One might think that the best metaphysical theory of the world includes the existence of other minds and of the physical world, while denying that we can know or be certain that this theory is true. This chapter considers Solipsism as a theory about reality. It examines the Veil of Perception, and then considers a series of direct arguments against the Solipsistic Veil, Phenomenalism, and Solipsism itself. The chapter looks at two obviously inadequate arguments for the (...) class='Hi'>Veil, namely, Berkeley's inconceivability argument and the argument from causal mediation. Then, the chapter looks at two much more interesting and important arguments, namely, the argument from hallucination and illusion and the argument from color and other secondary qualities. Besides the Veil of Perception, arguments for Idealism and Solipsism depend on an appeal to Ockham's Razor. These arguments can be taken either as providing additional support for Perceptual Realism or as a defense of Inferred Anti‐Idealism. (shrink)

According to a popular view, shared by the great atheists of the nineteenth century and by students in introductory courses on the philosophy of religion, religious belief is, at best, an edifying fiction. Given that it has apparently lost the ability to edify large sections of the population , it has also lost its only real claim to credibility. Following Hegel’s famous account of the “unhappy consciousness” in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Feuerbach and his successors diagnose religion as a symptom (...) of “alienation.” Human beings have a tendency to compensate for their own shortcomings, and those of the harsh environment they inhabit, by projecting an image of human perfection and endowing this projected image with a life of its own, thereby impeding our ability to make up for these shortcomings by our own efforts. But, so the story goes, modern intellectuals have pierced through the veil erected by human psychology, economics, and religious institutions and have seen the ideas of God, heaven, and the like for what they really are—illusions that, at best, edify the weak-minded, and, at worst, perpetuate intellectual and material bondage. Call this view atheistic fictionalism. According to the received wisdom, J. G. Fichte should occupy a prominent place in any account of the pedigree of atheistic fictionalism. On the received view, Fichte is a sort of extreme subjectivist or solipsist. So one is not surprised to learn that this Fichte was accused of atheism in 1798, and forced to relinquish his chair at Jena the following year, entering the pantheon of persecuted freethinkers alongside Giordano Bruno, Galileo, and Spinoza. (shrink)

It is argued that, contrary to popular pragmatist opinion, the source of epistemic normativity does not lie in the realm of practical rationality. Epistemic norms are indeed hypothetical, as the pragmatist anticipates, but he has misjudged how much their antecedent can do for him. I first consider the most general argument available to the pragmatist. I then focus on the way John Heil and Hilary Kornblith have refmed it. Kornblith’s position poses the most plausible challenge to the defender of the (...) autonomy of epistemic norms. Even at its best, however, the pragmatist argument flounders. (shrink)

This study examines the communication strategies employed by MeritCare's public relations staff during the fen-phen case. The ethic of significant choice was the primary lens for the study. The study revealed that MeritCare's public relations staff members believed they did, in fact, follow the ethic of significant choice. Specifically, they perceived that the biases held by staff helped maintain the public's safety as the primary issue during the fen-phen events. They also believed that their communication strategies allowed them to avoid (...) ambiguity and emotionalized language. Finally, the staff members felt that teaming with Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota enabled them to influence the marketplace of ideas by capitalizing on the credible standing of Mayo Clinic. (shrink)

The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between (...) “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes toitself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful. (shrink)

Solipsism indicates an epistemological position that denies the existence of ‘others’ by asserting that the ‘self’ is the only thing that can be known to exist. For sophist philosophers, the belief that “we can not know anything, and even if we do so, we cannot communicate it” is central to this theory. However, until now there has been little academic scholarship that has tried to provide answers to the pressing issues raised by solipsism. In Solipsist Ontology: Physical Things and Personal (...) Perceptual Space, Ural aims to redefine solipsism by analyzing and elaborating on traditional philosophical problems, such as empiricism and rationalism, as well as discussing problems of language, communication, and meaning. Ural reveals where solipsism has been previously ignored, pseudo-problems have arisen that disguise the sources of the problems with prejudices that concern the philosophical problems in question. Notably, many current, as well as traditional problems of ontology, epistemology, and language are bound up in discourses of solipsism. Ural argues that discarding solipsism as a philosophical discourse hinders new interpretations of traditional philosophical thought. This book offers a fresh perspective to solipsism by defining it in relation to concepts such as ‘physical things,’ ‘personal perceptual space’ and ‘identity.’ Importantly, Ural proposes that an understanding of ‘identity’ is not necessary in order to redefine solipsism. By building a logical system that fashions communication and solipsism as interrelated, it is possible to reject ‘identity’ as a useless concept and thus overcome the classic solipsist dilemma of “we are not able to communicate.” This original piece of research is an important and timely contribution to the field of philosophy that will be of great interest to teachers, researchers, and students. (shrink)

In 2009, the United States Air Force aired a series of science fiction-themed recruitment commercials on network television and their official YouTube channel. In these advertisements, the superimposition of science fiction imagery over depictions of Air Force operations frames these missions as near-future sci-fi adventure, ironically summarized by the tagline: “It’s not science fiction. It’s what we do every day.” Focusing on an early advertisement for the Air Force’s Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle, this essay explores how themes essential to the (...) science fiction genre play a role in influencing contemporary attitudes about autonomous and semi-autonomous robotic weapons, as well as the way in which the aesthetic and functional qualities of these advanced technologies are used to frame moral arguments about their use. As a reconfiguration of the near-future battleground in the guise of science fiction, the “Reaper” ad reveals the way in which science fiction has come to serve as a functional-aesthetic benchmark and cultural sounding board, against which “every day” technologies can be measured and claims about their value, ethos, and social appeal are made. This essay explores the ethical entanglements between science fiction film and video games, and military technology, and the complex role science fiction plays in influencing public attitudes towards military technologies. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of the tenability of methodological solipsism, which typically relies on the so-called Explanatory Thesis. The main arguments in the paper are directed against the latter thesis, according to which internal (or autonomous or narrow) psychological states as opposed to noninternal ones suffice for explanation in psychology. Especially, feedback-based actions are argued to require indispensable reference to noninternal explanantia, often to explanatory common causes. Thus, to the extent that methodological solipsism is taken to require the truth (...) of the Explanatory Thesis, it, too, can be regarded as untenable. (shrink)

In The Veiled God, Ruth Jackson Ravenscroft offers a detailed portrait of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s early life, ethics, and theology in its historical and social context, and critically reflects on the enduring relevance of his work for the study of religion.

The paper examines the shift of the veil from a religious and traditional symbol to a political metaphor during French colonized Algeria (1830–1962). It dis- cusses the significance of veiling for both the coloniz- ers and the colonists. For France, unveiled women would have been the proof of colonial power. For Algeria, veiling represented resistance to assimilation. Caught in between, the veil can be considered a metaphor for the Algerian colonization. The first part of the paper explores the (...) religious and traditional meanings associated with the veil. The second part analyses the political importance of the veil during colonization and its use as a tool for misleading the French authorities. (shrink)

I show that some of the most initially attractive routes of refuting epistemological solipsism face serious obstacles. I also argue that for creatures like ourselves, solipsism is a genuine form of external world skepticism. I suggest that together these claims suggest the following morals: No proposed solution to external world skepticism can succeed which does not also solve the problem of epistemological solipsism. And, more tentatively: In assessing proposed solutions to external world skepticism, epistemologists should explicitly consider whether those solutions (...) extend to knowledge of other minds. Finally, and also tentatively: epistemological solipsism warrants more philosophical attention than it currently enjoys. (shrink)

The veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives the veil of ignorance argument, and uses it to defend an intermediate position between Harsanyi's and Rawls' that she calls Relative Prioritarianism. None of these authors explore the implications of allowing that agent's behind the veil are averse to ambiguity. Allowing for aversion to (...) ambiguity---which is both the most commonly observed and a seemingly reasonable attitude to ambiguity---however supports a version of Egalitarianism, whose logical form is quite different from the theories defended by the aforementioned authors. Moreover, it turns out that the veil of ignorance argument neither supports standard Utilitarianism nor Prioritarianism unless we assume that rational people are insensitive to ambiguity. (shrink)

Solipsism, Individualism and Cognitive Science [1] "Artificial Intelligence cannot ignore philosophy" - John McCarthy I shall challenge the claim that Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence, or GOFAI is solipsistic while more recent neural or "brain-style" approaches to AI are not. After distinguishing GOFAI from connectionism, I will first show that GOFAI is not committed to solipsism but rather to what is more properly called individualism.

In this paper I will juxtapose the concept of the veil of ignorance – a fundamental premise of Rawlsian justice as fairness – and solidarity in the context of the organisation of a healthcare system. My hypothesis is that the veil of ignorance could be considered a rhetorical tool that supports compassion solidarity. In the concept of the veil of ignorance, I will find some crucial features of compassion solidarity within the Rawlsian concept of “reciprocity” – located (...) between “impartiality” and “mutual advantage”. I conclude that, even behind this “thick” veil, some essential, yet “particular” facts on health and wealth redistribution are available to decision makers. Lastly, I discover that by means of the assumption of self-interest in the original position the veil aims to convert egoism into empathy, thus invoking the solidarity of compassion that in turn could be translated into principles of the organisation of a healthcare system. (shrink)

The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between (...) “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes toitself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful. (shrink)

Philosophers usually have been anxious to avoid solipsism. A large number of good and great philosophers have tried to refute it. Of course, these philosophers have not always had the same target in mind and, like everything else, solipsism over the centuries has become increasingly elusive and subtle. In this book I undertake to state the position in its most modern and what I take to be its most plausible form. At some points in the history of philosophy the solipsist (...) has been one who denied the existence of everything except himself or even the existence of everything except his own present sensations. At other times, the solipsist instead of doubting these things has merely insisted that there could be no good reason for believing in the existence of anything beyond one's own present sensations. Roughly, this doubt is aimed at reasons rather than at things. A solipsist of this sort appears in Santayana's Scepticism and Animal Faith. (shrink)

In the _Phaedrus_, Plato provides an intriguing dramatic detail immediately before Socrates's first speech. "I shall veil myself to speak," Socrates declares, "so that I may run through the speech as quickly as possible and may not be at a complete loss from a sense of shame as I look towards you." In this essay, I argue that Socrates's veiling illustrates how authors of dialogic literature about philosophical topics subtly use dramatic and literary details to suggest preferred philosophical takeaways.

"Methodological Solipsism and the Multiverse" defends the many-universes interpretation of quantum physics, but draws attention to a major philosophical obstacle to the interpretation's acceptance: the question of why, if there are many universes, all on a par with one another, at a particular time the 'I' is manifest in only one. This is known as the 'preferred basis' problem. The so-called methodological solipsism approach, introduced by Driesch and employed by philosophers, such as Putnam and Fodor, is used to answer the (...) question. (shrink)

"The specter haunting modern philosophy is not the ghost in the machine: it is solipsism.".

In this paper, we will discuss solipsism and the limits of experience in the light of Wittgenstein’s TLP. One cannot draw the limits of experience without bringing in the notion of the experiencer. That is to say, the notion of self is very relevant to the discussion on the limits of experience. Solipsism means that ‘I’ is the only reality, and what I experience is all that I could know. We will focus on solipsism from two points of view, the (...) empirical point of view and the transcendental point of view. The empirical approach to solipsism makes the self as a matter of its experience. However, from the transcendental point of view, the transcendental or metaphysical self becomes the transcendental ground of our experiences. In the second section, we will discuss the relationship between solipsism and realism. Then how the self is related to the world will be discussed in the third section. For Wittgenstein, the self ‘I' is neither causally nor logically related to the world. This self is the metaphysical subject, and it is the limit of the world. In the fourth section, we will discuss the importance of the limit-self. The limit-self is not the matter or object of experience; rather, it is the ground of our world's experience. For Wittgenstein, it is not an item of the world; rather, it is the limit of the world. The limit-self cannot be described in language, and thus it is beyond our language. It is the limit of our language and also the limit of the world. Then, we will critically analyze the limit of experience, and the metaphysical self is placed on the limit of experience. This self is the non-solipsistic self. (shrink)

My title1 is taken from one of the most obscure, and most discussed, sections of an already obscure and much discussed work, the discussion of the self, the world, and solipsism in sections 5.6-5.641 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus.2 Wittgenstein writes: 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. 5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the (...) world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is. (shrink)

By questioning the validity of some of our basic concepts, such as space, object, and causality, quantum physics contributes quite decisively to the dramatic changes now taking place in our world picture. Veiled Reality provides a detailed view of the reasons why such a questioning arises, a survey of the corresponding conceptual and theoretical problems, and a comprehensive, up-to-date account, useful to scientists and epistemologists alike, of the various ways present-day physicists tackle these problems.The book deals with the E.P.R. reality (...) criterion, local causality, and quantum measurement including relativistic quantum collapse, decoherence theories, consistent histories approaches, and ontologically interpretable theories. Questions bearing on the connection between counterfactuality and realism, intersubjective agreement, and limits of the bearing of the verbs “to have” and “to be,” follow naturally from the analysis and are thoroughly examined. Finally, distinguishing between empirical reality and a veiled independent reality whose only knowable features are structural yields a clue to a plausible interpretation of current physics.Accessible to readers with only very elementary background in modern physics, Veiled Reality offers nonspecialists, including students in physics and philosophy, easy access to basic problems in the foundation of physics. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models (...) offer us a solution concept for disagreements behind the veil of ignorance. (shrink)

In this paper, I make two arguments: 1) There is a solipsistic layer in meaning in life, which I call the “heart of meaning in life” (HML). The bearer of the heart of meaning in life is the solipsistic being. The heart of meaning in life cannot be compared with anything else whatsoever. 2) The heart of meaning in life can be dynamically incorporated into the affirmation of having been born into this world, which I call “birth affirmation.” (...) There can be two interpretations of birth affirmation, the anti-anti-natalistic interpretation and the possible world interpretation. Birth affirmation can be an alternative to anti-natalism, which is destined to be frustrated in this universe. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s Tractarian discussion of solipsism opens with the claim that ‘[t]he limits of my language mean the limits of the world’ (TLP 5.6.) According to this paper, Wittgenstein expresses here a thought that the subject makes no sense of her thinking having content going beyond in kind that which she possesses in thinking. What the subject possesses in thinking is furthermore a truth or falsity, so that the idea is ruled out of truth-independent substance to the world. At the same (...) time, however, thinking is an act of the subject given to her only as such – only as something she does, and so only as a determination of herself. Truth is not therefore independent of the subject; rather, as Wittgenstein puts it, ‘the world is my world’ (TLP 5.62). This conclusion threatens an idealism under which the nature of truth is explained by reference to that of the subject; objectivity is grounded in a deeper subjectivity. This threat is deflected by the recognition that the solipsist’s subject is an essentially undistanceable ‘I’ without content or character, so that ‘solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism’ (TLP 5.64). (shrink)

Wittgenstein's view of philosophy in the Tractatus presupposes that thought may be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. It is commonly held, however, that in the Tractatus he treated thought as logically prior to language. If this view, expressed most lucidly by Norman Malcolm, were correct, Wittgenstein would be inconsistent in holding that thought can be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. I argue that this is not correct. Thought may be prior to language in time (...) but not in logic, for non-verbal symbols must have a logical structure in common with verbal ones. A view comparable with Malcolm's holds that Wittgenstein, under the influence of Schopenhauer, is committed to some form of solipsism. I argue that neither Schopenhauer nor Wittgenstein held any version of solipsism. For both philosophers, subject and object are correlative, so that it is incoherent to affirm the existence of the one without presupposing the existence of the other. (shrink)

“Veiled Resistance” explores the relationship between discourse and power through the figure of the veiled woman. Ingram argues that while veiled women historically have been produced as Other in Orientalist discourse, they also have subverted these dominant representations by manipulating the significations of the veil. Using the example of veiling practices employed by Algerian womenduring the Algerian Revolution , as well as the recent actions of Muslim women in Europe who are choosing to defy the law by veiling and, (...) in some cases, re-veiling themselves after a long period without doing so, Ingram examines the veil as a counter-discursive object. While religious, patriarchal, and colonial ideologies attempt to exploit, albeit in different ways, the women’sactions vis-à-vis the veil, these women can be seen to renegotiate the limits of representation through a conscious manipulation of the discourse that has attempted to discipline them and create new possibilities of embodiment. (shrink)

It is trivially true that solipsism, the view that “the world is my world” and that whatever there is is ontologically dependent on my thought or language, cannot be conclusively refuted. The issue of solipsism is, however, an important one. The paper considers this issue mainly from the point of view of Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism in the Tractatus and in his early Notebooks. It is argued that we should not accept the Wittgensteinian idea that solipsism eventually coincides with “pure (...) realism”. A position labeled “pragmatic realism” is briefly sketched in order to avoid both solipsism and what I call “credo realism”. Thus, I try to show that the issue of solipsism vs. realism should not simply be dismissed and that it should be approached from a pragmatist perspective. (shrink)

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe seems to be tangibly signalled by an increase in women and young girls wearing the Muslim veil, the hijab. In France, this has led to the legal banning of all headscarves and other religious symbols in state schools in the name of French secularism. The article considers the ambiguities and ambivalences associated with the politics of embodiment surrounding veiling and honour killings comparatively, in Britain and France, and the implications for ongoing debates (...) on multiculturalism. The article argues that the publicity surrounding symbolic practices of sexual intimacy in the context of modernity may come to be loaded with secondary symbolic connotations, often highly politicized, for both Muslims and Europeans, leading to irresolvable conundrums. The processes of higher order symbolization outlined here raise critical questions of authority: who has the authority to interpret the scriptures, in this case the Koran and ideas about individual liberty? Who has the right to determine the limits of modesty, or whom a young person should marry? As in the earlier confrontations in South Asia between Sufi saints and learned Muslim clerics, the current contestation involves a range of actors claiming authoritative sacred knowledge. (shrink)

The veil has remained controversial in the US since 9/11, yet it has not been subject to explicit regulation. Beginning with a court case in which a Muslim woman is banned from the courtroom for refusing a judge’s order to remove her niqab, I explore the ways in which the judge’s order resembles a demand for transparency. Transparency as a norm, a mode of discourse, and a kind of comportment betrays the explicit ethos of secular-liberal political norms and practices (...) as being purely procedural. Drawing on early immigration law, the PATRIOT Act, and other laws, I argue that transparency is a demand for “unfamiliar” strangers to present themselves as familiar, or at least, as unthreatening to the dominant, homogenous population—not merely through sincerity and collegiality, but through submission and obedience. The demand for transparency is also often an impossible demand for a gendered racial and cultural recomportment, that is, to transform oneself into someone familiar—a neutral, vaguely feminist, liberal subject. I conclude that transparency remains in excess of liberal political and civic culture’s explicit scope. (shrink)

Some authors view the veil of ignorance as a preferred method for allocating resources because it imposes impartiality by stripping deliberators of knowledge of their personal identity. Using some prominent examples of such reasoning in the health care sector, I will argue for the following claims. First, choice behind a veil of ignorance often fails to provide clear guidance regarding resource allocation. Second, regardless of whether definite results could be derived from the veil, these results do not (...) in themselves have important moral standing. This is partly because the veil does not determine which features are morally relevant for a given distributive problem. Third, even when we have settled the question of what features to count, choice behind a veil of ignorance arguably fails to take persons seriously. Ultimately, we do not need the veil to solve distributive problems, and we have good reason to appeal to some other distributive model. (shrink)

Solipsism is an extreme position. Ludwig Wittgenstein addressed this position several times over more than 20 years. Wittgenstein first became familiar with solipsism under the title of “theoretical egoism” when reading Schopenhauer at the tender age of 16. Elizabeth Anscombe related a personal conversation in which Wittgenstein said that Schopenhauer's theory of the world “as idea” struck him as fundamentally right, if in need of a few clarifications and adjustments, but that he opposed the theory of the world as will. (...) Wittgenstein's first philosophy was that of Schopenhauer and he was only liberated from it by Frege's conceptual realism. According to Schopenhauer, an “organic” philosophy needs an organic exposition. An organic philosophy stands in contrast to systematic philosophy, which argues sequentially “in the form of a chain” of propositions starting from one fundamental principle. Wittgenstein's overarching aim in the Tractatus is to delimit sense by expounding the limits for the expression of thoughts in language. (shrink)

Of all the problems attending the sense-datum theory, arguably the deepest is that it draws a veil of appearances over the external world. Today, the sense-datum theory is widely regarded as an overreaction to the problem of hallucination. Instead of accounting for hallucination in terms of intentional relations to sense data, it is often thought that we should account for it in terms of intentional relations to properties. In this paper, however, I argue that in the versions that might (...) address the problem of hallucination, this newer account is guilty of a vice similar to sense-datum theory’s: it draws a veil of abtracta over the concrete world. (shrink)

In this paper I want to propose that we see solipsism as arising from certain problems we have about identifying ourselves as subjects in an objective world. The discussion will centre on Wittgenstein.

A theory of how rationally to respond to disagreement requires a clear account of how to measure comparative reliability. Such an account faces a Generality Problem analogous to the well-known problem that besets reliabilist theories of knowledge. But whereas the problem for reliabilism has proved recalcitrant, I show that a solution in the case of disagreement is available. That solution is to measure reliability in the most fine-grained way possible, in light of all the circumstances of the present disagreement, but (...) behind a veil that precludes taking into account which views are one's own. This resolves two of the leading obstacles to understanding what disagreement rationally requires: the objection from neglecting the evidence, and the objection from absurd disagreements. Appealing to the contractualist's veil of ignorance also sheds an interesting light on the very different ways in which disagreement gets resolved in epistemology versus political theory. The comparison raises troubling questions on both sides, because it seems doubtful that the political theorist's usual strategies are epistemically rational, and it seems doubtful that the epistemologist's usual strategies are sufficiently attuned to what we care about. (shrink)

This book combines loosely "autobiographical" texts by two of the most influential French intellectuals of our time. "Savoir," by Hélène Cixous is an account of her experience of recovered sight after a lifetime of severe myopia; Jacques Derrida's "A Silkworm of One's Own" muses on a host of motifs, including his varied responses to "Savoir.".