The volume collects many of the most significant commentaries on, and contributions to, Protothetic. A Protothetic Bibliography is included.

This paper examines relations between reism, the metaphysical theory invented by Tadeusz Kotarbi?ski, and Le?niewski's calculus of names. It is shown that Kotarbi?ski's interpretation of common nouns as genuine names, i.e. names of things is essentially based on Le?niewski's logical ideas. It is pointed out that Le?niewskian semantics offers better prospects for nominalism than does semantics of the standard firstorder predicate calculus.

In this paper, we shall show that the following translation \(I^M\) from the propositional fragment \(\bf L_1\) of Leśniewski's ontology to modal logic \(\bf KTB\) is sound: for any formula \(\phi\) and \(\psi\) of \(\bf L_1\), it is defined as (M1) \(I^M(\phi \vee \psi) = I^M(\phi) \vee I^M(\psi)\), (M2) \(I^M(\neg \phi) = \neg I^M(\phi)\), (M3) \(I^M(\epsilon ab) = \Diamond p_a \supset p_a. \wedge. \Box p_a \supset \Box p_b.\wedge. \Diamond p_b \supset p_a\), where \(p_a\) and \(p_b\) are propositional variables corresponding to (...) the name variables \(a\) and \(b\), respectively. In the last, we shall give some comments including some open problems and my conjectures. (shrink)

Spacetime functionalism is the view that spacetime is a functional structure implemented by a more fundamental ontology. Lam and Wüthrich have recently argued that spacetime functionalism helps to solve the epistemological problem of empirical coherence in quantum gravity and suggested that it also (dis)solves the hard problem of spacetime, namely the problem of offering a picture consistent with the emergence of spacetime from a non-spatio-temporal structure. First, I will deny that spacetime functionalism solves the hard problem by showing that it (...) comes in various species, each entailing a different attitude towards, or answer to, the hard problem. Second, I will argue that the existence of an explanatory gap, which grounds the hard problem, has not been correctly taken into account in the literature. (shrink)

According to a historical claim oft-repeated by contemporary epistemologists, the ‘traditional’ conception of knowledge prevailed in Western philosophy prior to the publication in 1963 of Edmund’s Gettier’s famous three-page article ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’. On this conception, knowledge consists of justified true belief. In this article, I critically consider evidence for and against this historical claim, and conclude with a puzzle concerning its widespread acceptance.

I will introduce and motivate eliminativist super-relationism. This is the conjunction of relationism about spacetime and eliminativism about material objects. According to the view, the universe is a big collection of spatio-temporal relations and natural properties, and no substance (material or spatio-temporal) exists in it. The view is original since eliminativism about material objects, when understood as including not only ordinary objects like tables or chairs but also physical particles, is generally taken to imply substantivalism about spacetime: if properties are (...) directly instantiated by spacetime without the mediation of material objects, then, surely, spacetime has to be a substance. After introducing briefly the two debates about spacetime (§1) and material objects (§2), I will present Schaffer's super-substantivalism (§3), the conjunction of substantivalism about spacetime and eliminativism about material objects at the fundamental level. I shall then expose and discuss the assumption from which the implication from eliminativism to substantivalism is drawn, and discuss the compatibility of eliminativism with relationism: if spacetime is not a substance, and if material objects are not real, how are we to understand the instantiation of properties (§4)? And what are the relata of spatio-temporal relations (§5)? I then show that each argument in favor of super-substantivalism offered by Schaffer also holds for super-relationism (§6) and examine several metaphysical consequences of the view (§7). I conclude that both super-substantivalism and super-relationism are compatible with Schaffer's priority monism (§8). (shrink)

In a recent article, Ned Markosian gives an argument against four-dimensionalism understood as the view that time is one of four identical dimensions that constitute a single four-dimensional manifold. In this paper, I show that Markosian attacks a straw man as his argument targets a theory known to be false on empirical grounds. Four-dimensionalism rightly conceived in no way entails that time is identical to space. I then address two objections raised by Markosian against four-dimensionalism rightly conceived.

L'éthique des affaires est un sujet en vogue depuis quelques années, marquées aussi par l'apparition de nouvelles méthodes de management. Sans doute existe-t-il un phénomène de mode en ce sens, mais la tendance vers une éthique des affaires et un nouveau management plus humain semble durable, comme tente de le démontrer cet ouvrage, qui se veut un manifeste pour une éthique des affaires et du management au XXIe siècle. La première partie examine les contours de l'éthique des affaires et du (...) management, à travers une étude du sens des mots utilisés (particulièrement une minutieuse analyse de l'éthique), une recherche de ses finalités (la dignité de l'homme, le bien commun) et de ses organes. La seconde partie porte sur les atours de l'éthique des affaires et du management. D'abord dans le microcosme, c'est-à-dire entre partenaires, en dépeignant successivement les outils juridiques (la bonne foi, la cause, la transparence, etc.), les sujets (avec notamment d'importantes considérations sur le management des entreprises dans la lumière de la dignité du salarié) et le moment (dont les pourparlers, conduisant à traiter de la corruption). Ensuite dans le macrocosme, en visant par là les rapports entre tous les intervenants du monde des affaires (non partenaires), que ce soit entre concurrents, envers les non-concurrents, ou enfin envers les pays en voie de développement (donnant lieu à une analyse et à une présentation de perspectives). Ce livre est un essai multidirectionnel, comportant des ouvertures dans des domaines les plus variés, aux vues personnelles bien qu'appuyées par d'innombrables travaux récents dans des disciplines diverses. S'il constitue une réflexion théorique sur un vaste secteur de l'activité humaine, il a aussi une visée pratique. Fondé sur des convictions, il s'achève par une note optimiste. Son auteur s'est efforcé à la plus grande clarté, tout en restant fidèle à la rigueur des juristes. (shrink)

Does chemistry reduce to physics? If this means ‘Can we derive the laws of chemistry from the laws of physics?’, recent discussions suggest that the answer is ‘no’. But sup posing that kind of reduction—‘epistemological reduction’—to be impossible, the thesis of ontological reduction may still be true: that chemical properties are determined by more fundamental properties. However, even this thesis is threatened by some objections to the physicalist programme in the philosophy of mind, objections that generalize to the chemical case. (...) Two objections are discussed: that physicalism is vacuous, and that nothing grounds the asymmetry of dependence which reductionism requires. Although it might seem rather surprising that the philosophy of chemistry is affected by shock waves from debates in the philosophy of mind, these objections show that there is an argumentative gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical connection linking chemical properties with properties at the sub-atomic level, and, on the other, the philosophical thesis of ontological reduction. The aim of this paper is to identify the missing premises (among them a theory of physical possibility) that would bridge this gap. Introduction: missing elements and the mystery of discreteness The refutation of physicalism A combinatorial theory of physical possibilia Combinatorialism and the Bohr model Objections The missing premises and a disanalogy with mind. (shrink)

Annoncer une mauvaise nouvelle, décider d'un arrêt de traitement, tenter une opération risquée, réanimer un patient suicidaire... les dilemmes moraux ne sont pas rares en médecine. Les problèmes éthiques ont néanmoins revêtu une acuité particulière de nos jours du fait des progrès techniques, du coût des thérapeutiques innovantes, de l'évolution des moeurs, du vieillissement de la population. Cette nouvelle conjoncture conduit peu à peu à changer les façons d'exercer la médecine. Une culture du partage s'instaure avec les soignants, le monde (...) associatif ou les sciences humaines et sociales. La philosophie morale se trouve également mise à contribution. Car pour être une démarche rigoureuse, l'éthique biomédicale ne doit pas se réduire à un échange d'opinions informelles et spontanées. Elle doit se nourrir de la connaissance des travaux des philosophes d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. A cette fin, le présent ouvrage propose aux professionnels de santé, ainsi qu'à tous ceux qui sont concernés par leurs décisions, de découvrir les grands principes et les principales théories de la philosophie morale. De l'éthique des vertus au contractualisme moral, en passant par le probabilisme, le déontologisme, l'utilitarisme, le libertarisme, l'éthique de la sollicitude ou l'éthique narrative, l'histoire de l'éthique est riche en ressources. Chaque théorie morale apporte un éclairage nouveau et fournit des repères, tant pour l'élucidation des problèmes d'éthique au quotidien que pour la compréhension des débats de société autour de la bioéthique. (shrink)

Consider the agnostic who thinks that reason and evidence are neutral on the question of God’s existence, and as a result neither believes that God exists nor believes that God does not exist. Can such an agnostic live a genuinely religious life – even one in which God is the central animating idea? They might do so by accepting Pascal’s Wager: the expected rewards will always be greater if one bets on God’s existence than if one does not. Or they (...) might accept William James’s argument that religious beliefs are properly activated by our passional nature. But both of these routes involve abandoning the initial agnosticism, and so are open to charges of irrationality. In this paper I explore a third route to the religious life, suggested by Pascal’s discussion, one which uses fiction and make-believe as the central prop. It might seem that this too entails abandoning agnosticism in favour of the view that religion just is fiction. I suggest, however, that there is a phenomenon which I term “serious make-believe” in which one can remain agnostic about whether the object of make-believe is real or a useful fiction. Applied to religion, the result is a religious life that is both genuinely engaged and yet, by remaining agnostic, cannot be accused of irrationality. (shrink)

Many amateur sportsmen in the West, have today started undertaking long and intensive ordeals where their personal capacity to withstand increasing suffering is the prime objective. Running, jogging, the triathlon and trekking are the sorts of ordeal where people without any particular ability are not pitting themselves against others but are committed to testing their own capacity to withstand increasing pain. Constantly called upon to prove themselves in a society where reference points are both countless and contradictory and where values (...) are in crisis, people are now seeking a one-to-one relationship by redical means, testing their strength of character, their courage and their personal resources. Going right on to the end of a self-imposed ordeal gives a legitimacy to life and provides a symbolic plank that supports them. Performance itself is of secondary significance; it has a value only to the individual. There is no struggle against a third party, only a method for reinforcing personal will-power and over-coming suffering by going right to the limit of a personally imposed demand. The physical limit has come to replace the moral limit that present-day society is failing to provide. Overcoming suffering tempers the individual, providing a renewed significance and value to his life. (shrink)