20세기 초 등장한 상대성 이론은 혁신적인 물리학 이론으로서, 물리학의 발전뿐만 아 니라 철학적 사유의 발전을 그 배경으로 삼고 있다. 실제로 뉴턴이 17세기 말 고전역학을 제시한 이후 시간과 공간의 본성에 관한 철학적 문제가 본격적으로 제기되었다. 흄은 시 간과 공간에 대해 인간의 지각에 기초한 경험주의적인 해석을, 칸트는 시간과 공간이 외 부 세계에 존재하는 실체가 아니라 인간의 감각 경험을 가능하게 하는 일종의 인식 형식 이라는 해석을 제시했다. 19세기 전반기에 발견되어 체계적으로 개발된 비유클리드 기하 학은 시간과 공간의 본성에 대한 인간의 이해에 중요한 변화를 가져왔다. (...) 리만과 헬름홀 츠는 기하학의 기초가 되는 가정들이 칸트가 말하는 선험적 종합 명제가 아닌 일종의 경 험적 가설들이며, 물리 세계에 적용되는 기하학의 핵심에는 길이 단위를 측정하는 도구 가 공간 속을 이동하면서 보이는 행태에 대한 가설이 놓여 있다고 보았다. 푸앵카레는 리 만과 헬름홀츠가 제시한 논의의 연장선상에서, 물리학에서 사용되는 기하학과 물리학의 가장 기초적인 법칙들은 필연적 법칙도 아니고 경험적 사실도 아닌 일종의 규약이라는 관점을 제시했다. 마흐는 뉴턴이 제시한 절대적 시간 및 공간 개념을 경험주의적 관점에 서 강하게 비판하고 관계론적 관점에 기반하여 뉴턴에 대항하는 사고 실험을 제시함으로 써, 향후 경험적 사실들에 기초한 관계론적 물리학이 발전할 수 있는 방향을 제시했다. 아인슈타인의 상대성 이론은 전자기학의 발달 및 전자기적 관점과 역학적 관점 사이의 모순이라는 물리학적 맥락뿐만 아니라, 이상과 같은 시간과 공간에 관한 철학적 논의의 맥락 속에서 등장할 수 있었던 물리학 이론이었다. 따라서 상대성 이론의 철학적 의의를 이해하기 위해서는 이상과 같은 이 이론의 철학적 배경을 정확하게 점검할 필요가 있다. (shrink)

The present article first places Mach’s consideration about space and geometry into the context of the discussion of these issues in the nineteenth and early twentieth century and then proposes three interpretations of Mach’s thesis, put forward in chapter XXI of his Knowledge and Error, that the problem of measuring the volumes of material bodies is the origin of geometry. According to the first of these interpretations, Mach’s thesis is an assertion about the historical origin of the (...) science of geometry. Alternatively, one may understand Mach as suggesting that our geometric theorizing is best understood by relating it to our handling of material bodies and our interest in their volumes. Finally, Mach’s thesis may be conceived as asserting that the most appropriate form of geometry would be a metric geometry of the volumes of solids. The article concludes with a discussion of objections raised by Brentano against both Mach’s thesis of the priority of the measurement of volumes and his conception of bodies as complexes as sensations. (shrink)

Ernst Mach, philosopher, physicist, historian, and physiological-psychologist, presented a bio-psychological model of nature. Although within the community of philosophers Mach has been primarily seen as a physicist who took interest in philosophical questions about the foundations of physics, this thesis places Mach with the context of nineteenth-century evolutionary theory and psychology and sees his views on physics as being largely derivative of his bio-psychology. ;For Mach, nature was a unified whole under the inner direction of evolutionary processes. Evolution produced humans, (...) and humans, still under naturalistic influences, have produced science. Science, then, is deeply part of the natural world, both in its origination and its current practice. Mach can thus be seen as a deep evolutionary naturalist. ;This evolutionary perspective is integrated with psychology. Mach's research in psychology led him to see perception as fundamentally the comparison of contrasts. In fact, evolution, perception, and cognition all followed this model. Furthermore, since science is based upon the act of making measurements, and since measurement is at root the comparison of something to a given standard, all measurement inherently involves psychological comparison. Our knowledge of the world, then, cannot escape the psychological boundaries which constitute it. ;After tracing out Mach's views in bio-psychology, Mach's applications of this to physics are examined. In particular, his famous critique of Newtonian space and time which inspired Einstein can now be seen as partly arising out of the tradition of bio-psychology, and thus a path can be traced from the nineteenth century life sciences to the revolution in twentieth century physics. (shrink)

Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung. Von E. MACH Emer. Professor an der Unlversltlt Wlen. LEIPZIG Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth 1905. INTRODUCTION XIII On a number of occasions Mach expressed the sentiment, especially in his correspondence, that America was the land of intellectual freedom and opportunity, the coming frontier for a new radical empiricism that would help to wash metaphysics out of philosophy. In 1901 he sponsored the German edition of Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1881) (...) 2 by J. B. Stallo, Cincinnati lawyer and philosopher. Mach warmly endorsed Stallo's book because his scientific aims so closely approximated his own, and because Stallo rejected the latent metaphysical elements and concealed ontological assumptions of the mechanical-atomistic inter­ pretation of the world. The second edition of Wiirmelehre was dedicated to Stallo in 1900. The fourth edition of Populiir-wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen (1910), containing seven new essays, was dedicated to Harvard Professor of physiology, philosophY, and psychology, William James. Mach had a strong intellectual affinity for James' pragmatism because, like himself, he recognized that James had come to radically empirical views from science. Both men took pure pre-conceptualized experience, from which the mental and physical predicates of experience are composed, to be neutral rather than real, unreal, objective or subjective. (shrink)

We argue that the fundamental assertion underlying Mach's critique of Newton's first law is that inertial motion is not motion in the absence of causes; rather, it is motion whose cause lies in some homogeneous aspect of the environment. We distinguish this formal requirement (Mach's principle) from two hypotheses which Mach considers concerning the origin of inertia: that the distant stars play (1) a merely “collateral” or (2) a “fundamental” role in the causal determination of inertial motion. -/- In his (...) later writings, Mach deliberately avoids referring to the concept of causation, and indeed, this has made the interpretation of Mach's principle a subject of widespread controversy. However, in his earlier writings, the substance of Mach's critique is less ambiguously expressed. Therefore, close attention is given to Mach's early writings and the evolution of his thought. Various accounts in the secondary literature on Mach's principle, in particular those of Norton and DiSalle, are assessed on this basis. We end with a defence of the Machian status and legitimacy of the early Einstein's research program. (shrink)

Born in 1838, Mach was a pioneer in the field of physics, having even made an impression on Einstein in his younger life who credited him with being the "Philosophical forerunner of relativity theory." His name is also associated with the speed of sound (as in traveling at Mach "insert-number-here") as well as the Doppler effect. Throughout his career, he was particularly interested in the biological and sensory relationship to physics and science, and naturally, this interest expanded to that of (...) the world of psychological perception and physiological psychology as well as philosophy. The Analysis of Sensations is about just that, the nature of the relationship of physics and the physical sciences to psychological phenomena of sense and perception. It's a fascinating read for anyone looking to expand their knowledge of how the two sides of the same coin meld harmoniously. (shrink)

xi should hope for "first and foremost" from any historical investigation, including his own, was that "it may not be too tedious. " II That hope is generally realized in Mach's historical writings, most of which are as lively and interesting now as they were when they appeared. Mach did not follow any existing model of historical or philosophical or scientific exposition, but went at things his own way combining the various approaches as needed to reach the goals he set (...) for himself. When he is at his best we get a sense of the Mach whom William James met on a visit to Prague, the Mach whose four hours of "unforgettable conversation" gave the forty year old, well traveled James the strongest "impression of pure intellectual genius" he had yet received, and whose "absolute simplicity of manner and winningness of smile" captivated him completely. 12 Consider, for example, the first few chapters of this book, Principles of the Theory of Heat, which Mach devotes to the notion of temperature, that most fundamental of all thermal concepts. He begins by trying to trace the path that leads from our sensations of hot and cold to a numerical temperature scale. (shrink)

Mach's principle is discussed as a fundamental statement on kinematics, and an apparent contradiction is identified in the Lorentz-Minkowski form of the inertial metric. To resolve the incompatibility, length is redefined so that the speed of light is a field-dependent variable, although still constant for all inertial observers at a point in space-time. Gravitational theories with variableG are considered, and it is shown that a redefinition of length and time results in constantG and variablec.

Two definitions of Mach’s principle are proposed. Both are related to gauge theory, are universal in scope and amount to formulations of causality that take into account the relational nature of position, time, and size. One of them leads directly to general relativity and may have relevance to the problem of creating a quantum theory of gravity.

A look at Mach's contributions to psychology in historical context and his elimination of metaphysical problems (in psychology).

Ernst Mach’s definition of the relationship between thoughts and facts is well known, but the question of how Mach conceived of their actual relationship has received much less attention. This paper aims to address this gap in light of Mary B. Hesse’s view of a postempiricist approach to natural science. As this paper will show, this view is characterized by a constructivist conception of the relationship between theory and facts that seems to be consistent with Mach’s observations on (...) scientific knowledge. The paper first explores Hesse’s account of postempiricism and her project of a new epistemology. It then considers Ernst Mach’s conception of facts as the middle term of a triad of concepts that includes thoughts and elements as extreme terms. Finally, the paper will offer concluding remarks on Mach’s contribution to the debate on scientific realism and his attempt to redefine the notions of correspondence and objectivity in science. (shrink)

Recession of the galaxies indicates a repulsive force and suggests that Newton's formulation of gravitation is not complete. A possible modification is proposed, and this Neo-Newtonian equation allows a quantitative treatment of Mach's principle. It also limits the velocity of matter to c and gives a correct prediction for the perihelion of Mercury.

The relationGM=RC 2 is used as a definition ofG, withM andR defined by integrals of the energy-momentum and Einstein curvature tensors over a particular spacelike surface. Modified field equations then do not admit source-free solutions, in agreement with a strong form of Mach's principle.

According to a common belief concerning the Mach-Boltzmann debate on atoms, the new experiments performed in microphysics at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries confirmed Boltzmann’s atomic hypothesis and disproved Mach’s anti-atomic view. This paper intends to show that this belief is partially unjustified. Mach’s view on atoms consists in fact of different kinds of arguments. While the new experiments in microphysics refute indeed his scientific arguments against the atomic hypothesis, his epistemological arguments are unaffected. In (...) this regard, Mach’s epistemological approach remains relevant for today’s discussion on the status of the notion of atom. (shrink)

The father of neutral monism, Ernst Mach, argued that the fundamental constituents of the world are neither mental nor physical and that the distinction between the mental and physical ought to be erased. This article offers a reconstruction of Mach’s view. There is a “pure drive for knowledge” (reiner Erkenntnistrieb), and satisfying it, Mach argues, requires abandoning the mental/physical distinction. The reconstruction given will help to articulate and assess the differences between Mach’s position and Russell’s neutral monism, in (...) which the distinction between the mental and physical is preserved even in the unified science of the future. (shrink)

Here are presented the essential features of what Mach considered the four important types or ideas of space and time. These are referred to as ‘perceptual,’ ‘geometrical,’ ‘physical space and time’ and ‘mathematical manifolds.’ Although the first is foundational, we consider how in Mach’s view each further type is in a sense a more general abstraction, freed from particular limiting characteristics of the preceding type. What is most significant is his view of the fourth, in which the most fundamental (...) and essential feature of space is as a relation of immediacy and of time as a relation of mediacy. Some of the important implications of this are discussed, along with suggestions regarding their possible relevance to contemporary physics. (shrink)

Mach repudiated Newton's argument for absolute time. He denied there is such a thing as time itself that exists independently of any external change. In doing so, Mach failed to appreciate Newton's scientific practice. Absolute time is intrinsically related to Newton's laws of motion and the method of fluxions. Commentators have noted similarities between Mach's rejection of Newtonian time and his rejection of the independent existence of atoms. In this article, it shall be argued that the juxtaposition of absolute time (...) and the atomic theory is unsound. Mach had good reasons to question the existence of substantial time, and he went on to provide an alternative, ontologically relational account. Whereas his dismissal of atoms can be seen as a questionable form of “phenomenalism” or “positivism,” this is not the case regarding his position on time. (shrink)

A modified form of Mach's principle is proposed, and its consequences are discussed.

Traduction de l’article de Ernst Mach, « Die Leitgedanken meiner naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnislehre und ihre Aufnahme durch die Zeitgenossen » [Les idées directrices de ma théorie scientifique de la connaissance et leur réception par mes contemporains], paru dans Scientia, 7 (1910), p. 225–240. Dans la première partie du texte, Mach expose sa théorie économico-biologique de la connaissance en en retraçant la genèse, des premières années de sa formation intellectuelle jusqu’à la rédaction de ses derniers ouvrages. Il indique également les points de (...) rapprochement possibles avec les doctrines de certains physiciens, mais aussi avec celles de philosophes dont il s’estime particulièrement proche. Dans la seconde partie du texte, Mach répond point par point à la polémique amorcée par Planck et donne ainsi une image plus complexe de sa pensée, loin du dogmatisme que l’on associe ordinairement au positivisme. (shrink)

Li Zehou belongs to the most important contemporary Chinese philosophers. This paper presents a critical introduction of his theory regarding the consolidation of the specific Confucian system of kinship relations, which for him forms a crucial foundation of traditional Chinese social order. In Confucianism, the inter-familial relations form a basis of the social system, in which interpersonal relations are of utmost importance and which Li therefore denotes as ‘relationalism’. Shamanistic ceremonies were enhancing and strengthening the awareness of such social (...) unities. These early collective rites, especially those that include music and dance, had a powerful effect on early humans, creating intense feelings of respect, love and loyalty, and thus forming a basis for the Confucian social order. Li’s theory of the shamanist origins of Confucian relationalism will be illuminated through the lens of current historical and anthropological scholarship on shamanist rituality and their function within the corresponding cultural orders. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Jean-Paul Sartre's theory of the imagination emerges out of a position on perception that is similar to modern naïve realism in that he seeks to add elements of what today is called “relationalism” to his phenomenological description of perceptual and imaginative experience. The problem is that it is not clear that relationalism can be added to the phenomenologist's intentional theory of consciousness in the way Sartre recommends. This paper takes an analytic approach (...) to understanding Sartre's theory of perception, traces his motivation in arguing that perception and imagination are sui generis mental activity and identifies the ways in which Sartre's attempt to add elements of relationalism to the Husserlian account of perception runs into trouble with hallucinatory experience. (shrink)

This paper discusses three research perspectives on political culture, civic culture and citizenship: the classic approach of Almond and Verba; contemporary analyses of citizenship referring to the book Civic Culture by Almond and Verba and oriented to the empirical description of social reality; and theoretical analyses of new relational sociology, oriented to the ontology and epistemology of social reality. The authors’ analysis leads to two conclusions. Firstly, it is necessary to combine these three approaches – relational social theory with empirical (...) analyses departing from methodological individualism. This requires conducting an empirical analysis, where the basic ‘analytical units’ – of collection, interpretation and generalization of data – are not separate but combined by relations and networks within which people act. Secondly, Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński’s statements are the best starting point for conducting such a new research programme. What is decisive is his systematic, theoretical interest in contemporary agency theories and relationality of citizenship, combined with innovative application of quantitative methods. (shrink)

Since his death in 1942, Robert Musil has come to be recognized as one of the most significant novelists of this century. His masterpiece, the monumental and unfinished Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, presents in its merciless mirror not only the decaying culture of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before the outbreak of the First World War, but also our own spiritual culture, perilously close to a far more complete destruction. One can only be grateful for this translation of the dissertation which the (...) young Musil, having left engineering for philosophy, wrote in Berlin, where he had become a student of the celebrated Carl Stumpf. A warning, however, is in order. Those expecting connections between the mature work of the novelist and this careful examination of the theories of Ernst Mach may well be disappointed. This is the rather academic work of a gifted, sober, and disciplined young philosopher, who is careful not to exceed the limits that he has set himself in this study: to provide an immanent critique of Mach's theories. (shrink)

This essay examines the physicist Ernst Mach’s popular work. Like many other scientists in late nineteenth-century Central Europe, he viewed the popular genre as a means not only of edifying the lay public but of communicating arguments to other specialists. In many cases, he used his popularizations to draw his colleagues’ attention to the biological and evolutionary features of scientific reasoning, although his own understanding of those features changed in the 1880s and early 1890s. Notably, he came to believe (...) that human beings instinctively read substances into nature. Several years after adopting this new perspective on substance, he incorporated it into a series of popular works that were intended to outline his views on thermodynamics in general and to weigh in on the controversy over “energetics” that erupted at the 1895 Versammlung Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärtze. (shrink)

In the present article, I compare Ernst Mach’s and Heinrich Gomperz’s contributions to the German-speaking positivist tradition by showing how, in trying to refound epistemology on the basis of one definite category of experiential element, namely, sensation and feeling, respectively, they each epitomized one major trend of Immanenzpositivismus. I demonstrate that, besides Mach’s “sensualist” conception of positivism – in light of which historians have tended thus far to interpret all German-speaking positivist research of that period – there also (...) existed an “affectivist” conception of positivism, which originated in Avenarius’s empiriocriticism and culminated in Gomperz’s pathempiricism. Here I aim to provide a new perspective on the history of positivism by highlighting the role played in it by psychological concerns. First, I revisit the notion of Immanenzpositivismus, the form of positivism that prevailed in both Germany and Austria between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: in addition to addressing the definition of this philosophical school of thought, I discuss the issue of “pure experience”, from which the positivists tried to reinterpret the foundations of knowledge. Second, I deal with Mach’s sensation-based approach to Immanenzpositivismus by commenting on his ontological and typological analysis of the constitutive elements of experience and emphasizing the fact that his concept of Empfindung is a relatively ill-defined notion in light of contemporary psychological standards. Moreover, I show that, despite his pretense of confining his epistemological developments to the analysis of sensations, Mach did not deny the involvement of feelings in epistemology, as clearly evidenced by some passages of Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Third, I analyze Gomperz’s feeling-based conception of Immanenzpositivismus, that is, pathempiricism, by highlighting how he strove to radically refound epistemology on the basis of the most recent advances of affective psychology. Focusing on the question of language sciences, I also discuss how he considered the role of feelings in the various forms of theoretical knowledge, the only field of investigation that he revisited in detail in his unfinished book, the Weltanschauungslehre. Fourth and last, I contrast Gomperz’s with Mach’s positivist model and argue that the former is more coherent and has a higher explanatory power than the latter. In conclusion, I insist on the importance of revisiting pathempiricism within the broader framework of affective epistemology. (shrink)

Ernst Mach was one of the great philosopher-scientists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He was among the first to deal systematically with the contribution that the history and philosophy of science can make to science education. His teaching was the occasion to unite pedagogical, psychological, philosophical and scientific concerns. His ideas on education are scattered throughout his books, textbooks and journal articles. However, there are three lectures where he explicitly addressed pedagogical issues. – ‘On Instruction in the (...) Classics and the Mathematico-Physical Sciences’, ‘On Instruction in Heat Theory’, and ‘On the Psychological and Logical Moment in Scientific Instruction’. As well as intellectual and practical interests in education, Mach had a notable Enlightenment-inspired political involvement in educational reform. Mach’s relative neglect by English-speaking science educators is unfortunate. (shrink)