Comparative study of discipline in Theravada and Sarvastivada Buddhism.

The present paper is the third in a series dedicated to uncovering the canonical sources of Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita and, to the extent possible, the monk-poet’s sectarian affiliation. Whereas parts I and II focused on Chapter 16’s indebtedness to (Mūla)sarvāstivāda Vinaya and/or Sūtra literature, this third part inquires into the sources of Aśvaghoṣa’s account of the Buddha’s enlightenment in Chapter 14 (whose first 31 verses have been preserved in their Sanskrit original). Detailed analysis reveals this chapter’s intimate relationship with (...) T. 189, a (Mūla)sarvāstivāda (?) biographical sūtra extant in Chinese translation only, but also with textual materials that have come to belong to Mūlasarvāstivāda literature and, as already demonstrated by Kajiyama Yūichi, with the Nagar(opam)asūtra of the Saṃyuktāgama. Among these likely sources, some provide a lively description of the five destinies, others relate to the iconographic prescriptions laid down for drawing the so-called Wheel of saṃsāra/existence, while yet others spell out the doctrine of dependent origination. The detailed comparison of these materials is followed by an admittedly speculative attempt to assess the relationship between these sources. (shrink)

It has been claimed that Indian Buddhism, as opposed to East Asian Chan/Zen traditions, was somehow against humour. In this paper I contend that humour is discernible in canonical Indian Buddhist texts, particularly in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes (Vinaya). I will attempt to establish that what we find in these texts sometimes is not only humourous but that it is intentionally so. I approach this topic by comparing different versions of the same narratives preserved in Indian Buddhist monastic (...) law codes. (shrink)

In the study of Buddhism it is commonly accepted that a monk or nun who commits a pārājika offence is permanently and irrevocably expelled from the Buddhist monastic order. This view is based primarily on readings of the Pāli Vinaya. With the exception of the Pāli Vinaya, however, all other extant Buddhist monastic law codes (Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda) contain detailed provisions for monks and nuns who commit pārājikas but nevertheless wish to remain within the (...) saṅgha. These monastics are not expelled. Rather, they are granted a special status known as the śikṣādattaka. In this paper I explore the rules. concerning pārājika penance and the śikṣādattaka with specific regard to monastic celibacy. Given that five out of six extant law codes recognise this remarkable accommodation to the rule of celibacy, I argue that we must look to Vinayas other than the Pāli Vinaya if we are to arrive at a nuanced and representative view of Indian Buddhist monasticism. Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet.Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Abhidhamma Studies: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and TimeDouglas W. ShraderAbhidhamma Studies: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Time. By Venerable Nyanaponika Thera. Fourth edition. Edited with an introduction by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1998. Pp. 160. Paper $16.95.The delightful, thought-provoking Abhidhamma Studies: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Timeby the Venerable Nyanaponika Thera is the fourth incarnation of a text originally composed shortly after World War II, published in (...) 1949 (Frewin and Co., Ltd.). The Buddhist Publication Society issued a second, revised and enlarged edition in 1965 as well as a third edition, with relatively minor corrections, in 1976. The present edition, edited by Bhikkhu Bodhi, incorporates a variety of welcome changes, reflecting considerable effort and devotion to the task. In addition to authoring a superb introductory essay, Bodhi has "reformulated a few awkward sentences..., reorganized the notes, provided additional references, and supplied a bibliography" (p. viii). Perhaps the most intriguing and potentially significant change is evident in the title itself. Originally subtitled Researches in Buddhist Psychology, an apt but relatively uninformative description of its contents, the title now announces, even to the uninitiated, the book's unique, captivating subject matter: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Time.This book is essential reading for any serious student of Buddhism. Additionally, it will appeal to those interested in a wide variety of both phenomenological and ontological issues: the manifold of experience, the nature of consciousness, the analysis of time, concepts of anattā(ego selflessness) and paticca-samuppāda(dependent origination), and so forth. An intermediate to advanced level of familiarity and understanding of basic Buddhist doctrines is recommended. It will prove particularly useful to scholars and students who have been intimidated by the vast, often cryptic, Abhidhamma literature.Apparently, the Buddha and his teachings were as enticing and yet profoundly puzzling and enigmatic to his contemporaries and followers as they remain to millions today. They challenge everything we commonly take to be real. That which appears substantial, we are told, is not. Contrary to our own (unexamined) inner/ subjective experience, as well as the teachings of most major world religions, we neither arenor havea self, for there is no self either to be or to have. The attempt to reconcile the teachings of the Buddha with existing beliefs and assumptions concerning the nature of reality led to a proliferation of competing philosophical schools. Each school developed its own distinctive Abhidhamma literature, ostensibly representing a deeper understanding of the teachings of the Buddha. In practice, the literature served to distinguish one school from another, guarding against and/or [End Page 637]correcting the "erroneous" teachings of the other schools. Over a period of approximately three centuries, the Abhidhamma Pitaka grew rapidly…in terms of the sheer volume of literature as well as complexity of doctrine. Paralleling that increase, it came to play a position of ever greater prominence, rivaling even the canonical collections of the Buddha's word (the Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas). Together the three became known as the Tipitaka: "Three Baskets of the Doctrine."Unfortunately for scholars, the only Abhidhammas to survive the widespread persecution of Buddhism in India during the twelfth century A.D.were those that had been transported to, and transplanted in, other lands. Specifically, the Theravāda Abhidhamma (seven books in Pāli) found an enduring home in Sri Lanka. The Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma (also seven books) along with the Śāriputra-abhidharmaśāstra(probably the Dharmaguptaka School) were carried to China, where they were translated from Sanskrit into Chinese. Of these, it is the Theravaāda collection— particularly its first book (the Dharmasanganī) as well as the seventh book (the Patthana)—that forms the subject matter of Ven. Nyanaponika's study. The other two schools have long since vanished, except, as Bhikkhu Bodhi points out, that "a late exposition of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma system, Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa, continues to be studied among Tibetan Buddhists and in the Far East" (p. x).Abhidhamma Studiesis divided into five chapters and two appendixes. Chapter 1, which was added in the second edition, provides a brief historical overview of "The Abhidhamma Philosophy." Those who approach the Abhidhamma... (shrink)

Articles on spiritual philosophy and various aspects of Bhāgavatapurāṇa, Hindu mythological text; previously published in various newspapers and magazines.

On Ambedkar's philosophy and views, and Indian philosophy on dalits; includes quotation extracted from Buddhist scriptures and literature.

On the fundamentals of Vedanta philosophy.

Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)

On Jaina philosophy; includes translation in Hindi.

The present chapter is a bibliographic introduction to the study of the Sarvastivada school of Buddhism, discussing available studies on the history and literature of the school, and the relation of the Sarvastivada school with the Sautrantika school.

This article discusses a peculiar Sā$$\dot {\text{n}}$$n˙khya-Yoga theory of transformation (pariṇāma) that the author of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra created by drawing upon Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories of temporality. In developing his theory, Patañjali adaptively reused the wording in which the Sarvāstivāda theories were formulated, the specific objections against these theories, and their refutations to win the philosophical debate about temporality against Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. Patañjali’s approach towards the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories was possible, even though his system of Yoga is (...) based on an ontology that differs considerably from that of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism because both systems share the philosophical view that time is not a separate ontological entity in itself. Time is a concept deduced from change in the empirical world. This agreement results from the common philosophical orientation of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism and Yoga, which takes the phenomenon of experience as the basis of philosophical enquiry into the structure of the world. The intention that guided Patañjali’s adaptive reuse was twofold. On the one hand, he aimed at winning the debate with Sarvāstivāda Buddhism about how the problem of temporality can be solved. He thus integrated four mutually exclusive theories on temporality into a single theory of transformation of properties (dharma) involving a second-level and a third-level theory on the transformation of the temporal characteristic mark (lakṣaṇa) and on the transformation of states (avasthā), respectively. On the other hand, Patañjali intended to achieve philosophical clarification regarding the question of how exactly properties relate to their underlying substrate in the process of transformation of the three constituents or forces (guṇa) sattva, rajas and tamas of matter (pradhāna) that account for all phenomena of the world except pure consciousness (puruṣa). Patañjali’s theory of transformation is thus of central importance for his Sā$$\dot {\text{n}}$$n˙khya ontology, according to which the world consists of 25 categories or constituents (tattva), i.e., of primal matter (prakṛti) and its transformations and pure consciousness. (shrink)

The article analyses and interprets the critique of the special dharmic theory of the early Buddhist school of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. Special attention is paid to the critique of the theory of the existence of dharmas, elementary psycho-physical data, in all three time periods. At the beginning, a general Buddhist theory of two truths is presented, which tries to legitimize the so-called philosophy of abhidharma as a “higher teaching” regarding reality (dharma theory) which is only (...) rudimentarily present in the Buddha’s discourses. Then we turn to a concise presentation and analysis of the key ontological concepts of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika, and then to the critique of the same undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. It is concluded that sautrāntika, with its critique, “returned” Buddhist philosophy on the path of pure phenomenology after the sarvāstivada-vaibhāṣika’s attempt to interpret the Buddha’s teaching in line with a realistic reductive ontology. (shrink)

A Survey of Vinaya Literature. Charles S. Prebish. The Dharma Lamp Series 1, Jin Luen Publishing House, Taipei 1994. 157 pp. No price given.

This article argues that tahe Sarvāstivāda School’s foundational doctrine of ‘all-existence’ is posited as an axiom rather than a proposition requiring illation. The Āgamas exclusively possess the capacity to expound upon this doctrine. This article examines two scriptural proofs presented in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that substantiate the doctrine of ‘the existence of the three times’. It argues for an inherent relationship between these proofs and highlights the Vijñānakāya exposition on ‘the existence of the three times’. By scrutinizing the process of (...) establishing ‘the existence of the three times’ in the Vijñānakāya, it becomes evident that its characterization of the right observation aligns closely with that of the Saṃyukta Āgama. As a result, the sūtras related to the right observation, including the inaugural sūtra of the Saṃyukta Āgama, serve as scriptural proofs for the Sarvāstivāda school’s ‘all-existing’ theory. (shrink)

This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda’s “_X_ takes _Y_ as _svabhāva_” system constitutes a multilayered reduction system where “_X_ takes _Y_ as _svabhāva_” can be understood as “_X_ is reduced to _Y_.” Here, _svabhāva_ functions as a means of reduction. The reduction system comprises three layers, and its primary aim is to reduce non-dharma types to dharma types. Furthermore, the article discusses whether the multilayered reduction system is ontological or epistemological. Moreover, based on the third layer of the reduction (...) system, the article suggests that _svabhāva_ has only played a limited role in defining dharma types. (shrink)

Der Ursprung der japanischen Vinaya-Schule, Risshu, und die Entwicklung ihrer Lehre und Praxis. László Hankó. Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag, 2003. xiii, 433 pp. €50. ISBN 3898736202.

This article argues that tahe Sarvāstivāda School’s foundational doctrine of ‘all-existence’ is posited as an axiom rather than a proposition requiring illation. The Āgamas exclusively possess the capacity to expound upon this doctrine. This article examines two scriptural proofs presented in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that substantiate the doctrine of ‘the existence of the three times’. It argues for an inherent relationship between these proofs and highlights the Vijñānakāya exposition on ‘the existence of the three times’. By scrutinizing the process of (...) establishing ‘the existence of the three times’ in the Vijñānakāya, it becomes evident that its characterization of the right observation aligns closely with that of the Saṃyukta Āgama. As a result, the sūtras related to the right observation, including the inaugural sūtra of the Saṃyukta Āgama, serve as scriptural proofs for the Sarvāstivāda school’s ‘all-existing’ theory. (shrink)

This article argues that tahe Sarvāstivāda School’s foundational doctrine of ‘all-existence’ is posited as an axiom rather than a proposition requiring illation. The Āgamas exclusively possess the capacity to expound upon this doctrine. This article examines two scriptural proofs presented in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that substantiate the doctrine of ‘the existence of the three times’. It argues for an inherent relationship between these proofs and highlights the Vijñānakāya exposition on ‘the existence of the three times’. By scrutinizing the process of (...) establishing ‘the existence of the three times’ in the Vijñānakāya, it becomes evident that its characterization of the right observation aligns closely with that of the Saṃyukta Āgama. As a result, the sūtras related to the right observation, including the inaugural sūtra of the Saṃyukta Āgama, serve as scriptural proofs for the Sarvāstivāda school’s ‘all-existing’ theory. (shrink)

While it has been known for several decades that the Āvaśyakacūrṇi of the Śvetāmbara Jaina tradition and the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya of the Buddhist tradition share some common narrative plots or motifs, so far no detailed study has been made to understand the different ways in which parallel narrative material is utilized in the two texts. Through a comparative study of stories of three characters in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya and their counterparts in the Āvaśyakacūrṇi, this paper demonstrates that the (...) Buddhists and the Jainas who composed or redacted the two texts exploited parallel narrative plots or motifs along different lines and for different purposes. In particular, with regard to Jīvaka, who is widely known among Buddhists as a model of medical skill and religious faith, this paper argues that the fact that Jīvaka is prominently featured in Buddhist literature but finds no parallel in Jaina literature may be explained by the different attitudes of the two religions to medical healing and to the role of secular physicians in general. (shrink)

U članku se istražuje osnovna linija argumentacije buddhističke škole sarvāstivādavaibhāṣika u prilog obrani njihove osnovne ontološke teze o egzistentnosti dharmi kroz sva tri vremenska razdoblja onako kako ju je izložio Vasubandhu u svome djelu Abhidharmakośabhāṣya . U uvodnome dijelu daje se kratki prikaz nekih prijepora u pogledu podrijetla te buddhističke škole kao i njihovog tekstovnoga korpusa. Nakon toga slijedi istraživanje Vasubandhuova izvješća o specifičnostima dharmičke ontologije te škole kao što su problemi dharmičke »funkcionalnosti« , njihove kauzalne djelotvornosti i problema »prijelaza« (...) atemporalnih dharmi u područje realnog oblikovanja iskustva . U završnom osvrtu se pokušava pokazati da se opća promjena filozofijske perspektive u razdoblju postkanonske abhidharme najradikalnije ostvarila u buddhističkoj školi sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika koja je bila prisiljena raznovrsnim teorijskim konstruktima pomiriti svoje shvaćanje dharmi kao »atemporalnih« konstituensa iskustva s općom buddhističkom postavkom o netrajnosti i nesupstancijalnosti svih fenomena .The article deals with the main line of argumentation of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Buddhist school of thought in defence of their basic ontological thesis of the existence of dharmas through all three-time period as it is exposed in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya . Introductorily some observations are given with regard to major controversies connected with the origin and textual corpus of that Buddhist school. Then follows investigation of Vasubandhu’s exposition of the particularity of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Dharmic ontology – e.g. functionality of dharmas, their causal efficiency and the problem of "transition" of temporal dharmas into the domain of a real experience . In the concluding philosophical assessment an attempt is made to show that the general shift of the philosophical perspective in the period of the so-called postcanonical Abhidharma was the most radical reflected in the Sarvāstivāda- Vaibhāṣika school which was forced to harmonize through various theoretical constructs their basic notion of dharmas as »atemporal« constituens of experience with the general Buddhist understanding of all phenomena as impermanent and devoid of substance of any kind. (shrink)

This paper compares the Cīvaravastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya with its counterparts in the other four Sthavira Vinayas, namely the Cīvarakkhandhaka/Cīvaradharma[ka] sections of the Vinayas of the Theravādins, Dharmaguptakas, Mahīśāsakas and Sarvāstivādins. It demonstrates that a significant number of stories and rules in the Cīvaravastu have no parallel in the other Sthavira Vinayas. Even those stories and rules that have parallels or partial parallels in the other Sthavira Vinayas can still offer us glimpses into the distinctive concerns of the (...) Mūlasarvāstivādin jurists who wrote or redacted this text. Based on three comparative tables and two examples, this paper argues that the Mūlasarvāstivādin authors/redactors of the Cīvaravastu, contrasted with the jurists of other Sthavira sects or schools, displayed at least five characteristics. First, they shared some common narrative lore with the Śvetāmbara Jainas, which is not found in the other Sthavira Vinayas. Second, they showed a stronger predilection for including past-life stories. Third, they repeatedly used the learned-but-greedy monk Upananda to create comic effect. Fourth, they were strongly and explicitly concerned with a wider range of legal issues related to Buddhist monastic inheritance, and came up with detailed solutions to such issues. Fifth, they showed a more acute awareness of the connection between monastic clothing and public image, as well as the need for thoroughly differentiating the appearance of Buddhist monks from that of other religious groups in ancient India. (shrink)

Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden und der kanonischen Literatur der Sarvastivada-Schule, Sanskrit Dictionary of the Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds and of the Canonical Literature of the Sarvastivada School. Begonnen von Ernst Waldschmidt. Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen herausgegeben von Heinz Bechert. 10 Lieferung: kukkura/gandu-praticchadana - bearbeitet von Michael Schmidt und Siglinde Dietz. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1998. I-III, 81, 160 pp. DM 54.

This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda’s “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” system constitutes a multilayered reduction system where “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” can be understood as “ X is reduced to Y.” Here, svabhāva functions as a means of reduction. The reduction system comprises three layers, and its primary aim is to reduce non-dharma types to dharma types. Furthermore, the article discusses whether the multilayered reduction system is ontological or epistemological. Moreover, based on the (...) third layer of the reduction system, the article suggests that svabhāva has only played a limited role in defining dharma types. (shrink)

According to the Buddhist concept of ‘dependent origination’ (pratītyasamutpāda), discrete factors come into existence because of a combination of causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya). Such discrete factors, further, are combinations of five aggregates (pañ caskandha) that, themselves, are subject to constant change. Discrete factors, therefore, lack a self-nature (ātman). The passing through time of discrete factors is characterized by the ‘characteristic marks of the conditioned’: birth (utpāda), change in continuance (sthityanyathātva), and passing away (vyaya); or, alternatively: birth (jāti), duration (sthiti), (...) decay (jarā), and impermanence (anityatā). In the interpretation of the precise nature of these characteristic marks of the conditioned, and their relation to the discrete factor they characterize, different opinions were prevalent within the Sarvāstivāda School of Buddhist philosophy, with, judging from later scholastic literature, the views of the Dārṣṭāntika/sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika sub-schools as most prominent ones. The Indian and Chinese Madhyamaka philosophers pointed to the fallacies in the Sarvāstivāda interpretations of the nature of the characteristic marks of the conditioned and their relation to the discrete factors they characterize, and, hence, to the fallacies in the Sarvāstivāda interpretations of the concepts ‘time’ and ‘temporality’. (shrink)

The present contribution suggests the common authorship of three P?li commentaries of the twelfth/thirteenth centuries CE, namely the Vinayavinicchaya??k? called Vinayas?ratthasand?pan?, the Uttaravinicchaya??k? called L?natthappak?san?, and the Saccasa?khepa??k? called S?ratthas?lin?. The information collected from these three commentaries themselves and from P?li literary histories concerning these three texts leads to the second quarter of the thirteenth century CE as the period of their origination. The data from parallel texts explicitly stated to having been written by V?cissara Thera in the texts themselves (...) render it possible to establish with a high degree of probability V?cissara Thera as their author. (shrink)

Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden und der kanonischen Literatur der Sarvastivada-Schule. Sanskrit Dictionary of the Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds and of the Canonical Literature of the Sarvastivada School. Begonnen von Ernst Waldschmidt. Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen herausgegeben von Heinz Bechert. 11. Lieferung: gata/caturmahabhautika-editor: Michael Schmidt; contributors to the 11th fasc.: S. Dietz, P. Kieffer-Pülz, M. Schmidt. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1999. 161-240 pp. 12. Lieferung: caturmaharajakayika/jvrcih-sikhopama - contributors to the 12th fasc.: J. (...) Chung, S. Dietz, P. Kieffer-Pülz, M. Schmidt. V & R, Göttingen 2000. I-III, 241-320 pp. 13. Lieferung: jvalana/trayo-dasa - contributors to teh 13 fasc.: J. Chung, S. Dietz, M. Schmidt. V & R, Göttingen 2001, I-II, 321-400 pp. Each fasc. DM 56. (shrink)

Der Pravarana in dem kanonischen Vinaya-Texten der Mulasarvastivadin und der Sarvastivadin. Jin-il Chung., Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1998. 368 pp. ISBN 3-525-26156-X.

Die Vorschriften für die Buddhistische Nonnengemeinde im Vinaya-Pitaka der Theravadin. Ute Hüsken. Dietrich Meier Veralg, Berlin 1997. 519 pp. ISBN 3-496-02632-4.

본 고찰은 破法輪僧의 원인에 대한 佛傳과 律藏의 상이한 관점과 그럼에도 불구하고 이러한 논리구조가 하나로 화해될 수 있는 측면을 조명한 것이다.파법륜승은 붓다 재세시 불교교단에서의 가장 큰 사건이다. 또한 이는 붓다라는 불교의 교조에 대한 반대라는 측면에서 이후 불교가 종교화되면서도 계속해서 문제점을 내포하게 되는 사건이 된다. 그러므로 파법륜승의 접근에 있어서도 관점에 따른 다양한 측면이 존재하게 된다는 것은 어찌 보면 당연하다고 하겠다.파법륜승의 원인에 있어서 이를 불전은 종교적 입각점에 근거해서 붓다 왕궁시절의 제바달다와의 경쟁과 이로 인한 제바달다의 패배에 두고 있다. 그러나 율장은 사실적인 입각점에 의해서 붓다의 (...) 만년에 제바달다가 붓다께 교단의 승계를 요청하고, 이러한 요구가 붓다에 의해서 모욕적으로 거절되는 것을 들고 있다. 이렇게 놓고 본다면, 불전과 율장은 동일한 사건의 원인에 대해서 전혀 상이한 주장을 하고 있는 것이 된다.종교는 사실적인 측면이 기반이 될 수는 있어도 사실이 그대로 목적이 되는 것은 아니다. 그러한 의미에서 율장이 불전에 비해서 보다 사실적이라는 논리는 성립될 수 있어도 그렇기 때문에 보다 정당성을 확보하고 있다고는 말해 질 수가 없는 것이다.종교적 관점과 사실적 관점은 분명 다른 입각점을 확보하고 있다. 그러나 그럼에도 불전과 율장에서는 이러한 양자가 동일한 불교라는 종교적 테두리 안에 배속됨으로 인하여 양자는 결국 유리될 수만은 없는 화해로 나아가게 된다. 그리고 이러한 영향은 오늘날의 붓다의 생애를 다루는 인식들 속에서까지도 상당부분 유지되고 있다고 하겠다. (shrink)

This paper mainly addresses the following issues: how Buddhists deal with future existence, the difference between yogic perception and the cognition of ordinary people with regard to future entities, and how Buddhists resolve the contradiction between the theory of momentariness and that of action and its fruit. According to the Sarvāstivādins, a future entity exists in reality as long as there is cognition that has this entity as its object. According to the Sautrāntikas, however, that theory does not hold true. (...) A future entity is just what will occur hereafter, and it is never the case that such an entity exists at present. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not directly negate an opponent’s argument that the distinction between past and future entities is made by yogic perception, but implicitly accept it. They state that because a future entity is situated in a causal stream, yogis can cognize it through purified worldly cognition. As for an effect that will occur in the future, Buddhists do not seem to follow the model that one and the same agent of action will necessarily receive the fruit of past action, which is often seen in other schools such as the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas. Rather, Buddhists adopt the theory of the uninterrupted succession of cause and effect. (shrink)

본고는 수행도 가운데 가행도에 해당하는 순결택분인 사선근과, 이 가운데 난선근과 정선근이 전제하고 있는 信(śraddhā)의 의미에 주목하여 단선근과의 관계를 고찰하였다. 먼저 아비달마문헌에 근거해 사선근에 관해 고찰한 후, 『심론』계열의 논서와 『구사론』, 그리고 정통유부계열의 논서에서 입장의 차이를 보이고 있는 난선근과 정선근의 해석에 초점을 맞추어 논의를 전개하였다. 전자는 四諦十六行相의 관찰을 중점적으로 설명하고 있으나 후자는 信의 의미 또한 부각시키고 있다. 여기서 사예류지, 삼보, 오온무상, 사성제에 대한 信은 정(頂)과 정타(頂墮)를 구분하게 되는 중요한 역할을 하며 不信은 정타로 이어진다. 한편 단선근의 자성으로 제시되고 있는 不信은 인과법칙의 부정을 의미하는 (...) 사견과 같은 맥락에서 설명되며 무명으로 귀속된다. 반대로 인과법칙을 인정하는 정견은 信과 같은 의미이고 속선근으로 연결되는 것에서 信이 선근의 단절과 속기의 직접적인 원인이 된다는 것을 확인할 수 있었다. 이러한 관점에서 信은 인과법칙에 대한 바른 이해에 근거하고 있는 것이 명확히 드러난다. 이러한 견해는 초기불교에서 이론적 원형이 확인되며, 이를 계승하고 있는 유부는 信을 인과법칙에 대한 확신으로 이해하여 慧의 의미와 궤를 같이하는 것을 알 수 있었다. (shrink)