The claim of the Easter Proclamation that original sin is a “happy fall” (felix culpa) that earned us the Incarnation of the Son of God seems to virtually contain the elements for developing a “Greater God Theodicy,” according to which sin has been permitted by God “in order to” obtain some greater goods. In this paper I introduce four ways in which greater good theodicies can be drawn from the felix culpa claim: two “supralapsarian” ways (a (...) deterministic and a Molinist one) and two “infralapsarian” ways (a conditional and a retrospective one). I consider the philosophical pros and cons of each proposal, showing that infralapsarian options are preferable. (shrink)

Deleuze’s sense of the history of philosophy in Difference and Repetition is manifestly agonistic and counter-dialectic. Against a history of philosophy that has only considered difference as a relation between or among competing terms, Deleuze affirms a philosophy of immanence where the task of philosophy is to think difference in itself. This ‘overcoming’ of Hegel (and Plato) nevertheless intensifies rather than vanquishes Hegel’s own demand for immanence: philosophy is not one event among others, but the necessary means through which life (...) appears to, and recognizes, itself. Life is the absolute appearing to itself. For Deleuze philosophy is also, ultimately, the means through which life takes on a higher power of expression. A world that has overcome representation is a world made expressive. (shrink)

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The primal sin is an unprecedented event because it is the moment at which creation first became corrupted. This makes it remarkably difficult to explain. In contemporary analytic discussions of the primal sin, a dichotomy has emerged. Generally, scholars working in this area accept inexplicability to avoid blaming God, resulting in a labelling of the primal sin as mysterious. In this paper, I will outline a Felix Culpa model of the primal sin, which I shall call the Primigenius (...) Felix Culpa model. Through this model, I will suggest that the primal sin was made inevitable by God to maximise the value of the actual world. I will argue that, despite inheriting many of the disadvantages that come with a Felix Culpa, this model significantly reduces the inexplicability of the primal sin. (shrink)

Luck threatens in similar ways our conceptions of both moral and epistemic evaluation. This essay examines the problem of luck as a metaphilosophical problem spanning the division between subfields in philosophy. I first explore the analogies between ethical and epistemic luck by comparing influential attempts to expunge luck from our conceptions of agency in these two subfields. I then focus upon Duncan Pritchard's challenge to the motivations underlying virtue epistemology, based specifically on its handling of the problem of epistemic luck. (...) I argue that (1) consideration of the multifold nature of the problem of epistemic luck to an adequate account of human knowledge drives us to a mixed externalist epistemology; and (2) the virtue-theoretical approach presents a particularly advantageous way of framing and developing a mixed externalist epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Blackwell Publishing Limited and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts). (shrink)

In “Supralapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa,’” Alvin Plantinga turns from defensive apologetics to the project of Christian explanation and offers a supralapsarian theodicy: the reason God made us in a world like this is that God wanted to create a world including the towering goods of Incarnation and atonement—goods which are appropriate only in worlds containing a sufficient amount of sin, suffering, and evil as well. Plantinga’s approach makes human agents and their sin, suffering and evil, instrumental means (...) to the end of God’s cosmic aims. I press the objection that means/end conceptuality is inadequate to explain how God is loving and merciful (as opposed to abusive) towards human sinners and sufferers. Plantinga’s theodicy remains under-developed without an explanation of how Incarnation and atonement benefit them. (shrink)

The problem of evil has challenged religious minds and hearts throughout the ages. Just how can the presence of suffering, tragedy, and wrongdoing be squared with the all-powerful, all-loving God of faith? This book gathers some of the best, most meaningful recent reflections on the problem of evil, with contributions by shrewd thinkers in the areas of philosophy, theology, literature, linguistics, and sociology. In addition to bringing new insights to the old problem of evil, Christian Faith and the Problem of (...) Evil is set apart from similar volumes by the often-novel approaches its authors take to the subject. Many of the essays pursue classic lines in speculative philosophy, but others address the problem of evil through biblical criticism, the thought of Simone Weil, and the faith of battered women and African American slaves. As a result, this book will interest a wide range of readers. Contributors: Paul Draper Eduardo J. Echeverria Laura Waddell Ekstrom Stephen Griffith Del Kiernan-Lewis Richard T. McClelland Barbara Omolade Richard Otte Alvin Plantinga John R. Schneider Robert Stanley Peter van Inwagen Carol Winkelmann Keith D. Wyma. (shrink)

플란팅가는 ‘복된 탓 논증’을 통해, 신이 그의 전지전능함과 완전히 선함에도 불구하고 죄와 고통이 존재하는 세계를 창조하는것이 정당화됨을 설명하는 신정론을 제시하고자 한다. 곧, 신의 목적은 극히 좋은 세계를 만드는 것인데, 이 세계를 극히 좋게 만드는 요소는 다름 아니라 성자의 육화와 대속이며, 죄와 고통은 이런육화와 대속의 필요 조건이기에, 신이 죄와 고통을 허용하는 것은창조 목적의 성취라는 측면에서 정당화된다는 것이다. 이 논증의 가장 핵심적 문제 중 하나는 대속의 가치가 어떻게신에 의해 창조된 극히 좋은 세계의 종합적 가치에 기여하는가 하는 문제이다. 이와 관련하여 플란팅가는 세 가지 (...) 가치 가정을 제시하는데, 본 논문에서는 그에 근거하여 복된 탓 논증을 세 가지 버전으로 재구성하였다. 우선 강한 버전에 따르면 대속은 우연적인가능 사태 중 가장 가치로운 것이며 따라서 모든 극히 좋은 세계는반드시 대속을 포함해야 한다. 그러나 신의 사랑이라는 측면에서보았을 때 대속이 가장 가치로운 사태라는 플란팅가의 주장은 설득력이 떨어지는데, 신의 완전한 사랑은 모든 가능 세계에서 동일할 것이며, 그 사랑에 대한 완전한 지식도 죄와 대속에 대한 실제적 경험의 여부와는 관계없이 내세에서 동일하게 가지게 될 것이기 때문이다. 또한 ‘신의 존재’가 대속과 마찬가지로 무한한 가치를지니고 있다는 플란팅가의 주장은, 극히 좋은 세계의 창조를 위해왜 굳이 대속과 그 필요조건인 죄와 고통이 요구되는지 의문을 갖게 한다. 다음으로 온건한 버전에 따르면, 자유로운 피조물들이 죄를 짓고 대속을 통해 구원받는 세계는 동일한 피조물들이 죄를 짓지 않기에 대속도 없는 세계보다 가치로운데, 이는 아마도 ‘용서하는 신의 사랑’이라는 요소를 후자의 세계가 결하기 때문일 것이다. 그러최규하 ▶ 플란팅가의 ‘복된 탓 논증’에 대한 비판적 접근 35 나 죄의 가능성이 있는 자유로운 피조물을 포함하는 모든 가능 세계에서 죄인을 용서하고자 하는 신의 사랑은 늘 동일할 것이다. 또한 자유로우면서도 신의 의지를 늘 따르는 피조물들은 신의 의지를 완벽히 알 것이기에 죄인을 용서하는 신의 사랑 또한 죄와 용서의 실제적 경험없이도 잘 알 것이다. 따라서 온건한 버전 역시 어떤 면에서 대속을 포함한 세계가 그렇지 않은 세계보다 나은지 설명해주지 못한다. 마지막으로, 약한 버전에 따르면, 대속을 포함한 세계는 그것이포함하는 죄와 고통에도 불구하고 신이 창조할 만한 극히 좋은 가능 세계 중의 하나이다. 이는 그 자체로는 설득력이 있는 주장이지만, 문제는 이 주장이 과연 성공적인 신정론을 구성하느냐 하는 것이다. 곧, 신이 궁극적인 창조 목적을 달성한다는 사실이 그 자체로 신의 죄와 고통의 허용을 도덕적으로 설득력있게 정당화할 수있는가. 플란팅가는 복된 탓 논증을 통해 ‘극히 좋은 세계의 창조’라는결과가 신의 죄와 고통의 허용을 성공적으로 정당화한다고 보았으며, 이는 그의 논증이 결과주의적 윤리원칙에 근거하고 있음을 보여준다. 그러나 이러한 결과주의자 신은 그리스도교의 신과는 분명한 차이를 보여주는데, 전자는 필요에 따라 개인의 희생을 통해서라도 세계 전체의 종합적 가치를 극대화하고자 하는 반면, 후자는 창조주로서 또 각 개인의 아버지로서 이중의 책임을 지고 세계전체의 선과 각 개인의 선을 모두 도모하기 때문이다. 따라서 플란팅가의 신정론이 그리스도교의 신을 정당화하고자 하였음을 전제한다면, 복된 탓 논증은 그 결과주의적 전제로 인해 신이 각 개인과의 인격적인 관계에서 지니는 아버지로서의 책임에 대해 적절히다루지 못하기에, 신이 죄와 고통을 허용하는 것에 대한 성공적인신정론을 제시하지 못한다. (shrink)

Das Faustbuch von 1587 führt die Tradition der altchristlichen Teufelspaktlegenden fort und bricht sie zugleich um. Die neue Konzeption, die hinter den verwirrenden inneren Widersprüchen und Inkonsequenzen des Werkes faßbar wird, zielt auf eine bewußte Zerstörung des alten Legendenschemas. Dabei ist es sowohl verfehlt, in Faustus noch einen mittelalterlichen Magier zu sehen wie auch ihn als macht- und wissenssüchtigen Renaissancemenschen zu verstehen; vielmehr wird an dieser Figur ein neuer Umgang mit dem Bösen narrativ diskutiert. Er ist das Opfer einer Strategie (...) des Teufels, durch die das Böse sich verflüchtigt und damit die Möglichkeit der Umkehr verbaut wird. (shrink)

Contra el “Yo soy” de la Modernidad, explicitado y hasta ejecutado como “Yo soy uno de tantos”, Heidegger realza con Kierkegaard el instante ejemplar de la “repetición”. Es ella la que llama a Heidegger desde Aristóteles, “repetido” desde las nociones de pólis y philía, con centro cordial en el eû zên. Ello implica una mutación de la idea religiosa de “culpa” en el rasgo existentivo de la “deuda” de estar-siendo-sidos: cada uno de nosotros somos deudores de la existencia del (...) otro, en cuanto héteros, en el mundo compartido; tal la mutación concomitante de la procura sustitutoria por aquella que, brotando de antemano, va hacia el poder-ser del otro. Ésta sería la “ética” originaria de Heidegger, si dejamos resonar en ella el êthos en que se forja comunidad. (shrink)

Molinists generally see Calvinism as possessing certain liabilities from which Molinism is immune. For example, Molinists have traditionally rejected Calvinism, in part, because it allegedly makes God the author of sin. According to Molina, we ‘should not infer that He is in any way a cause of sin’. However, Greg Welty has recently argued by way of his Gunslingers Argument that, when it comes to God’s relationship to evil, Molinism is susceptible to the same liabilities as Calvinism. If his argument (...) is successful, he has undercut, at least partially, justification for believing in Molinism. While I concede that Welty’s argument is successful in that it does undercut some justification for believing in Molinism, this concession does not entail that, as it relates to the problem of evil, the Calvinist and the Molinist are in the same epistemic position. In this article, I argue that, when it comes to God’s relationship to evil, the Molinist is in a superior epistemic situation to the Calvinist. I do this in two steps. First, I argue for what I call the Robust Felix Culpa Theodicy. Second, I argue that the Robust Felix Culpa Theodicy is incompatible with Calvinism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, although Alvin Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy appears on only two pages of his recent book Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and Naturalism (2011) (i.e. 58-59), it is of pivotal importance for the book as a whole. Plantinga argues that there is superficial conflict but deep concord between science and monotheism, and that there is superficial concord but deep conflict between science and naturalism. I contend that the weakness of the (...) class='Hi'>Felix Culpa theodicy lends support to the view that there is more than superficial conflict between science and monotheism, and offer an alternative response to the challenge of evil which suggests that there might be, after all, concord between science and (religious) naturalism. (shrink)

The problem of evil has generated varying attempts at theodicy. To show that suffering is defeated for a sufferer, a theodicy argues that there is an outweighing benefit which could not have been gotten without the suffering. Typically, this condition has the tacit presupposition given that this is a post-Fall world. Consequently, there is a sense in which human suffering would not be shown to be defeated even if there were a successful theodicy because a theodicy typically implies that the (...) benefit in question could have been gotten without the suffering if there had not been a Fall. There is a part of the problem of evil that would remain, then, even if there were a successful theodicy. This is the problem of mourning: even defeated suffering in the post-Fall world merits mourning. How is this warranted mourning compatible with the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God? The traditional response to this problem is the felix culpa view, which maintains that the original sin was fortunate because there is an outweighing benefit to sufferers that could not be gotten in a world without suffering. The felix culpa view presupposes an object of evaluation, namely, the true self of a human being, and a standard of evaluation for human lives. This book explores these and a variety of other topics in philosophical theology in order to explain and evaluate the role of suffering in human lives. (shrink)

According to the Felix Culpa Theodicy, worlds containing atonement and incarnation are of such great value that God is justified in actualizing such a world, despite all of the moral evil that has accompanied it. Focusing upon Alvin Plantinga’s articulation of this theodicy, I argue against FCT on the basis of normative ethical considerations. On the one hand, the deontic status of at least some actions depends upon the consequences of those actions. On the other hand, the existence (...) of atonement depends upon the deontic status of at least one action. Under certain circumstances, this two-way dependence yields a contradiction if atonement has the kind of value conferred upon it by FCT. I conclude by discussing some implications for Molinism and evidential arguments from moral evil. (shrink)

This chapter narrates in broad strokes the history of theodicy. Starting with an indication how Biblical texts have functioned in theodical thinking, it discusses the key ideas of Irenaeus (soul‐making), St. Augustine (free will), Leibniz (best of all possible worlds), Joseph Butler (imperfect comprehension of God's governance), Hegel (cunning of Reason), C.S. Lewis (God's megaphone), Ewing (principle of organic unities), Plantinga (felix culpa), and Swinburne (greater goods).

Seul, saint, fou, idiot -- Des deux inanités : de dieu et de l'histoire -- Ou bien Dieu... ou bien l'histoire (Hegel, Dostoïevski, Chestov, Kojève & Bataille) -- Des trois religions des années trente (communisme, fascisme et surréalisme) et d'une quatrième (Acéphale) -- Penser le fascisme (Freud, Reich & Bataille) -- La folie Acéphale (Ou la religion antichrétienne, antifasciste, anticommuniste) -- In-signifiances d'Acéphale (Blanchot & Bataille) -- Le surréalisme au service de la religion (Artaud, Breton & Bataille) -- Felix (...) Culpa -- Éloge du péché (Sartre & Bataille, entre autres) -- Sainteté du mal (Charlotte d'Ingerville & Sainte) -- Vies & livres -- Correspondances coïncidences -- Une amitié intenable (Leiris & Bataille) -- Histoire d'un trompe-l'oeil -- L'idiotie de Bataille -- Une passion paradoxale de la raison. (shrink)

First published in 1953, Tragedy and the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall argues that our response to tragedy is made up of a series of responses: the impact of experience which produces the archetypes of belief; the formation of the archetype of rebirth; the crystallization of the archetype of rebirth in the myth and ritual of the ancient Near East; the transformation of myth and ritual in the religions of the ancient world, including Christianity; the formalization of the archetype of (...) rebirth into the concept of felix culpa, the paradox of the fortunate fall and finally the secular utilization of the paradox of the fortunate fall as the substance out of which tragedy is made. This book will be of interest to students of literature, philosophy and history. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Evil and Contemporary Philosophical Orthodoxy Defense versus Theodicy The Free Will Defense Life's Purpose and Perfect Happiness Developing a Theodicy Adams and Horrendous Evil Plantinga's “ O Felix Culpa ” Theodicy Beasts and the Problem of Evil References.

In this paper, we attempt to show that if Plantinga’s free will defence succeeds, his O Felix Culpa theodicy fails. For if every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity, then given that Jesus has a creaturely essence (as we attempt to show), it follows that Incarnation and Atonement worlds cannot be actualized by God, in which case we have anything but a felix culpa.

Continental philosophy, beginning with Kant, has found itself exposed to the abyss of reason. This crisis makes it a more ready dialogue partner with some of the Zen tradition. I explore this opening by bringing Eihei Dōgen into an encounter with Continental thought, broadly construed. Rather than demonstrate how Dōgen already fits within Continental thought or re-engineering the latter so that he can fit, I argue that this encounter, already precipitated by Continental philosophy’s own acknowledgement of the felix (...) class='Hi'>culpa of Western philosophy’s otherwise indefensible overreach, transforms and expands the manners in which thinking counts as philosophical. This is no less than to recover a sense of philosophy as genetic and creative, rather than a shopworn tool kit of universal insights. (shrink)

Arguably, the most philosophically nuanced defense of a Felix Culpa theodicy, born out of serious theological reflection, is to be found in Alvin Plantinga’srecent article entitled “Superlapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa.’” In this paper I look at Plantinga’s argument for the necessity of evil as a means to God’s fargreater ends and raise four objections to it. The arguments I give are aimed at the theological adequacy of explaining the emergence of evil as a functionalgood. I (...) conclude that Plantinga’s Felix Culpa approach fails to demonstrate the necessity of evil for heightened intimacy with God, and collides with agent-centeredconsiderations. Moreover, I argue that all Felix Culpa theodicies reverse the apparent value God places on means and ends in the economy of salvation, while lending to evil a potentially morally and theologically distorting rational legitimacy. (shrink)

John Wesley explained the existence of evil in moral rather than metaphysical terms. His understanding of the fall was fairly typical of western theology and he also enthusiastically embraced a version of the felix culpa theme as essential for theodicy. Unlike many influential western theologians, he also relied heavily on libertarian freedom to account for evil. His most striking proposal for theodicy involves his eschatalogical vision of the future in which he believed the entire world living then will (...) be converted. I argue that his theodicy is implicitly universalist, especially in its eschatalogical speculations, and show that this is in tension with his strong libertariancommitments. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that moral evil is for Kant an ineradicable aspect of human existence; moreover the author argues that moral evil is a datum of experience which none of the rationalist systems which preceded Kant's, nor Hegel's system which came after, could assimilate, a rock upon which they all shattered. Reboul's concern is to investigate the "insondable profondeur du mal radical" as this theme appears in the forty years of Kant's active philosophic production; his interest reflects (...) the influence of his mentor, Karl Barth. Reboul is at his best in his clear depiction of Kant's ingenuity at reconciling the optimism of the Enlightenment with the Reformation's conviction of sin. For example, the very insufficiency of Leibniz' attempt to supply a ground for every decision of the will, his inability to explain the reality of willful evil, is used by Kant as an excuse for not going beyond Leibniz' theory. "Expliquer la liberté serait la détruire," writes Reboul. Kant assimilates the idea of progress by assigning it to the level of phenomenal or technical improvements. Moral value resides only in those acts by which we loosen the ties of sensible determination upon the will and render ourselves autonomous. The struggle for autonomy must be fought by each man for himself; there is a decisive limit to the help we can derive from "progress." For Kant man is bent towards evil not only by reason of his spontaneous attraction to sensible objects, but also in virtue of a basic perversion of his faculty of judgment, a perversion which comes close to being identified with liberty itself. It is significant, as Reboul notes, that all of Kant's examples of free will are also examples of moral evil. This low estimate of man's spontaneous faculties is at the basis of Kant's suspicion of all eudaimonistic ethics, his demand that every moral decision be "disinterested," that the moral law be the sole determinant of the will. Just as in the first Critique Kant insists on finding an adequate cause to ground the universality which attaches to the laws of science and mathematics, so in ethics he demands an adequate explanation of the radical character of evil present in the world; this he finds in a perversion of the human faculty of judgment, whereby a contingent element of experience is illegitimately raised to the status of a universal maxim by the will. The moral decision must be disinterested because every attraction by a sensible object threatens to become the occasion for such a definitive fixation of our moral character. But Kant's deeper originality lies in a view which bridges the Enlightenment and later periods. Kant breaks with a convention of systematic philosophical activity which had held sway from the Greeks through Leibniz, the view that reality must be consistent. For Kant, the principle of non-contradiction does not apply to the phenomenal world but only to the noumenal. For Kant, human existence can harbor contradictions; consequently man lives perpetually in tension. As a citizen of two worlds, he is committed to achieving a moral ideal which the basic perversion of his will renders unrealizable. This tension can be viewed optimistically, as with Hegel ; then the "positivity" of evil is interpreted as a necessary step, a " felix culpa," by which God rouses man to greater efforts and brings him to maturity, autonomy, and a vision of the real. The other alternative is the Schopenhauerian interpretation, wherein the tensions in the absurdity of the human condition are taken as too extreme to warrant further participation. Reboul is excellent in showing the form these tensions take in Kant's system: the mystery of how a basically perverted will can be converted into a "good faith," although this is the ethical command; the command never to feel oneself "justified" through having done one's duty, even though the moral command obligates us to strive perpetually for this condition. However, in stressing the harsh import of sin for Kant, and thus saving Kant from Hegel, has Reboul not placed Kant in the company of Schopenhauer, Sartre, and Camus?--P. M. (shrink)

Plantinga’s free will defense is sometimes regarded as a successful response to the logical problem of evil. Still, a recent objection concludes Plantinga’s defense and theodicy are incompatible. According to this objection, in Plantinga’s defense, Jesus’ having a creaturely essence entails that Jesus suffers from transworld depravity and sins in the actual world, but this result conflicts with Plantinga’s theodicy and with Christian theism, where Jesus is sinless. In this paper, I argue that this objection is unsound, because creaturely essences (...) suffer from transworld depravity only contingently, so it is not necessarily true that their instantiations go wrong in the actual world. Hence, Plantinga’s defense and theodicy are not incompatible, so both answers to the problem of evil can be endorsed in conjunction. (shrink)

Niels de Haan (2023) defends the possibility of holding collectives morally responsible against a challenge posed by the problem of self-induced moral incapacity. Self-induced moral incapacity seems to introduce a responsibility gap that corporate agents might exploit to avoid responsibility. De Haan argues that the problem does not introduce responsibility gaps because collective moral agents become responsible for actions they committed while they were incapacitated once they reacquire moral capacity. I argue that de Haan’s argument is incomplete. Simply because a (...) group reacquires moral capacity does not also necessarily mean that the group retains attributability for the wrongs in question. This means we must supplement de Haan’s argument with an Attributability Proviso: To overcome the problem of self-induced moral incapacity it must be the case that the group reacquires moral capacity and that we can still attribute the earlier actions to the group despite the changes that it has gone through. (shrink)

This article presents a model for the procedure of elaboration of an effective ethical code. Taking as the starting point the concept of business ethics as critical hermeneutics, we describe a process which will lead to the creation of a document that is truly ethical and efficient. We believe the elaboration of an ethical code should follow a definite procedure, and that the process is as important as the result, but we also add that in order for the process to (...) be a truly rational dialogue it is necessary to make efforts to ensure the participation of truly valid interlocutors who can represent their interests in conditions that are as close as possible to an ideal community of dialogue. Our model for the elaboration of an ethical code attempts to break with the conventional distinction between processes of elaboration and application in order to develop a truly integrative ethics, while also giving attention to the concrete conditions in which the ethical code is developed. In our view the contribution made by this model is the emphasis it places on the transformation of the will of the participants in the dialogue. (shrink)

Wie passen Wirtschaft und Religion zusammen? Kann der Gottesbund als Geschaftsmodell dienen? Und welche Rolle spielt dabei die menschliche Verantwortung? - Ein christlicher und ein islamischer Theologe diskutieren miteinander, klaren Hintergrunde und Begriffe und suchen die Kontroverse. Ein Buch, das die essenziellen Fragen fur das Verhaltnis von Religion und Wirtschaft stellt, erstmals in einem interreligiosen Kontext. Ein Novum, das spannende Entdeckungen bietet."--Back cover.

O artigo analisa a questão da crescente precariedade no mundo do trabalho à luz das teses do brasileiro Ruy Mauro Marini e do conceito de superexploração do trabalho, formulado por esse autor no âmbito de uma teoria marxista da dependência, a princípio, para designar regime específico das formações sociais latino-americanas. Nesse sentido, em um primeiro momento, analisamos algumas tendências mundiais em curso no mundo do trabalho e, em seguida, os processos de transformação nos regimes de superexploração do trabalho nos países (...) dependentes e sua atual apresentação fenomênica nos países capitalistas centrais. Ao fim, analisamos a vigência e a centralidade dessa categoria, assim como suas implicações para o devido entendimento da política e das novas morfologias da classe trabalhadora na América Latina e no mundo. (shrink)

Less Erroneous Pictures. Whalers’ Knowledge in Nineteenth‐Century Natural History, Oceanography, and Literature. This paper uses the iconoclasm of Herman Melville's Moby‐Dick as a point of departure to examine the problem of representing whales pictorially. Focussing on the use of images in cetological works and whaling logbooks, the paper investigates how the whalers’ knowledge, which served the hunting, killing, and economic exploitation of whales, came to be inscribed in the antithetical work of natural historians who were increasingly interested in living organisms. (...) This paper argues that Melville's juxtaposition of whalers’ and naturalists’ knowledge runs parallel with a dichotomy, along which natural histories, travelogues, and thematic maps of oceanography constitute the whale as an object of knowledge. It concludes by suggesting that, at the same time, this dichotomy is repeatedly undermined for the sake of the whale's representation. (shrink)

How does Christian philosophy address phenomena in the world? Felix Ó Murchadha believes that seeing, hearing, or otherwise sensing the world through faith requires transcendence or thinking through glory and night. By challenging much of Western metaphysics, Ó Murchadha shows how phenomenology opens new ideas about being, and how philosophers of "the theological turn" have addressed questions of creation, incarnation, resurrection, time, love, and faith. He explores the possibility of a phenomenology of Christian life and argues against any simple (...) separation of philosophy and theology or reason and faith. (shrink)