A Solution to the Cable Guy Paradox

Erkenntnis 71 (3):355-359 (2009)
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Abstract

The Cable Guy will definitely come between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and I can bet on one of two possibilities: that he will arrive between 8 and 12, or between 12 and 4. Since I have no more information, it seems (eminently) plausible to suppose the two bets are equally attractive. Yet Hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval is, initial appearances to the contrary, more choice-worthy. In this paper, I rebut the argument.

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2009-08-22

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Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University

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References found in this work

Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
Belief and the will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 235-256.
Two principles of bayesian epistemology.William Talbott - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.
The Cable Guy paradox.A. Hajek - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):112-119.

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