This book explores Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy and sociology of science, which, though central to his thought, have been largely neglected in critical examinations of his work. Addressing the resultant confusion that surrounds Bourdieu's sociologized philosophy of science, it expounds his epistemology and sociology of science, situating it within the context of Anglo-American post positivist philosophy of science and shedding light on the critique of relativist sociology of science that emerges from his field theory. From a (...) detailed critique of Bourdieu's reflexive sociology and his attempt to enhance the uneasy epistemic status of the social sciences, the author draws on the thought of Jürgen Habermas to suggest critical ethnography as a way of going beyond Bourdieu's critical theory. As such, Bourdieu's Philosophy and Sociology of Science will appeal to sociologists, philosophers and scholars across the social sciences with interests in the work of Bourdieu and the sociology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

This paper begins by defending the twofold relevance, political and theoretical, of the notion of social suffering. Social suffering is a notion politics cannot do without today, as it seems indispensable to describe all the aspects of contemporary injustice. As such, it has been taken up in a number of significant research programmes in different social sciences (sociology, anthropology, social psychology). The notion however poses significant conceptual problems as it challenges disciplinary boundaries traditionally set up to (...) demarcate individual and social phenomena. I argue that philosophy has a role to play in the attempt to integrate the diverging perspectives stemming from the social sciences. I attempt to show that, as it engages with the social sciences to account for the conceptual and normative issues thrown open by the question of social suffering, philosophy in fact retrieves the very idea of critical theory, as a conjugated critique of social reality and of its knowledge. I conclude by showing how the question of social suffering then becomes a useful criterion to distinguish between the different existing approaches in critical theory. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to explore Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of social science. To this end, the paper sheds light on the main epistemological presuppositions that undergird Bourdieu’s defence of reflexive sociology as a scientific endeavour. The predominant view in the literature is that, in most of his writings,Bourdieu has a tendency to embrace a positivist conception of social science. When examining Bourdieu’s conception of social science in more detail, however, it becomes clear that the (...) assumption that he remains trapped in a positivist paradigm does not do justice to the complexity of his multifaceted account of social science. In order to illustrate the complexity of Bourdieu’s conception of social science, the following analysis scrutinises ten epistemological tensions which can be found in Bourdieu’s writings on the nature of knowledge production. In view of these epistemological tensions, a more fine-grained picture emerges which demonstrates that Bourdieu invites,and indeed compels, us to reflect upon the complexity of the various tension-laden tasks posed by the pursuit of a critical social science. (shrink)

In his highly influential book (The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, first published in 1958), Peter Winch introduces an alternative concept of interpretive social science, in which the focus is shifted from the actors’ subjective motives to the common elements found in every understandable action: language-games and rule-following. This Wittgensteinian, linguistic version of interpretive social science has had its vast array of critics throughout the years: according to some of them, it (...) neglects the practical side of sociology; while others claim that it fails properly to answer the questions raised by the translation from one language-game to another, or that it renders critical social theory impossible. In my article, I try to reflect critically upon these critiques themselves, showing that the Winchian theory does not overlook the practice in understanding the different forms of life; that with slight modifications it is able to cope with the problem of translation, and that it does not aspire to be the critical theory that many of its critics would like it to be. (shrink)

“The Crisis of representation” – a discussion that was hold from the middle of 1980 to the middle of 1990 s in social sciences, when the legitimation of the big social theories was questioned as well as the deconstruction of scientific texts and the process of knowing, based on positivistic principles, were done. In this article the author offers the analysis of intellectual context of the development of social sciences (sociology and anthropology) in the crisis. The latter (...) are analyzed in three aspects. Firstly, the crisis concerned the process of knowing, based on principle of the unity of methods and concepts: some authors argued the influential role of language in the construction of reality. Other authors referred to implicit moral and political dimensions while the third provided deconstruction of the scholar figure and the notion of reality. In a similar vein, the crisis was articulated in the critics of scientific texts where implicit meanings and rhetorical devices were found. To the author’s view, the need of reconstruction of the crisis of representation can be explained by the want of more reflexive approach to the practices of social sciences today. (shrink)

This essay is written in the belief that it is possible to say both where Max Weber's philosophy of social science is mistaken and how these mistakes can be put right. Runciman argues that Weber's analysis breaks down at three decisive points: the difference between theoretical pre-suppositions and implicit value-judgements; the manner in which 'idiographic' explanations are to be subsumed under causal laws; and the relation of explanation to description in sociology. The arguments which Weber put forward are (...) fundamental to the methodology of the social sciences, and since his death it has come to be increasingly widely held that with perhaps the sole exception of Mill's System of Logic there is still no other body of work of comparable importance in the academic literature on these topics. Runciman's attempt to correct Weber's mistakes therefore constitutes in itself a valuable contribution to the philosophy of social science. (shrink)

In the age of the `return to the empirical' in which the theoretical disputes of an earlier era seem to have fallen silent, we seek to excavate the intellectual conditions for reviving theoretical debate, for it is upon this recovery that deeper understanding of the nature and purpose of empirical social science depends. We argue against the all too frequent turn to ontology, whereby critical realists have sought an epistemological guarantor of sociological validity. We seek, to the contrary, (...) to crystallize a culturally-based, hermeneutic account of a rational social science. Derived from disputes within the sociology of culture, on the one hand, and the long-standing concerns of interpretive philosophy, on the other, we offer a cultural-sociological approach to epistemology. We view the production of truth in social science as a reading of a meaningful social world, and as a performance of truth-claims that is constrained by evidence, but whose success depends on other contextual factors. We conclude that the rationality of social science can be achieved only by forgoing ontology. Theories are abstractions of investigators' meanings that allow the interpretation of social meanings in turn, whether those are actions, relations, or structures. Successful explanations are those that intertwine these meaning structures of investigators and actors in an effective way. (shrink)

In light of heated recent debates about neutrality and scientificity in social sciences, this issue seizes the opportunity to reconsider the terms of epistemological and political arguments concerning the relationships between critique and social sciences.

These essays reveal another side of Horkheimer, focusing on his remarkable contributions to critical theory in the 1930s. Max Horkheimer is well known as the director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research and as a sometime collaborator with Theodor Adorno, especially on their classic Dialectic of Enlightenment. These essays reveal another side of Horkheimer, focusing on his remarkable contributions to critical theory in the 1930s. Included are Horkheimer's inaugural address as director of the Institute, in which (...) he outlines the interdisciplinary research program that would dominate the initial phase of the Frankfurt School, his first full monograph, and a number of other pieces published in the 1930s. The essays, most of which have not appeared in English before, are surprisingly relevant to current post-philosophy debates, notably "On the Problem of Truth," with its focus on pragmatism, and "The Rationalism Debate in Current Philosophy," a sustained critique of the post-Cartesian philosophy of consciousness. Horkheimer's 1933 critique of Kantian ethics, "Materialism and Morality," is of particular interest given the current reaction to the neo-Kantian aspect of Habermas's work. There are also essays relevant to the current foundations debate within Continental philosophy, and the rationality/relativism question is sustained throughout the volume. (shrink)

This book addresses, and at the same time reflects, the impact of Max Weber on both the social sciences and on critical theory's critique of the social sciences ...

This article presents critical psychology in some new light. First, it presents the history of US critical psychology in terms of the overall foundation of its critique (identity-based, ideologically-based, and epistemologically-based). Second, it broadens the population that can be called critical psychologists. The argument is made to include: (1) philosophers of language, science, and mind critical of psychology’s foundational assumptions, conceptions, and methods of inquiry; and (2) non-professional, ordinary people who live their lives critical of (...) psychology by eschewing mainstream approaches and taking alternative routes to getting help with their emotional and physical pain, or the education of their children. Third, the article discusses ontology-based critique through the example of the practical-critical theory/practice of social therapy. (shrink)

Why a theory about social sciences? -- Chapter A: The world's social in social science thinking -- Chapter B: Categorical essentials of disciplinary thinking -- Chapter C: The social science approach to scientific thinking-advancements of teleological theorizing -- Chapter D: The discourse about and the progress of social science knowledge -- Chapter E: Going beyond the social sciences.

In recent years, social scientists have turned their critical lens on the historical roots and contours of their disciplines, including their politics and practices, epistemologies and methods, institutionalization and professionalization, national development and colonial expansion, globalization and local contestations, and their public presence and role in society. The Social Sciences in the Looking Glass offers current social scientific perspectives on this reflexive moment in the social sciences. Examining sociology, anthropology, philosophy, political science, legal theory, (...) and religious studies, the volume's contributors outline the present transformations of the social sciences, explore their connections with critical humanities, analyze the challenges of alternate paradigms, and interrogate recent endeavors to move beyond the human. Throughout, the authors, who belong to half a dozen disciplines, trace how the social sciences are thoroughly entangled in the social facts they analyze, and are key to helping us understand the conditions of our world. Contributors. Chitralekha, Jean-Louis Fabiani, Didier Fassin, Johan Heilbron, Miriam Kingsberg Kadia, Kristoffer Kropp, Nicolas Langlitz, John Lardas Modern, Álvaro Morcillo Laiz, Amín Pérez, Carel Smith, George Steinmetz, Peter D. Thomas, Bregje van Eekelen, Agata Zysiak. (shrink)

This book brings together a collection of work from emerging and established scholars who have put forth a vision of what critical sociology is and what it could be in the early decades of the 21st century. Pushing beyond the theoretical outlines of sociological critique, the authors demonstrate how critical sociology is practiced through conceptual innovation and empirical analyses interweaving the themes of society, power, and culture. Interrogating the Social reinvents the project of critical sociology in (...) two ways: by reflecting upon society as an object of inquiry; and by questioning the existing social order's self-evident character and exclusionary effects. In doing so, it answers three related questions: How should social relations and interactions be re-thought today? What new institutional and discursive configurations of power are emerging? How do we make sense of contemporary cultural performances and movements This edited collection is suited to a wide and diverse audience across the disciplines of sociology, political science, social and political theory, and cultural studies. (shrink)

What's Critical About Critical Realism?: Essays in Reconstructive Social Theory draws together 4 major articles that are situated at the intersection of philosophy and sociology. Preceded by a general presentation of Bhaskar ́s work, critical realism is used to reconstruct the generative structuralism of Pierre Bourdieu, warn about the dangers of biocapitalism, theorize about social movements and explore the hermeneutics of internal conversations. Together, the essays form a logical sequence that starts with a search (...) for a solid conception of social structure through a realist critique of Bourdieu ́s rationalist epistemology, proceeds to an ideology critique of posthumanism through an investigation of Actor-Network Theory, extends critical realism to social movements through an investigation of the constitution of collective subjectivities and engages in a sustained dialogue with Margaret Archer through an attempt to reconnect hermeneutics and pragmatism to critical realism. The result is an ongoing dialogue between British critical realism, French historical epistemology, German critical theory and American pragmatism. As suits a collection of essays in social theory, this book will address a broad audience of sociologists, philosophers, social psychologists and anthropologists who are interested in contemporary social theory at the cutting edge. Academics and advanced students who relate to critical realism and critical theory, epistemology and philosophy of the social sciences, hermeneutics and pragmatism, or anyone else who follows the work of Roy Bhaskar, Pierre Bourdieu, Bruno Latour or Margaret Archer will find a keen interest in some of the theoretical questions the book raises. (shrink)

The ArgumentI argue that “social epistemology” can be usefully reformulated as a philosophy of science accounting, specifically one that fosters a critical form of instrumental rationality. I begin by observing that philosophical and sociological species of “science accountancy” can be compared along two dimensions; constructive versus deconstve; reflexive versus unreflexive. The social epistemologist proposes a constructive and reflixive accounting for science. This possibility has been obscured, probably because of the persuasiveness of the Frankfulrt School's portrayal (...) of “critical” and “instrumental” rationalities as polar opposites. In challenging this polarity, I present four “acciybtability conditions” that define pure critico-instrumental rationality. These conditions are most likely to be met during a period of“crisis” in the future direction of science. The bulk of the paper concerns case study of such a crisis that enables us to examine contrasting ways of meeting the four conditions. Ernst Mach and Max Planck debated“the end of science” in the first decade of this century, a time marked by both science's increasing involvement in the means of social reproduction and prowing concern that science pursued for its own sake was exhibiting diminishing margianl returns on investment. In analyzing Planck's victory, I conclude that its tegacy has been an ever-widenig gap between the“content” and“function” of scientific knowledge in society, as measured by the increasing numbers of jobs that are devoted to mediating the production and distribution of knowledge. (shrink)

This book presents the current feminist critique of science and the philosophy of science in such a way that students of philosophy of science, philosophers, feminist theorists, and scientists will find the material accessible and intellectually rigorous.Contemporary feminist debate, as well as the debate brought on by the radical critics of science, assumes—incorrectly—that certain movements in philosophy of science and science-driven theory are understood in their dynamics as well as in their details. All too often, labels such (...) as “Kuhnian” or “positivistic” are taken for granted, and much of the contemporary postmodern or post-structuralist feminist theory that sets out to criticize science does little to alleviate the reader’s lack of knowledge with regard to such movements.Unlike other texts, Philosophies of Science: Feminist Theories provides a student-oriented framework so that, for example, positivism is given a thorough grounding before the feminist critique of such epistemological theory is given. Other movements discussed include the Kuhnian turn, sociology of science, and the radical critique of science. Feminist theory and critique are interwoven throughout, with one chapter devoted to feminist thought, which includes the work of such thinkers as Longino, Hararway, Hubbard, Nelson, Harding, and Keller. (shrink)

This collection of essays, first published two decades ago, presents central feminist critiques and analyses of natural and social sciences and their philosophies. Unfortunately, in spite of the brilliant body of research and scholarship in these fields in subsequent decades, the insights of these essays remain as timely now as they were then: philosophy and the sciences still presume kinds of social innocence to which they are not entitled. The essays focus on Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Rousseau, (...) and Marx; on the 'adversary method' model of philosophic reasoning; on principles of individuation on philosophical ontology and philosophy of language; on individualistic assumptions in psychology; functionalism in sociological and biological theory; evolutionary theory; the methodology of political science; and conceptions of objective inquiry in the sciences. In taking insights of both Liberal and Marxian women's movements into the purportedly most abstract and value-free areas of Western thought, these essays chart sexist and androcentric assumptions, claims and practices in the cognitive, technical cores of Western sciences and their philosophies. They begin to identify the distinctive aspects of women's experiences and locations in male-supremacist social structures which can provide resources needed for the creation of post-androcentric thinking in research, scholarship, and public policy. Such uses of feminist insights remain controversial today, and even among some feminists. These authors were all junior researchers and scholars two decades ago; today many are among the most distinguished senior scholars in their fields. Their work here provides a splendid opportunity for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy and the social sciences to explore some of the most intriguing and controversial challenges to disciplinary projects and to public policy today. (shrink)

The debates on the scientificity of social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, are recurring. From the original methodenstreitat the end the 19th Century to the contemporary controversy on the legitimacy of “regional epistemologies”, a same set of interrogations reappears. Are social sciences really scientific? And if so, are they sciences like other sciences? How should we conceive “research programs” Lakatos (1978) or “research traditions” for Laudan (1977) able to produce advancement of knowledge in the field of (...) social and human phenomena? Is the progress of knowledge in social sciences similar to the one generally observed in natural sciences? Is it possible to evaluate the relative merits of each one of these research programs? -/- These debates are important vectors of social and intellectual polarization. The historical divide between the positivist and the hermeneutics poles precedes the structure of the contemporary debate around the epistemic space of social sciences, It is not only a question of renewing the opposition between a monist view of sciences (e.g. McIntyre, 1996) and a dualistic one (e.g. Geertz, 1973) or even a trialist view of sciences (e.g. Lepenies, 1985). It is also a question of asserting dichotomies transformed into framework (including when it is a question of exceeding them): nature-culture, nomothetic-idiographic, models-narrative, structure-history, cause-reason, explanation-comprehension. -/- In this short introduction, we provide, in section 2, a first overview of this epistemological debate in social science. Section 3 proposes a different standpoint on the same questions, by introducing both ontological and methodological aspects in this basic epistemological debate. Namely, following (Hollis, 1994) oppositions of the explanation - understanding, causes - meaning, etc., types discussed in the firsts ection are comparatively examined together with oppositions of the structure - action, holism - individualism types. This allows us to discus show multi-agent design, by integrating various dimensions and standpoints in the same framework (Phan, Amblard, 2007, Chapters 1, 5, 14) can help us to shift these boundaries, and to bypass these oppositions. As model building and ontology design are at the core of this process (Phan, Amblard, 2007, Chapter 12), Section4 discusses various issues of the art of modelling, starting both from economists’ and sociologists’ current standpoints. (shrink)

This is a review of the book: Sheehan H. Marxism and the Philosophy of Science. A Critical History. The First Hundred Years. (L.: Verso, 2017. XII. 450 p.). The keynote of the book serves the conviction that Marxism is a sort of “super-theory” that can explain not only any social and political life, but also profound philosophy of science, including natural science. Science is presented in the book as a form of social practice. The main (...) idea of the Marxist philosophy of science is the status of the theory of dialectical materialism. The author shows that Marxist ideas could be considered as the origins of many disciplines: the sociology of science, the history of science, the history of technology; they had a noticeable effect on non-Marxist thought as well. However, Stalinism and Lysenkoism significantly decelerated the development of the Marxist philosophy of science. (shrink)

Field theory is often criticized because sociologists applying it fail to follow two seminal rules: the three key concepts of field theory—capital, habitus, and field structure—must be implemented in relation to each other and reconstructed for the historically specific moment of their application. I claim that Bourdieu developed his conceptual tools in response to Bachelard’s insight that scientific progress requires a break from common sense. Once we appreciate the epistemological foundation of field theory concepts, we can better appreciate the rules (...) for their application, avoid their typical criticism, and further improve them. (shrink)

The problem of holism in social science has, as Zahle and Collin, the editors of this volume note, a long history. It has revived, however, in a peculiar way, inspired by such things as the literature on corporate responsibility in ethics, the idea of supervenience, “Critical Realism” in sociology, ideas about emergence, the use of game-theoretic models to account for collective outcomes, and various notions of collective actors with collective intentions. These new inspirations interact with older problematics, such (...) as the micro–macro relation problem in sociology, the traditional argument that sentences such as “the crowd stormed the Bastille” have explanatory import apart from the import of sentences about the individual, and claims about reducibility of various kinds.This volume collects original papers by many of the main commentators on this set of topics and is an indispensable starting point for future discussion. No one should venture into this area without understanding the v .. (shrink)

As concepts, communication and information are very closely related, but they also designate more than their usual conceptual meaning when they are called upon in social theories as well as in philosophical theories about the reality and the truth of social life; information and communication are then designating physical events or event like objects of the observable reality, which will be hereafter described as a procedural ontologization of information. Why do they have this role and how do they (...) play it in contemporary social sciences and philosophy of social sciences? This article questions the scientificity of these concepts in these theoretical contexts. It wants to propose a framework for an epistemology of communication and information that is critical about the cybernetician paradigm in the social sciences. It presents this paradigm’s main features: informational ontology and probabilistic sociality. It offers a critique of this paradigm’s epistemological and methodological pretensions. It finally exposes the basis of an alternative philosophical theory of communication that wants to support the thesis that the cybernetician paradigmatic communication theory is not scientifically productive; and that it cannot be used in social scientific theoretical contexts without being dramatically redesigned and reoriented towards new goals. (shrink)

In the modern knowledge society there is a high need for highly qualified scientists and engineers. At the same time the conditions of the consumer society reduce the prestige of intellectual activity, which becomes one of many ordinary goods. There is also a sharp contradiction between the growing specialization and differentiation in the sciences, on the one hand, and everyday consciousness, on the other, which falls behind the scientific advances. One of the urgent tasks of scientific policy, therefore, is to (...) eliminate dangerous gaps between science as a social institution and the modern society. This policy must be directed towards the integration of science into a cultural society and ensuring personnel reproduction in science by creating new tools (social and human technologies) – special types of transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary trading zones. Currently, this type of social technology is not developed in Russia; underdeveloped are the scientific methods of their design as well. It is expected that scientific and techno-social filling of the gaps will take place by developing methods of research, modeling and design of trading zones on the basis of critical social epistemology (S. Fuller, I. Kasavin), history and sociology of science (P. Galison, H. Collins). (shrink)

Situating Karl Mannheim in a tradition of critical social philosophy, Iaan Reynolds argues that Mannheim’s early explorations in the sociology of knowledge offer a novel approach to this tradition, since they emphasize the need for social research to cultivate the critical self-awareness of social researchers.

In his previous book, Contemporary Hermeneutics, Josef Bleicher offered an introduction to the subject, locating it mainly within the philosophy of social science, and looking at the profound impact it is having on a wide range of intellectual pursuits. This book follows on from this and expounds the author's view that the development of the hermeneutic imagination is an indispensable condition for reflexive sociological work and emancipatory social practice. Dr Bleicher examines the various approaches to sociology – (...) empiricist, functionalist, structuralist, interpretive, critical – by reference to a hermeneutic paradigm, and shows how the hermeneutic imagination leads to a redirection in sociology, away from scientistic presuppositions and towards an awareness of the dialogue which links the subject and object in the study of social phenomena. He argues that by allowing the hermeneutic imagination to develop, it is possible to counter the steering of social processes on the basis of technocratic imperatives, and to provide a rational anticipation of a better future. (shrink)

The paper critically reconstructs the crowd psychological heritage in phenomenological and social science emotion research. It shows how the founding figures of phenomenology and sociology uncritically adopted Le Bon’s crowd psychological imagery as well as what I suggest calling the disease model of emotion transfer. Against this background, it can be examined how Le Bon’s understanding of emotional contagion as an automatic, involuntary, and uncontrollable mechanism has remained a dominant force in emotion research until today. However, a closer look (...) at phenomenological descriptions and empirical investigations of how emotion’s spread shows that there is little evidence supporting Le Bon’s crowd psychological framework. Thus, I suggest that the disease model should be dismissed in favor of more plausible approaches to interpersonal emotion dynamics. (shrink)

This book engages with post-truth as a problem of societal order and for scholarly analysis. It claims that post-truth discourse is more deeply entangled with main Western imaginations of knowledge societies than commonly recognised. Scholarly responses to post-truth have not fully addressed these entanglements, treating them either as something to be morally condemned or as accusations against which scholars have to defend themselves (for having somehow contributed to it). Aiming for wider problematisations, the authors of this book use post-truth to (...) open scholarly and societal assumptions to critical scrutiny. Contributions are both conceptual and empirical, dealing with topics such as: the role of truth in public; deep penetrations of ICTs into main societal institutions; the politics of time in neoliberalism; shifting boundaries between fact - value, politics - science, nature - culture; and the importance of critique for public truth-telling. Case studies range from the politics of nuclear power and election meddling in the UK, over smart technologies and techno-regulation in Europe, to renewables in Australia. The book ends where the Corona story begins: as intensifications of Modernity's complex dynamics, requiring new starting points for critique. (shrink)

Critical realism, championed by its proponents as the most promising post-positivist social science paradigm, has gained significant influence in the last few decades. This paper provides a critical evaluation of the critical realism movement in the hope of facilitating more fruitful dialogues between its proponents and rivalling schools of sociologists. Two concerns are raised about contemporary critical realism. First, critical realism is not the only philosophical school against positivism and not necessarily the best. Second, (...) critical realists exaggerate the importance of critical realism to social science and conflate philosophy of science with sociological theories. (shrink)

Using sources from classical to modern that draw on related concepts such as risk and chance, this book creates a novel approach to the recognized but theoretically often unattended issue of uncertainty. Andreas Klinke develops a new, general theory of uncertainty that provides a taxonomy of categories which are deduced from a critical inventory in philosophy, social and natural sciences, and risk research. Comprising six parts, the philosophical grounding of uncertainty sets the stage for the following accounts (...) and explanation of four distinctive guises of uncertainty that form a taxonomic notion and rationale: ontological, epistemological, linguistic-communicative, and teleological uncertainty. The theoretical-conceptual rumination provides a complex, differentiated view of the anatomy of uncertainty and an understanding that can be used in further theoretical and empirical research, as well as socio-political practice. The latter is delineated in the final part addressing the societal domestication of uncertainty. This book will be of great interest to scholars and students in philosophy, social and natural sciences, risk research, as well as inter- and transdisciplinary science fields. (shrink)

: It has been said that Kant's critical philosophy made it impossible to pursue either the Cartesian rationalist or the Lockean empiricist program of providing a foundation for the sciences (e.g., Guyer 1992). This claim does not hold true for much of nineteenth century French philosophy, especially the eclectic spiritualist tradition that begins with Victor Cousin (1792-1867) and Pierre Maine de Biran (1766-1824) and continues through Paul Janet (1823-99). This tradition assimilated Kant's transcendental apperception of the unity (...) of experience to Descartes's cogito. They then took this to be the method of a philosophical psychology that reveals the active self as substance or cause and thus provides the epistemological grounding for these categories. However, to dismiss these philosophers as simply confused or mistaken would be to overlook the historical role that their interpretations of Kant played in the subsequent development of philosophy and the social sciences in France. Specifically, Émile Durkheim's (1858-1917) sociological theory of the categories was deeply influenced by the eclectic spiritualist tradition and yet at the same time developed in reaction to it, as he thought that its psychological account of the categories failed to bring out their shared or universal character and the extent to which our conceptions of the categories are cultural products. (shrink)

This paper presents a program of action for the philosophy of regulatory science, based on a general theory of social epistemology. Two candidates are considered. The first one, offered by Alvin Goldman, is not fit for our purposes because it is focused on a veritism incompatible with non‐epistemic aims of regulatory science. The second, championed by Steve Fuller, sociologically investigates the existing means of producing knowledge, to modify them with the goal of obtaining democratic aims through action (...) on a legislative meta‐level. The program has been built upon this procedure, instantiated by the identification, characterization, and modification of epistemic policies. (shrink)

An Archaeology of Educational Evaluation: Epistemological Spaces and Political Paradoxes outlines the epistemology of the theories and models that are currently employed to evaluate educational systems, education policy, educational professionals and students learning. It discusses how those theories and models find their epistemological conditions of possibility in a specific set of conceptual transferences from mathematics and statistics, political economy, biology and the study of language. The book critically engages with the epistemic dimension of contemporary educational evaluation and is of (...) theoretical and methodological interest. It uses Foucauldian archaeology as a problematizing method of inquiry within the wider framework of governmentality studies. It goes beyond a mere critique of the contemporary obsession for evaluation and attempts to replace it with the opening of a free space where the search for a mode of being, acting and thinking in education is not over-determined by the tyranny of improvement. This book will appeal to academics, researchers and post-graduate students in the fields of educational philosophy, education policy and social science. (shrink)

In developing an "internal" sociology of science, the sociology of scientific knowledge drew on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to reinterpret traditional epistemological topics in sociological terms. By construing scientific reasoning as rule following within a collective, sociologists David Bloor and Harry Collins effectively blocked outside criticism of a scientific field, whether scientific, philosophical, or political. Ethnomethodologist Michael Lynch developed an alternative, Wittgensteinian reading that similarly blocked philosophical or political critique, while also disallowing analytical appeals to historical or institutional contexts. I (...) criticize these Wittgensteinian sociologies and argue for the historical and contemporary significance of methodological criticisms of scientific practice that conjoin epistemological and political categories. I consider two such cases briefly: the Baconian criticism of Scholastic science in the early Royal Society and the criticism of AIDS drug testing protocols by activists. Key Words: Wittgenstein • sociology of scientific knowledge • ethnomethodology • scientific method • interpretive sociology. (shrink)

The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences provides a remarkable comparative assessment of the variations of positivism and alternative epistemologies in the contemporary human sciences. Often declared obsolete, positivism is alive and well in a number of the fields; in others, its influence is significantly diminished. The essays in this collection investigate its mutations in form and degree across the social science disciplines. Looking at methodological assumptions field by field, individual essays address anthropology, area studies, economics, history, the (...) philosophy of science, political science and political theory, and sociology. Essayists trace disciplinary developments through the long twentieth century, focusing on the decades since World War II. Contributors explore and contrast some of the major alternatives to positivist epistemologies, including Marxism, psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, narrative theory, and actor-network theory. Almost all the essays are written by well-known practitioners of the fields discussed. Some essayists approach positivism and anti-positivism via close readings of texts influential in their respective disciplines. Some engage in ethnographies of the present-day human sciences; others are more historical in method. All of them critique contemporary social scientific practice. Together, they trace a trajectory of thought and method running from the past through the present and pointing toward possible futures. Contributors. Andrew Abbott, Daniel Breslau, Michael Burawoy, Andrew Collier , Michael Dutton, Geoff Eley, Anthony Elliott, Stephen Engelmann, Sandra Harding, Emily Hauptmann, Webb Keane, Tony Lawson, Sophia Mihic, Philip Mirowski, Timothy Mitchell, William H. Sewell Jr., Margaret R. Somers, George Steinmetz, Elizabeth Wingrove. (shrink)

The central aim of this thesis is to confront the world-view of positivistic materialism with its nihilistic implications and to develop an alternative world-view based on process philosophy, showing how in terms of this, science and ethics can be reconciled. The thesis begins with an account of the rise of positivism and materialism, or ‘scientism’, to its dominant position in the culture of Western civilization and shows what effect this has had on the image of man and consequently on (...) ethical views. After having shown the basic weaknesses of this world-view, the positivist account of science is criticised and an alternative epistemology is developed in which the aim of disciplined inquiry is seen to be understanding. It is argued on the basis of this epistemology that science and metaphysics are indissociable, and that the materialist conception of being is open to challenge from a different ontology. Having reviewed the various conceptions of being which have been developed in the past, a version of process philosophy is outlined and it is argued that this promises to be far more effective than materialism as a foundation for the natural sciences. In particular it is shown how in terms of process philosophy it is possible to conceive of living, sentient organisms as having emerged from inanimate being. This provides the basis for the development of a conception of humanity as an emergent form of life. The human order is then seen as a process of becoming within nature with its own unique dynamics, irreducible to any other processes, involving both intentional and unintentional processes. It is shown how on the basis of this conception of humanity it is possible to develop an ethical theory and a critical social science, and in this way, to transcend the disjunction between science and ethics. -/- . (shrink)

Steve Fuller's social epistemology aims to integrate the philosophy of science and sociology of science, and to enhance the ability of these disciplines to contribute to science policy. While applauding the re?vitalizing energy of the enterprise, a sociological perspective requires attention to four key aspects of the programme. First, the character of interdisciplinarity requires careful specification, lest the critical dynamic of social studies of science be compromised by calls to pluralism. Second, social epistemology (...) can and should transcend the traditional epistemological attribution of positions ('positionism') to protagonists. Third, the argumentative dynamic of social studies of science, which enables the successive reconceptualization of ?epistemic? matters, suggests some problems for social epistemology's use of ?sociological results?. Finally, social epistemology requires a more sociologically informed understanding of what in practice counts as normative research, since the current programme trades upon unexamined conceptions of policy audience. (shrink)

Social science, history, and philosophy have often been neglect in thinking through their fundamentally intertwined relationship. The result is often an inattention to philosophy where social science and history is concerned, or a neglect of historicity and social analysis where philosophy is concerned. Meanwhile, the place of values in research is often uneasily passed over in silence. The inattention to, and loss of, the intersection between these different disciplines and their subject matters, leaves our (...) investigations all the more impoverished as a result. In resolving these problems, it is not enough to strive for cooperation or integration, but to rethink of the nature of the disciplines themselves; their interests, purposes, and presuppositions. In this volume, contributors explore different facets of these relationships, and move beyond the problematics erected by positivism often cast in terms of value-free or value-neutral science, that is, a science obsessed with empirical data, schematic classifications, and the pursuit of law-like forms. While positivism has been subject to critique, the influence and legacy of positivism remains. It remains in the way in which we often think about science; the line drawn between the sciences and the humanities; the norms researchers should follow; what a successful explanation looks like; and the ethical, normative, and political implications of scientific research. Aimed at students and researchers of philosophy, history and the social sciences, this book is driven by a desire to revindicate questions concerning ontology and social ontology, to rethink the nature of explanation, and to resituate normativity and values within scientific, social scientific, and historical pursuits. (shrink)

In this book, Michael Murphy argues that if cosmopolitanism is to remain critical and relevant, what is required is a process of critique and cooperation. At the level of intercultural exchange, this requires understanding the encounter with the Other as a mutual phase of development and holds out the potential to rejuvenate world philosophies. Through this process the cosmopolitan imagination emerges from a dialogue between global traditions of relational sociologies on matters of common concern. The second stage of the (...) book applies this methodology to provide a radical account of being and acting in the world. This will be achieved through engaging in conversation with the works of the critical theorist, Gerard Delanty; the decolonial theorist, Walter Mignolo; and the Buddhist, Confucian, and phenomenological-inspired work of Watsuji Tetsurō. In providing a move away from abstractions and ideals to instead focus on injustices and everyday life, Murphy uncovers an independent source for political legitimacy not defined by the rationality of the state or dependent on the ideals of Western philosophy. Part of this investigation also reveals a post-individual account of agency as an enactive being. Emphasising agency as becoming has the potential to allow us to reimagine the relationship between the self and the institutions of democracy. The main themes of this book are eurocentrism, critical cosmopolitanism, post-individual subjectivity, and democracy--back cover. (shrink)

This book is a socio-historical analysis of rationalism as a worldview - that guides many of our actions in concrete everyday life - and as a philosophy - that guides our epistemological understanding of the reality around us. It explores the multifaceted manifestations of the idea in the Enlightenment philosophy, modern sociological theorising and in post-structural standpoints. The volume also critiques rationality from feminist, subaltern and post-colonial perspectives. Finally, it delves into the multilayered sociological significances of rationalisation of (...) different domains of life. Transdisciplinary in scope and with essays by foremost scholars in the field, this volume will be a major intervention across the humanities and the social sciences. It will be of interest to students and researchers in sociology, anthropology, history, philosophy, gender studies, political science, cultural anthropology, education, and religious studies. (shrink)

The article critically examines the project of Brian Epstein's social ontology. The authors propose to interpret a social fact as derived from the appropriate perspective of an observer carrying out a structural reconstruction of a social phenomenon and identify difficulties in the way of analyzing social facts as structurally independent of causally determining factors. The article shows that the determination and foundation of social facts cannot be understood as asymmetric, substantiates the symmetrical nature of the (...) relationship between the determinable complex fact and the ontological foundations that determine them, and suggests that the judgments describing them are equivalent, and also proves the need to involve philosophical and scientific methodology, the resources of the philosophy of language and epistemology to address the issue of the validity of projects “ontological fixation”, which the authors of the article propose to consider as a scientific classification. Understanding the ontology of the social is possible only when going beyond its limits, and any classifications can be idiosyncrasies of individual classifiers or observers, scientifically unequal and requiring epistemological evaluation. The authors note that epistemology allows us to judge the necessity or, on the contrary, artificiality of classification, and the question of the ontological basis of a social fact should be solved by analogy. Accordingly, the search for such ontological foundations is not possible without prior resolution of the epistemological problem: which classifications (fixations) of “natural” or “social species” are structurally necessary (in the sense that their macro-properties properties stem from the internal structure), and which are arbitrarily constructed by the observer, based on his idiosyncrasy or local-historical, cultural or ideological position. (shrink)

The axial aim of the paper is to dissect the main concepts of Margaret Archer’s theoretical position. In that line, first, the broader context of critical realism as a unique standpoint of philosophy of science is depicted, as her understanding of epistemology of the social is derived from there. The main body of the manuscript conveys discussions about crucial conceptual categories of the sociology of Margaret Archer primarily linked with analytical dualism, realist social theory, and (...) morphogenetic/morphostatic approach. Moreover, a short review of novel tendencies in further articulation of Archer’s theory, such as relational sociology, is presented. Furthermore, some examples of empirical application of her concepts are noted, as well as some critical remarks addressed to her epistemological-theoretical standpoint. Finally, in the concluding section, the prospects of using Archer’s sociological theory for empirical research on the transformation of contemporary Croatian society are emphasized. (shrink)

This is an open access book. The aim of the Conference is to provide a shared platform for academics, scholars, PhD students, and graduate students with different cultural backgrounds to present and discuss research, developments and innovations in the fields of contemporary education, social sciences and humanities are referred with the understanding of the Human being. Papers concerning education, philosophy, philosophical anthropology, sociology, theory and history of culture, epistemology, religions, ethics are strongly related with analyzing of the (...) Human being will be considered. Interdisciplinary approach and comparative perspective are encouraged. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Standpoint Logic: Origins A Philosophy of Method Notes.

This paper revisits the controversy surrounding Bhaskar's ‘spiritualisation’ of critical realism (CR), formally introduced with the publication of From East to West. It describes the principal divisions amongst realists with respect to the five moments of CR theoretical development signified by Bhaskar in terms of his own publications. The article critiques some of his later arguments, such as that for reincarnation; but it also locates and identifies a much earlier error as being consistent with, and fundamental to, the later (...) ideas that so many realists had problems with. The principal error is to be found in the concept of ontological truth. (shrink)

For two decades the German edition of this book has been a standard reference point for students of the philosophy of the social sciences in Germany. Today it still stands as a unique and masterful guide to the major problems and possibilities in this field.On the Logic of the Social Sciences foreshadowed the direction in which methodological discussions have traveled since it appeared and anticipated the problems they presently face. Habermas's statement of the principal issues is concise (...) and elegant, and his own original resolution of them is of continuing relevance. He considers the main lines of thought pursued by epistemologists and methodologists of the social sciences, from neo-Kantianism to behaviorism, and from problems of measurement to those of interpretive logic, in a sustained and provocative argument that involves analysis and critique at every point and ends with his own sharply profiled position.Beginning with the turn of the century debates on the distinction between natural and cultural sciences, Habermas discusses the relationship between sociology and history. He takes up the problem of a general theory of social action, focusing first on the nature of "interpretive understanding" and then on the scope and limits of functionalist explanation. In the concluding sections, he draws on psychoanalysis and classical social theory to sketch the outlines of his view of sociology as a critical theory of the present. Along the way he provides a great deal of material that is useful in understanding his own work.Jürgen Habermas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. On the Logic of the Social Sciences is included in the series Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy. (shrink)

FREE to download my New Book . https://www.academia.edu/31495642/_Meta-Philosophy_Meta-Cognition_and_Critique_of_Doing_Philosophizi ng am in the top 0.5% of Academic Publications on Academia.Edu and belong to a group of Academic giving our work for FREE as Commercial Publishers change too much for books. My new book is HERE for download: https://www.academia.edu/31495642/_Meta-Philosophy_Meta-Cognition_and_Critique_of_Doing_Philosophizi ng Abstract So far in my books and articles I have dealt with the following‭ (‬I hope I do not commit self-plagiarism by referring to my previous work and ideas expressed therein‭! ‬Lol‭)‬: -/- My own (...) discussions or‭ ‘‬philosophizing‭’ ‬follow right at the end after the numerous and very lengthy quotes from philosophers.‭ ‬The nature of the subject-matter of philosophy,‭ ‬the methodology,‭ ‬methods,‭ ‬techniques and tools of doing philosophy or philosophizing,‭ ‬the nature of the different steps or stages of the process/es of theorizing,‭ ‬the fact that doing philosophy are some of the stages of theorizing,‭ ‬the fact that philosophers lack meta-cognition and/or meta-reflection of these things.‭ ‬If they had awareness of what and how they are doing philosophy they might not become involved in quibbling over concepts and the differentiations of these concepts.‭ ‬It is as if philosophers are blind to what they are doing and have been doing for thousands of years,‭ ‬with the result that they continue repeating the same thing‭ – ‬arguing with words over the use of words and in the process creating more and more‭ –‬isms.‭ ‬They are seemingly unable to escape from such‭ –‬isms and their implications.‭ ‬Instead of getting or going anywhere they way they conceive‭ (‬of‭) ‬problems and express their questions they end up with conceiving of notions that cannot be solved or dissolved.‭ ‬They enclose themselves in an insular world or bubble of their own making,‭ ‬compared to sciences investigating humans and the different features and systems of the human body who find irrelevant the problems that philosophers have with things such as the brain,‭ ‬cognition,‭ ‬mind,‭ ‬consciousness,‭ ‬perception,‭ ‬thinking,‭ ‬etc.‭ ‬Sciences deal with these things on many levels and multi-dimensional while philosophers try to restrict them to a single level in one dimension by their words and the way they use those words.‭ ‬Consequently they lose sight of their objects and are unable to question them or express questions about them in a meaningful manner. -/- In my articles and books on the subject-matter I dealt with the traditional branches of philosophy and that with the differentiation of other disciplines and discourses the discourse of philosophy lost subject-matter.‭ ‬I mentioned newer areas of‭ ‘‬philosophy‭’‬,‭ ‬such as X-Phi,‭ ‬Philosophy’s interdisciplinary involvement in for example cognitive sciences,‭ ‬that there exists a philosophy of every discipline possible‭ (‬eg philosophy of science,‭ ‬art,‭ ‬music,‭ ‬sport,‭ ‬social sciences,‭ ‬etc‭)‬,‭ ‬that discourses such as Logic,‭ ‬Critical Thinking,‭ ‬Argumentation and argument maps,‭ ‬Reasoning,‭ ‬etc are relevant to and employed by many if not all disciplines and many discourses and are not uniquely subject-matter of the discourse of philosophy and does not have to form part of or be taught as subject-matter of philosophy. -/- I identified and discussed the methodology,‭ ‬methods,‭ ‬techniques and tools of doing philosophy and some underlying or implicit transcendentals such as pre-suppositions,‭ ‬suppositions and assumptions.‭ ‬I explore the nature of the different features,‭ ‬aspects,‭ ‬characteristics,‭ ‬steps and stages of the processes of theorizing.‭ ‬I showed that doing philosophy or philosophizing employ and/or consist of some of these features,‭ ‬steps and stages of theorizing. -/- As I involuntary have‭ (‬am‭)‬,‭ ‬seemingly endless‭ (‬a stream of consciousness like‭) ‬philosophically-‭ (‬question or problem and insight‭) ‬related‭ ‘‬intuitions‭’‬,‭ ‬it is difficult,‭ ‬painful and frustrating to me for that to be interrupted by social interaction,‭ ‬talking to people,‭ ‬phones,‭ ‬executing all sorts of‭ ‬mundane activities,‭ ‬etc.‭ ‬To understand or cope with this‭ ‘‬mental state‭’ ‬is one of the reasons why I need to explore meta-cognition or thinking about thinking,‭ ‬especially one’s own thinking and related‭ ‘‬activities‭’‬. (shrink)

Richard Rorty challenges the traditional use of hermeneutic understanding to defend the methodological autonomy of the social sciences, claiming that hermeneutics is part of both social and natural science and, moreover, that it exposes the limits of ?epistemologically centered philosophy?. Hermeneutics is interested in edification rather than truth, in finding new ways of speaking rather than adjudicating knowledge claims or securing the grounds of rational consensus. Although Rorty refers to Gadamer's ?philosophical hermeneutics? as support for this position, (...) Gadamer's own analysis points in a different direction. First, it distinguishes the social from the natural sciences as forms of practical, not theoretical, knowledge. As hermeneutic analyses, the social sciences participate in an on?going dialogue about values and forms of life. Second, the goal of this dialogue is cognitive and normative agreement. Indeed, hermeneutics is an act of integration which tries to expand consensus between different cultures and historical perspectives by mediating their claims to truth. (shrink)

Science and Technology Studies has attained a strong international profile in recent decades. Science Studies incorporates work in the History and Philosophy of Science, but emphasizes the social, cultural, and political implications of developments in the natural sciences, mathematics, engineering, and medicine. The Sociology of Science remains a vital part of Science Studies, but many other key contributors in the field identify more strongly with core disciplines such as Anthropology, Political Science, and Communication Studies. Edited by a leading (...) scholar in the field, this new four-volume collection from Routledge brings together classic work and the very best contemporary and cutting-edge scholarship. It provides researchersâe"and advanced studentsâe"with easy access to the key items of scholarly literature, material that is otherwise inaccessible or scattered throughout a variety of specialist journals and books. In particular, the collection enables users to gain a deep understanding of the current controversies surrounding science. The materials gathered exemplify important arguments, empirical studies, perspectives, and controversies (such as âe~the science warsâe(tm) of the 1990s). The collection also includes a full index, together with a comprehensive introduction, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context. Science and Technology Studies is an essential work of reference and will be welcomed as a vital one-stop research and pedagogic resource. (shrink)

This article asks whether an interdisciplinary "critical science studies" (CSS) is possible between a critical theory in the Frankfurt School tradition, with its commitment to universal standards of reason, and relativistic sociologies of scientific knowledge (e.g., David Bloor's strong programme). It is argued that CSS is possible if its practitioners adopt the epistemological equivalent of Rawls's method of avoidance. A discriminating, public policy–relevant critique of science can then proceed on the basis of an argumentation theory that employs an (...) immanent standard of relevance, which is illustrated by drawing on Helen Longino's critique of behavioral theory. (shrink)