One of the most essential characteristics of living material—indeed, according to many, its most essential characteristic—is the fact that it is irritable. A living cell responds to sudden environmental changes, and typically a cell of a given sort responds in a definite and particular way no matter what the nature of the stimulation. Thus when a muscle cell is exposed to sudden heat, to sudden cold, to a sharp mechanical impact, to ultraviolet radiation, or to an electric current, (...) it shortens. Similarly, a nerve fiber responds in its own characteristic way, and this response is independent of the nature of the stimulation. In general, mechanical impacts, ultraviolet radiation, electric shocks, and certain types of chemical substances are stimulating agents for many diverse types of protoplasm and they serve to arouse it to activity. The response of protoplasm to stimulation may be prevented by anesthetics. These are substances which nullify the effect of a stimulus without killing or seriously injuring the protoplasm. The remarkable fact is that there are general anesthetics, substances which in much the same concentration can prevent protoplasmic activity in widely different protoplasmic systems. Many fat solvents, such as ether, are general anesthetics. Magnesium salts also behave as anesthetics for many different types of cells. (shrink)

The paper concludes the argument that certain aesthetic objects conduce to a feeling of radical contingency, and to an openness to St Thomas's Third Way proof for the existence of God. Much is conceded to the late Mr Gershon Weiler's criticism of an earlier discussion. The upshot is (a) that Necessary Being as converse of radical contingency may be an Aesthetic Idea/Sublime of Kant's kind, and (b) that without the ‘I AM that I am’, it is empty. The ‘inference’ from (...) radical contingency to Necessary Being may function as George Eliot thought Wit to function, intellectually/aesthetically. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between psychology and neurobiology in the context of cognitive science. Are the sciences that constitute cognitive science independent and theoretically autonomous, or is there a necessary interaction between them? I explore Fodor's Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) which starts with the fact of multiple realization and purports to derive the theoretical autonomy of special sciences (such as psychology) from structural sciences (such as neurobiology). After laying out the MRT, it is shown that, on closer inspection, the (...) argument is either circular or self-undermining--the argument either assumes the very autonomy it seeks to demonstrate or the concluded autonomy is contradicted by the theoretical interdependence invoked by the premises of the argument. Next, I explore a concrete example of multiple realization in the explanation of animal behavior: the convergent evolution of jamming avoidance behaviors in three genera of weakly electric fish. Contrary to the image painted by the MRT, the work on these animals involves a high degree of interaction between the various levels of investigation. The fact that our understanding of electric fish behavior involves functional theories and multiple realization without the kind of disunified science that is supposed to follow from such a situation indicates that the mere fact of multiple realization cannot be the basis for an autonomous psychology. (shrink)

The 1790 Fête de la fédération in the early French Revolution evoked the memory of the taking of the Bastille while tamping down on the simmering social forces that had erupted on 14 July 1789. How to do both? As an official architect put it, through the festival, ‘the sentiment of each becomes the sentiment of all by a kind of electrification, against which even the most perverse men cannot defend themselves’. This paper argues that a new language of revolutionary (...) electricity came into being with the French Revolution. It argues that revolutionaries drew upon concepts of medical electricity developed in the 1780s to analogize the literal electricity of the ether to the revolutionary electricity of collective political sentiment. Though historians have associated electricity with radical politics, this paper argues that in the hands of bureaucrats and festival planners, electricity entered revolutionary discourse as a powerful mechanism for exercising authority and control over an unruly revolutionary public. (shrink)

In a similar way to what happens when a wave of electricity impacts the animal body and provokes a convulsive stir of muscles and nerves which can burn and ultimately paralyze the affected surface, some rough emotional experiences may lead us to sudden numbness. Keeping abreast with the most sophisticated phenomenological tools to account for an extremely damaging kind of psychological experience that can ultimately defeat the purpose of a sheer descriptive approach, this chapter does provide a descriptive analysis of (...) the kind of emotional shock that risks threatening the moral integrity of an agent. I shall zoom in my analysis on the typically acknowledged moment when disturbing information from a socially shared context outside ourselves comes suddenly to the fore of our attention, thus disrupting the focus even of the the most trivial perceptive input. I argue that in the longer run the outcome of such an experience may amount to a reconfiguration of the subject’s core values, daily routines and even her life-long expectations and projects. (shrink)

With the economic and political support of the United States, in July 1947, Turkey signed contracts with the Westinghouse Electric International Company and J.G. White Engineering Corporation to construct its first international civilian airport, Istanbul's Yeşilköy Airport. As this article will argue, the building of Yeşilköy (1949–53), through a partnership with two American engineering firms, is essentially an early Cold War narrative of transnational exchange involving the multidirectional flow of technical knowledge, expertise and resources between the United States (...) and Turkey; the circulation of geopolitically significant (and frequently competing) military, civilian and government actors; and the local and global implications of these transmissions. Yet the Yeşilköy construction narrative also illustrates how post-war technology transfer was a highly political process of constant adaptation, modification and negotiation. Fraught with unforeseen friction and thorny challenges, Yeşilköy exemplifies the complicated American Cold War strategy of creating and maintaining alliances through engineering knowledge, personnel and practices, often with unintended consequences. Moreover, as a case study, Yeşilköy opens a new window into the cautious science diplomacy that occurred along the Iron Curtain, while filling a notable historiographic gap with respect to aviation in early Cold War Turkey. (shrink)

Anxiety shifts visual attention and perceptual mechanisms, preparing oneself to detect potentially threatening information more rapidly. Despite being demonstrated for threat‐related social stimuli, such as fearful expressions, it remains unexplored if these effects encompass other social cues of danger, such as aggressive gestures/actions. To this end, we recruited a total of 65 participants and asked them to identify, as quickly and accurately as possible, potentially aggressive actions depicted by an agent. By introducing and manipulating the occurrence of electric shocks, (...) we induced safe and threatening conditions. In addition, the association between electric shocks and aggression was also manipulated. Our result showed that participants have improved sensitivity, with no changes to criterion, when detecting aggressive gestures during threat compared to safe conditions. Furthermore, drift diffusion model analysis showed that under threat participants exhibited faster evidence accumulation toward the correct perceptual decision. Lastly, the relationship between threat source and aggression appeared to not impact any of the effects described above. Overall, our results indicate that the benefits gained from states of anxiety, such as increased sensitivity toward threat and greater evidence accumulation, are transposable to social stimuli capable of signaling danger other than facial expressions. (shrink)

Explanations are supposed to provide us with understanding. It is common to make a distinction between genuine, scientific understanding, and the phenomenological, or ‘aha’ notion of understanding, where the former is considered epistemically relevant, the latter irrelevant. I argue that there is a variety of phenomenological understanding that does play a positive epistemic role. This phenomenological understanding involves a similarity between bodily sensations that is used as evidence for mechanistic hypotheses. As a case study, I will consider 17th and 18th (...) century research into the mechanism behind the electric eel’s power to shock. Se supone que las explicaciones nos dotan de comprensión. Es habitual hacer una distinción entre compresión cientifica, genuina, y la noción fenomenológica, o ‘ahá’, de comprensión, donde la primera se considera epistemológicamente relevante y esta última irrelevante. Argumento que hay un tipo de compresión fenomenológica que sí juega un papel positivo epistémico. Esta comprensión epistemológica conlleva cierta semejanza con las sensaciones corporales que se usan como evidencia de algunas hipótesis mecanicistas. Como caso de estudio, consideraré la investigación en los siglos xvii y xviii del mecanismo tras la capacidad de la anguila eléctrica para provocar un shock. (shrink)

Ever since it was first unleashed in 1818 the story of Victor Frankenstein and his reanimated, stitched-together corpse has inspired intense debate. Can organic life be reanimated using electricity or genetic manipulation? If so, could Frankenstein’s monster really teach itself to read and speak as Mary Shelley imagined? Do monsters have rights, or responsibilities to those who would as soon kill them? What is it about music that so affects Frankenstein’s monster, or any of us? What does Mel Brook’s Frau (...) Blucher say to contemporary eco-feminism? Why are some Frankenstein’s flops and others historic successes? Is there a true Frankenstein? Why are children, but not adults, drawn to Shelley’s monster? And what is a “monster,” anyway? Frankenstein and Philosophy calls 25 philosophers to stitch together these and other questions as they apply to history’s greatest horror franchise. Some chapters treat the Frankenstein films, others the original novel, and yet others the many comic books, novels, and modern adaptations. Together they pay tribute to perhaps the most enduring pop culture icon and the fundamental fears, hopes, and puzzles it raises. (shrink)

Lloyd Berkner , radio engineer and ionospheric physicist, was among a small circle of power brokers who helped bring American science and the American state closer together during World War II and the early years of the Cold War. In this exemplary biographical study, Allan Needell, a historian at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, gives a well‐documented account of Berkner's life and career and a nuanced examination of how American scientists and engineers defined and balanced the (...) interests of their professions and of the national security state during those crucial years.A product of the Midwest prairie, Berkner was an accomplished radio operator before entering the University of Minnesota to study electrical engineering and to train as a Naval Reserve aviator. The Bureau of Standards hired Berkner as a radio engineer in 1928, just in time for him to participate in Richard Byrd's highly publicized Antarctic expedition. The adventure helped form what Needell calls Berkner's “technocratic vision” that justified science both as a heroic exploration of the unknown and as a prime mover of technology and human progress. Berkner energetically pursued this vision of science, first at the Bureau of Standards and then at the Carnegie Institution of Washington , where he directed internationally respected research on ionospheric physics.World War II honed Berkner's skills in instrument building and organization. On active duty he served as the naval liaison at the MIT Rad Lab to produce radars and helped install them on naval aircraft. He also came into close contact with Vannevar Bush, I. I. Rabi, Jerome Wiesner, and other influential scientists who shared his enthusiasm for collaboration with the military. A rising star at the end of World War II, Berkner worked to build a science‐state partnership for the ensuing Cold War, which he saw as a continuation of the struggle between democracy and dictatorship.Berkner helped bring scientific expertise to bear on American defense and foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s as executive secretary of the military's Joint Research and Development Board and as a consultant to the State Department and the CIA. He drafted the famous “Berkner report” on science and American foreign policy, directed Project Troy on the overseas operations of the Voice of America, and participated in the heated debate over continental defense against a possible Soviet nuclear attack. Berkner's election to the National Academy of Sciences in 1948, despite the lack of an advanced degree, undoubtedly aided his agenda, as did his assuming in 1951 the presidency of the Associated Universities, Inc. .In the 1950s, Berkner helped initiate the International Geophysical Year , which led to the launching of the Soviet Sputnik in 1957. Did Berkner propose the satellite component of the IGY as a cover for U.S. satellite intelligence programs? Needell finds no smoking gun but presents strong circumstantial evidence that intelligence was indeed a factor in Berkner's thinking. The connection apparently posed no moral challenge for Berkner, who maintained an abiding faith in the harmonious goals of American science and state—what he called the “unity of democracy.” Not everyone shared Berkner's faith, however. The geophysicist Merle Tuve, Berkner's boss at Carnegie, for example, feared government control of science and fought against Berkner both at the CIW and in national science policy. In the end, Needell sees Berkner as a kind of broker who brought American scientists together with the state through both strategies of insulation and overt integration of interests and action.Based on rich archival sources, Science, Cold War, and the American State is a superb social and political study of American science and technology rendered through Lloyd Berkner's life and times. Needell writes with clarity and achieves a nice balance between narrative and contextual analysis, which makes the book suitable for teaching courses. For scholars, the study raises fascinating questions for further research. One wonders, for example, to what extent Needell's intriguing hypothesis—that Berkner's activism derived from his nonacademic background—can be applied to other scientist‐statesmen. Above all, the book's focus on the ease with which Berkner moved between the worlds of science, government, and national security points to the need to reformulate the well‐known debate between the historians Paul Forman and Daniel Kevles over who was using whom in the U.S. science‐state relationship during the Cold War. Neither the science nor state community was monolithic, and further comparative studies of mediators on the scene such as Berkner should help deepen our understanding of the dynamics of that partnership. (shrink)

In the course of 1901, V. Crémieu published the results of some experiments carried out to test the magnetic effects of electric convection currents. According to Crémieu, his experiments had proved that convection currents had no magnetic effects and consequently they were not equivalent to conduction currents, that is they were not ‘real’ electric currents. These negative results conflicted with those of well-known experiments carried out by other researchers, in particular with Rowland's experiments, and with Maxwell's, Hertz's and (...) Lorentz's theories, which was more shocking. The publication of Crémieu's experiments raised a controversy which involved directly or indirectly some leading French and British physicists, and led Rowland together with his student Pender to re-perform his experiments. Pender's results confirmed those preiously obtained by Rowland, in striking conflict with those of Crémieu. The importance of Crémieu's experiments was stressed by Poincaré in some of his publications, where he analysed and criticized various aspects of the question. However, he was involved more deeply: his correspondence with Crémieu shows that many of the experiments performed by Crémieu were conceived by Poincaré and carried out with his guidance. To put an end to the controversy, Poincaré obtained Kelvin's support to organize Crémieu's and Pender's joint experiments. The results of these experiments showed that the conflicting results obtained previously were due to an ‘anomalous’ behaviour of the dielectrics used by Crémieu in his apparatus. (shrink)

Milgram’s experiments, subjects were induced to inflict what they believed to be electric shocks in obedience to a man in a white coat. This suggests that many of us can be persuaded to torture, and perhaps kill, another person simply on the say-so of an authority figure. But the experiments have been attacked on methodological, moral and methodologico-moral grounds. Patten argues that the subjects probably were not taken in by the charade; Bok argues that lies should not be used (...) in research; and Patten insists that any excuse for Milgram’s conduct can be adapted on behalf of his subjects. (Either he was wrong to conduct the experiments or they do not establish the phenomenon of immoral obedience). We argue a) that the subjects were indeed taken in b) that there are good historical reasons for regarding the experiments as ecologically valid, c) that lies (though usually wrong) were in this case legitimate, d) that there were excuses available to Milgram which were not available to his subjects and e) that even if he was wrong to conduct the experiments this does not mean that he failed to establish immoral obedience. So far from ‘disrespecting’ his subjects, Milgram enhanced their autonomy as rational agents. We concede however that it might (now) be right to prohibit what it was (then) right to do. (shrink)