Ce texte est consacré à la conception de la liberté absolue chez Schelling, telle qu’elle est exposée dans les Weltalter et accomplie dans la philosophie tardive. À partir d’une élucidation des rapports entre liberté, nécessité et contingence, nous souhaitons montrer que Schelling parvient à développer un nouveau concept de liberté absolue qui d’une part ne concerne pas seulement Dieu mais aussi l’homme, et qui d’autre part dépasse la liberté kantienne comme autonomie et autodétermination, mais aussi la liberté de l’É (...) crit sur la liberté de 1809 comme « pouvoir du bien et du mal ». En outre, nous soutenons que la liberté du Dieu « Seigneur de l’être » de la philosophie de Munich et Berlin se distingue de celle du Dieu seulement « sur-étant » des Weltalter. Seule la « liberté d’être et de ne pas être » du « Seigneur de l’être » représente une forme de liberté à laquelle l’homme peut et doit tendre, une liberté non pas de l’auto-anéantissement, mais du don de soi, liberté suprême qui n’est autre que celle de l’amour. (shrink)

Une longue introduction précède les contributions de ces trois philosophes et théologiens à la querelle sur la distinction entre l'être et l'essence qui anima la Faculté de théologie de l'Université de Paris dans les années 1280.

Résumé — II s’agit ici de montrer que la mimèsis tragique chez Aristote a un sens éthique, dans la mesure où elle donne à réfléchir sur les conditions du bonheur humain. En effet, en montrant des personnages soumis aux vicissitudes de la fortune, elle donne à réfléchir sur la contingence du bonheur, que la vertu ne suffit pas à assurer. En ce sens, la mimèsis tragique est le pendant de l’Éthique à Nicomaque qui définit les conditions morales du bonheur. (...) Ce sens éthique de la tragédie peut déboucher sur une portée éthique, dans la mesure où la connaissance qu’elle procure de la condition humaine et du hasard qui règne sur la vie des hommes s’oppose à toute hubris en faisant prendre conscience au spectateur de la fragilité du bonheur. Dès lors, on peut dire que le sens éthique de la tragédie selon Aristote est d’abord intellectuel, mais qu’il peut avoir du coup une portée pratique. La différence entre Platon et Aristote sur ce point vient de la différence de leurs conceptions éthiques : pour Platon en effet, et contrairement à son disciple, la condition nécessaire et suffisante du bonheur est la vertu, de telle sorte que la mimèsis tragique, en tant qu’elle présente des hommes soumis à des malheurs sans pour autant avoir nécessairement commis une faute, donne une fausse idée du bonheur. C’est pourquoi chez Platon la tragédie ne peut donner un enseignement éthique, contrairement à ce qui se passe chez Aristote. (shrink)

L’esthétique de Croce a souvent été lue comme une philosophie de la conscience esthétique, qui présuppose une distinction stricte entre l’artiste et l’œuvre, entre le sujet connaissant et l’expression artistique. Dans cette optique, l’œuvre serait une traduction fidèle de la pensée de l’artiste. Les pages qu’Adorno consacre à Croce dans sa Théorie esthétique semblent en quelque sorte se référer à cette ligne d’interprétation. Dans cet essai, nous voudrions examiner une autre lecture possible de la réflexion de Croce sur l’art à (...) partir d’une esthétique de la production, pour mettre en évidence le fait que pour lui toute procédure artistique est essentiellement instable et fondée sur un corps à corps avec les matériaux. Entre l’artiste et l’œuvre, il n’y aurait donc pas de relation linéaire, mais plutôt une sorte de tension que l’art, à différents niveaux, matérialise. (shrink)

Generally in agreement with the stoic doctrin of causality, Seneca’s primary concern is not conceptual precision, but rather the way the problem of causality is perceived and understood by the human mind, which is unable to comprehend immediately the world’s absolute rationality. The relative vagueness surrounding the notion of cause, and particularly that of Primary Cause, implies the use of a pedagogical device which prepares the progrediens to grasp the ambiguity existing between necessity and contingency. Seneca dramatizes causality, creates a (...) play, and provides the deus with masks, so as to allow the progressing student of wisdom to comprehend the various facets of the god, as perceived by man, wise or not : necessity, contingency, Fortune, providence. The Roman philosopher’s favourite tools in this dramatization of causality are on one hand the personification of Fortune, and on the other the symbolical hypotyposis which allows the conceptualization of the Primary Cause, governing the world, through an analogy with a concrete figure, particularly that of the ideal princeps. So, through this theatrical depiction of causality, the philosopher provides the „spectator” with a distanciation, a catharsis and a comprehension of the world. (shrink)

Contingent conditionals, at the comparative logical works, has yielded different, and often inconsistent, analyses. At contemporaries’ works, there are two approaches to the contingent conditionals: modal and truth-table methods. At the former, there has been used modal connectives of necessity and possibility to analyze the contingent conditionals; but at the latter, some truth-tables has been proposed. At the paper, besides presenting and criticizing the extant theories, we gain new analyses and formulations of the disputed subject matters.

The contingency of biological regularities—and its implications for the existence of biological laws—has long puzzled biologists and philosophers. The best argument for the contingency of biological regularities is John Beatty’s evolutionary contingency thesis, which will be re-analyzed here. First, I argue that in Beatty’s thesis there are two versions of strong contingency used as arguments against biological laws that have gone unnoticed by his commentators. Second, Beatty’s two different versions of strong contingency are analyzed in terms of two different stabilities (...) of regularities. Third, I argue that Beatty and his commentators have focused on the more ineffective trajectory stability version of the argument, whereas the constancy stability version provides a more substantial and applicable argument against the existence of biological laws. Fourth, I develop a counterexample to Beatty’s thesis. Finally, I discuss the possibility of evolution producing repeatable and general non-lawlike regularities and patterns by utilizing the notion of generative entrenchment and by criticizing the thesis of multiple realizability of biological properties. (shrink)

Contingent transcranialists claim that the physical mechanisms of mind are not exclusively intracranial and that genuine cognitive systems can extend into cognizers' physical and socio-cultural environments. They further claim that extended cognitive systems must include the deep functional integration of external environmental resources with internal neural resources. They have found it difficult, however, to explicate the precise nature of such deep functional integration and provide compelling examples of it. Contingent intracranialists deny that extracranial resources can be components of genuine extended (...) cognitive systems. They claim that transcranialists fallaciously conflate coupling with constitution and construe cognition as extending always from brains into world rather than world into brains. By using insights from recent research in developmental psychology and by explicating the nature of one form that deep functional integration can take, I argue that (i) transcranialists do not fallaciously conflate coupling wth constitution, and (ii) human emotional ontogenesis is a world-to-brain transcranial achievement. Jennifer Greenwood is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at the School of History, Philosophy, Religion, and Classics, University of Queensland. (shrink)

"This volume is concerned with how we ought to evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend - discussed here as the "problem of contingent future persons." For it seems that those future persons who are brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by them in any conventional sense. This is a relatively novel problem in ethics and as yet there is simply no consensus on how (...) we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. However, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. Intended for professional ethicists, policy researchers, and graduate students, this volume explores the theological implications of the problem and advances the investigation of it both philosophical and in theological terms." --Book Jacket. (shrink)

There is a familiar debate between Russell and Strawson concerning bivalence and ‘the present King of France’. According to the Strawsonian view, ‘The present King of France is bald’ is neither true nor false, whereas, on the Russellian view, that proposition is simply false. In this paper, I develop what I take to be a crucial connection between this debate and a different domain where bivalence has been at stake: future contingents. On the familiar ‘Aristotelian’ view, future contingent propositions are (...) neither true nor false. However, I argue that, just as there is a Russellian alternative to the Strawsonian view concerning ‘the present King of France’, according to which the relevant class of propositions all turn out false, so there is a Russellian alternative to the Aristotelian view, according to which future contingents all turn out false, not neither true nor false. The result: contrary to millennia of philosophical tradition, we can be open futurists without denying bivalence. (shrink)

I argue that propositions are contingent existents. Some propositions that in fact exist might not have existed and there might have been propositions that are distinct from every actually existing proposition. This is because some propositions are singular propositions, which are propositions containing ordinary objects as constituents, and so are ontologically dependent on the existence of those objects; had those objects not existed, then the singular propositions would not have existed. I provide both a philosophical and technical understanding of the (...) contingent status of propositions. (shrink)

Todd and Rabern (2021) mount an argument that – contra both Thomason’s (1970) supervaluationism and MacFarlane’s (2014) relativism – an “open future” view is incompatible with the principle they call “Retro-closure”, according to which today’s rain implies that yesterday it was true that it would rain a day later. In a recent piece, MacFarlane replies. This paper has two aims. First, I argue that MacFarlane’s response to Todd and Rabern is unsuccessful on its own terms. Second, I attempt to clarify (...) Todd and Rabern’s overall argument, and explain how MacFarlane’s replies should be construed within the overall dialectic. The intended result: if you want an "open future", then one's best option is a modified Peirceanism (Todd 2021); if one wants Retro-closure, one's best option is one on which there is a determinate "Thin Red Line" (a view sometimes called "Ockhamism"). However, one cannot have what supervaluationism and relativism both promise, viz., a view that preserves both. (shrink)

In this study John Bowlin argues that Aquinas's moral theology receives much of its character and content from an assumption about our common lot: the good we desire is difficult to know and to will, in particular because of contingencies of various kinds - within ourselves, in the ends and objects we pursue, and in the circumstances of choice. Since contingencies are fortune's effects, Aquinas insists that it is fortune that makes good choice difficult. Bowlin then explicates Aquinas's treatment of (...) a number of topics in light of this difficulty: the moral and theological virtues, the first precepts of the natural law, the voluntariness of virtuous action, and the happiness available to us in this life. By noting that Aquinas proceeds with an eye on fortune's threats to virtue, agency, and happiness, Bowlin places him more precisely in the history of ethics, among Aristotle, Augustine, and the Stoics. (shrink)

Why does one theory "succeed" while another, possibly clearer interpretation, fails? By exploring two observationally equivalent yet conceptually incompatible views of quantum mechanics, James T. Cushing shows how historical contingency can be crucial to determining a theory's construction and its position among competing views. Since the late 1920s, the theory formulated by Niels Bohr and his colleagues at Copenhagen has been the dominant interpretation of quantum mechanics. Yet an alternative interpretation, rooted in the work of Louis de Broglie in the (...) early 1920s and reformulated and extended by David Bohm in the 1950s, equally well explains the observational data. Through a detailed historical and sociological study of the physicists who developed different theories of quantum mechanics, the debates within and between opposing camps, and the receptions given to each theory, Cushing shows that despite the preeminence of the Copenhagen view, the Bohm interpretation cannot be ignored. Cushing contends that the Copenhagen interpretation became widely accepted not because it is a better explanation of subatomic phenomena than is Bohm's, but because it happened to appear first. Focusing on the philosophical, social, and cultural forces that shaped one of the most important developments in modern physics, this provocative book examines the role that timing can play in the establishment of theory and explanation. (shrink)

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (‘PSR’), every fact has an explanation for why it obtains. If the PSR is true, there must be a sufficient reason for why God chose to create our world. But a sufficient reason for God’s choice plausibly necessitates that choice. It thus seems that God could not have done otherwise, and that our world exists necessarily. We therefore appear forced to pick between the PSR, and the contingency of creation and divine choice. I (...) show that a third option remains open, and thus that it is possible to preserve the contingency of creation and divine choice even while endorsing the PSR. My solution depends on the coherence of a restricted modal realism. On this modal realism, there is more than one possible morally optimal created world, and for each such world there is an existing possibility in which God creates that world. (shrink)

The influence of externally focused organizational capabilities on the generation of proactive environmental strategies was examined under contingenteffects of uncertainty in the general business environment in 134 North American and European ski resorts. Capabilities of strategic proactivity and continuous innovation were found to be associated with proactive environmental strategies. Managerial perceptions of uncertainty in the general business environment were found to moderate the deployment of the capability of continuous innovation at all levels of uncertainty and stakeholder engagement at low and (...) average levels of uncertainty. The study contributes to the resource-based view by illuminating an important contingency under which these capabilities are likely to be deployed to generate such a strategy. (shrink)

In Contingent Computation, M. Beatrice Fazi offers a new theoretical perspective through which we can engage philosophically with computing. The book proves that aesthetics is a viable mode of investigating contemporary computational systems. It does so by advancing an original conception of computational aesthetics that does not just concern art made by or with computers, but rather the modes of being and becoming of computational processes. Contingent Computation mobilises the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Alfred North Whitehead in order to (...) address aesthetics as an ontological study of the generative potential of reality. Through a novel philosophical reading of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and of Turing’s notion of incomputability, Fazi finds this potential at the formal heart of computational systems, and argues that computation is a process of determining indeterminacy. This indeterminacy, which is central to computational systems, does not contradict their functionality. Instead, it drives their very operation, albeit in a manner that might not always fit with the instrumental, representational and cognitivist purposes that we have assigned to computing. (shrink)

Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status‐conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of (...) moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude‐based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status‐holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter. (shrink)