While the story of Stanislav Petrov – the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel who likely saved the world from nuclear holocaust in 1983 – is often trotted out to advocate for the view that human beings ought to be kept “in the loop” of automated weapons’ responses, I argue that the episode in fact belies this reading. By attending more closely to the features of this event – to Petrov’s professional background, to his familiarity with the warning system, and to his decisions (...) to defy his protocol – it becomes clear that Petrov was not seamlessly working “in his loop,” but reassessing it entirely. I claim that this exhibits a paradox intrinsic to all automated loops: namely, that their optimum function in fact rests on unforeseen human interventions that cannot be reliably codified ex ante, that is, that good judgment cannot simply be “programmed into” their protocols. This dependence, moreover, reveals automation’s ineluctable need for virtue ethics – not in the usual sense (whereby ethics deliberates about, say, possible damages and loss of life), but in the sense that ethical judgment, rightly understood, entails the reassessment of all of the conditions surrounding a decision, including whether a protocol should be followed at all. (shrink)

Surveillance plays a crucial role in public health, and for obvious reasons conflicts with individual privacy. This paper argues that the predominant approach to the conflict is problematic, and then offers an alternative. It outlines a Basic Interests Approach to public health measures, and the Unreasonable Exercise Argument, which sets forth conditions under which individuals may justifiably exercise individual privacy claims that conflict with public health goals. The view articulated is compatible with a broad range conceptions of the (...) value of health. (shrink)

In seinem Aufsatz “Transparency, Self-Consciousness, and Reflection” und in seinem Buch Transparency and Reflection entwickelt Boyle eine Lösung für das Problem der Transparenz. Antworten, die auf Fragen über das Bewusstsein gegeben werden, bringen demnach nur die Arten des Gegebenseins zum Ausdruck, die in Antworten auf weltbezogene Fragen schon enthalten sind. Diese sowie auch die Lösung für ein anderes Problem, das Boyle „the anti-egoist challenge“ nennt, gründen auf der Idee, dass eine Antwort auf eine weltbezogene Frage eine Art des Gegebenseins enthält, (...) die ihrerseits implizit auf das antwortende Subjekt referiert. Diese wird expliziert, wenn eine Frage über das Bewusstsein beantwortet wird. Mir scheint, dass diese Idee einen Fallstrick spannt. Denn damit die von Boyle vorgeschlagene Lösung gelingt, muss die relevante Referenz auf die erste Person in einer Art des Gegebenseins des Subjekts bestehen. Doch wenn diese Art des Gegebenseins die typische Fregeanische Spezifizierung erfüllt, dann ist sie privat, – und genauso privat ist dann auch die Art des Gegebenseins, in der sie enthalten ist. Folglich wird sich die Privatheit über diejenigen Antworten, die sich auf Fragen über das Bewusstsein richten, auf alle Antworten hinaus ausbreiten, die sich auf die mit ihnen verknüpften Fragen über die Welt richten. (shrink)

Although testing for substance abuse can be intrusive, inaccurate, and ineffective at ferreting out those who are a threat to others, it can be morally justified in certain carefully circumscribed cases.

Selected by the Economist as one of the best books of 2020. -/- Privacy Is Power argues that people should protect their personal data because privacy is a kind of power. If we give too much of our data to corporations, the wealthy will rule. If we give too much personal data to governments, we risk sliding into authoritarianism. For democracy to be strong, the bulk of power needs to be with the citizenry, and whoever has the data (...) will have the power. Privacy, I argue, is not a personal preference; it is a political concern. I also argue that personal data is a toxic asset, and should be regulated as if it were a toxic substance, similar to asbestos. I call for a complete ban to the trade in personal data. The book is at once philosophical and political, and extremely practical and accessible. It discusses liberal democracy, equality, justice, and autonomy. It includes a chapter for policymakers, and one that addresses what ordinary citizens can do to protect privacy. Finally, the book covers the tension between privacy and public health in the context of covid19. -/- . (shrink)

From the Supreme Court to the bedroom, privacy is an intensely contested interest in our everyday lives and privacy law. Some people appeal to privacy to protect such critical areas as abortion, sexuality, and personal information. Yet, privacy skeptics argue that there is no such thing as a right to privacy. I argue that we cannot abandon the concept of privacy. If we wish to avoid extending this elusive concept to cover too much of (...) our lives or shrinking it to cover too little, we must come to understand it. After exploring the privacy arguments of philosophers and constitutional and tort privacy law, I argue for a new definition of privacy and an explanation of its value that clarifies and resolves many of our conflicts. Privacy is critical because it allows us to protect a realm in which we can have intimate relations with others. (shrink)

Can the government stick us with privacy we don't want? It can, it does, and according to this author, may need to do more of it. Privacy is a foundational good, she argues, a necessary tool in the liberty-lover's kit for a successful life. A nation committed to personal freedom must be prepared to mandate inalienable, liberty-promoting privacies for its people, whether they eagerly embrace them or not. The eight chapters of this book are reflections on public regulation (...) of privacy at home; isolation and confinement for punitive and health reasons; religious modesty attire; erotic nudity; workplace and professional confidentiality; racial privacy; online transactions; social networking; and the collection, use and storage of electronic data. (shrink)

The phenomenon of the New Genetics raises complex social problems, particularly those of privacy. This book offers ethical and legal perspectives on the questions of a right to know and not to know genetic information from the standpoint of individuals, their relatives, employers, insurers and the state. Graeme Laurie provides a unique definition of privacy, including a concept of property rights in the person, and argues for stronger legal protection of privacy in the shadow of developments in (...) human genetics. He challenges the role and the limits of established principles in medical law and ethics, including respect for patient autonomy and confidentiality. This book will interest lawyers, philosophers and doctors concerned both with genetic information and issues of privacy; it will also interest genetic counsellors, researchers, and policy makers worldwide for its practical stance on dilemmas in modern genetic medicine. (shrink)

This book argues that the irreducible singularity of each person as a psychical subject implies the privacy of the psychical and that of experience, and yet the private accessibility of each person to his or her mind is compatible with interpersonal communication and understanding. The book treats these major issues against the background of the author's original metaphysics--panenmentalism."--Publisher's website.

Respecting privacy and patients’ satisfaction are amongst the main indicators of quality of care and one of the basic goals of health services. This study, carried out in 2007, aimed to investigate the extent to which patient privacy is observed and its correlation with patient satisfaction in three emergency departments of Tehran University of Medical Science, Iran. Questionnaire data were collected from a convenience sample of 360 patients admitted to emergency departments and analysed using SPSS software. The results (...) indicated that, according to 50.6% of the patients, the extent to which their privacy was respected was described as either ‘weak’ or ‘average’. Spearman’s coefficient indicated a significant correlation between respecting privacy and the patients’ satisfaction about the various aspects of privacy studied. Considering the levels of privacy observed together with the patients’ degree of satisfaction, it is imperative that clinical professionals address both aspects from conceptual and practical viewpoints. (shrink)

: Does the rejection of pure proceduralism show that we should adopt Brettschneider’s value theory of democracy? The answer, this paper suggests, is ‘no’. There are a potentially infinite number of incompatible ways to understand democracy, of which the value theory is, at best, only one. The paper illustrates and substantiates its claims by looking at what the secret ballot shows us about the importance of privacy and democracy. Drawing on the reasons to reject Mill’s arguments for open voting, (...) in a previous paper by A. Lever, it argues that people’s claims to privacy have a constitutive, as well as an instrumental, importance to democratic government, which is best seen by attending to democracy as a practice, and not merely as a distinctive set of values. (shrink)

As privacy concerns among consumers rise, service providers increasingly want to provide services that support privacy enhancing technologies. At the same time, online service providers must be able to protect themselves against misbehaving users. For instance, users that do not pay their bill must be held accountable for their behavior. This tension between privacy and accountability is fundamental, however a tradeoff is not always required. In this article we propose the concept of a time capsule, that is, (...) a verifiable encryption with timed and revocable decryptability. The time capsule together with its related protocols offer support of privacy while retaining strong accountability. In our scheme an honest user may enjoy full anonymity, but dishonest users who do not pay their bill have their identity revealed. In contrast to existing revocable anonymity systems, our proposed scheme requires less trust in an external authority, while simultaneously making accountability easier (and less costly) to achieve. (shrink)

Defining privacy is problematic because the condition of privacy appears simultaneously to require separation from others, and the possibility of choosing not to be separate. This latter feature expresses the inherent normative dimension of privacy: the capacity to control the perceptual and informational spaces surrounding one’s person. Clearly the features of separation and control as just described are in tension because one may easily enough choose to give up all barriers between oneself and the public space. How (...) could the capacity for privacy give rise to its absence? Yet both the separation and control features of privacy do seem indispensable to any sensible understanding of it. In this paper I set out an approach to defining privacy that keeps these features and avoids the tension between them. (shrink)

This book explores the Janus-faced features of privacy, and looks at their implications for the control of personal information, for sexual and reproductive freedom, and for democratic politics. It asks what, if anything, is wrong with asking women to get licenses in order to have children, given that pregnancy and childbirth can seriously damage your health. It considers whether employers should be able to monitor the friendships and financial affairs of employees, and whether we are entitled to know whenever (...) someone rich, famous or powerful has cancer, or an adulterous affair. It considers whether we are entitled to privacy in public and, if so, what this might mean for the use of CCTV cameras, the treatment of the homeless and the provision of public facilities such as parks, libraries and lavatories. Above all, the book seeks to understand whether and, if so, why privacy is valuable in a democratic society, and what implications privacy has for the ways we see and treat each other. The ideas about privacy we have inherited from the past are marked by beliefs about what is desirable, realistic and possible which predate democratic government and, in some cases, predate constitutional government as well. Hence, this book argues, although privacy is an important democratic value, we can only realise that value if we use democratic ideas about the freedom, equality, security and rights of individuals to guide our understanding of privacy. (shrink)

The goal of the book is to present the latest research on the new challenges of data technologies. It will offer an overview of the social, ethical and legal problems posed by group profiling, big data and predictive analysis and of the different approaches and methods that can be used to address them. In doing so, it will help the reader to gain a better grasp of the ethical and legal conundrums posed by group profiling. The volume first maps the (...) current and emerging uses of new data technologies and clarifies the promises and dangers of group profiling in real life situations. It then balances this with an analysis of how far the current legal paradigm grants group rights to privacy and data protection, and discusses possible routes to addressing these problems. Finally, an afterword gathers the conclusions reached by the different authors and discuss future perspectives on regulating new data technologies. (shrink)

I argue that there is nothing wrong with perfect voyeurism , covert watching or listening that is neither discovered nor publicized. After a brief discussion of privacy I present attempts from Stanley Benn, Daniel Nathan, and James Moor to show that the act is wrong. I argue that these authors fail to make their case. However, I maintain that, if detected or publicized, voyeurism can do grave harm and to that extent should be severely punished. I conclude with some (...) thoughts on the stubborn intuition that perfect voyeurism is wrong despite the absence of harm. (shrink)

Privacy is often linked to freedom. Protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is a hallmark of a free society, and pervasive state‐sponsored surveillance is generally considered to correlate closely with authoritarianism. One link between privacy and freedom is prominent in the library and information studies field and has recently been receiving attention in legal and philosophical scholarship. Specifically, scholars and professionals argue that privacy is an essential component of intellectual freedom. However, the nature of intellectual freedom and (...) its link to privacy are not entirely clear. My aim in this article is to offer an account of intellectual freedom as a type of positive freedom. I will argue that a full account of intellectual freedom must involve more than an absence of constraints. Rather, intellectual freedom is at least partly a function of the quality of persons’ agency with respect to intellectual endeavors. Such an account best explains the relation between intellectual freedom and privacy and avoids problems with conceptions of intellectual freedom based solely on constraints. (shrink)

Privacy rights can surely be waived. But can they also be forfeited? If so, why and under what conditions? This article takes up these questions by developing a novel theory of privacy rights forfeiture that draws inspiration from Judith Thomson’s canonical work on privacy. The paper identifies two species of forfeiture rooted in modes of negligent and reckless conduct and argues that both self-directed and other-regarding considerations play a role in grounding forfeiture. The paper also contributes to (...) the literature by proposing a new taxonomy of how Hohfeldian entitlements can be divested generally. It likewise engages at length with a recent article by Benedict Rumbold and James Wilson in which the authors criticize Thomson’s work and appear to reject the very idea of privacy forfeiture. In response, I make the case that Rumbold and Wilson’s forfeiture-free model of privacy is unconvincing on substantive moral grounds. (shrink)

New technologies and practices, such as drug testing, genetic testing, and electronic surveillance infringe upon the privacy of workers on workplaces. We argue that employees have a prima facie right to privacy, but this right can be overridden by competing moral principles that follow, explicitly or implicitly, from the contract of employment. We propose a set of criteria for when intrusions into an employee''s privacy are justified. Three types of justification are specified, namely those that refer to (...) the employer''s interests, to the interests of the employee her- or himself, and to the interests of third parties such as customers and fellow workers. For each of these three types, sub-criteria are proposed that can be used to determine whether a particular infringement into an employee''s privacy is morally justified or not. (shrink)

Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally public activities, such as political speech, do not deserve privacy protection. In this article, I develop a new argument for the view that surveillance of intentionally public activities should be limited to protect the specific good that this context provides, namely democratic legitimacy. Combining insights from Helen Nissenbaum’s contextualism and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, I argue that strategic surveillance of the public sphere can undermine the capacity (...) of citizens to freely deliberate in public and therefore conflicts with democratic self-determination. (shrink)

The cluster of concerns usually identified asmatters of privacy can be adequately accountedfor by unpacking our natural rights to life,liberty, and property. Privacy as derived fromfundamental natural rights to life, liberty,and property encompasses the advantages of thecontrol and restricted access theories withouttheir attendant difficulties.

The dominant approach in privacy theory defines information privacy as some form of control over personal information. In this essay, I argue that the control approach is mistaken, but for different reasons than those offered by its other critics. I claim that information privacy involves the drawing of epistemic boundaries—boundaries between what others should and shouldn’t know about us. While controlling what information others have about us is one strategy we use to draw such boundaries, it is (...) not the only one. We conceal information about ourselves and we reveal it. And since the meaning of information is not self-evident, we also work to shape how others contextualize and interpret the information about us that they have. Information privacy is thus about more than controlling information; it involves the constant work of producing and managing public identities, what I call “social self- authorship.” In the second part of the essay, I argue that thinking about information privacy in terms of social self- authorship helps us see ways that information technology threatens privacy, which the control approach misses. Namely, information technology makes social self- authorship invisible and unnecessary, by making it difficult for us to know when others are forming impressions about us, and by providing them with tools for making assumptions about who we are which obviate the need for our involvement in the process. (shrink)

Increasing privacy concerns are arising from expanding use of aggregated personal information in health practices. Conversely, in light of the promising benefits of data driven healthcare, privacy...

This article concerns the nature and limits of individuals’ rights to privacy over information that they have made public. For some, even suggesting that an individual can have a right to privacy over such information may seem paradoxical. First, one has no right to privacy over information that was never private to begin with. Second, insofar as one makes once-private information public – whether intentionally or unintentionally – one waives one’s right to privacy to that information. (...) In this article, however, we suggest the moral situation is more complicated than this. Rather, we argue that there is a class of public information – namely, once-private information that individuals have made public unintentionally – which remains within the scope of an individuals’ right to privacy, even when it has passed into the public domain. Significantly, this class includes any information rights-holders were unaware could be inferred from information they have made public and which they would not otherwise have wanted to be in the public domain. As we show, as well as clarifying several everyday dilemmas with regards to individuals’ privacy rights, this finding has elucidates a number of problems in the ethics of Big Data. (shrink)

The Internet of Things (IoT) is, in part, an information handling system that can remove humans from the information handling process. The particular problem explored is how we are to understand privacy when considering informational systems that handle personal information in ways that impact people’s lives when there is no human operator in direct contact with that personal information. I argue that these new technologies need to take concepts like privacy into account, but also, that we ought also (...) to take these technologies into account to reconsider and perhaps reconceptualise privacy. This paper argues that while an inhuman system like the IoT does not necessarily violate the interpersonal privacy of people, if the IoT is used as part of a state surveillance program, a political notion of privacy may be violated. (shrink)

The sense of shame is part of human nature. What, then, is the role and significance of such a particular sensation, one that causes mental anxiety in a sick person’s weakest and the most vulnerable state? We know from historical documents going back as far as ancient Greece and Egypt that respecting patient privacy should be regarded as a moral duty for physicians in charge of treatment. However much today’s healthcare may have changed compared to centuries past, we note (...) that patient privacy has not lost its importance. In the current healthcare system, digital recording of private information and images enables others, in principle, to access these personal data quite easily. While we cannot reject the advantages offered by modern medicine, we need to consider how to design a healthcare system that respects patient privacy. What should be the standards of privacy in emergency services where urgent decisions and interventions have to be made? How should we guarantee patient privacy during medical education? The chapters of this book approach questions like these from the perspectives of different disciplines. The writings illustrate the increasing complexity of patient privacy issues in modern healthcare systems, particularly the growing difficulty to protect confidential data. At the same time, we can observe that patients are becoming more aware of their rights and their sensitivity in this area has increased. In our opinion, an approach that requires us to choose between the two values –health and privacy – would be wrong. Therefore, the question we should focus on is: “what kind of healthcare system should be developed to ensure the greatest respect for humans’ natural right to privacy?” If we want to answer this question and find sustainable solutions for these problems, it is crucial to use a multidisciplinary approach. From this perspective, the present volume is a first contribution to be published in Turkey to pursue this aim, including articles offered from various disciplines. (shrink)

This paper examines workplace surveillance and monitoring. It is argued that privacy is a moral right, and while such surveillance and monitoring can be justified in some circumstances, there is a presumption against the infringement of privacy. An account of privacy precedes consideration of various arguments frequently given for the surveillance and monitoring of employees, arguments which look at the benefits, or supposed benefits, to employees as well as to employers. The paper examines the general monitoring of (...) work, and the monitoring of email, listservers and the World Wide Web. It is argued that many of the common justifications given for this surveillance and monitoring do not stand up to close scrutiny. (shrink)

Technological advances are bringing new light to privacy issues and changing the reasons for why privacy is important. These advances have changed not only the kind of personal data that is available to be collected, but also how that personal data can be used by those who have access to it. We are particularly concerned with how information about personal attributes inferred from collected data (such as online behaviour), can be used to tailor messages and services to specific (...) individuals or groups. This kind of ‘personalised targeting’ has the potential to influence individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, and choices in unprecedented ways. In this paper, we argue that because it is becoming easier for companies to use collected data for influence, threats to privacy are increasingly also threats to personal autonomy—an individual’s ability to reflect on and decide freely about their values, actions, and behaviour, and to act on those choices.4 While increasing attention is directed to the ethics of how personal data is collected, we make the case that a new ethics of privacy needs to also think more rigorously about how personal data may be used, and its potential impact on personal autonomy. (shrink)

The first few years of the 21st century were characterised by a progressive loss of privacy. Two phenomena converged to give rise to the data economy: the realisation that data trails from users interacting with technology could be used to develop personalised advertising, and a concern for security that led authorities to use such personal data for the purposes of intelligence and policing. In contrast to the early days of the data economy and internet surveillance, the last few years (...) have witnessed a rising concern for privacy. As bad data practices have come to light, citizens are starting to understand the real cost of using online digital technologies. Two events stamped 2018 as a landmark year for privacy: the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and the implementation of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The former showed the extent to which personal data has been shared without data subjects’ knowledge and consent and many times for unacceptable purposes, such as swaying elections. The latter inaugurated the beginning of robust data protection regulation in the digital age. Getting privacy right is one of the biggest challenges of this new decade of the 21st century. The past year has shown that there is still much work to be done on privacy to tame the darkest aspects of the data economy. As data scandals continue to emerge, questions abound as to how to interpret and enforce regulation, how to design new and better laws, how to complement regulation with better ethics, and how to find technical solutions to data problems. The aim of the research project Data, Privacy, and the Individual is to contribute to a better understanding of the ethics of privacy and of differential privacy. The outcomes of the project are seven research papers on privacy, a survey, and this final report, which summarises each research paper, and goes on to offer a set of reflections and recommendations to implement best practices regarding privacy. (shrink)

Privacy, Due process and the Computational Turn: The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of Technology engages with the rapidly developing computational aspects of our world including data mining, behavioural advertising, iGovernment, profiling for intelligence, customer relationship management, smart search engines, personalized news feeds, and so on in order to consider their implications for the assumptions on which our legal framework has been built. The contributions to this volume focus on the issue of privacy, which is often equated (...) with data privacy and data security, location privacy, anonymity, pseudonymity, unobservability, and unlinkability. Here, however, the extent to which predictive and other types of data analytics operate in ways that may or may not violate privacy is rigorously taken up, both technologically and legally, in order to open up new possibilities for considering, and contesting, how we are increasingly being correlated and categorizedin relationship with due process – the right to contest how the profiling systems are categorizing and deciding about us. (shrink)

Many attempts to define privacy have been made over the last century. Early definitions and theories of privacy had little to do with the concept of information and, when they did, only in an informal sense. With the advent of information technology, the question of a precise and universally acceptable definition of privacy in this new domain became an urgent issue as legal and business problems regarding privacy started to accrue. In this paper, I propose a (...) definition of informational privacy that is simple, yet strongly tied with the concepts of information and property. Privacy thus defined is similar to intellectual property and should receive commensurate legal protection. (shrink)

In this chapter I identify three problems affecting the plausibility of group privacy and argue in favour of their resolution. The first problem concerns the nature of the groups in question. I shall argue that groups are neither discovered nor invented, but designed by the level of abstraction (LoA) at which a specific analysis of a social system is developed. Their design is therefore justified insofar as the purpose, guiding the choice of the LoA, is justified. This should remove (...) the objection that groups cannot have a right to privacy because groups are mere artefacts (there are no groups, only individuals) or that, even if there are groups, it is too difficult to deal with them. The second problem concerns the possibility of attributing rights to groups. I shall argue that the same logic of attribution of a right to individuals may be used to attribute a right to a group, provided one modifies the LoA and now treats the whole group itself as an individual. This should remove the objection that, even if groups exist and are manageable, they cannot be treated as holders of rights. The third problem concerns the possibility of attributing a right to privacy to groups. I shall argue that sometimes it is the group and only the group, not its members, that is correctly identified as the correct holder of a right to privacy. This should remove the objection that privacy, as a group right, is a right held not by a group as a group but rather by the group’s members severally. The solutions of the three problems supports the thesis that an interpretation of privacy in terms of a protection of the information that constitutes an individual—both in terms of a single person and in terms of a group—is better suited than other interpretations to make sense of group privacy. (shrink)

Digital privacy scholars tend to bemoan ordinary people’s limited knowledge of and lukewarm interest in what happens to their digital data. This general lack of interest and knowledge is often taken as a consideration in favor of legislation aiming to force internet companies into adopting more responsible data practices. While we remain silent on whether any new laws are called for, in this paper we wish to underline a neglected consequence of people’s ignorance of and apathy for digital (...) class='Hi'>privacy: their potential to encourage capture by industry interests. In particular, we argue that such laws may be at increased risk of capture because they are unlikely to be democratically responsive. We make this claim on a twofold basis: first, well-known theoretical mechanisms explaining how the absence of responsiveness leads to capture, identified in prior political science and political philosophy literature, yield the prediction that digital privacy legislation is likely to be unresponsive and thus captured; second, empirical data concerning the European Union’s digital privacy laws, with a special focus on the General Data Protection Regulation, appears to confirm these predictions: the bloc’s (world’s?) flagship privacy protection law seems more responsive to corporate than citizen interests. (shrink)

While the balance between individual privacy and government monitoring or corporate surveillance has been a frequent topic across numerous disciplines, the issue of privacy within the family has been largely ignored in recent privacy debates. Yet privacy intrusions between parents and children or between adult partners or spouses can be just as profound as those found in the more “public spheres” of life. Popular access to increasingly sophisticated forms of electronic surveillance technologies has altered the dynamics (...) of family relationships. Monitoring, mediated and facilitated by practices of both covert and overt electronic surveillance, has changed the nature of privacy within the family. Parents are tracking children via GPS-enabled cell phone tracking software and are monitoring the Internet use of family members. Parents, siblings, and children are also posting information about their family members online, often without consent, and are creating social media profiles for others online. Prior scholarly work in philosophy and law has primarily addressed the privacy of children from third parties, usually commercial entities, and in the context of making medical decisions. Less attention has been directed at exploring a more general right of privacy of one family member against parents, siblings, children, or spouses. In this article, we do just that. We consider several moral rules that determine appropriate privacy boundaries within the family. More specifically, we will consider when overt or covert surveillance of a child, spouse, or partner by an adult family member is morally permitted. (shrink)

In order to be held responsible, it is not enough that you’ve done something blameworthy, someone else must also have the standing to hold you responsible. But a number of critics have claimed that this concept of ‘standing’ doesn’t hold up to scrutiny and that we should excise it from our analyses of accountability practices. In this paper, I examine James Edwards’ (2019) attempt to define standing. I pose objections to some key features of Edwards’ account and defend an alternative. (...) Reflecting on examples of meddling blame and privacy norms, I argue, helps us see that the concept of standing is useful after all. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Dimensions of Privacy Theories of Privacy Liberty and Decisional Privacy Justifying a Right to Informational Privacy Secrecy and Authority Note References.

Pervasive, easy-to-use privacy services are keys to enabling users to maintain control of their private data in the online environment. This paper proposes (1) an online privacy lifecycle from the user perspective that drives and categorizes the development of these services, (2) a layered platform design solution for online privacy, (3) the evolution of the PeCAN (Personal Context Agent Networking) architecture to a platform for pervasively providing multiple contexts for user privacy preferences and online informational (...) class='Hi'>privacy services, and (4) use of platform network effects for increasing wide-scale user adoption of privacy services. One implication of this paper’s concepts is that platform-mediated networks, which are reportedly the vehicles for most of the revenue earned by 60 of the world’s largest companies, and other platforms that commonly host millions of users, will not have to individually reinvent and manage sophisticated user services for privacy protection since universal privacy platforms can be layered on them in future. (shrink)