There is a de re modal truth that proves inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. For this truth requires on that theory, the existence of things (counterparts) that exist in distinct worlds but are also spatiotemporally related.

This paper addresses the likely impact on women of being denied emergency contraception (EC) by pharmacists who conscientiously refuse to provide it. A common view—defended by Elizabeth Fenton and Loren Lomasky, among others—is that these refusals inconvenience rather than harm women so long as the women can easily get EC somewhere else nearby. I argue from a feminist perspective that the refusals harm women even when they can easily get EC somewhere else nearby.

To clarify the proper role of values in science, focusing on controversial expert responses to Covid-19, this article examines the status of (in)convenient hypotheses. Polarizing cases like health experts downplaying mask efficacy to save resources for healthcare workers, or scientists dismissing “accidental lab leak” hypotheses in view of potential xenophobia, plausibly involve modifying evidential standards for (in)convenient claims. Societies could accept that scientists handle (in)convenient claims just like nonscientists, and give experts less political power. Or societies could hold scientists to (...) a higher bar, by expecting them not to modify evidential standards to avoid costs only incidentally tied to error. (shrink)

Ethnic minority patients have been discussed and problematised in Western health literature. Drawing on an interpretation of central parts of the French philosopher Michel Foucault's authorship, we analysed a broad selection of materials to identify mechanisms through which the truth about ethnic minority patients is constructed. We identified a single, yet consistent discursive strategy that we termed ‘figure of inconvenience’ in which ethnic minority patients were classified and assigned a specific subjection illustrating them as ‘inconvenient’ to the nurse's practice. (...) Concurrently, their relatives were afforded the position of substitutes. The discourse exemplifies how the behaviour or appearances of ethnic minority patients cannot be reconciled with the traits of ethnic Danish patients. Finally, we discussed implications that such a strategy may have for the provision of healthcare services for ethnic minority patients in Denmark. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:19. AN 'INCONVENIENCE' OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM In Part II of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Cleanthes maintains that the similarities between the works of nature and those of human contrivance, namely, the presence of means to ends relations and a coherence of parts, are sufficient to enable us to reason analogically to the conclusion that the cause of the design of the world resembles human intelligence. Cleanthes insists in (...) Part IV that the ideas which -we have of mind are 'just and adequate and correspondent' to God's nature. Philo, who throughout the discussion has insisted on 'the adorable mysteriousness ' of the divine nature, responds to Cleanthes by saying that he will endeavour to show the inconveniences of that anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged; in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute. (D160) It is the aim of this paper to explicate this 'inconvenience of Cleanthes' anthropomorphism. Philo begins by claiming that nothing is gained by Cleanthes' position whether it is assessed by 'reason' or by 'experience'. The judgment of reason is that a mental world or universe of ideas requires a cause as much as does a material world or universe of objects ; and if similar in its arrangement must require a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? In an ahi: L ra.-t view, they are entirely alike; and no difficulty attenda the one supposition, which is not common to both of them. (D160) Similarly, experience cannot perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two kinds of worlds, but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. (D16ÌÌ 20. Philo concludes that the type of argument employed by Cleanthes leads to an infinite regress: How therefore shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being, whom you suppose the Author of nature, or, according to your system of anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle. (D161) He then suggests, as though it will prove to be more satisfactory, that we should not go beyond the material world itself: But if we stop, and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on in infinitum? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression?... If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on, without end. It were better... never to look beyond the present material world. (D161-162) In suggesting that it is better never to look beyond the material world, what precisely is it that Philo is 2 advocating? George Nathan maintains that "Cleanthes is unaware that Philo is trying to eliminate only the externality of the cause. He is not trying to deny its intelligence ". (Chappell 410) Pike, on the other hand, interprets Philo' s position as eliminating the requirement for a causal account of the order present in the world: If we introduce an ordered mind in an effort to explain the existence of an ordered world, must we not provide a similar explanation of the ordered mind? But if we accept this demand, we shall have to introduce yet another intelligent being as the creator of the first. This explanatory chain can end only in an infinite regress. We would probably do better to assume that order in the material world is an ultimate fact that does not require explanation. Once we take the first step down the explanatory trail we are committed to go on forever. (Pike 157) 21. I will now examine critically the interpretations suggested by Nathan and Pike. Certain questions suggest themselves regarding Nathan's position. First, what does Nathan mean by the intelligence of... (shrink)

Influential parts of the veterinary profession, and notably the American Veterinary Medicine Association, are promoting the routine neutering of cats and dogs that will not be used for breeding purposes. However, this view is not universally held, even among representatives of the veterinary profession. In particular, some veterinary associations in Europe defend the view that when reproduction is not an issue, then neutering, particularly of dogs, should be decided on a case-by-case basis. However, even in Europe the American view is (...) gaining ground. In light of this situation, this paper considers whether or not routine neutering of cats and dogs, in cases where uncontrolled reproduction is not an issue, can be ethically defended. The starting point of this consideration is a review of the veterinary literature on the effects of neutering on companion animals. The focus is both on the welfare of neutered animals themselves, and on behavioral and other effects that may not directly affect the animals’ welfare, but that maybe motivating factors for owners to neuter their companion animals. Here it becomes clear that justification for routine neutering, particularly of confined male dogs, does not follow from claims about the dogs’ own welfare. The costs of neutering male dogs, in terms of the increased risk of very serious diseases, may well outweigh the benefits. Then, building on this veterinary material, but including some other, additional considerations, the paper goes through some possible ethical approaches to routine animal neutering. These ethical approaches offer different degrees of concern about, or opposition to, routine neutering. Finally, based on this ethical exploration, it is argued that routine neutering, at least in the case of non- free-ranging companion animals, raises significant ethical questions, and from some ethical perspectives, looks highly problematic. (shrink)

In this article, we provide a comprehensive analysis and a normative assessment of rationing through inconvenience as a form of rationing. By “rationing through inconvenience” in the health sphere, we refer to a nonfinancial burden that is either intended to cause or has the effect of causing patients or clinicians to choose an option for health-related consumption that is preferred by the health system for its fairness, efficiency, or other distributive desiderata beyond assisting the immediate patient. We argue (...) that under certain conditions, rationing through inconvenience may turn out to serve as a legitimate and, compared to direct rationing, even a preferable tool for rationing; we propose a research agenda to identify more precisely when that might be the case and when, alternatively, rationing through inconvenience remains ethically undesirable. After defining and illustrating rationing through inconvenience, we turn to its moral advantages and disadvantages over other rationing methods. We take it as a starting assumption that rationing, understood as scarce-resource prioritization, is inevitable and, in a society that has goals beyond optimizing health care for individual patients—such as improving societal health care, education, or overall welfare—prudent and fair. (shrink)

Divers argued that there are modal truths that are inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. Noonan and Jago proposed an answer to the challenge, by invoking a duplicate interpretation of the modal truths. Here, I present a slightly different kind of modal truth that would prove inconvenient even for a Lewisian who accepts Noonan and Jago's proposal.

Individual-level interventions are often interesting and easy to implement, but are unfortunately ill-equipped to solve most major global problems (e.g., climate change, financial insecurity, unhealthy eating). Resources spent developing, pursuing, and touting relatively ineffective i-frame interventions draw resources away from the development and implementation of more effective s-frame solutions. Behavioral scientists who want to develop solutions to the world's biggest problems should focus their efforts on s-frame solutions.

Suprastate policy formation in such bodies as the WTO remains fundamentally exclusive of individuals within states. This article critiques the "don't kill the goose" arguments commonly offered in defense of such exclusions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:On the Inconvenience of Other People by Lauren BerlantNicholas AdlerBerlant, Lauren. On the Inconvenience of Other People. Duke University Press, 2022. 256pp.An Ambivalent TriumphAttachment is a double-edged sword. This idea is the scaffolding of the late Lauren Berlant's pivotal work, Cruel Optimism (2011), which explores the idea that attachment to a collectively invested fantasy of "the good life" acts in disservice of personal growth and lasting (...) fulfillment. The Inconvenience of Other People ostensibly repeats this structure while reattributing the role of fantasy. The premise here is that attachments to other people act in disservice to the fantasy of personal sovereignty. Of course, both texts argue for collectivity and for a recasting of the ordinary that structures current fantasies. But while Cruel Optimism builds around the unavoidable condition of fantasy, Inconvenience takes relations within the present as its fundamentally unavoidable condition, specifically the drive to be in relation even though such relations are inconvenient. "People" in the work's title stands for any attachment, any person or thing to which we exist in relation. To be part of the world is to be constantly taking in and living with the objects around us. This constant process of adjustment generates constant friction with our fantasy of sovereignty, or control, over ourselves. In Berlant's words, "inconvenience is another way of pointing to the experience of nonsovereign relationality," making our inconvenience drive the urge to maintain and explore those nonsovereign relations despite the uncomfortable friction they produce (18). Berlant's final monograph investigates the complexities of living with that inconvenience as well the potential for "loosening [those inconvenient objects] and becoming loose with them" in order to make that inconvenience generative of new perspectives and approaches (150).The prospect of overhauling our relationship with inconvenience takes place on multiple registers, both in terms of the affective states that guide the experience of inconvenience and the frameworks that determine its expression in the world. Refiguring ambivalence and dissociation, [End Page 123] the traditional affective responses to inconvenience, as well as offering a more dynamic structure for engaging with inconvenience than that of the institution, Berlant demonstrates—in a contained and structured way—the very object-loosening for which the text advocates. Although the book is presented as a collection of "assays...clusters of actions that become forms of life that shift the pressures of being in relation," it is nonetheless broken into three distinct chapters that focus on the role of the inconvenient in political relations, sexual relations, and relations with the self (11). These chapters, respectively, take up the inconvenient with regard to infrastructure, ambivalence, and dissociation.To productively engage with inconvenience, it must be accommodated within a social infrastructure. The term infrastructure positions the material of lived relationality as more flexible than that of institutions and more legible than that of expressive causality. For Berlant, "infrastructures are productive, durationally extensive spaces for the pliable forms of life that people use to make rules and norms and other means of extending the world" (23). In Chapter 2, they invoke the concept of the commons, "an orientation toward life and value unbound by concepts of property as constituted by division and ownership," using it as a way to illustrate infrastructuralism in effect (82). The commons can refer to as concrete a physical space as the Boston Common, as explored through Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Nature," or as abstract an inheritance as shared language, as explored through Juliana Spahr's lyrical autobiography, The Transformation (2007).The commons of both Emerson and Spahr make use of the concept of analogy. For Emerson, it stands for "the separation within the nonsovereign relation [of the commons] that makes linking possible" (Berlant 94). Spahr takes a more critical approach, continuing Emerson's use of the term while shining light on the glitches that emerge when any analogy is examined too closely. Acknowledging the rhetorical gymnastics required to "figure equally valued social being" within "imperialist capitalist infrastructures" reveals every possible analogy as both grossly oversimplifying and only temporarily comprehensible (105). Objects within these commons are constantly adjusting and generating new relations. The sense of an ongoing dynamic is what Berlant hopes this... (shrink)

In his text ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’, Max Weber associates the understanding of science as a vocation with the scientist’s ability to present the audience with ‘inconvenient facts’. He argues that this presentation provides a ‘full understanding of the facts’ and overcomes any personal value judgment. This overcoming refers to Weber’s understanding of scientific objectivity. I propose to interpret this understanding in the context of contemporary studies of public science communication. I pose the question, ‘Should scientists objectively present inconvenient facts to (...) the public or should they neglect objectivity in science-society communication?’ I will start by legitimizing this question in the context of contemporary discussions on public science communication. To answer this question I will then use Heather Douglas’s observations addressing irreducible complexity of objectivity as a conceptual framework. I will briefly describe, with some modifications, this idea in relation to Weber’s representation of ‘inconvenient facts’. I then will continue by referencing discussions concerning scientist’s norms in public science communication and relate them to the formulations of objectivity above. In conclusion, I will offer an explanation of why the objectivity in Weber’s interpretation remains relevant to regulate contemporary public science communication. (shrink)

This chapter examines the ways in which Rorty interprets Freud in order to bolster some of his views about the nature of the self. In the process, it identifies certain tensions between (a) the kind of “holism of the mental,” which Rorty largely derives from the work of Donald Davidson, and (b) some of the claims Freud and other psychoanalysts make about the identity and mental life of human beings.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact globally. Most affected, however, are those individuals and groups routinely disadvantaged by the social injustice created by the misdistribution of power, money, and resources. Simple measures that prevent the spread of COVID-19, such as frequent hand washing and social distancing, are unavailable to millions of people in the wealthiest of nations and in the poorest of nations. Disadvantaged groups are impacted more directly and in disproportionately higher numbers due to existing poor health, (...) and the disruption of services central to securing an income and an education will have lasting consequences for their futures. The unintended effect of exclusionary government policies is that privileged citizens and healthcare systems are also at greater risk. This paper seeks to highlight the impact of COVID-19 on those already suffering health inequities through consideration of some of the social determinants of health on groups in affluent and poorer nations. It also highlights some of the factors that may assist in tackling health inequities as we emerge from this pandemic. (shrink)

Short essays that touch many topics-anxiety, consciousness, death, happiness, morality, stupidity, & truth-that make the case for realism & help set expectations with regard to the human condition.

Karl Pflock has done a thorough job of deflating the widely held myth that an alien spacecraft , with aliens aboard, crashed in New Mexico in early July 1947. To bolster his case he spent a great deal of time and effort in tracking down “eyewitnesses,” unearthing obscure documents, and untangling the tangled story from its beginning up to the present. Primary sources are used wherever possible, and the relevant affidavits, formerly classified reports, and so forth are not only cited (...) fully but in many cases reproduced in the text or in one of the appendixes.Pflock often goes into very fine and intricate detail indeed, but as a result he makes a convincing case. For example, it is fascinating to “follow the trail back” and watch the purported hundreds of eyewitnesses dwindle to a handful, none of whom produced any hard evidence of extraterrestrials. Equally engrossing are matters such as how the myth spread and grew ever more complex, the role of the media in the whole affair, and the enshrinement of “Roswell” as an accepted fact by many.The Roswell incident took place just a couple of weeks after the famous first sighting of UFOs by Kenneth Arnold near Mount Rainier on 24 June 1947. The media played the latter story for all it was worth, and for months afterward newspapers large and small ran prominent stories about the literally hundreds, if not thousands, of flying saucer reports that suddenly poured in from “reliable witnesses” . Roswell got on this bandwagon early, so it is not surprising that it achieved widespread fame. Moreover, that prominence has lasted, as one can confirm by visiting many a bookstore or public library.Of course there was something found in New Mexico in July 1947, and there were indeed secret projects going on at that time and place, although aliens and their spaceships played no part in matters. Instead, as Pflock demonstrates pretty clearly, the explanation is much more mundane .While this book is a thorough refutation of the Roswell affair, one may ask why we should read it, let alone buy it. After all, isn't this just another case of mass delusion, of interest to psychiatrists, sociologists, and the like, but not to many more?One answer is that the Roswell myth is recent, and indeed still forming, so that we can examine the process in almost as much detail as we like and from almost any aspect we choose. And while this immediacy may deny us historical perspective, it does provide us with a point of view that no future generation can have.Another answer is that no reader of Isis is immune from the possibility of being asked sometime, somewhere, by someone, “Do you believe in flying saucers?” “Are aliens visiting Earth?” or, more to the point, “What about Roswell?” As the last is the most famous and widely believed‐in topic in all of ufology, it might be useful to keep Pflock's book handy. There should be little fear of the subject going out of date, as half a century later the television series Roswell is now in its third successful year, public interest is renewed after every TV “documentary” on the topic, and the International UFO Museum and Research Center is still the main attraction in the city of Roswell.As Pflock points out, the Roswell affair is yet another example of how myth can take precedence over reality and how the will to believe can be strengthened by evidence to the contrary. In this respect we might all glance in a mirror, for similar delusions can be held not only by the uninformed but also by scholars; no doubt many readers can recall, with wry chuckles, examples in their own fields.Perhaps this New Mexican fable will never die. However, at least we can do our best to speed it on its way, and this book can be a big help in such an effort. In short, buy this book, read it, keep it available, and above all donate a second copy to your local public library. (shrink)

“No one has advanced a just and logical reason why reward for service to the public should be extended to the inventor of a mechanical toy and denied to the genius whose patience, foresight, and effort have given a valuable new [discovery] to mankind” . The law around the world permits the granting of patents for drugs, medical devices, and cosmetic treatment of the human body. At the same time, patentability for a method of treatment of the same body is (...) denied in some countries on various public policy grounds. Is there any logical justification for this distinction? Are methods of medical treatment not as vital to the health or even to the life of a patient as drugs or medical devices? Why is a cosmetic result patentable and a curative result not? (shrink)

Whatever else these articles demonstrate, they reveal that two efforts closely associated with professionalizing healthcare ethics consultants —surveying the practice and certificating its pra...

Using four examples of cost-effectiveness analyses, I argue that discussions of and research on cost-effectiveness in medical practice should clearly delineate between protocol and practice cost-effectiveness analyses. Failure to do so risks confusing conclusions that warrant substantial confidence and limited applicability with conclusions with broader applicability but more limited confidence. Further, these different types of analyses incorporate different sets of values. I argue that some favor should be shown for those analyses that include a wider array of values.

This article presents the stance taken by José Ortega y Gasset in the debate that took place in early-twentieth-century Spain regarding the convenience of reading Don Quixote in schools. To this end, we start by describing, albeit briefly, the state of Ortega y Gasset’s thought in 1920, when he writes Biología y pedagogía, the essay with which we shall concern ourselves. According to Ortega y Gasset, Don Quixote must not be read in the classroom because it does not contribute to (...) the development of the students’ spontaneous life, or natura naturans. In order to foster this development, Ortega y Gasset suggests leaving Don Quixote aside and resort to myths such as Odysseus or Heracles because their exploits would excite the students’ vital pulse. However, we suggest several reasons why the aim stated by Ortega y Gasset —and several other highly valuable educational benefits— could be reached resorting to the reading of selected passages of Don Quixote instead of the feats of Odysseus and Heracles. (shrink)

Noise is said to disturb, disorient, and confuse, but this article looks specifically at the figure of noise “striking” – rather than, say, a rumbling or murmuring disquiet – us to examine its potential to unsettle European liberal hegemonic norms of ordering society and the inequalities they produce. In particular, it focuses on noisy protest, rebellion, and riot which might “awaken” citizens to these injustices and efforts to suppress them. Drawing on work of Saidiya Hartman, Christina Sharpe, Lauren Berlant, Fred (...) Moten, Jacques Derrida, and Catherine Malabou, this article replays and dislodges the long-standing distinction between noise and logos by examining the transformative capacity of noise as something differential that inserts inconvenience into non-relational forms of sovereignty. (shrink)

The non-identity problem concerns actions that affect who exists in the future. If such an action is performed, certain people will exist in the future who would not otherwise have existed: they are not identical to any of the people who would have existed if the action had not been performed. Some of these actions seem to be wrong, and they seem to be wrong in virtue of harming the very future individuals whose existence is dependent on their having been (...) performed. The problem arises when it is argued that the actions do not harm these people—because the actions do not make them worse off than they would otherwise be.1 Consider: Radioactive Waste Policy: We are trying to decide whether to adopt a permissive radioactive waste policy. This policy would be less inconvenient to us than our existing practices. If we enact the newly-proposed policy, then we will cause there to be radioactive pollution that will cause illness and suffering. However, the policy will have such significant effects on public policy and industry functioning, that different people will exist in the future depending on whether we enact the policy. Two things should be emphasized. First, the illness and suffering caused will be very serious: deformed babies, children with burns from acid rain, and adults dying young from cancer. Second, the policy will affect who will exist in the future because our present practices invade people’s everyday lives, for example by affecting recycling practices in the home; these practices will change if the policy is adopted. Furthermore, whether we adopt the policy will determine which plants are built where, what jobs are available, and what trucks are on the road. These effects will create small differences in everyone’s lives which ultimately affect who meets whom and who conceives with whom, or at least when people conceive. This affects who exists in the future. (shrink)

Science strives for coherence. For example, the findings from climate science form a highly coherent body of knowledge that is supported by many independent lines of evidence: greenhouse gas emissions from human economic activities are causing the global climate to warm and unless GHG emissions are drastically reduced in the near future, the risks from climate change will continue to grow and major adverse consequences will become unavoidable. People who oppose this scientific body of knowledge because the implications of cutting (...) GHG emissions—such as regulation or increased taxation—threaten their worldview or livelihood cannot provide an alternative view that is coherent by the standards of conventional scientific thinking. Instead, we suggest that people who reject the fact that the Earth’s climate is changing due to greenhouse gas emissions oppose whatever inconvenient finding they are confronting in piece-meal fashion, rather than systematically, and without considering the implications of this rejection to the rest of the relevant scientific theory and findings. Hence, claims that the globe “is cooling” can coexist with claims that the “observed warming is natural” and that “the human influence does not matter because warming is good for us.” Coherence between these mutually contradictory opinions can only be achieved at a highly abstract level, namely that “something must be wrong” with the scientific evidence in order to justify a political position against climate change mitigation. This high-level coherence accompanied by contradictory subordinate propositions is a known attribute of conspiracist ideation, and conspiracism may be implicated when people reject well-established scientific propositions. (shrink)

L'économie, les sciences sociales et la philosophie, utilisent abondamment la notion de rationalité. Indispensable, elle semble insaisissable. Cet ouvrage vise à la clarifier. Mais il poursuit surtout un autre objectif. La difficulté qu'ont les sciences sociales à devenir des sciences à part entière provient de ce qu'elles utilisent généreusement des explications irrationnelles du comportement qui paraissent fragiles. Cela explique le succès croissant depuis une vingtaine d'années, aux États-Unis et en Europe, de la Théorie dite du Choix Rationnel (TCR). Faut-il y (...) voir, comme le prétendent ses promoteurs, une théorie capable de donner aux sciences sociales un fondement solide? Faut-il accepter sa conception utilitariste de la rationalité? L'examen critique de la TCR permet de donner une réponse précise à ces questions et d'identifier un modèle qui préserve ses avantages en éliminant ses inconvénients. Ce n'est donc pas un exposé sur les avatars de la notion de rationalité qui est proposé ici, mais bien une théorie de la rationalité. (shrink)

Grimwade et al highlight the current lack of a universal, standardised approach to the payment of participants taking part in controlled human infection model studies.1 As they discuss, payment for these studies is controversial, with many voicing arguments for and against higher payments, particularly for those studies which involve significant burdens to the participant. The main concerns about overpayment relate to the concepts of undue inducement or coercion, whereas underpayment raises concern about exploitation and unfair treatment. In many healthy volunteer (...) trials compensation for travel, time and inconvenience are generally accepted as fair payment, but payment for risk is less accepted, with a belief that non-therapeutic studies should only incur minimal risks, so payment for risk should not be necessary.2 This paper argues that payment for risk should be included for CHIM studies. Their findings among members of the UK public and CHIM experts from a variety of centres suggest that there is support for greater risks being associated with higher payments for participants. The amount of compensation offered by a trial has to be approved by an ethics committee/institutional review board, and some research suggests that IRB members have concerns about higher payments being offered, with only approximately one-third agreeing that payment should be offered for risk.3 Without agreement and clear guidance for calculating compensation for these types of trial, there is bound to be …. (shrink)

Even lawyers who obey the law often seem to act unethically--interfering with the discovery of truth, subverting justice, and inflicting harm on innocent people. Standard arguments within legal ethics attempt to show why it is permissible to do something as a lawyer that it would be wrong to do as an ordinary person. But in the view of most critics these arguments fail to turn wrongs into rights. Even many lawyers think legal ethics is flawed because it does not accurately (...) describe the considerable moral value of their work. In Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, Bradley Wendel introduces a new conception of legal ethics that addresses the concerns of lawyers and their critics alike.Wendel proposes an ethics grounded on the political value of law as a collective achievement that settles intractable conflicts, allowing people who disagree profoundly to live together in a peaceful, stable society. Lawyers must be loyal and competent client representatives, Wendel argues, but these obligations must always be exercised within the law that constitutes their own roles and confers rights and duties upon their clients. Lawyers act unethically when they treat the law as an inconvenient obstacle to be worked around and when they twist and distort it to help their clients do what they are not legally entitled to do. Lawyers and Fidelity to Law challenges lawyers and their critics to reconsider the nature and value of ethical representation. (shrink)

My focus is on pragmatic arguments for various rationality constraints on a decision maker’s state of mind: on his beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be exposed to a decision problem in which she will act to her guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, she can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent himself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of this kind are synchronic Dutch (...) Books, for the standard probability axioms, diachronic Dutch Books, for the more controversial principles of reflection and conditionalization, and Money Pumps, for the transitivity requirement on preferences. It is suggested that the proposed exploitation set-ups share a common feature. If the violator of a given constraint is logically and mathematically competent, she can be exploited only if she is disunified in his decision-making, i.e., only if she makes decisions on various issues she confronts separately rather than jointly. In other words, exploitation is possible only if the decision problem has been framed in a certain way. Unification in decision making is relatively unproblematic in synchronic contexts, but it may be quite costly and inconvenient diachronically, especially when the issues under consideration are widely spread over time. On my view, therefore, pragmatic arguments should be seen as delivering conditional recommendations: If you want to afford disunification, then you’d better satisfy these constraints. The arguments of this kind fail to establish the inherent rationality of the constraints under consideration. Isaac Levis view of the status of pragmatic arguments is diametrically opposed to mine. According to him, only synchronic pragmatic arguments are valid. The diachronic ones, he argues, lack any validity at all. This line of reasoning is questioned in my paper. (shrink)