Liberal Democratic Law, the Ethics of Civility, and Agonistic Politics between Hegemony and Compromise This article brings Van der Walt’s argument on the importance of an ‘ethics of civility’ in liberal democracies into dialogue with agonistic democratic theory. While agonists agree with Van der Walt that democracy requires citizens’ readiness to live with views that they do not consider ‘reasonable enough,’ they focus on the political processing of conflicts among political actors with opposing views of what is reasonable. (...) The article argues that agonism may be a suitable complement to Van der Walt’s argument, because it shows how politics can help foster citizens’ willingness to act according to the demands of an ‘ethics of civility.’ It refers to Chantal Mouffe’s and James Tully’s agonistic theories and shows that both describe forms of conflict processing that prevent situations in which an ‘ethics of civility’ would demand too unequally distributed sacrifices: continued hegemonic struggle in the case of Mouffe and compromise in the case of Tully. (shrink)

It has often been noted that liberal democracies are facing a serious political crisis. A common reaction to this situation is to call for more comprehensive or more effective liberal democratic education. This volume discusses some of the most important challenges to and critiques of the paradigm of liberal democratic education. In doing so, it offers novel insights into how liberal democratic education can be amended, extended or qualified to address the special challenges of the current (...) political moment. (shrink)

In recent decades, the discipline of bioethics has grown rapidly, as has the practice of ethical consultation. Interestingly, this new recognition of the relevance of moral philosophy to our daily life has been accompanied by skepticism among philosophers regarding the existence of moral expertise or the benefits of philosophical training. In his recent article in Bioethics, William R. Smith suggested that this skepticism is rooted in philosophers' belief that moral expertise is inconsistent with liberal–democratic values, when in fact they (...) are compatible. In this paper, we provide a unique opportunity to empirically examine Smith's observation by utilizing and extending global data on philosophers' beliefs about moral expertise, involving 4087 philosophers from 96 countries. Our findings support Smith's theoretical observation and show that societal levels of support for liberal–democratic values are associated with greater skepticism about moral expertise. We suggest that these findings might be explained by the cognitive process of motivated reasoning and an invalid inference of “is” from “ought.” Consequently, the potential tension between moral expertise and liberal–democratic values is invalidly used for rejecting the existence of moral expertise, while its main and valid implication is for how moral expertise should be applied in liberal–democratic settings. (shrink)

This article contributes to the debate concerning the identification of politically relevant cases of corruption in a democracy by sketching the basic traits of an original liberal theory of institutional corruption. We define this form of corruption as a deviation with respect to the role entrusted to people occupying certain institutional positions, which are crucial for the implementation of public rules, for private gain. In order to illustrate the damages that corrupt behaviour makes to liberal democratic institutions, we (...) discuss the case of health care professionals’ abuse of their right to conscientious objection to abortion services. We show that the conscience clause can be instrumentally abused to sabotage democratically established public rules and thus exert undue private influence on their implementation. In this sense, from a liberal democratic perspective, institutional corruption is problematic because it is disruptive of such fundamental liberal ideals as the impartiality of public institutions and citizens’ political equality. (shrink)

This paper suggests that liberal democratic governments adopt a reconciliatory approach to conscientious disobedience. Central to this approach is the view – independent of whether conscientious disobedience is always morally justified – that conscientious disobedience is normatively distinct from other criminal acts with similar effects, and such distinction is worthy of acknowledgment by public apparatus and actors. The prerogative applies to both civil and uncivil instances of disobedience, as defined and explored in the paper. Governments and courts ought to (...) take the normative distinction seriously and treat the conscientious disobedients in a more lenient way than they treat ordinary criminals. A comprehensive legislative scheme for governments to deal with prosecution, sentencing, and imprisonment of the conscientious disobedients will be proposed, with the normative and practical benefits of such an approach discussed in detail. (shrink)

In this essay I situate Rawls’s conception of liberal democratic toleration within the account of political and law-making activity undertaken by free equals that he develops across his three main...

How do we prevent the next pandemic? Will governments successfully tackle climate change? Will they find ways to close the gap between the haves and have-nots and to eliminate poverty? Which solution - democratic or authoritarian - will determine the global governance of a flawed nation-state system? This unique contribution to global studies advances a multidisciplinary theory that the governments of all human societies are the tenuous outcome of the competing solutions to the Imperatives of Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy (OWL). (...) The OWL paradigm provides a common framework to evaluate the contrasting responses of the liberal democratic, Chinese, and Russian solutions to global governance. Underscored is the volume's contention that global governance is the overriding issue confronting nation-states and the diverse and divided peoples of what is now a global society for the first time in the evolution of the species. The volume addresses a wide spectrum of audiences, united in their shared resolve that the democracies prevail in a projected century-long struggle between democratic and authoritarian regimes to determine global governance. Scholars, teachers, students, elected officials, policy analysts, media professionals, and engaged citizens who make self-government work will profit from this visionary and provocative study. (shrink)

The Triumph of Liberal Democratic Peace and the Dangers of Its Success” provides an overview of the “liberal democratic peace theory” that is associated with Kant and has been developed by Doyle and other contemporary scholars. The chapter examines the problem of wars that are fought in the name of democracy and the way that the liberal democratic peace theory can end up encouraging military interventions. It argues that a careful understanding of the Kantian democratic peace theory (...) can resist the urge to intervene. It employs Galtung’s notion of cultural violence to provide a critique of interventionist peace action. It concludes by advising that we work to find a way to build bridges between democracies and non-democracies. (shrink)

The essays in Part III of the book, on liberal constraints and traditionalist education, argue for a more regulatory conception of liberal education and emphasize the need for some controls over cultural and religious educational authority. Walter Feinberg’s essay, on religious education in liberal–democratic societies in relation to the question of accountability and autonomy, takes up the issue of educational constraints with respect to religious schools in such societies. While he allows that religious education need not be (...) inconsistent with liberal goals, and can find reasons why some liberal societies feel it appropriate to provide public support for religious schools, he argues that certain conditions can render such support tyrannical and unwise. He concludes that if the conditions are appropriate for public support of religious schools, then there should also be significant public control. After an introduction in Section 14.1, the chapter has six further sections: Section 14.2 discusses some of the potential lines of conflict between religious liberal education and public education; Section 14.3 examines a number of arguments that have been advanced in support of public funding for religious schools; Section 14.4 looks at a potentially fundamental reason for denying public funding for religious schools – that it would be tyrannical to take tax funds from one believer in order to advance the beliefs of another – and the implications as regards the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; both Sections 14.4 and 14.5 suggest some of the conditions that need to be satisfied in order to supply this funding – primarily that it must be predicated on the school advancing individual and social autonomy; Section 14.6 briefly suggests what such an arrangement might entail for the traditional way in which the public/private divide is conceived; Section 14.7 concludes. (shrink)

How Do We Make Liberal Democratic Law Together? Remarks on Van der Walt’s Notion of a ‘Diffuse We’ In the last section of the article ‘Rawls, Habermas and Liberal Democracy,’ Van der Walt introduces the notion of a ‘diffuse we’ to delineate the role that constituent power plays in his account of liberal democratic law. This contribution raises questions about Van der Walt’s understanding of a liberal democratic community as a plural self. The first part of (...) the article reviews some of the core passages of his The Concept of Liberal Democratic Law to highlight the different accounts of the unity of a liberal democratic community, which Van der Walt rejects. The last part of the paper questions the (epistemic) conditions under which the ‘diffuse we’ proposed by Van der Walt can socially cooperate and express a shared commitment to be bound by liberal democratic norms. (shrink)

This book brings together essays by leading political, legal, and educational theorists to re-examine the requirements of citizenship education in liberal-democratic societies. The chapters in the book evaluate demands by minority groups for cultural recognition through education, and also examine arguments for and against citizenship education as a means of fostering a shared national identity.

Liberal democratic theory is the ideological expression of capitalism. Its paramount function is to justify the distribution of property and power which permits a minority of men to exploit and dominate the lives of the majority. A crucial device for carrying out this task is the elaboration of a theory of political equality which maintains the economic foundation of capitalism. But as capitalism is itself an evolving system, so the theory which protects its interests passes through important stages. A (...) fundamental change occurs in the transition from classical liberal theory to its contemporary articulation as political science. For Locke and Mill an egalitarian directive is first abstractly posited and then, through specific modification, withdrawn. For Schumpeter, however, what the classical doctrine would have regarded as the perversion of democracy, is itself made integral to the redefinition of the democratic process. The result of the behavioral restatement is the destruction of the tension which separates ideal imperatives from distorted reality and obfuscates the need and possibility of radical political change. (shrink)

Johan van der Walt’s book The Concept of Liberal Democratic Law is an insightful reflection on, as its title promises, the concept of liberal democratic law. It proposes a clear articulation of wha...

In this dissertation I seek to answer the question, “What are the virtues of the excellent citizen in a liberal democracy?" This question is important on three levels. First, if civic virtue is as important to the perpetuation of liberal democratic community as neo-liberal and communitarian thinkers have argued, then curiosity alone should motivate us. Second, if projects to foster the virtues are critical, then we must understand the virtues in order to foster them effectively and appropriately. (...) Third, those who wish to attain greater excellence in citizenship need to know what the virtues are so that they may pursue them. In Chapters One and Two, I argue that current accounts of civic virtue are deficient because they fail to explore its basis, nature, and constituents. To better understand civic virtue, we must explore specific citizen virtues. To fulfill this aim, we require a citizen virtue catalog structured by an explanatory framework that is anchored in the role-based nature of citizen virtue. Such a framework provides the rationale for determining which virtues should be included in the catalog and which should not as well as a basis for comparing competing catalogs. As the role of citizen is to assist his state, the citizen virtues are those qualities that enable the citizen to assist the state in achieving its aims” in protecting, promoting, and realizing the liberal democratic ideals (namely, freedom, equality, self-government, collective cooperation, and stability). In the remaining chapters, I survey neo-liberal accounts of citizen virtue proposed by Richard Dagger, William Galston, David Jones, Mark Kingwell, Stephen Macedo, and Thomas Spragens, Jr. I apply the Chapter Two framework to assess the virtue candidates they propose. These chapters share a common format but differ in focus. Chapter Three takes up the citizen virtues that treat political community: cooperation, participation, vigilance, deliberative excellence, and obedience to law. Chapter Four, the liberal citizen virtues: allegiance to liberal democratic community, tolerance, and respect for rights. And Chapter Five, the citizen virtues relating to self-governance: autonomy, responsibility, and restraint. Chapter Six concludes. (shrink)

Is there a principled way to understand what liberal democratic states owe, as a matter of justice, to the victims of disasters? This article shows what is normatively special and distinctive about disasters and argues for the view that there are substantial duties of justice for liberal democratic states. The article rejects both a libertarian and a utilitarian approach to this question and, based on broadly Rawlsian principles, argues for a ‘political definition’ of disasters that is concerned with (...) the restoration of citizens' dignity and their capacities for effective citizenship. (shrink)

Rawls, Habermas and Liberal Democratic Law The theoretical undertakings of both Rawls and Habermas pivot on an aspiration to explain (and surely to promote through explanation) the Enlightenment ideal of reason reflected in the idea of liberal democracy. The thoughts developed in my book The Concept of Liberal Democratic Law (2020, CLDL hereafter) pivot on the same aspiration. What obviously distinguishes the theoretical undertaking in CLDL from those of Habermas and Rawls, is the greater emphasis in CLDL (...) on the precariousness of this ideal of reason. This article first gives a short exposition of some of the main lines of thought developed in CLDL. It then moves on to an analysis of Rawls’ theory of political liberalism and Habermas’ discourse-theoretical explanation of the legitimacy of modern law through the prism of the key elements of CLDL highlighted in the first part of the article. (shrink)

Elements of the relation between religion and politics are standard themes in political theory: toleration and free exercise rights; the parameters of separation of church and state; arguments for and against constraints imposed on religious discourse by philosophic norms of public reason. But religious parties and partisanship are no part of political theory, despite contemporary interest in value pluralism and in liberal democratic theory's capacity to address multicultural, religious, and ethnic group claims. This essay argues that religious parties are (...) missing elements in discussions of identity politics. They play an important role not just in expressing but also in constructing and mobilizing religious political identity. Political activity linked to parties is a principal way of bringing diffuse, politically unorganized groups, whose leaders are self-appointed and not regularly accountable for the way they represent co-religionists in political life, into the democratic mainstream. With political organization and especially partisanship, the fact of pluralism is made concrete for democratic purposes. (shrink)

The political self is a concept which is fundamental to political theory. This work focuses an liberal democratic theory because this type of political theory privileges the individual. It is ideal ground for rethinking a concept of the political self. ;I propose to look at abstractions and idealizations which are theoretical tools used in determining a concept of the political self. These: valuable theoretical manoeuvres are not value-neutral. A critical stance must always be taken when such conceptualizations are undertaken. (...) The conception of the political person in the theory of John Rawls will be examined through the lens of the concepts of autonomy and difference. This will focus our attention to the particular theoretical endeavours which-have excised certain features from the concept of the political person. I argue that the fiction of the 'persons in the original position' in Rawls's theory has been extended to an ideal of the political person which excludes certain individuals. This extension is unwarranted and detrimental to some individuals. ;I analyze the categories of the public-private since these are tied to a notion of the self. I claim that profound difference cannot be accommodated within the public realm of traditional liberal theory; it forces the concerns of certain individuals, such as care givers and persons with severe incapacities, into the private realm. These individuals are relegated to the private sphere only and consequently suffer from a devalued moral status. This devalued moral status within political society comes from the fact that they can not approximate the ideal of a fully cooperating member of society. This, I argue, goes against the ideal of a just society which values selves as individuals of equal moral worth. ;Finally, I suggest that our theorisation has always involved a certain detachment from bodily concerns. These have been erased from our theoretical considerations; I claim they have theoretical import. I suggest that we need to think of the political self as a whole self. The liberal focus on interests or goods should be supplemented by an understanding of needs. The latter address our interdependency as well as our vulnerability. The call for political presence is more than just a call to be heard, it's a call to be seen and recognized in the flesh. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine some of the ways in which Koizumi Junichiro took advantage of changes in television news to win the 2001 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election and become prime minister of Japan. Koizumi adopted a strategy of political populism to increase his exposure in the media and develop a public reputation. Changes in the LDP selection procedure, in combination with long-term social and economic change and political reform, meant that the media mattered more to his (...) campaign than had previously been the case. We use data from the Japan Election Study II (JES II) to show that the effects of Koizumi' media-driven popularity and style of politics reversed the LDP' electoral fortunes in the Upper House Election in 2001. (shrink)

¿Deben tener derecho los estados democráticos liberales a excluir a los inmigrantes de su territorio? Este artículo cuestiona dos argumentos centrales a favor del control de las fronteras: (1) el derecho exclusivo del estado al asentamiento en un determinado territorio; y (2) el derecho exclusivo de los ciudadanos y residentes legales a la pertenencia a dicho estado. El artículo muestra que los estados contemporáneos no mantienen una vinculación inexorable a un trozo particular de tierra que les permita justificar el derecho (...) exclusivo de asentamiento y que los habitantes no pueden defender coherentemente su restricción unilateral al acceso a la pertenencia. Para terminar, el artículo desarrolla una visión alternativa de los derechos territoriales estatales. (shrink)

Remarks on Johan van der Walt’s Concept of Liberal Democratic Law: With Kelsen, Beyond Kelsen and the Unexplored Issue of Independent Technocratic Institutions This article engages with Van der Walt’s concept of liberal democratic law. Firstly, it shows that his concept is significantly influenced by Hans Kelsen’s theory, mainly by Kelsen’s democratic political theory but also by Kelsen’s legal theory (insofar as the latter is considered to be related to the former). Secondly, it demonstrates that he goes also (...) beyond Kelsen’s theory by considering necessary for the sustainability of liberal democratic law an adequate social state. Given this, I argue that there is, to an extent, a proximity to Hermann Heller’s social Rechtsstaat theory. Thirdly, it shows that – although the socio-economic level is, to an extent, considered – he leaves unexplored the rise of independent technocratic institutions in the economic governance framework of contemporary liberal democracies (the independent central banks, like the European Central Bank, being the main example). I argue that this issue needs to be explored in order to reach a realistic understanding of liberal democratic law (an understanding that Van der Walt aims at). (shrink)

Richard Rorty's moral writings offer a cogent summary of the moral content of contemporary liberal democratic culture. Rorty insists on a divide between our public and private lives, yet he claims that moral progress is primarily driven by the imagination of great poetry and philosophy . A pressing tension thus emerges between private imagination and public moral justification, which is also very real in contemporary liberal democratic culture itself. I sketch a way out of this problem, which fits (...) well with the pragmatism he shares with William James and John Dewey. (shrink)

Reason, religion, and public culture have been of significant interest recently, with critics reevaluating modernity's conception of secularism and calling for a “postsecular” public discourse. Simultaneously, one sees rising religious fundamentalisms and a growing style of antirationalism in public debate. These conditions make a reconceptualization of public reason necessary. The main goals of this article are to establish agnostic public reason as the conceptual guide and normative ethic for public debate in liberal democracies by considering the secular/religious reason boundary (...) explicitly and to argue that this ethic of public reason requires a commitment to reason giving and a particular epistemic attitude but that it does not, nor should it, take precedence over first-order judgments. An ethics of citizenship based on the process of reason giving with the appropriate epistemic stance might be one step toward rectifying the problem of an increasing separation between enclave publics, even if, by design, it cannot solve fundamental disagreement. (shrink)

This article considers two questions: Do democratic states have the right to deport non-citizens present or residing on their territory? And, if so, what principles should guide deportation in democratic states? The overall objective is to offer an account of what deportation should look like in a liberal democratic state. I begin by situating the practice of deportation in larger discussions of the extent of state discretion in controlling both borders and membership; here, I will argue that potential deportees (...) occupy an awkward middle space, i.e. it is not clear whether they should be treated according to the principles that regulate discretion at the border or discretion in admitting migrants to membership. I then consider more deeply whether deportation can be rendered non-arbitrary, or whether it is bound to remain unjustly applied; where it cannot be rendered non-arbitrary, it must be rejected, or so I shall argue. To be non-arbitrary, the practice of deportation must meet three criteria: a publicity criterion, a justification criterion, and a collective interest criterion. In the final section of the article, I disentangle deportation into its component parts – I distinguish just cause for deportation from just action in deportation – and consider how the criteria that stem from a commitment to non-arbitrariness constrain its application to non-citizen residents. The consequence of requiring deportation to be applied, if at all, in a non-arbitrary way is that there will certainly be cases where liberal democracies find themselves unable to deport those who might otherwise be thought eligible for deportation. Ultimately, I conclude that deportation from liberal democratic states can be fair only in a small number of cases. (shrink)

This study compares the codes of media ethics adopted by the PCCPress Complaints Commission, the IFJInternational Federation of Journalists and the SPJSociety of Professional Journalists based on the claim that it is the public's right to know, and examines the origins of this concept. A new approach is presented here which falls between the liberal-democratic approach on the one hand and on the other, the extreme ultra-Orthodox approach that claims that it is the public's duty not to know. This (...) new approach which indicates that it is the public's duty to know has evolved from the analysis of Jewish texts from Biblical times and from the study of events in Jewish community life throughout the world. This novel approach is likely to effect a change in the contents of broadcasts and in the boundaries of media ethics. (shrink)

Recently, mental strength education requires to change in a way that establishes a military value system suitable for a liberal democracy while facing the need to strengthen mental strength in response to unpredictable security situations. The key to fulfilling these twofold objectives lies in the fact that there is a positive correlation between the enhancement of a soldier’s democratic awareness and intangible force. Therefore, it is of great importance to emphasize the concept of ‘citizen in uniform’ as one of (...) the central military values. However, this concept has one problem before its use in military mental strength in which the orders of the military status and the orders of the civic seem heterogeneous and even conflicting. This study aims to dissolve the internal tension of this concept through a new philosophical interpretation of citizens in uniform, freedom, people and state, thereby providing the foundation for establishing for establishing new military values and enhancement of mental force. To this end, it examines the explanation of the current curriculum regarding these concepts first and diagnoses its several problems (II). The current curriculum presents a brief explanation of the compatibility of civil rights and military obligations but does not resolve the conflict between the two. A new understanding of them is possible by introducing Hegelian insights in Philosophy of Rights (III). From Hegel's point of view, freedom is not the mere absence of coercion but a capacity for self-determination. Freedom is difficult to realize wholly at the level of an isolated individual, and it calls for an ethical community to give it a specific form. A state that is the best entity in humanity is the supreme unit that defines individual freedom and identity. Then it naturally derives that national defense is one of the supreme missions directly related to the freedom and identity of its people. A re-description of the contents of the curriculum based on these insights can conceptually resolve the aforementioned problem and even strengthen its arguments (IV). The state and the people are in a more essential correlation than previously depicted, and liberal democratic values such as freedom, human rights and welfare are proved as constitutive of a state itself. The superiority of liberal democracy, which the current textbook attempts to prove, also becomes transparent. Finally, military duties do not conceptually conflict with civil freedom but are considered as a form of it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Girardian Critique of the Liberal Democratic Peace TheoryKyle Scott (bio)IntroductionRené Girard is unfamiliar to most political scientists, but the liberal democratic peace theory (LDPT) is known by almost all in the discipline. René Girard has developed a theory of the origin and perpetuation of violence that is well known to scholars in literature, anthropology, and theology. Girard’s theory can be adapted to the LDPT in order (...) to provide a causal explanation for the empirical evidence that finds democracies do not go to war with one another. Without understanding why democracies do not fight one another, the LDPT is only an empirical artifact. Uncovering a causal explanation, if one exists, can help lead researchers to unravel the paradox of why democracies do not go to war with one another but are just as war prone as nondemocracies. In addition to unraveling this paradox, understanding the causal link between peace and democracy will help us find out whether more democracies will lead to more peace.Girard poses a challenge to the democratization for peace thesis, a thesis that serves as the basis for much of the foreign policy of the United States.1 For Girard, violence originates in desire. A subject desires what others desire and [End Page 45] therefore others are seen as roadblocks to that desire. This can turn violent. But the violence does not have to occur between the two subjects who have the same desire; it can be redirected to a surrogate victim who ends up being a scapegoat. If Girard’s theory is applied to the LDPT, the conclusion would be that nondemocracies are merely scapegoats for democracies so that order can be maintained in communities of democracies. Therefore, if the world becomes composed entirely of democracies, there will be no scapegoats left and democracies will fight one another.Such a theory of violence, and such a critique of the LDPT, is unfamiliar to mainstream political scientists.2 I do not suggest that Girard’s theory holds the answer to the problem of achieving perpetual peace, but the base assumption of Girard’s theory should be addressed by those who favor the LDPT. Girard begins from the idea that to achieve peace one must first understand the origin of violence. The LDPT, on the other hand, looks only at the conditions in which peace occurs, ignoring the origins of violence, thus potentially arriving at misleading conclusions.3 Applying Girard’s theory to the LDPT, and deriving alternative hypotheses from that application, will benefit all those who study war, as Girard provides a fresh perspective in the search for the causal mechanism underlying the empirical findings.Fortunately this article is not the first to apply Girard’s theory outside its traditional arenas. John Steele explains that expressive punishment can be explained in Girardian terms; R. G. Hamerton-Kelly argues that nuclear deterrence can be understood in Girardian terms; and Scott Thomas examines the current state of international affairs in a Girardian context.4 These studies can be used as a template by scholars trying to apply Girard’s theory to a field of study that has not previously used it. I will follow this template by first providing a critical examination of the current state of LDPT scholarship and then moving on to a discussion of Girard’s theory of violence. Section III contrasts Girard’s theory with other alternative explanations of war and peace in order to distinguish Girard’s theory from these explanations and to help clarify Girard’s theory.I. The Liberal Democratic Peace TheoryThe most widely accepted theory in international relations is the LDPT, even though empirical evidence supports both sides in the debate. However, most scholars agree that stable democracies do not go to war with other stable democracies.5 There are critics who suggest that the logic underlying the democratic [End Page 46] peace theory is flawed, and that exceptions to the theory can be found.6 The point of this article is not to contest the findings of those who support or refute the LDPT, but to illuminate one of its gravest shortcomings—the lack of a convincing causal explanation—and to provide direction to... (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether it is permissible for a liberal democratic state to deny anti-liberal-democratic citizens and groups the right to run for parliament. My answer to this question is twofold. On the one hand, I will argue that it is, in principle, permissible for liberal democratic states to deny anti-liberal-democratic citizens and groups the right to run for parliament. On the other hand, I will argue that it is rarely wise (...) (or prudent) for ripe democracies to exclude anti-liberal-democrats from parliamentary elections. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is related to the inherent stability of just institutions. The second is that exclusion can lead to group polarization and enclave deliberation that can engender political extremism and impair processes of interpersonal and intrapersonal deliberation in liberal democracies. (shrink)

In this essay I critique two influential accounts of rational autonomy in common schooling that conceive liberalism as an ideal form of life, and I offer an alternative approach to democratic education that views liberal theory as concerned with coexistence among rival ways of living. This view places moral agency, not rational autonomy, at the heart of schooling in liberal societies—a moral agency grounded in initiation into dynamic traditions that enable self-definition and are accompanied by exposure to life-paths (...) other than one’s own. This alternative challenges the tendency in large diverse democracies (such as those of the US and the UK) to prefer common to particularistic schools, thereby placing many types of faith and secular schools on a more equal footing and providing moral justification for education in the national cultures of small liberal republics (such as Denmark, Israel and Lithuania) that maintain special relationships to particular groups while acknowledging the rights of all citizens. I call this approach the pedagogy of difference. (shrink)

Civil disobedience is a form of protest consisting in an act contrary to law, whose aim is to bring about a change in laws or policies deemed unjust. In the traditional Western philosophical debate, civil disobedience was mainly discussed and justified within the boundaries of a democratic regime. John Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience is explicitly based on this liberal assumption. He conceptualises civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent, conscientious and political breach of the law, only appropriate to nearly (...) just societies, hence to democratic regimes. This article intends to question Rawls’ premise by considering civil disobedience from a different perspective: when it is undertaken outside of a nearly just framework, precisely in not fully democratic contexts, such as the so-called “anocracies”, regimes that mix democratic and autocratic traits. The emblematic case of Sudan’s most recent actions of civil disobedience is examined to argue that, contrary to the liberal conceptualisation, civil disobedience does have a role and appropriateness in frameworks of this kind, where the aim is not only to oppose unjust laws or policies, but also to achieve a broader structural change through rigorously nonviolent forms of political action. (shrink)

This paper looks at the case of moral philosophy in order to assess the extent to which and ways in which teacher education should respond to the liberal principle of justification. This principle states that moral and political decisions made by citizens with special kinds of influence and other coercive powers should be accountable to other citizens on the basis of good reasons. To what extent should teachers, who are empowered by the state with such special kinds of influence, (...) be held accountable to this principle and what kind of education is needed in order to prepare teachers for such accountability? Moral philosophy stands as an informative test case because it expressly deals in the justification of judgements and actions and so it stands to reason that arguments for moral philosophy in teacher education are likely to appeal to educational values that dovetail with demands of this principle. I first identify some preliminary criteria under which activities are understood to be educationally worthwhile in the context of the broader principle of justification. I then argue that the justificatory obligations incurred by liberal citizens who adopt the role of teacher not only allow for, but also require, moral philosophy as an activity in programmes of teacher education. (shrink)

In this ground-breaking study, George Klosko combines a theoretical discussion of liberalism with an empirical analysis of the conditions under which people give their support to liberal democratic regimes and regard policies as legitimate.

According to many in the West, the liberalizing effects of North America’s free market ideals will generate equality and justice worldwide. I hold that we should be critical of those who justify imposing liberal democratic ideals on underdeveloped nations by simply suggesting that they promote equality and justice. In the West, entrenched disparities have shaped liberal ideals in ways that make inequality and injustice look natural and normal. Indeed, gender, class, and racial oppression have existed right alongside (...) class='Hi'>liberal democratic ideals. If liberal ideals can be molded to make inequality and injustice look natural and normal in the West, then these same ideals can justify economic interactions, technology transfers, military cooperation, and mutual benefit agreements that sustain global inequality and injustice. (shrink)

Andrew Fiala's Against Religion, Wars, and States: The Case for Enlightenment Atheism, Just War Pacifism, and Liberal-Democratic Anarchism argues that we need to overcome the idea of the nation-state and look toward global justice, that we need to develop a more critical stance toward religion while embracing enlightened humanism and natural science, and that we need to look beyond violent solutions to social problems in order to build world peace.

Political parties are considered one of the most important political organizations and have a role in making and drawing up public policy. In Japan, they play a role, but there are not enough opportunities to assume governance. The Liberal Democratic Party is the most prominent party in Japan and plays a role in shaping and directing public policies in the country, and seeks to achieve a balance between the economy and the economy.And securityIn social affairs, the party played a (...) vital role in promoting democracy and achieving political stability in the country. The party also seeks to manage the economy effectively and strengthen international relations through diplomacy and international cooperation, relying on its political orientations. The Liberal Democratic Party represents a model for political parties in Japan, which contributes to Effectively in making public policy and shaping the future course of the country, through its effective participation in governments, parliament and other democratic mechanisms, the Liberal Democratic Party remains a fundamental pillar in the Japanese political system, and a major partner in formulating and implementing policies that directly affect the lives of citizens and the future of the country. In its entirety. (shrink)