contributions to liberal politics and social policy. The liberal accommodation condition stipulates that the theory in question should accommodate as many reasonable conceptions of the good and religious doctrines as possible while the intelligibility condition stipulates that the theory must have a recognizable Confucian character. By and large, Joseph Chan’s Confucian perfectionism is able to satisfy the above two conditions. However, contrary to (...) Chan and many other Confucian scholars, I argue that any active promotion of Confucianism will violate the liberal accommodation condition. I propose the “wide view of moderate perfectionism,” which enables Confucianism to shed light on a wide range of political and social issues without promoting Confucianism actively. Thus, I present a new approach to the long-standing question of how Confucianism may improve political and social development in a liberal society. (shrink)

Much of the world will be living in broadly "liberal" societies for the foreseeable future. Sustainability and security, however defined, must therefore be considered in the context of such societies, yet there is very little significant literature that does so. Indeed, much ecologically-oriented literature is overtly anti-liberal, as have been some recent responses to security concerns. This book explores the implications for sustainability and security of a range of intellectual perspectives on liberalism, such as those offered by John (...) Rawls, Robert Nozick, Frederick Hayek, Ronald Dworkin, Michael Oakeshott, Amartya Sen and Jrgen Habermas. (shrink)

We live in a liberal, democratic, multicultural society where ideally the values of personal liberty and autonomy are paramount. In such a society the state, through the law, should not be concerned with telling people how they should live their lives. In spite of this, many of the ethical stances taken in liberal societies are paternalistic and authoritarian. This readable and balanced book is an original discussion of contemporary issues in bioethics. Max Charlesworth argues that as (...) there can be no public consensus on a set of core values – liberal societies accept a variety of religious, non-religious, political and moral stances - there should be a plurality of ethical stances as well. On this basis he discusses issues such as the ending of human life, the new reproductive technologies and ethical distribution of limited health-care resources, particularly hospital care. (shrink)

When new laws are being considered to regulate emerging technologies, it is common to engage in a formal consultation process to assess community views, especially in sensitive areas where views may differ widely. However, it is not clear how we should assess the responses to such consultation. If the respondents with the most extreme views, at either end of the political or ethical spectrum, speak in large numbers or strong language, their submissions surely cannot be added up and given the (...) weight of the majority in determining the course of future action. The ‘silent majority’ of the community may not participate in the consultation process at all. Even if they do participate more fully, it will often not be possible to find a compromise solution that offers something to everyone.Professor Charlesworth considered these issues in his ground-breaking book, Bioethics in a Liberal Society. He said that there are some issues on which community consensus on a core set of values will not be possible. To move forward, a liberal society must accept that there will be a range of views but however discordant those views appear to be, it may still be possible to identify matters on which there is agreement. Those matters may then form the basis of a policy that is widely accepted, even if it is not what the individual participants would have chosen initially. This approach may be illustrated by examining recent community consultation in Australia concerning research involving human embryos. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo se presenta una reflexión crítica de la propuesta ética liberal de Charles Taylor y su viabilidad en el contexto político de las sociedades liberales actuales. Una conformación social y política liberal se entiende como aquella donde se promueven y se defiende mayores libertades en esquemas de derechos individuales junto con la exigencia del respeto a esas garantías individuales. Sin embargo, el contexto político liberal, siendo el más idóneo en las sociedades actuales, presenta varios (...) problemas éticos que Taylor ya ha identificado como malestares de la modernidad, tales como el exceso de individualismo, la primacía de la razón instrumental y la fragmentación y polarización de la sociedad. Ante estos retos y conflictos que surgen por el propio liberalismo, la ética de Taylor es una alternativa posible para comprenderlos y gestionarlos desde un civismo ético y la promoción de metas comunes. ABSTRACT This article presents a critical reflection on the liberal ethical proposal of Charles Taylor and its viability in the political context of current liberal societies. A liberal social and political configuration is understood as one in which greater liberties are promoted and defended in individual rights schemes together with the requirement of respect for those individual guarantees. However, the liberal political context although the most suitable in current societies, presents several ethical problems that Taylor has already identified as the malaise of modernity: excess of individualism, primacy of instrumental reason and fragmentation and polarization of the society. Faced with these challenges and conflicts arising from the liberalism itself, Taylor's ethics is a possible alternative to understand and manage them from an ethical civility and the promotion of common goals. (shrink)

One of the most important assumptions in liberal societies is that citizens should be tolerant of a diversity of values. We are challenged by this assumption to justify restraint when we confront what we oppose, disapprove of, or perceive to be immoral, even if we have the power to suppress perceived immoralities. Based on the work of Elliot Turiel, Jonathan Haidt, and Gerald Gaus, the argument developed in this article is that the best way to address the challenge is (...) to distinguish between public morality and other normative categories such as convention and private morality. Public morality circumscribes what should not be publicly tolerated. Conventional and private immoralities that are not prohibited by public morality should be tolerated. (shrink)

Why should leaders of polities; as representatives of citizens; be required to apologise and make reparations for deeds committed in the historical past? Assumptions commonly made by liberals about the scope of responsibility and the duties of citizens make this question difficult to answer. This paper considers some unsuccessful attempts within a liberal framework to defend obligations of reparation for historical injustices and puts forward an account based on the lifetime-transcending interests of citizens.

This article examines Richard Rorty’s much criticized figure of the ironist, and the role that it plays in liberal society. It argues that, against Rorty’s own presentation, irony might have positive social consequences. It does so by examining Rorty’s description of the ironist, arguing that it contains different ideas which emerge at different points in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. It takes up William Curtis’ claim that irony is a civic virtue, one closely associated with liberal ideas such (...) as tolerance and pluralism. Curtis is insightful in identifying this aspect of irony, but I argue that it might also play a further role. The ironist is concerned with self-creation, something which Rorty takes to be a private activity, but I argue that the selves ironists create might potentially benefit liberal society, with the ironist’s redescriptions calling into question received wisdom and alerting us to unnoticed forms of cruelty. (shrink)

This paper argues for the importance of the political context of a society for bioethics. In particular, I argue that in a liberal constitutional society, such as the one we find ourselves in, no particular moral perspective is granted a privileged position. Rather, individuals are allowed to live their lives according to values they adopt for themselves, and the rights granted to protect this ability “trump” social consensus, and place boundaries on the social application of personal moral (...) beliefs and values. (shrink)

In this Paper I am concerned to argue that the traditionally and contemporarily important arguments for a liberal society do provide a justification for what may fairly be called a liberal society. However, many liberals may wish to deny that the society which these arguments are seen to justify when their various limitations and qualifications are noted, can properly be called liberal, for it is less committed to non-interference with liberty than is the (...) class='Hi'>liberal society which those who advance these arguments believe to be justified by them. (shrink)

One prominent criticism of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples is that it treats certain non-liberal societies, what Rawls calls ‘decent hierarchical societies’, as equal participants in a just international system. Rawls claims that these non-liberal societies should be respected as equals by liberal democratic societies, even though they do not grant their citizens the basic rights of democratic citizenship. This is presented by Rawls as a consequence of liberalism’s commitment to the principle of toleration. A number (...) of critics have claimed that Rawls’s treatment of these non-liberal societies is symptomatic of a more general problem with political liberalism, namely, its reliance on toleration as its ‘fundamental principle’. Against this view, I argue that the principle of toleration should not be understood as political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’. This is revealed through a consideration of the normative basis of what Rawls calls the ‘Liberal Principle of Legitimacy’. A correct understanding of political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’, which I claim is a principle of equal ‘civic respect’ for citizens, shows that Rawls’s toleration of non-liberal societies is in fact a misapplication of political liberalism to the global domain. Moreover, I explain that political liberalism must assert that the principle of equal civic respect for citizens is the correct principle to govern the public political relations of citizens in all pluralist societies, and that most ‘decent hierarchical societies’ are pluralist in nature. Identifying political liberalism’s fundamental principle as that of equal civic respect for citizens helps to render political liberalism, in both the domestic and international domains, a more coherent and compelling approach to thinking about fundamental political issues. Key Words: civic respect • international relations • justice • political liberalism • Rawls • toleration. (shrink)

What legal rights and duties immigrants should have is among the most ferociously debated topics in the politics of liberal societies today. However, as this article will show, there is remarkably little disagreement of great magnitude among political theorists and philosophers of immigration on the rights and duties of resident immigrants (even in contrast to the closely related philosophical discussion of justice in immigrant admissions). Specifically, this article will survey philosophical positions both on what legal rights immigrants (documented permanent (...) residents, guestworkers, and undocumented immigrants) ought to have (including to citizenship and against deportation), and on what liberal societies may justly do to require immigrants to integrate. This article will reveal that there is a substantial, growing gap between contemporary politics worldwide and what the moral norms of liberalism seem to entail concerning the rights and duties of immigrants. (shrink)

The paper discusses three aspects of belonging to religious systems of belief within a modern liberal society, namely (1) the sincerity and consistency of belief, (2) the possibility of exteriorization of belief through broader social interactions or transactions, and (3) the relationship between religious belief and the modern concept of affirmative tolerance, or affirmation of differences, which has become a pronounced public policy in multicultural liberal societies. The author argues that, while negative tolerance allows sincere religious belief (...) to flourish in the private sphere and for benevolence to be shown to those who are seen as mistaken in their beliefs, affirmative tolerance opens an array of logical issues. The demand to extend potential substantive validation to opposed beliefs produces the ricochet effect of de-validating one’s own beliefs. This creates difficulties for religious communities when issues at stake are beliefs that, in the respective belief-systems, are definitive of the moral goodness and moral badness. Upon a more careful examination of the logical relations between the soteriological promises characteristic of what is sometimes called the ‘substantive’ layer of religiousness, on the one hand, and the public expectation of a tolerant coexistence of religious communities on a social level, on the other hand, it becomes clear that the tolerance required can only be a negative tolerance. Any expectation of affirmative tolerance de-values the soteriological script of the respective system of religious belief, and is thus likely to lead to serious disturbances in a liberal context of multi-cultural coexistence. The author argues that the recent political announcements of a ‘failure of the multicultural experiment’ are caused by the aggressive pursuit of ‘affirmative tolerance’ rather than by any in-built intolerance of others in any of the large religious belief systems now prevalent in the liberal democratic world. (shrink)

Gaylin and Jennings tell us that we must change the everyday behavior shaping the landscape of modern American society. Our current culture of autonomy is predicated on rationality as the basis of human conduct. But, we are reminded here, man is not inherently rational; appeals to emotion are far more effective than logical argument in changing our conduct.

Cardinal Etchegaray argues here that the dialogue between church and state, with both parties rooted in sometimes conflicting absolute claims and values, has become more recently a wider-ranging dialogue between the church and a pluralist, relativist liberal society. The very definition of “liberal society” is open to argument, and the church may find elements to commend or oppose in any given definition. Since the nineteenth century the church has often found itself in opposition to various ideas (...) of “liberty,” especially those that represent an idolatry of absolute rights that push aside Christian spiritual and moral concerns. Now that liberalism has become the pervasive model for society, the church finds it may more easily express its critique, with the aim of making society more conducive to allowing people to become fully human. Indeed, the church provides a necessary check on the excesses of liberal society, particularly those of capitalism and democratic populism. Its essential point is the transcendent dimension of the human person—our connection with the divine. The pursuit of economic and political ends needs to be governed by a concern for the ethical, itself founded on the divine. Liberal society will only live up to its own highest aspirations through promoting self-mastery and an awareness that humanity’s freedom is ultimately found only in God. (shrink)

이 글은 오늘날 자유주의 사회에서 살아가는 한 개인이자 시민으로서 어떻게 살아야 하 는가라는 질문과 그 답을 로티적 자유주의 사회, 문화, 시민에 대한 성찰에서 구하고자 한 다. 로티적 논변의 논리적 구조는 다음과 같다. ‘우리가 자유주의적 자아론을 인정한다면, 자유주의적 사회를 정당화할 수 있다. 그리고 우리가 공동체주의적 자아론을 긍정한다면, 자유주의적 사회를 거부해야 한다. 그런데 우리는 전자를 인정하거나 후자를 긍정한다. 따 라서 우리는 자유주의 사회를 정당화하거나 거부해야 한다.’ 로티는 이 모순되는 결론을 피하기 위해서 딜레마의 양 뿔 사이를 피해 가는 논변을 제시한다. 자유주의자와 공동체주 의자는 (...) 모두 철학적 자아론으로부터 사회론을 정당화하거나 부정할 수 있다고 가정하지 만, 로티는 그 가정이 필요하지 않다고 생각한다. 오히려 사회론은 현실의 구체적 제도와 문화에 대한 역사적이고 사회학적 서술로 정당화될 수 있다. 따라서 자유주의 사회를 특정 자아론에 의해 정당화하거나 부정하는 결론이 아니라, 문제가 되는 자유주의 사회의 제도 와 문화 및 구체적 시민에 대해서 개선된 모습을 희망적으로 제안하는 일이 더욱 중요하 다. 이것이 로티적 결론이다. 로티는 개선된 자유주의 사회, 문화, 시민의 유토피아적 모습을 제안한다. 이상적인 자 유주의 사회는 ‘정치적·문화적 자유’가 사회의 유일한 목표이고, 이상적인 자유주의 문화 는 과학적 문화가 아니라 시적 문화이며, 이상적인 자유주의 시민은 타인과 함께 할 수 없 는 자신만의 독특한 사적 욕망을 추구하는 데 아무런 거리낌이 없는 대담한 시인이자 이 론적 아이러니스트이면서, 동시에 타인의 고통에 책임감을 느끼면서 함께 공감하고 연대 하는 실천적 자유주의자이다. 다만 현실적으로 사적 욕망과 공적 책임의 문제가 상충할 때 로티는 공적 책임을 우선해야 한다고 주장한다. ‘철학(이론)에 대한 민주주의(실천)의 우선성’을 주장한다. 사적 자아 완성을 추구하는 이론적 욕망과 공적 연대를 확대하기 위한 실천적 책임은 한 인간의 서로 다른 관심 방향이기 때문에 서로 충돌할 필요가 없지만, 간 혹 특정 시점이나 환경에서 한 인간의 삶에 동시에 요구될 때 우리는 사적 완성이 아니라 공적 실천과 책임을 우선하자는 게 로티의 제안이자 권유이다. 자유주의 사회의 시민성에 대한 로티적 성찰은 우리 사회의 제도와 구성원의 행위에 관 한 성찰로 이어진다. 로티에게서 한 사회의 도덕적 진보는 잔인성을 감소하려는 제도와 관 행 들에 의해 측정된다. 한 사회가 구성원들에게 과거보다 제도적으로 덜 잔인해지거나 구 성원들이 서로에게 덜 잔인하게 행동할 때 그 사회의 도덕적 진보는 그만큼 달성된다. 마 찬가지로 우리 사회가 도덕적으로 더 나은 사회가 되기 위해서는 제도적으로 시민들에게 가하는 공권력의 폭력이 더 잘 통제되는 ‘법치’가 잘 작동해야 하고, 더불어 개인의 양심과 사상과 언론의 자유 등 정치적 자유가 잘 실현되어야 한다. 나아가 개인적 신념이나 집단 적 신념의 차이 때문에 개인적으로나 집단적으로 서로를 증오하고 적대하는 정치적 행위 를 줄여나가야 한다. 그 대신 더 크고 넓은 ‘우리-지향’을 향해 서로를 연대하고 함께 할 시민으로 생각할 필요가 있다. (shrink)

I have argued elsewhere (Jackson 1991) that even if it were feasible to found peace on procedural justice or prudential fear alone, this would be to sacrifice a value (agape) that is indispensable to the meaning of life in order to secure a real but lesser good. Christianity, in contrast, puts charity first as a reason for action. Paul Weithman maintains that John Rawls raises more difficult questions for the strong agapist than I realized. Through an examination of Weithman's argument (...) concerning (1) moral self-sacrifice and (2) the constraints on public justification of political purposes, I reaffirm the deficiencies of Rawlsian liberalism. (shrink)

RésuméLes soins sont cruciaux pour toute société ; cependant, les théories de la justice les ignorent souvent dans leur analyse. La théorie d'Asha Bhandary sur la prise en charge libérale de la dépendance cherche autant à rectifier l'invisibilité des soins qu’à défendre les principes de justice concernant les modalités de soins en revendiquant plusieurs modifications importantes à la théorie de la justice de John Rawls. Dans cet article, j'analyse les modifications de Bhandary à la théorie de Rawls pour examiner comment (...) la prise en charge libérale de la dépendance s'intègre dans un cadre politique libéral plus large, tout en protégeant contre l'oppression. J’évalue également la licéité et les limites de l'enseignement de l'autonomie et des habiletés de soins aux enfants dans une société politiquement libérale. (shrink)

There is a divide within political and legal theory concerning the justification of hate-crime legislation in liberal states. Opponents of Hate-Crime Legislation have recently argued that enhanced punishment for hate-motivated crimes cannot be justified within political liberal states. More specifically, Heidi Hurd argues that criminal sanction which target character dispositions unfairly target individuals for characteristics not readily under their control. She further argues that a ‘character’ based approach in criminal law is necessarily illiberal and violates the state’s commitment (...) to political neutrality. In the current paper, I attempt to show the difficulties and absurdity that follows from Hurd’s characterization of hate- rimes. I aim to show that punishment for undesirable character traits is consistent with western conceptions of criminal law. Upon doing so, I then go on to construct a positive argument for the justifiability of punishing for character traits as well as for the enhanced punishment associated with hate-motivated crimes. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family:CalistoMT;} From his theory of communicative action (1981) until his later political writings, the philosopher Jürgen Habermas has put on the juridical language the main responsibility of describing the essence of Civil Society. That´s why the Habermasian analysis becomes a defence of a capitalistic conception of the actual (...) society, turning around a strict notion of individual. (shrink)

Ideally, should liberals in a pluralistic society be able to agree to abide by a common legal system such that all their disputes are resolved without resort to illegal force? Rawls believes the answer is “yes.” I explain and defend his answer, but I also conclude, focusing on the example of abortion, that the truth is “not necessarily, not always.” Rawls’s conceptions of reasonable citizens and public reason help explain why there is a strong prima facie duty to forswear (...) illegal force. It is based on the duty to respect others, which requires that one be able to justify one's actions to them insofar as they are reasonable and matters of basic justice are at issue. One cannot justify using illegal force to those who reasonably think a law is just; to them it is a form of disrespect. Nonetheless, if one reasonably thinks that a fundamental injustice is tolerated or even established by the law, then one may be no less reasonable than one has reason to be if one uses illegal force, sacrificing this form of respect to right a greater wrong. (shrink)