The book under review is found to be peerless in its quality as an offering in its niche. This collection also surpasses its predecessor-volume, Beyond Animal Rights, in being open to rights discourse. The call for an ethic that embodies what Marti Kheel calls a "unity of reason and emotion" rings as true today as ever. Yet the new version still carries unsustainable stereotypes about rights. Simply depending on empathy or sympathy is an insufficient guide for ethics. Caring (...) about seeking the good and avoiding the bad is suggested as a partial route for the development of this problematic ethic of care family of theories in animal ethics. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to analyse experiences of moral concerns in intensive care nursing. The theoretical perspective of the study is based on relational ethics, also referred to as ethics of care. The participants were 36 intensive care nurses from 10 general, neonatal and thoracic intensive care units. The structural characteristics of the units were similar: a high working pace, advanced technology, budget restrictions, recent reorganization, and shortage of experienced nurses. The data consisted of the participants’ examples of (...) ethical situations they had experienced in their intensive care unit. A qualitative content analysis identified five themes: believing in a good death; knowing the course of events; feelings of distress; reasoning about physicians’ ‘doings’ and tensions in expressing moral awareness. A main theme was formulated as caring about - caring for: moral obligations and work responsibilities. Moral obligations and work responsibilities are assumed to be complementary dimensions in nursing, yet they were found not to be in balance for intensive care nurses. In conclusion there is a need to support nurses in difficult intensive care situations, for example, by mentoring, as a step towards developing moral action knowledge in the context of intensive care nursing. (shrink)

Caring labor has emerged as a wide-ranging field of study. Industrialized nations have experienced a significant increase in female labor participation, which has been both the cause and the result of changes in the way care is provided. In the United States, the New Deal legislation cared for the population with new measures intended to provide greater security. Because pension, health, and welfare benefits were tied to employment, the provision of care remained gendered. Scholarly study of caring labor (...) examines such changes and considers the prospects for labor and social movements to provide quality care for all. (shrink)

Care theorists often think of care as involving “caring-about”—concern or attentiveness—and “caring-for”—acting to nurture, look after, or meet needs. One problem for any theory of care is the scope of our obligations to care in both of those senses; in particular, our capacities for “caring-about” often outrun our capacities for “caring-for.” Accounts of care as potentially global in scope may ascribe overwhelming obligations to moral agents; however, we are often tempted to avoid or ignore (...) situations that may call for a caring response. I suggest that some Kantian ideas may help to strike a reasonable balance. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 80-82.

Every ethic, if it is not to be a feather in the wind, needs an epistemology. As we look at epistemologies from Plato's Theaetetus to Kant's First Critique to contemporary virtue epistemology, the question of knowledge is always tethered to an ethics, sometimes tightly, sometimes loosely. To live a good life and act rightly toward others, we need to know what we need to know to do this well; we need to know how to know that what we are doing (...) is what is good or right; and we need to know how we can know what is good and right. That is, if we wish to know that what we are doing is right, what principles or precepts to follow, we need to reflect on the nature and the possibility of knowledge itself.What Vrinda Dalmiya... (shrink)

I address motivations that feminist philosophers have for being concerned about the "maleness" of philosophy and the "problem of difference" within feminist theory. An appropriate motivation for caring about both sets of issues is the desire not to oppress others. In order to be able to understand this motivation and to act on it, we need to retain gender as an analytical category.

The long-running discourse on respect for human dignity and autonomy in the physician-patient relationship pertaining to persons with dementia (PwDs) is explored deeply in this paper through the use of a real-life case, to highlight the complex interplay between autonomy and best interest when it comes to a PwD's experiential and critical interests. Many scenarios and perspectives are described and applies to the case. However, there are a few perspectives, which are touched upon that could do with further scrutiny. Firstly, (...) it has been argued that rigid adherence to the advance directives of PwDs means that PwDs will be the only people who are not allowed to ever change their minds. This withdrawal of a fundamental freedom hardly accords with respect for human dignity, or for any residual autonomy that these individuals may still enjoy. Secondly, viewing this case through the lens of care ethics, and incorporating the recently proposed conceptual framework of anthropological vulnerability, may reveal valuable insights regarding care provision and caring physician-patient relationships. These perspectives would analyse the role of relational ontology, particularly in relation to significant others, significant communities, and caregivers. (shrink)

This is the age of the welfare state. The general assumption is that something is amiss if governments do not provide benefits to its people. Since these benefits are funded by coercive taxation, this implies that those who are taxed are morally required to pay for benefits for others. This paper argues that this assumption is mistaken. Like the founders of the American republic, I argue that government should protect individual liberty, not provide benefits to the needy.

(2001). The Care-Based Ethic of Nazi Medicine and the Moral Importance of What We Care About. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 64-74.

Why do we so often care about the outcomes of games when nothing is at stake? There is a paradox here, much like the paradox of fiction, which concerns why we care about the fates and threats of merely fictional beings. I argue that the paradox threatens to overturn a great deal of what philosophers have thought about caring, severing its connection to value and undermining its moral weight. I defend a solution to the paradox that (...) draws on Kendall Walton's solution to the paradox of fiction, developing his idea that it be extended to games. The solution takes games to involve make‐believe: in particular, players and spectators make‐believe that the outcome of the game matters. I also explore how the phenomenon extends beyond games. And I explore some moral implications: in particular, my view preserves the idea that we have reason not to impede others in their pursuit of what they care about. (shrink)

Moral philosophy is at its best when it takes human psychology seriously. Such are the instincts of Thomas Wren. His engaging book Caring About Morality is an attempt to offer an account of human motivation that is true to human psychology, but which captures the spirit of Kantian morality without Kantian metaphysics. I argue that there are some fundamental psychological considerations which Wren does not take into account, and which are an obstacle to the success of his project. (...) Moral motivation, 1 suggest, is much more tied to the psychological histories of persons than Wren allows. (shrink)

Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the intelligibility objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the ethical idlers objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural (...) properties play in the non-naturalist's understanding of normativity. The role of non-natural properties is not to be responded to, but to "mark" which natural properties it is correct for us to respond to in certain ways. (shrink)

This is a response to an article by Lamont Rodgers that critically discusses my work on moderate libertarianism and the sufficiency proviso. I take the opportunity to clarify and elaborate a couple of points.

The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative (...) commitments to the exercise of our other capacities for which being a full-blown agent is a necessary condition. Thus, the only kind of reason available is hypothetical rather than categorical. The status of this reason may seem to undermine the importance of this answer. I show, however, that it both achieves much of what we want when we cite categorical reasons and highlights why agency is valuable. (shrink)

The article aims at discerning and explaining the significance and role of emotive notions in understanding music, in performing it or listening to it with the appropriate understanding. The suggestion focuses on two notions: that of making sense of various musical features and their interconnections, and that of helping manage the enormous information one needs to process in keeping on the trail of the music in real time.

This article explores a significant question, implicit in Kafka’s novel Metamorphosis, explicitly asked by Rorty: ‘Can I care about a stranger?’ Alphonso Lingis’s view is adopted to overcome a mainstream belief that there is a distinction between my community and the stranger’s community, or us community and the community of those who have nothing in common. His view is thus beneficial to reveal the in-depth paradoxical meaning in the relationship between the stranger and me: I am the stranger and (...) the stranger is me. Therefore, to care about the stranger is to care about myself. (shrink)

Can our caring about truth be rooted in “relaxed” naturalism? I argue that it cannot. In order to care about truth we need the universe to be capable of providing non-adventitious good, which relaxed naturalism cannot do. I use Michael Lynch’s work as a springboard to showing this claim.

This chapter considers how and why real people can care about fictional characters.. Caring rests on having interests at stake, and in literary contexts those interests concern the accuracy and content of a representation; we as people, as part of our natural history, are beings for whom representation and being represented are centrally important. This chapter argues for a better integration of the “internal” and “external” perspectives on fictional characters, that is, a better integration of what are too (...) often taken as divergent and incompatible points of view: (1) the characters as witnessed from the outside, and (2) the reader’s vicarious identification with, and thus imaginative entry into the life of, the character from the inside. (shrink)

Some generic generalizations have both a descriptive and a normative reading. The generic sentence “Philosophers care about the truth”, for instance, can be read as describing what philosophers in fact care about, but can also be read as prescribing philosophers to care about the truth. On Leslie’s account, this generic sentence has two readings due to the polysemy of the kind term “philosopher”. In this paper, I first argue against this polysemy account of descriptive/normative generics. In response, (...) a contextualist semantic theory for generic sentences is introduced. Based on this theory, I argue that descriptive/normative generics are contextually underspecified. (shrink)

This paper explores citizens’ views about the welfare of farmed fish and the mental abilities of fish with a large survey data sample from Finland (n = 1,890). Although studies on attitudes towards animal welfare have been increasing, fish welfare has received only limited empirical attention, despite the rapid expansion of aquaculture sector. The results show that the welfare of farmed fish is not any great concern in the Finnish society. The analysis confirms the distinct character given to farmed (...) fish compared to traditional farmed animals. Salmon are rated low in their mental abilities, including the capacity to feel pain, which may weaken ethical concerns for fish welfare. When analyzing the social determinants surrounding the rating of the welfare of farmed fish, it was shown that fish welfare attitudes follow general animal welfare attitudes regarding age and place of residence as fish welfare tends to be rated more negatively among younger age groups and among urban residents. However, no clear connection could be identified between gender and the rating of fish welfare, which may suggest that the distinct cultural categorization of fish diminishes the typical gender difference identified in animal attitudes. It is concluded that in order to improve awareness about fish welfare, there is a need to increase dissemination of scientific knowledge about fish and their welfare. Moreover, further research should be directed toward studying the moral positioning of fish and the distinct moral categorization they receive. (shrink)

The focus of AI ethics has recently shifted towards the question of whether and how the use of AI technologies can promote sustainability. This new research question involves discerning the sustainability of AI itself and evaluating AI as a tool to achieve sustainable objectives. This article aims to examine the justifications that one might employ to advocate for promoting sustainable AI. Specifically, it concentrates on a dimension of often disregarded reasons — reasons of “meaning” or “meaningfulness” — as discussed more (...) recently in the “meaning in life” literature of analytic ethics. To proceed, the article first elucidates the working definitions of “sustainable AI” and “meaning in life”, while also setting the criteria for evaluating the plausibility of these reasons. Subsequently, it presents and scrutinises three arguments for the claim that one has reasons to care about sustainable AI from a perspective of meaning: the Meaning-conferring-action Argument, the Afterlife Argument, and the Harm Argument. In conclusion, this article asserts that only the Harm Argument presents a viable line of reasoning. However, it also outlines the presuppositions of this argument and the additional steps necessary to make it compelling. (shrink)

In the post-Gilligan debate about the differences, if any, between the ways in which people of different genders see the moral world in which they live, I detect two assumptions. These can be found in Gilligan's early work, and have infected the thought of others. The first, perhaps surprisingly, is Kohlberg's Kantian account of one moral perspective, the one more easily or more naturally operated by men and which has come to be called the justice perspective. This is the (...) perspective whose claims Gilligan initially found suspect, not because she thought it a distorted account of the way in which male subjects operated, but because she disputed its claims to be the only account or the best or dominant one. Throughout the ensuing debate Kohlberg's account has been left in place, and challenged not for correctness but only for uniqueness. (shrink)

In this book Thomas Wren uncovers and assesses the largely hidden philosophical assumptions about human motivation that have shaped contemporary psychological ...

Sixteenth-century Nahua philosophy understands neltiliztli (truth) and tlamitilizli (wisdom, knowledge) nonsemantically in terms of a complex notion consisting of well-rootedness, alethia ,authenticity, adeptness, moral righteousness, beauty, and balancedness. In so doing, it offers compelling a posteriori grounds for denying what Alvin Goldman calls veritism .Veritism defends the universality of correspondence (semantic) truth as well as the universal centrality of correspondence (semantic) truth to epistemology. Key Words: truth • veritism • Nahua philosophy • Aztec philopsophy • mesoamerican philosophy • teotl • (...) Alvin Goldman • Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are ultimate (in one or another sense). I argue that this is a mistake. Taking debates (...) class='Hi'>about ordinary objects as a case study, I show that the arguments that animate these debates bear directly on the question of which objects there are and cannot plausibly be recast as arguments about what’s ultimate. I then address the objection that, because they are easy answerable, questions about what there is cannot be a proper subject of ontological debate. (shrink)

We explored the relationship between qualities of victims in hypothetical scenarios and the appearance of framing effects. In past studies, participants’ feelings about the victims have been demonstrated to affect whether framing effects appear, but this relationship has not been directly examined. In the present study, we examined the relationship between caring about the people at risk, the perceived interdependence of the people at risk, and frame. Scenarios were presented that differed in the degree to which participants (...) could be expected to care about the group and the extent to which the group could be construed as interdependent. A framing effect was found only for the scenario describing the victims as the participants’ friends who did not know each other (high caring/low interdependence), and this went in the opposite direction from typical framing effects. Finally, perceived interdependence and caring affected choice both within and across scenarios, with more risky choices made by participants with high interdependence ratings and high caring ratings. (shrink)

This paper tries to understand the phenomenon that humans are able to empathize with robots and the intuition that there might be something wrong with “abusing” robots by discussing the question regarding the moral standing of robots. After a review of some relevant work in empirical psychology and a discussion of the ethics of empathizing with robots, a philosophical argument concerning the moral standing of robots is made that questions distant and uncritical moral reasoning about entities’ properties and that (...) recommends first trying to understand the issue by means of philosophical and artistic work that shows how ethics is always relational and historical, and that highlights the importance of language and appearance in moral reasoning and moral psychology. It is concluded that attention to relationality and to verbal and non-verbal languages of suffering is key to understand the phenomenon under investigation, and that in robot ethics we need less certainty and more caution and patience when it comes to thinking about moral standing. (shrink)

during july 2020—eight months into the COVID-19 pandemic, and four months after the first US stay-at-home orders—a metaphorically viral quote misattributed to Dr. Anthony Fauci spread across social media: "I don't know how to explain to you that you should care about other people." This line encapsulated the frustration of those willing to sacrifice personal autonomy to limit the spread of COVID-19 and highlighted a consistent individualist tension in US culture.How consistent this tension is can be seen by tracing (...) the origin of the phrase; first, to the title of a June 2017 Huffington Post article by Kayla Chadwick. This article concerns the political debates leading up to the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Acts... (shrink)

In their discussions of issues concerning the nature of human action, and also in their inquiries into the structure of practical reasoning, philosophers typically draw upon a more or less standard conceptual repertoire. The most familiar item in that repertoire is the indispensable, ubiquitous, and protean notion of what people want or — synonymously, at least in the usage that I shall adopt — what they desire. I believe that the elementary repertoire in which the concept of desire is so (...) centrally situated needs to be enriched by the articulation of certain additional notions. It is more or less customary to identify the point of practical reasoning or deliberation simply as a matter of figuring out how to attain whatever goal it is that we want to reach. In many instances, however, what inspires our thinking and shapes our conduct is not that we merely wantone thing or another.Often, what moves us is that there is something of which it is both more precise and more informative to say that we care about it or that we regard it as important to ourselves. In certain cases, it is appropriate to characterize what guides us in terms of a rather particular mode of caring — namely, love. It is with these concepts — what we care about, what we consider important to us, and what we love — that I shall here be concerned. (shrink)

Concern for the fate of rare species leads us to ask why the extermination of species is wrong. No satisfactory account can be given in terms of animal rights, and a speciesist perspective can yield at best only a case for preservation of those species which enough people happen to care about. An attempt is made to analyze the concept of rarity, and its relation to value. Finally, it is suggested that the problem can be resolved only in terms (...) of an environmental ethic, according to which the existence of each species, and of ecological wholes, is held to have intrinsic value. (shrink)

The Svalbard Global Seed Vault provides a backup of seed collections from genebanks around the world. It’s unique character has made it iconic in the public imagination as a ‘Noah’s Ark’ for crop plants. Its remote location and strict controls on access have, however, also lent it an air of mystery, swirling with conspiracy theories. In this paper, I first clarify the aims of the Vault, the history of its development and the policies and practices of its current operation. Given (...) concerns around its potential links to the biotechnology industry, I go on to ask whether GM crops are currently stored in the Vault. Presenting several reasons for why GM crops are formally excluded, while indicating the potential for both change and unintentional contamination, I am compelled to question whether GM crops should be excluded. Answering this requires an interrogation of their potential conservation value as modern contributors to crop biodiversity. In exploring this issue, I suggest that there has been surprisingly little discussion of the moral status and conservation value of bio-technological crop plants and indeed, of how we care for all the techno-lifeforms we are currently engaged in co-creating. I suggest that these are becoming important issues as biotechnological techniques and applications begin to rapidly evolve and diversify. Emphasizing the scope for a refreshed interdisciplinary research agenda exploring the interface between biotechnology and biodiversity conservation, I conclude the article by proposing new concepts of synbiodiversity and symbiodiversity to encourage further debate. (shrink)

This article draws on interviews with “foodies”—people with a passion for eating and learning about food—to explore questions of gender and foodie culture. The analysis suggests that while this culture is by no means gender-neutral, foodies are enacting gender in ways that warrant closer inspection. This article puts forward new empirical findings about gender and food and employs the concept of “doing gender” to explore how masculinities and femininities are negotiated in foodie culture. Our focus on doing gender (...) generates two insights into gender and food work. First, we find that doing gender has different implications for men and women within foodie culture. Alongside evidence that foodies are contesting particular gendered relations within the food world, we explore how broader gender inequities persist. Second, we contend that opportunities for doing gender in foodie culture cannot be considered apart from class privilege. (shrink)

True beliefs are better guides to the world than false ones. This is the common-sense assumption that undergirds theorizing in evolutionary epistemology. According to Alvin Plantinga, however, evolution by natural selection does not care about truth: it cares only about fitness. If our cognitive faculties are the products of blind evolution, we have no reason to trust them, anytime or anywhere. Evolutionary naturalism, consequently, is a self-defeating position. Following up on earlier objections, we uncover three additional flaws in (...) Plantinga's latest formulation of his argument: a failure to appreciate adaptive path dependency, an incoherent conception of content ascription, and a conflation of common-sense and scientific beliefs, which we diagnose as the ‘foundationalist fallacy’. More fundamentally, Plantinga's reductive formalism with respect to the issue of cognitive reliability is inadequate to deal with relevant empirical details. (shrink)

President Clinton needs no instructions on how to proceed. In May 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called upon Indonesian President Suharto to resign and provide for "a democratic transition." A few hours later, Suharto transferred authority to his handpicked vice president. Though not simple cause and effect, the events illustrate the relations that prevail. Ending the torture in East Timor would have been no more difficult than dismissing Indonesia's dictator in May 1998.

이 논문은 행복에 관한 이론 중 욕구만족이론의 한 형태를 탐구한다. 본 논문에서 추구하는 목표는 두 가지이다. 첫째는, 프랭크프르트(Harry G. Frankfurt)가 제시하는 ‘소중히 여김’(caring)과 ‘의지적 필연성’(volitional necessity)이 행복에 관한 견해를 설명해 주고 있음을 보이는 것이다. 둘째는 행복에 관해 프랭크프르트가 견지하는 입장의 문제점을 제시하는 것이다. 첫째 목표를 성취하기 위해 나는 프랭크프르트의 견해에서 ‘소중히 여김’과 ‘의지적 필연성’이 진정으로 원하는 것을 나타내는 근거가 된다는 것을 주장한다. 한 개인이 진정으로 원하는 것의 성취가 행복이라고 할 때, 소중히 여기는 것을 하는 것과 의 지적 필연성에 의한 (...) 힘에 의해 행동하는 것은 행복해지는 길이라는 것이 프랭크프르트의 주장이다. 둘째 목표의 성취를 위해, 나는 ‘소중히 여김’과 ‘의지적 필연성’이 진정으로 원하는 것을 잘 드러낼 수 없다고 주장한다. 프랭크프르트의 견해를 따르게 되면 한 개인이 불운으로 여기는 것이 자신이 진정으로 원하는 것을 드러내는 경우가 있게 된다는 것을 지적한다. 또한 가치 있다고 여기는 것과 소중히 여기는 것이 일치하지 않을 때 전자가 아닌 후자가 자신이 원하는바를 드러낸다고 할 설득적인 이유가 없다고 주장한다. 만약 소중히 여기는 것이 가치 있게 여기는 것이나 판단하는 것과 완전히 독립적이라면, 소중히 여기는 것이 한 개인의 진정한 욕구를 표현한다는 것은 이상할 수 있다. 의지적 필연성에 관해선, 의지적 필연성의 힘도 한 개인의 진정으로 원하는 바를 잘 표현한다고 할 수 없다고 주장한다. 또한 의지적 필연성의 힘과 그 힘에 반대되는 것 중 어느 것이 진정한 욕구의 표현인지 결정하기 어렵다는 것을 주장한다. (shrink)

At the same time, it is not entirely inappropriate to ask why Kant does not care about natural language. One searches in vain for many remarks about, let alone any kind of developed discussion of, language in Kant’s texts, a lacuna that becomes especially salient in the Critique of Pure Reason, particularly to those reading that text in the late twentieth century. Yet it is in this text, along with the Critique of Judgement, where one would expect to (...) see a discussion of language in Kant’s systematic works. Thus a puzzle emerges: on the one hand, Kant displayed a remarkably wide range of curiosity about philosophical and other questions; on the other hand, there is an almost equally remarkable lack of consideration of language in his writing—most specifically in the first Critique, where the topic seems fundamentally relevant and yet is utterly ignored. Can this apparent discrepancy be reconciled? Worse yet, does not the fact that Kant neglects the questions raised by natural language reveal a fundamental gap in his critical account of reason’s scope and limits, and raise doubts about Kant’s approach that becomes even more pressing with the advent of the so-called “linguistic turn” in philosophy? (shrink)