Priest, argues that classical reasoning can be made compatible with his preferred logical theory by proposing a methodological maxim authorizing the use of classical logic in consistent situations. Although Priest has abandoned this proposal in favour of the one in G. Priest, I shall argue that due to the fact that the derivability adjustment theorem holds for several logics of formal consistency, these paraconsistent logics are particularly well suited to accommodate classical reasoning by means of a version (...) of that maxim, yielding thus an enthymematic account of classical recapture. (shrink)

The idea of classical recapture has played a prominent role for non-classical logicians. In the specific case of non-classical theories of truth, although we know that it is not possible to retain classical logic for every statement involving the truth predicate, it is clear that for many such statements this is in principle feasible, and even desirable. What is not entirely obvious or well-known is how far this idea can be pushed. Can the non-classical (...) theorist retain classical logic for every non-paradoxical statement? If not, is she forced to settle for a very weak form of Classical Recapture, or are there robust versions of classical recapture available to her? These are the main questions that I will address in this paper. As a test case I will consider a paracomplete account of the truth-theoretic paradoxes and I will argue for two claims. First, that it is not possible to retain the law of excluded middle for every non-paradoxical statement. Secondly, that there are no robust versions of classical recapture available to the paracomplete logician. (shrink)

In this paper, we approach the problem of classical recapture for LP and K3 by using normality operators. These generalize the consistency and determinedness operators from Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Underterminedness, by expressing, in any many-valued logic, that a given formula has a classical truth value (0 or 1). In particular, in the rst part of the paper we introduce the logics LPe and Ke3 , which extends LP and K3 with normality operators, and we establish (...) a classical recapture result based on the two logics. In the second part of the paper, we compare the approach in terms of normality operators with an established approach to classical recapture, namely minimal inconsistency. Finally, we discuss technical issues connecting LPe and Ke3 to the tradition of Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Underterminedness. (shrink)

In this paper, we use a ‘normality operator’ in order to generate logics of formal inconsistency and logics of formal undeterminedness from any subclassical many-valued logic that enjoys a truth-functional semantics. Normality operators express, in any many-valued logic, that a given formula has a classical truth value. In the first part of the paper we provide some setup and focus on many-valued logics that satisfy some of the three properties, namely subclassicality and two properties that we call fixed-point negation (...) property and conservativeness. In the second part of the paper, we introduce normality operators and explore their formal behaviour. In the third and final part of the paper, we establish a number of classical recapture results for systems of formal inconsistency and formal undeterminedness that satisfy some or all the properties above. These are the main formal results of the paper. Also, we illustrate concrete cases of recapture by discussing the logics $\mathsf{K}^{\circledast }_{3}$, $\mathsf{LP}^{\circledast }$, $\mathsf{K}^{w\circledast }_{3}$, $\mathsf{PWK}^{\circledast }$ and $\mathsf{E_{fde}}^{\circledast }$, that are in turn extensions of $\mathsf{{K}_{3}}$, $\mathsf{LP}$, $\mathsf{K}^{w}_{3}$, $\mathsf{PWK}$ and $\mathsf{E_{fde}}$, respectively. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that Logics of Formal Inconsistency $$ can be used as very sophisticated and powerful methods of classical recapture. I will compare $LFIs$ with the well-known non-monotonic logics by Batens and Priest and the ‘shrieking’ rules of Beall. I will show that these proposals can be represented in $LFIs$ and that $LFIs$ give room to more complex and varied recapturing strategies.

Adopting a non-classical logic may not imply resigning the classical theories that have proven their worth. Nevertheless, the project of classical recapture poses some challenges, some of them specific to paraconsistent approaches. In this article, we analyse the consequences of introducing a recovery operator to subvaluationist logic. We argue that the classical recovery can indeed be carried out in a subvaluationist setting, but that doing so amounts to committing to a hierarchy of recaptures.

An old and well-known objection to non-classical logics is that they are too weak; in particular, they cannot prove a number of important mathematical results. A promising strategy to deal with this objection consists in proving so-called recapture results. Roughly, these results show that classical logic can be used in mathematics and other unproblematic contexts. However, the strategy faces some potential problems. First, typical recapture results are formulated in a purely logical language, and do not generalize (...) nicely to languages containing the kind of vocabulary that usually motivates non-classical theories—for example, a language containing a naïve truth predicate. Second, proofs of recapture results typically employ classical principles that are not valid in the targeted non-classical system; hence, non-classical theorists do not seem entitled to those results. In this paper, we analyze these problems and provide solutions on behalf of non-classical theorists. To address the first problem, we provide a novel kind of recapture result, which generalizes nicely to a truth-theoretic language. As for the second problem, we argue that it relies on an ambiguity and that, once the ambiguity is removed, there are no reasons to think that non-classical logicians are not entitled to their recapture results. (shrink)

The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s (2009) and Graham Priest’s (2010) interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent their interpretation is an adequate model of the logic for the catuskoti, and the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā. Priest and Garfield try to make sense of the contradictions within the catuskoti by appeal to a series of lattices – orderings of truth-values, supposed to model the path to enlightenment. They use Anderson & Belnaps's (1975) framework of First Degree Entailment. (...) Cotnoir (2015) has argued that the lattices of Priest and Garfield cannot ground the logic of the catuskoti. The concern is simple: on the one hand, FDE brings with it the failure of classical principles such as modus ponens. On the other hand, we frequently encounter Nāgārjuna using classical principles in other arguments in the MMK. There is a problem of validity. If FDE is Nāgārjuna’s logic of choice, he is facing what is commonly called the classical recapture problem: how to make sense of cases where classical principles like modus pones are valid? One cannot just add principles like modus ponens as assumptions, because in the background paraconsistent logic this does not rule out their negations. In this essay, I shall explore and critically evaluate Cotnoir’s proposal. In detail, I shall reveal that his framework suffers collapse of the kotis. Furthermore, I shall argue that the Collapse Argument has been misguided from the outset. The last chapter suggests a formulation of the catuskoti in classical Boolean Algebra, extended by the notion of an external negation as an illocutionary act. I will focus on purely formal considerations, leaving doctrinal matters to the scholarly discourse – as far as this is possible. (shrink)

The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s and Graham Priest’s interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent their interpretation is an adequate model of the logic for the catuskoti, and the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā. Priest and Garfield try to make sense of the contradictions within the catuskoti by appeal to a series of lattices – orderings of truth-values, supposed to model the path to enlightenment. They use Anderson & Belnaps's framework of First Degree Entailment. Cotnoir has argued (...) that the lattices of Priest and Garfield cannot ground the logic of the catuskoti. The concern is simple: on the one hand, FDE brings with it the failure of classical principles such as modus ponens. On the other hand, we frequently encounter Nāgārjuna using classical principles in other arguments in the MMK. There is a problem of validity. If FDE is Nāgārjuna’s logic of choice, he is facing what is commonly called the classical recapture problem: how to make sense of cases where classical principles like modus pones are valid? One cannot just add principles like modus pones as assumptions, because in the background paraconsistent logic this does not rule out their negations. In this essay, I shall explore and critically evaluate Cotnoir’s proposal. In detail, I shall reveal that his framework suffers collapse of the kotis. Taking Cotnoir’s concerns seriously, I shall suggest a formulation of the catuskoti in classical Boolean Algebra, extended by the notion of an external negation as an illocutionary act. I will focus on purely formal considerations, leaving doctrinal matters to the scholarly discourse – as far as this is possible. (shrink)

As a response to the semantic and logical paradoxes, theorists often reject some principles of classical logic. However, classical logic is entangled with mathematics, and giving up mathematics is too high a price to pay, even for nonclassical theorists. The so-called recapture theorems come to the rescue. When reasoning with concepts such as truth/class membership/property instantiation, (These are examples of concepts that are taken to satisfy naive rules such as the naive truth schema and naive comprehension, and (...) that therefore are compatible with a solution to paradox cast in the logics considered below. Other notions of similar kind can be added to the list.) if one is interested in consequences of the theory that only contain mathematical vocabulary, nothing is lost by reasoning in the nonclassical framework. This article shows that this claim is highly misleading, if not simply false. Under natural assumptions, some well-established approaches to recapture are incorrect. (shrink)

It is commonly held that the ascription of truth to a sentence is intersubstitutable with that very sentence. However, the simplest subclassical logics available to proponents of this view, namely K3 and LP, are hopelessly weak for many purposes. In this article, I argue that this is much more of a problem for proponents of LP than for proponents of K3. The strategies for recapturing classicality offered by proponents of LP are far less promising than those available to proponents of (...) K3. This undermines the ability of proponents LP to engage in public reasoning in classical domains. (shrink)

Non‐classical logicians do not typically reject classically valid logical principles across the board. In fact, they sometimes suggest that their preferred logic recovers classical reasoning in most circumstances. This idea has come to be known in the literature as ‘classical recapture’. Recently, classical logicians have raised various doubts about it. The main problem is said to be that no rigorous explanation has been given of how is it exactly that classical logic can be recovered. (...) The goal of the paper is to address this problem. First, I discuss a number of different ways to characterize the idea of classical recapture and I examine how far it can be pushed. Secondly, I argue that a palatable form of classical recapture is given by the thought that classical logic can be retained for statements that are grounded (in Kripke’s sense). To substantiate this view I provide a formal fixed‐point semantics for a language containing a predicate standing for the concept of groundedness and I address a couple of objections that have been deployed against the claim that classical recapture can aid the non‐classical logician’s cause. (shrink)

In this paper, we extend the expressive power of the logics K3, LP and FDE with anormality operator, which is able to express whether a for-mula is assigned a classical truth value or not. We then establish classical recapture theorems for the resulting logics. Finally, we compare the approach via normality operator with the classical collapse approach devisedby Jc Beall.

Logicians interested in naive theories of truth or set have proposed logical frameworks in which classical operational rules are retained but structural rules are restricted. One increasingly popular way to do this is by restricting transitivity of entailment. This paper discusses a series of logics in this tradition, in which the transitivity restrictions are effected by a determinacy constraint on assumptions occurring in both the major and minor premises of certain rules. Semantics and proof theory for 3-valued, continuum-valued and (...) surreal-valued semantics are given and the proof theory for the systems outlined. The framework is robust in the sense that no conditional, defined or primitive, which sustains the contraction principles underlying Curry paradoxes can be expressed. Classical recapture is smoothly achievable in the system which however is expressively limited and not semantically closed. The conclusion considers the issue of how to extend the system to capture full naive set theory. (shrink)

The Liar paradox arguably shows that a coherent and self-applicable notion of truth is governed by nonclassical logic. It then seems natural to conclude that classical logic is inadequate for defining a truth theory. In this article, we argue that this is not the case. In the spirit of Reinhardt (Math Logic Formal Syst 94:227, 1985; J Philos Logic 15:219–251, 1986), and in analogy with Hilbert’s program for the foundation of classical mathematics, we will articulate an instrumentalist justification (...) for the use classical logic: it will be argued that classical reasoning is a _useful but dispensable instrument_, which can yield philosophically adequate truth theories. (shrink)

We will present a three-valued consequence relation for metainferences, called CM, defined through ST and TS, two well known substructural consequence relations for inferences. While ST recovers every classically valid inference, it invalidates some classically valid metainferences. While CM works as ST at the inferential level, it also recovers every classically valid metainference. Moreover, CM can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. Nevertheless, CM cannot recapture every classically valid meta-metainference. We will afterwards develop a hierarchy of consequence (...) relations CMn for metainferences of level n. Each CMn recovers every metainference of level n or less, and can be nontrivially expanded with a transparent truth predicate, but cannot recapture every classically valid metainferences of higher levels. Finally, we will present a logic CMω, based on the hierarchy of logics CMn, that is fully classical, in the sense that every classically valid metainference of any level is valid in it. Moreover, CMω can be nontrivially expanded with a transparent truth predicate. (shrink)

This paper begins an axiomatic development of naive set theoryin a paraconsistent logic. Results divide into two sorts. There is classical recapture, where the main theorems of ordinal and Peano arithmetic are proved, showing that naive set theory can provide a foundation for standard mathematics. Then there are major extensions, including proofs of the famous paradoxes and the axiom of choice (in the form of the well-ordering principle). At the end I indicate how later developments of cardinal numbers (...) will lead to Cantor’s theorem, the existence of large cardinals, and a counterexample to the continuum hypothesis. (shrink)

We assess Meyer’s formalization of arithmetic in his [21], based on the strong relevant logic R and compare this with arithmetic based on a suitable logic of meaning containment, which was developed in Brady [7]. We argue in favour of the latter as it better captures the key logical concepts of meaning and truth in arithmetic. We also contrast the two approaches to classical recapture, again favouring our approach in [7]. We then consider our previous development of Peano (...) arithmetic including primitive recursive functions, finally extending this work to that of general recursion. (shrink)

Standard reasoning about Kripke semantics for modal logic is almost always based on a background framework of classical logic. Can proofs for familiar definability theorems be carried out using anonclassical substructural logicas the metatheory? This article presents a semantics for positive substructural modal logic and studies the connection between frame conditions and formulas, via definability theorems. The novelty is that all the proofs are carried out with anoncontractive logicin the background. This sheds light on which modal principles are invariant (...) under changes of metalogic, and provides (further) evidence for the general viability of nonclassical mathematics. (shrink)

Counterexamples to reassurance relative to a relation between models of the logic of paradox are provided. Another relation, designed to fix the problem in logic without equality, is introduced and discussed in connection with the issue of classical recapture.

It is not uncommon among theorists favoring a deviant logic on account of the semantic paradoxes to subscribe to an idea that has come to be known as ‘classical recapture’. The main thought underpinning it is that non-classical logicians are justified in endorsing many instances of the classically valid principles that they reject. Classical recapture promises to yield an appealing pair of views: one can attain naivety for semantic concepts while retaining classicality in ordinary domains (...) such as mathematics. However, Julien Murzi and Lorenzo Rossi have recently suggested that revisionary approaches to truth breed revenge paradoxes when they are coupled with the thought that classical reasoning can be recaptured in certain circumstances. What’s novel about the paradoxes they put forward is that they cannot be dismissed so easily. The concepts used to generate these paradoxes—those of paradoxicality and unparadoxicality—are concepts that non-classical theorists need in order to offer a diagnosis of the truth-theoretic paradoxes. My goal in this paper is to argue that non-classical theorists can represent the concept of paradoxicality without falling prey to revenge paradoxes. In particular, I will show how to provide a formal fixed-point semantics for a language extended with a paradoxicality predicate that adequately expresses the non-classical logician’s notion of paradoxicality. (shrink)

The paper generalizes Van McGee's well-known result that there are many maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema to a number of non-classical theories of truth. It is shown that if a non-classical theory rejects some classically valid principle in order to avoid the truth-theoretic paradoxes, then there will be many maximal non-trivial sets of instances of that principle that the non-classical theorist could in principle endorse. On the basis of this it is argued that the (...) idea of classical recapture, which plays such an important role for non-classical logicians, can only be pushed so far. (shrink)

This is the culmination of a discussion on Berry's Paradox with Graham Priest, over an extended period from 1983 to 2019, the central point being whether the Paradox can be avoided or not by removal of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). Priest is of the view that a form of the Paradox can be derived without the LEM, whilst Brady disputes this. We start by conceptualizing negation in the logic MC of meaning containment and introduce the LEM as part (...) of the classical recapture. We then examine the usage of the LEM in some other paradoxes and see that it is applied to cases of self-reference. In relation to Priest's [2019] paper, we go on to find a similar use of the LEM in Priest's derivation of Berry's Paradox. However, it is found to be deeper and trickier than other paradoxes, requiring a special effort to untangle the relationships between the LEM, self-reference and meta-theoretic influence. We then examine Brady's previous formalization of Berry's Paradox, considering Brady's most recent view of restricted quantification and his recursive account of the least number satisfying a property. We show that neither of these methods can be used to formalize the paradox. We also examine the inductive shapes for the Substitution of Identity Rule for intensional and extensional identities, while conceding Priest's point, made in [2019], that his shape of Substitution of Identity is not relevant to his proof of Berry's Paradox. (shrink)

We present a multi-conclusion natural deduction calculus characterizing the dynamic reasoning typical of Adaptive Logics. The resulting system AdaptiveND is sound and complete with respect to the propositional fragment of adaptive logics based on CLuN. This appears to be the first tree-format presentation of the standard linear dynamic proof system typical of Adaptive Logics. It offers the advantage of full transparency in the formulation of locally derivable rules, a connection between restricted inference-rules and their adaptive counterpart, and the formulation of (...) abnormalities as a subtype of well-formed formulas. These features of the proposed calculus allow us to clarify the relation between defeasible and multiple-conclusion approaches to classical recapture. (shrink)

In his article "Reassurance via Translation" Marcel Crabbe proposed a formalism to obtain reassurance and classical recapture in the setting of minimal FDE. His formalism proved to be general enough to be extended in order to formalize other forms of non-monotonic systems based on preference relations. It is the aim of this article to show how his result can be extended in a natural way by combining two different reasoning systems, namely minimal FDE and circumscription, in order to (...) get a paraconsistent and paracomplete version of circumscription, which we will call paracomplistent circumscription, which has the advantages of FDE and circumscription but is neither explosive nor lacks modus ponens in consistent contexts. Furthermore, we will complete a proof Crabbe left unfinished. (shrink)

We reflect on the nature of corporate codes of conduct is this article. Based on John Austin’s speech act theory, four characteristics of a performative concept of corporate codes will be introduced: 1) the existential self-performative of the firm identity, 2) which is demanded by and responsive to their stakeholders; 3) Because corporate codes are structurally threatened by the possibility of failure, 4) embracing the code not only consists in actual corporate responsible behaviour in light of the code, but in (...) the incessant recapturing of the code in the struggle of firms against the possible incongruence between their ethical principles and their actual responsible behaviour. A performative concept of corporate codes helps to bridge classical dichotomies like individualist versus collectivist approaches of moral agency and restrictive versus empowering ethics, and opens a new perspective on the interaction between individual ethical behaviour and the corporate institutionalisation of codes. (shrink)

The Alexandrian emphasis on smallness, elegance, and slightness at the expense of grand themes in major poetic genres was not preciosity for its own sake: although the poetry was written by and for scholars, it had much larger sources than the bibliothecal context in which it was composed. Since the time of the classical poets, much had changed. Earlier Greek poetry was an intimate part of the life of the city-state, written for its religious occasions and performed by its (...) citizens. But eh conquests of Alexander had altered the structure and the boundaries of the Greek world to an astonishing degree. Alexandria, the center of the poetic culture of the new age, was a city that had not even existed at the time of Euripides; it was in Egypt, not in Greece, and was a huge, polyglot community. As immigrants immersed in a new, impersonal, and bureaucratic society, the poets not unreasonably sought out what was small, intimate, and personal in their verses. The heroes of early Greek poetry are larger than life; those of Alexandrian poetry are life-size. They are human, like us; they have a childhood and an old age; they are afraid or in love or caught in a rainstorm. It was simply one way of reducing the world to more manageable dimensions. At the same time, the new world of Alexandria needed a new poetry. To continue writing epics about a mythology that seemed very far away was senseless; it was impossible to recapture either the style or the immediacy of Homer, lyric poetry, or Attic tragedy. The scholar-poets of Alexandria admired the literature of classical Greece; for them Homer was incomparable and inimitable, to be studied—but not to be copied. Far better, then, to find a new voice on a more manageable scale: instead of oral epic, erudite epyllion; instead of lyric, epigram; instead of tragedy, mime. The poets of an urban and unheroic world might long for but could never re-create the grandeur of the past. James E. G. Zetzel is associate professor of classics at Princeton University and editor of the Transactions of the American Philological Association. He is the author of Latin Textual Criticism in Antiquity and, with Anthony T. Grafton and Glenn W. Most, has translated Friedrich August Wolf’s Prolegomena ad Homerum. (shrink)

We are far removed, in this section of the Encyclopedia on memory, from the mnemotechnic icons described by Francis Yates in The Art of Memory and much closer to Augustine's advice about how to remember and to psalmodize Scripture. Memory, for Hegel, is the learning by rote of names, or of words considered as names, and it can therefore not be separated from the notation, the inscription, or the writing down of these names. In order to remember, one is forced (...) to write down what one is likely to forget. The idea in other words, makes its sensory appearance, in Hegel, as the material inscription of names. Thought is entirely dependent on a mental faculty that is mechanical through and through, as remote as can be from the sounds and the images of the imagination or from the dark mine of recollection, which lies beyond the reach of words and of thought[…]No wonder, then, that Hegel's Aesthetics turns out to be a double and possibly duplicitous text. Dedicated to the preservation and the monumentalization of classical art, it also contains all the elements which make such a preservation impossible from the start. Theoretical reasons prevent the convergence of the apparently historical and the properly theoretical components of the work. This results in the enigmatic statements that have troubled Hegel's readers, such as the assertion that art is for us a thing of the past. This has usually been interpreted and criticized or, in some rare instances, praised as a historical diagnosis disproven or borne out by actual history. We can now assert that the two statements "art is for us a thing of the past" and "the beautiful is the sensory manifestation of the idea" are in fact one and the same. To the extent that the paradigm for art is thought rather than perception, the sign rather than the symbol, writing rather than painting or music, it will also be memorization rather than recollection. As such, it belongs indeed to a past which, in Proust's words, could never be recaptured, retrouve. Art is "of the past" in a radical sense, in that, like memorization, it leaves the interiorization of experience forever behind. It is of the past to the extent that it materially inscribes, and thus forever forgets, its ideal content. The reconciliation of the two main theses of the Aesthetics occurs at the expense of the aesthetic as a stable philosophical category. What the Aesthetics calls the beautiful terms turns out to be, also, something very remote from what we associate with the suggestiveness of symbolic form.Paul de Man, Sterling Professor of the Humanities at Yale University, is the author of Blindness and Insight and Allegories of Reading and is currently completing a book tentatively titled The Resistance to Theory. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Political Allegory in Rousseau", "The Epistemology of Metaphor", and "A Letter". (shrink)

With the Reformation, philosophers sought to establish a new way of thinking independent of religion. Borrowing principles popularized religious reformers: the right of conscience, the utter transcendence of God, the sinfulness of the world, they constructed a new metaphysics that highlighted the mystery of God and the complete intelligibility of 'rational man.' From this history an understanding of our religious situation is distilled. The chapters of this work develop for the reader the intellectual structure of religion and show how its (...) language, imagery and ritual function. They argue that if religion no longer presents a challenge, it is because we think of it in terms of the 'new metaphysics.' To recapture the reality, we must join our contemporaries who are attacking the premises of classical modern philosophy and so experience ourselves afresh. (shrink)

I examine the link between extensionality principles of classical mereology and the anti‐symmetry of parthood. Varzi's most recent defence of extensionality depends crucially on assuming anti‐symmetry. I examine the notions of proper parthood, weak supplementation and non‐well‐foundedness. By rejecting anti‐symmetry, the anti‐extensionalist has a unified, independently grounded response to Varzi's arguments. I give a formal construction of a non‐extensional mereology in which anti‐symmetry fails. If the notion of ‘mereological equivalence’ is made explicit, this non‐anti‐symmetric mereology recaptures all of the (...) structure of classical mereology. (shrink)

In order to reason in a non-trivializing way with contradictions, para- consistent logics reject some classically valid inferences. As a way of re- covering some of these inferences, Graham Priest ([Priest, 1991]) proposed to nonmonotonically strengthen the Logic of Paradox by allowing the se- lection of “less inconsistent” models via a comparison of their respective inconsistent parts. This move recaptures a good portion of classical logic in that it does not block, e.g., disjunctive syllogism, unless it is applied to (...) contradictory assumptions. In Priest’s approach the inconsistent parts of models are compared in an extensional way by considering their inconsis- tent objects. This distinguishes his system from the standard format of (inconsistency-)adaptive logics pioneered by Diderik Batens, according to which (atomic) contradictions validated in models form the basis of their comparison. A well-known problem for Priest’s extensional approach is its lack of the Strong Reassurance property, i.e., for specific settings there may be infinitely descending chains of less and less inconsistent models, thus never reaching a minimally inconsistent model. In this paper, we demonstrate that Strong Reassurance holds for the extensional approach under a cardinality-based comparison of the incon- sistent parts of models. Furthermore, we introduce and investigate the metatheory of the class of first-order nonmonotonic inconsistency-tolerant construct over the extensional or quantitative comparisons of their respec- tive models. Core model-theoretic properties for these logics, such as the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, along with other nonmonotonic properties, are further studied. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary and ecumenical collection of essays honors the transformative work of Margaret A. Farley, Gilbert L. Stark Professor of Christian Ethics at Yale Divinity School, using it as a starting point for reflection on the contribution of feminist method to theology and ethics. Through a variety of perspectives, contributors show that by resisting classical oppositions between “interpersonal” and “social” ethics and by insisting that social, economic, and political realities be taken seriously in considerations of justice, feminist concerns challenge (...) the very categories of Christian ethics. With essays ranging from sexual ethics to human rights, medical ethics to freedom, _A Just and True Love_ offers a broad perspective on the last twenty-five years of feminist innovation in Christian ethics and a glimpse of its global future, particularly in continents such as Africa. “This book brings together a number of the most prominent thinkers in Christian theology and ethics today in a justly deserved tribute to the work and influence of Margaret Farley. The essays explicitly acknowledge and engage Farley in various degrees; one comes away appreciating both the integrity of her work and its versatility.” —_Darlene Fozard Weaver, Villanova University _ “Inevitably while listening to or reading Margaret Farley, we find her refrain, ‘I want to ask all over again.’ Reexamining, reframing, and rethinking is Farley’s method of engaging anew human experience and relationality. The authors of these essays capture that method as they reconsider feminism and sexuality, love and freedom, justice and truth, contraception and women’s rights. Like her own work, they reset the ethical agenda to recapture a more loving truth. A very successful collection for a most admired colleague. Ryan and Linnane are to be congratulated!” —_James F. Keenan, S.J., Boston College_ “In_ A Just and True Love,_ a host of distinguished scholars consider fundamental themes of feminist theological ethics and their significance for global justice, the meaning of Christian love, creative casuistry, and truthful life in the Church. I can imagine no higher praise than to affirm that these authors have succeeded marvelously in doing exactly what they set out to do: to produce a volume worthy of the theological work and wisdom of Margaret Farley.” —_William Werpehowski, Villanova University_. (shrink)

From a Michigan professor of law and philosophy, a thought-provoking investigation into life's biggest questions with the help of great philosophers old and new-including his two young children. Like any new parent, Scott Hershovitz closely observed his two young sons, Rex and Hank, from their early days. From the time they could talk, he noticed that they raised philosophical questions and were determined to answer them. Children find the world a puzzling place, so they try to puzzle it out. Often, (...) that leads to profound insight. Sometimes, they recreated ancient arguments. Sometimes, they advanced novel views. Kids are natural philosophers, Hershovitz realized. Indeed, they are some of the best around. With great humor and storytelling, Hershovitz follows an agenda set by Rex and Hank, canvassing pressing questions about rights, revenge, authority, sex, gender, race, knowledge, truth, and other daunting mysteries most grown-ups mostly ignore. Through the lens of his sons' curiosity, Hershovitz takes us on an engaging tour through contemporary and classic philosophy. We all want our children to think deeply about themselves, the world around them, and their place within it. Hershovitz calls on us to support our kids' philosophical adventures. But more than that, he challenges us to join up to them, so that we can become better, more discerning thinkers and recapture some of the wonder kids have at the world. (shrink)

This lively study examines how God became remote from the world, the consequences for belief, and how God is today being re-imagined as being at home in the world and at work in natural and human events. Beyond classical theism and modern atheism, traditions of God at home in the world are recovered and holistic images of God explored -- old and new. Incorporating insights from quantum physics, postmodern theory, chaos theory and evolutionary biology, the book recaptures the sense (...) of God as the "soul" of the world, commending a secular mysticism of God "in, with and under" all the struggles of matter, life and consciousness. This reinvigorated tradition of divine action is brought into respectful dialogue with the undeniable challenges to faith which evil and suffering pose. (shrink)

Is it possible to preserve national security through ethical policies? Richard Ned Lebow seeks to show that ethics are actually essential to the national interest. Recapturing the wisdom of classical realism through a close reading of the texts of Thucydides, Clausewitz and Hans Morgenthau, Lebow argues that, unlike many modern realists, classic realists saw close links between domestic and international politics, and between interests and ethics. Lebow uses this analysis to offer a powerful critique of post-Cold War American foreign (...) policy. He also develops an ontological foundation for ethics and makes the case for an alternate ontology for social science based on Greek tragedy's understanding of life and politics. This is a topical and accessible book, written by a leading scholar in the field. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Virtues, Obligations, and the Prophetic VisionRoy Branson (bio)Ethics at its best is only bad poetry—that is, it seeks to help us see whatwe see every day but fail to see rightly...If ethicists had talent, they might be poets,but in the absence of talent, they try tomake their clanking conceptual anddiscursive chains do the work of art.—Stanley HauerwasThe speaker was so severely bent over that his congenitally deformed back had (...) to be supported. He was a young Ph.D. in history. We were some 50 physicians, lawyers, health care administrators, and ethicists studying the ethics of organ transplants. Before he arrived, the conference had discussed different understandings of equal access and the nuances of federal policies governing organ transplant distribution. 1 In his lecture, our guest matter-of-factly described his own condition. He then pointed out that not only in ancient civilization but in American history as well, the disabled had been killed just because they were disabled. Indeed, even now, he said, they were not being allowed to live.In the question and answer session, he was immediately challenged by nationally prominent transplant surgeons. He responded by asking the surgeons: If two people could avoid death and anticipate significantly prolonged life from receiving an organ transplant and the only difference between them was that one was disabled and the other not, who would receive the life-saving transplant? The surgeons’ initial, spirited defense of excluding the significantly disabled person died down as they began to realize that, as far as they were concerned anyway, they might not have allowed the lecturer to live. They were stunned by the realization that they had not felt the disabled were fully persons. In the silences between their sentences, the participants sensed that they had passed beyond the discussion of economic, medical, and legal terms to glimpse new horizons of responsibility. [End Page 361]The conference was experiencing the truth of William F. May’s claim that moral quandaries must be placed within “a fresh and liberating vision of the world;” within “metaphysical horizons” (May 1983, pp. 15, 19).Pastoral VirtuesIn the late sixties, André Hellegers, the dynamic physician and Catholic layman who founded the Kennedy Institute of Ethics and who claimed that he had invented the word bioethics, focused bioethics elsewhere—on virtue. “As the caring branches of medicine were gradually pushed aside by the curing ones,” Hellegers said, “there seemed to be less use for the Christian virtues.” We must, he declared, “recapture the Christian virtues of care” (cited in McCormick 1985, p. 111). In a subsequent essay on the conceptual foundation of bioethics, Hellegers, writing with Albert Jonsen, did not invoke the word pastor, but he did argue that the codes drawn up for the ethical practice of medicine were, among other things, guides for the cure of physicians’ souls (Jonsen and Hellegers 1976, pp. 35–36).In 1969, at the same time that André Hellegers was in the process of establishing the Kennedy Institute, Edmund Pellegrino, then a medical school dean, led in the founding of humanities programs within American medical schools. Pellegrino, like Hellegers, a physician and Catholic layman, also focused on virtue. Obligations are not irrelevant for Pellegrino, but in biomedical ethics “one starts always with one’s commitment to be a certain kind of person and then approaches clinical quandaries, conflicts of values, and patient interests as a good person ought” (Pellegrino 1988, p. 123). Pellegrino knows that the classical and Christian tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, a tradition with which he identifies, is concerned with the whole gamut of ethics. But for Pellegrino, that tradition teaches that “no matter to what depths a society may fall, virtuous persons will always be the beacons that light the way back to moral sensitivity” (p. 123). He freely acknowledges that “a virtue-based ethics is inherently elitist, in the best sense, because its adherents demand more of themselves than does the prevailing morality” (p. 123).Hellegers and Pellegrino added to the need of physicians acquiring professional skills their responsibility to become the embodiment of the moral ideal in the patient-physician relationship by caring for the patient... (shrink)

The Comment gives corroborative support to Stróżyński’s thesis by using resources from I.6[1].7–9 and VI.5[23].1. The nature of the soul and its ascent to intellect and the One is clarified in I.6[1].7, as the soul’s ascent recaptures its own nature. It identifies not only with intellect, but directly with the One, needing only its own powers, making union with the One within one’s reach and common to all. A barrier to seeing this has been the 19th century description of mysticism (...) as rare and incommunicable. I.6[1].8–9 add both a method of reading texts and the cosmos in ancient mystical fashion and a redefinition of light for seeing the One. In VI.5[23].1, Plotinus provides a fundamental sense of self that captures an ancient wisdom that identifies the self internally with the One not as totally other but as intimately immanent to the soul. (shrink)

Strict-Tolerant Logic ($$\textrm{ST}$$ ST ) underpins naïve theories of truth and vagueness (respectively including a fully disquotational truth predicate and an unrestricted tolerance principle) without jettisoning any classically valid laws. The classical sequent calculus without Cut is sometimes advocated as an appropriate proof-theoretic presentation of $$\textrm{ST}$$ ST. Unfortunately, there is only a partial correspondence between its derivability relation and the relation of local metainferential $$\textrm{ST}$$ ST -validity – these relations coincide only upon the addition of elimination rules and only (...) within the propositional fragment of the calculus, due to the non-invertibility of the quantifier rules. In this paper, we present two calculi for first-order $$\textrm{ST}$$ ST with an eye to recapturing this correspondence in full. The first calculus is close in spirit to the Epsilon calculus. The other calculus includes rules for the discharge of sequent-assumptions; moreover, it is normalisable and admits interpolation. (shrink)

According to the interpretational theory of logical validity (IR), logical validity is preservation of truth in all interpretations compatible with the intended meaning of logical expressions. IR suffers from a seemingly defeating objection, the so-called cardinality problem: any instance of the statement ‘There are n things’ is true under all interpretations, since it can be written down using only logical expressions that are not to be reinterpreted; yet ‘There are n things’ is not logically true. I argue that the cardinality (...) problem is indeed a serious problem for IR, when understood in terms of ‘asymmetry of information’. I then argue that IR can be rehabilitated by making quantifiers context-sensitive: what we do not reinterpret is the Kaplanian character of a quantifier, rather than its content. ‘There are n things’ is false in a context where fewer than n things are relevant, so it is not logically true in IR. I finally discuss some objections and ramifications of my account: I discuss how to make space for the possibility of an explicitly absolutely general quantifier in my framework, how terms can be logical even though context-sensitive, and how to recapture classical logic within my framework. (shrink)

In order to reason in a non-trivializing way with contradictions, paraconsistent logics reject some classically valid inferences. As a way to recover some of these inferences, Graham Priest proposed to nonmonotonically strengthen the Logic of Paradox by allowing the selection of “less inconsistent” models via a comparison of their respective inconsistent parts. This move recaptures a good portion of classical logic in that it does not block, e.g., disjunctive syllogism, unless it is applied to contradictory assumptions. In Priest’s approach (...) the inconsistent parts of models are compared in an extensional way by consid- ering their inconsistent objects. This distinguishes his system from the standard format of (inconsistency-)adaptive logics pioneered by Diderik Batens, according to which (atomic) contradictions validated in models form the basis of their comparison. A well-known prob- lem for Priest’s extensional approach is its lack of the Strong Reassurance property, i.e., for specific settings there may be infinitely descending chains of less and less inconsistent models, thus never reaching a minimally inconsistent model. In the following paper, we show that Strong Reassurance holds for the extensional ap- proach under a cardinality-based comparison of the inconsistent parts of models. We develop and study the meta-theory of a class of nonmonotonic inconsistency-tolerant logics based on the extensional and the quantitative comparisons of their respective models, including important model-theoretic properties, such as the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, as well as principles of nonmonotonic inference. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we want to recapture the genesis of the logics of order. The origin of this notion is traced back to the work of Jerzy Kotas, Roman Suszko, Richard Routley and Robert K. Meyer. A further development of the theory of logics of order is presented in the papers of Jacek K. Kabziński. Quite contemporarily, this notion gained in significance in the papers of Carles Noguera and Petr Cintula. Logics of order are (...) named there _logics of weak implications_. They play a crucial role in their monograph (Noguera and Cintula _Logic and Implication. An Introduction to the General Algebraic Study of Non-Classical Logics_, Trends in Logic 57, Springer, Berlin, 2021). But, more importantly, the other goal is to define some subclasses of the logics of order in reference to later results of Jacek K. Kabziński and Michael Dunn. The original conception of implication is due to Kabziński. Implication is a stronger notion than the notion of the connective of order aka weak implication. As a result, the three subclasses of logics of order are isolated: logics of implication, logics of symmetry, and tonoidal logics. These notions are uniformly defined and investigated from various viewpoints in terms of consequence operations. The emphasis is put on their semantics. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophical thought, Leo Strauss is associated with the rediscovery of ancient political philosophy against modern political philosophy. The rediscovery of ancient political philosophy is the rediscovery of classical rationalism or “moderate Enlightenment” against modern rationalism or “radical Enlightenment” and can be understood as recapturing the “the question of man’s right life” and “the question of the right order of society”. This article would like to show that it was his study of medieval Islamic and Jewish texts that (...) enabled Strauss to rediscover the classical rationalism. Also, in this article we would like to argue that although the opposition between Athens and Jerusalem, Reason and Revelation embodies two irreconcilable alternatives or a way of life in his thought, this opposition should be only examined with references to claims about radical rationalism of modern philosophy. In this case, we would like to argue that there can be seen a commonality between these “opponents”, i.e., Athens and Jerusalem, Reason and Revelation in terms of both their attitudes towards morality and their approaches to the relationship between philosophy and society. (shrink)

A mutation alters the hemoglobin in some members of a species of antelope, and as a result the members fare better at high altitudes than their conspecifics do; so high-altitude foraging areas become open to them that are closed to their conspecifics; they thrive, reproduce at a greater rate, and the gene for altered hemoglobin spreads further through the gene pool of the species. That sounds like a classic example (owed to Karen Neander, 1995) of a causal chain traced by (...) evolutionary biology. But a view now nearly universal among philosophers maintains that such biological causation is always shadowed, perhaps even rivaled, by causation on a different level.1 That the subgroup of antelopes forages in areas closed to the conspecifics is a state of affairs embodied or realized, notes this view, in certain movements and state changes done by certain physical microparticles—untold billions of microparticles and movements, but a finite and determinate (more on this below) collection nevertheless. That the subgroup reproduces at a greater rate is likewise realized by a huge collection of microparticle movements, a different collection. And the microparticle happenings comprised in the first collection are causally responsible, strictly in accordance with the laws of microphysics, for the microparticle happenings in the second. Biological causation is always shadowed, perhaps even rivaled, by causation on the level of microphysics. The view I mean is general: any case of causing uncovered by any of the special sciences can be recaptured at the level of microphysics. This view is I think what most philosophers mean by “physicalism”; in any case, “physicalism” is the label I shall use. Physicalism comes in two forms. Modest physicalism holds that any causal transaction reported by the special sciences can be retraced by microphysics.2 Hegemonic physicalism holds that retracing such a transaction at the level of.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 123.3 (2002) 501-511 [Access article in PDF] Epilogue Jeffrey Henderson Judging from its migration in the early fourth century to southern Italy, Thesmo (if, following our editor's lead, I may be permitted this short form) was evidently successful in its own time; its exportability was perhaps due to its relative atopicality, its parodies of a tragic poet whose international celebrity (despite Aristophanes' prediction in Frogs) (...) only increased after his death, and its setting at a festival celebrated all over the Greek world, to say nothing of its sheer comic exuberance. And yet of Aristophanes' extant plays, Thesmo is the most precariously attested (one medieval manuscript and its apograph; four papyrus fragments) and least explored by scholars, editors, and translators. Before Sommerstein's edition of 1994, no separate scholarly edition or commentary had appeared for ninety years. Recently, however, Thesmo has been attracting lively interest: some new translations, fresh consideration of its portrayal of gender, genre, and cult, one new critical edition (with Italian translation) by Carlo Prato (2001) and another by Colin Austin (forthcoming) in preparation for the Oxford series edited by K. J. Dover. And so conditions are ripe for an evaluation of Thesmo as a play for the stage, even as a play that can speak to our times.Mary-Kay Gamel's conference and dramatic festival in February 2001 brought together scholars and students, performers, and local audiences to examine and experience the play's theatrical vitality past and present and succeeded not only in stimulating fresh consideration of its original character, but also in revealing the limitations of approaching an ancient comedy solely as a fixed reader's text, the document of a time long past. I was invited to the conference to play the role not of critic or respondent but rather of informal and freeform commentator, a role that with the reader's indulgence I will continue to play as this selection of papers is presented to a wider audience.It may seem self-evident that not everything worth knowing about a play can be conveyed by the words of its script alone; drama, after all, means enaction. Yet that is the assumption, implicit or explicit, on which classical drama has been studied, with Aristotle's blessing, since Hellenistic times. In classical Athens, art and education had been based primarily [End Page 501] on mousike: the performance of poetry, music, and dance, especially in drama, the primary musical enterprise of Athens; and drama had been judged and interpreted, as by Aristophanes and Plato, in terms of its effects—moral, civic, and spiritual no less than aesthetic—on the theatrical public. But by the time of Aristotle's Poetics, the rise of prose and of narrowly text- or language-based analytical systems divorced from communal contexts was fast removing performance and spectators from the evaluative study of drama.In traditional classical scholarship, formed in the Hellenistic schools and libraries, drama has been important chiefly as a corpus of fixed inherited texts. The fact that performance is intrinsically unstable, evanescent, and difficult to recreate in academic settings and that original performances are impossible to recapture, unacceptably complicated the construction of a stable "classical tradition" of literary interpretation and imitation. And so classicists have not until recently tried to develop performance-based approaches that could provide insights into our extant scripts that textual and formal analysis alone cannot.But the effort to develop performance-based approaches is well justified. In play scripts, like musical scores and song lyrics, the potential for ever different and ever-changing performance styles and contexts is a vital dimension of their meaning, and all the more powerful for being indeterminate. Thus watching a classical play performed is always different from reading it and always enlarges our response to it as a work of art, however remote our response may be from the original audience's. That each restaging of a play produces a different reading and a different experience for the audience may disturb text-bound readers, but this sort of dynamic instability is intrinsic to the play's theatricality, which cannot be fully apprehended in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Wager of Lucien Goldmann: Tragedy, Dialectics and a Hidden GodDavid WetselThe Wager of Lucien Goldmann: Tragedy, Dialectics and a Hidden God, by Mitchell Cohen; xi & 351 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, $35.00.Students of Pascal’s Pensées for the most part know Lucien Goldmann because of his 1959 landmark study, The Hidden God. Still controversial after thirty-five years, Goldmann’s theories concerning the Pensées have never been accepted (...) by mainstream Pascal scholarship. Jean Mesnard, France’s leading expert on Pascal, wrote in 1976 that “Goldmann’s Pascal is perhaps tragic, but he is most certainly a Molinist.” Mesnard, however, went on to acknowledge that no other critic before Goldmann had recognized the extent to which Pascal occupies a permanent place in the history of ideas. “To criticize Goldmann,” Mesnard went so far to say, “risks making Pascal less powerful.”Most pascalisants have erroneously assumed that Goldmann’s reading of Pascal represented nothing more than the imposition of Marxist theory upon the text of the Pensées. Among the revelations of Mitchell Cohen’s new study is that, to the contrary, Pascal represents one of the essential formative influences on Goldmann himself: “By the time he returned to Paris after the war, Goldmann was thoroughly conversant with Pascal’s oeuvre.... The appeal to him of Pascal was natural; Pascal was both a believer and a scientist.... [Goldmann] stated that were he to rewrite [Kant] he would assert that ‘Pascal was the first’ in the history of dialectical thought” (p. 48).Students of Pascal will be particularly fascinated by Cohen’s revealing analysis of Goldmann’s The Hidden God in the first section of chapter six of his study. Cohen’s account of Goldmann’s Towards a Sociology of the Novel (1964) and of his essays on Genet will likewise fascinate students of literature. However, The Wager of Lucien Goldmann goes far beyond those questions with which Goldmann’s name has been most closely associated in literary circles. The product of a painstaking excavation of Goldmann’s philosophical development, Cohen’s book recaptures a period of postwar Parisian intellectual life which drew to an end only with the events of 1968 and which has been obscured in recent years by postmodernism.A critic both of existentialism and of structuralism, Goldmann is portrayed by Cohen as the leading representative of Western Marxist humanism. Rejecting both the doctrine of Marxism’s “scientificity” and the traditional Marxist vision of the proletariat, Goldmann insisted upon Marxism’s need to reinvent itself. Specialists in Marx, Hegel, Heidegger, and particularly Lukács will appreciate Cohen’s careful explanations of Goldmann’s links to these key thinkers. Perhaps most fascinating is his account of the debate between Goldmann and the “anti-humanists”: “When the humanist Goldmann ‘transcended’ liberalism, he did so in the specifically Hegelian sense of negating and preserving at once, absorbing what was vital into socialism, while annulling [End Page 409] its abstractions. After all, he conceived socialist humanism as the culmination and not the annulment of Western culture...” (p. 290).This study, which I recommend to all students of modern France as well as to my fellow pascalisants, is, of course, not essentially meant to be a biography. Yet one sometimes finds oneself yearning for a more intimate portrait of Goldmann the man. Once he leaves his native Romania in the early 1930s, he seems to become the classical Parisian academic intellectual with no real personality of his own. Yet Cohen manages at least to neutralize Julia Kristeva’s parody of Goldmann in The Samurai, her roman à clef about French intellectuals in the 1960s, as quoted by Cohen: “Graying, pot-bellied, smiling, with his shirt open and of course no tie, he addressed everyone by the familiar tu and was always ripping up existentialism and lauding dialectical reason (as overhauled by Pascal), alienation, and the New Novel.”David WetselArizona State UniversityCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In Plutarch's two narratives of the recapture of the Cadmea by the Thebans, 379/8 B.C. , he speaks of three harmosts as in command of the Spartan garrison. This is the only instance in Spartan history where more than one harmost is mentioned as exercising authority in the same city, and it suggests the question: Was Thebes for some reason receiving different treatment from the other cities where we hear of harmosts in residence ?

Antiphon's speech on the murder of Herodes has been variously dated by several scholars, but all seem to agree that it was delivered a good many years after the revolt and recapture of Mytilene. According to this opinion the speaker in § 74 declares himself too young to know much of what happened in those days. Before going into this more carefully, it seems necessary to visualize the situation of the accused man. In order to achieve this the best (...) we can do is to follow his own words in the Sirjyrjcris, §§ 20–24: ‘I travelled from Mytilene on the same ship as the lost man; we were on our journey to Ainos, I to see my father—he happened to be there at that time—he in order to sell some slaves to Thracian natives. These natives, who were to pay the ransom, and the slaves were on board too.—All this I will prove by witnesses.—As we, however, met with stormy weather, we were compelled to put in to a harbour in the territory of Methymna; there we found that* ship into which Herodes changed; in that ship, according to the accusers, he died. Now all this was mere chance: obviously I had not persuaded him to travel with me, no, he was travelling on his own business. Then I, personally, had a very good reason for travelling to Ainos; our putting in to that harbour was not premeditatd, we were compelled to. And again, when we were lying at anchor, the change of ship took place without any trickery or fraud: again, it was done because of necessity. The ship, viz., on which we had been travelling was not covered, the other one on the contrary had a covering; that was because of the rain.—All this I will prove by witnesses.—After boarding the other ship we drank some wine. After that it is only known that he left the ship, but did not return. I myself never left the ship that night at all. When the next day but did not return. I myself never left the ship that night at all. When the next day he had disappeared, we looked for him, I as well as the others. Probably it seemed strange to them, it certainly did to me. And it was I who caused a messenger to be sent to Mytilene, not one of the crew or the passengers belonging to Herodes, but my own servant. If I had been guilty, I would not, of course, have sent a man who might have informed against me. But when the man could not be found in Mytilene, nor anywhere else, and when the weather had improved and all the other ships were putting out, I also sailed.—All this I will prove by witnesses. (shrink)

It is a commonplace of modern criticism that every text is to be located within a complex network of cultural practices and material. Students of the ancient world may sometimes feel at a disadvantage; we simply do not have as much information as we would like in order to contextualize thoroughly. This has been especially true in the study of Platonic dialogues. The meagre remains of the writings of the sophists against whom Plato measured himself and of the art to (...) which he refers entail that analysis of Plato is often confined to the structure of his philosophy. Of course, the requirements of Plato's arguments must always be assigned primary importance; the relative lack of information about Plato's cultural context has not prevented detailed exposition of his method and achievements. Occasionally, however, a kindly fate allows us to set a dialogue, or part of it, in its appropriate material and ideological context and to create an interface between literary, philosophical, and archaeological evidence. Such evidence may not alter our evaluation of Plato's arguments on the analytic level, but it can enrich our appreciation of his literary artistry and recapture for us some of the resonance that his work would have had for a contemporary audience. (shrink)