Metaphysics

This is the first edited volume to be dedicated exclusively to the philosophy of Susan Stebbing (1885–1943)—a pivotal figure in early analytic philosophy and Britain’s first female professor of philosophy who has, until recently, been unjustly neglected. This volume collects eleven new essays that explore various elements of Stebbing’s prolific output. The volume and its contributors aim to reinstate Stebbing’s place in the analytic tradition by examining her ideas in context and elucidating their significance.

This paper considers the prospects for a green Kantian philosophy. It does so by revisiting Steven Vogel’s postnaturalist objections against Kant. Though Descartes is part of the story, Kant is a primary environmental obstacle for Vogel. Like others in environmental philosophy, Vogel criticizes Kant for his dualism, anthropocentrism, idealism, and nonconsequentialism. The present paper looks into the first two objections. It begins by reconstructing Vogel’s argument against “nature” to appreciate his claim that modern philosophy haunts contemporary environmental philosophy. After pointing (...) out difficulties with Vogel’s objections, resources in Kant are explored to assuage Vogel’s concerns regarding noumena and non-human animals. The paper concludes with a glimpse of an alternate interpretation of Kant that has the potential to respond to the remaining worries of idealism and nonconsequentialism. (shrink)

Circular sets are said to provide clear-cut cases of circular orders of ontological dependence. I argue that this claim is unwarranted given the epistemic parity of two principles of set-dependence.

Understanding Mental Causation proposes a new, non-relational theory of mental causation. Andrea White believes that contemporary philosophy of mind labours under a misapprehension of what mental causation is supposed to be. This volume explains where the leading theories go astray, and how the new theory proposed solves critical problems for philosophers of mind and action. Ordinary experience suggests that what we do with our bodies causally depends, somehow, on what is going on in our minds. However, the problem of how (...) to understand the causal relationship between mind and body remains. Contemporary philosophy of mind is shaped by the question: how is it possible for the mental to causally interact with the physical? Mental causation is often presented as a cause-effect relation between mental and physical entities. This understanding of mental causation is widely endorsed because it seems like a straightforward explanation of what is going on when people act intentionally. Desires and beliefs are seen as causes of the actions they explain, entailing the existence of causal relations between mental items and physical events. White calls this the 'causalist' view of intentional action. This view is not universally accepted. The 'non-causalist' view denies that intentional action entails the existence of causal relations between mental items and physical events. However, non-causalists reach this conclusion by arguing that explanations of intentional actions which cite beliefs or desires are not usually causal explanations at all. White presents a theory of intentional action that falls between the 'causalist' and 'non-causalist' views. She rejects the idea that as-a-cause is how we should understand the place of mentality in intentional action. Concepts like belief, desire and intention do not refer to items which can stand in causal relations to actions or physical events. However, like causalists, she holds that explanations of intentional actions which cite the agent's thoughts do give causal information. This intermediary view demands a new theory about the causation that is on display when human beings act intentionally, one that does not reduce mental causation to a relation between mental items and physical events. Orthodox theories of causation, inspired by David Hume, assume that causation is always a relation between events. Therefore, the causation demonstrated in intentional action must be a relation, because all causation is, and will count as mental causation if and only if at least one of the terms of that relation is a mental entity. White challenges this orthodoxy by presenting her own non-relational theory of causation. Denying causation is always a relation, she holds instead that causation is a general type of process in which substances engage and that exercising a causal power is to engage in a process. White shows how this novel theory can be used to provide a better understanding of intentional action and the mental causation associated with it. She suggests that to act intentionally is to engage in a process and, as such, to exercise a power - but a power of a special sort. The power to act intentionally is a power to structure one's own activities so that they demonstrate a pattern - a pattern which is only revealed by attributing mental states to the agent. So, when an agent acts intentionally, they engage in the process of mental causation because the agent is manifesting a special power to organise their activities into a pattern that can be made sense of by appeal to mental concepts. Broadening our understanding of causation, and more specifically incorporating the concepts 'power' and 'process', opens up new ways of understanding intentional action and mental causation. In Understanding Mental Causation, White presents a compelling new account in this key area of philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Catalan translation and notes on George Berkeley’s A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Published in Berkeley, George. Tractat sobre els principis del coneixement humà. Almería (Spain): Círculo Rojo, November 2019 (ISBN: 978–84–1338–476–4).

The author is leading a 'working group' as part of the 'Science, Technoscience and faith at a time of integral ecology' chair, which is considering possible convergences between Teilhard and Whitehead. He asks the question: can we find anything resembling fraternity in Whitehead's metaphysics?

Meta-quantum idealism (MQI) proposes a novel framework for understanding the fundamental nature of reality. Rooted in the interplay of quantum field theory, geometry, and idealist metaphysics, MQI challenges traditional ontological assumptions by reimagining space, time, and matter as emergent phenomena arising from the dynamic self-modifications of an infinite quantum field. This paper articulates the foundational principles of MQI and explores its implications for physics, metaphysics, and mathematics.

This essay explores the recurring archetype of forbidden knowledge across ancient civilizations, myths, and speculative history, drawing connections between secret societies, religious texts, and cultural symbolism. Beginning with the concept of hidden oligarchies influencing humanity’s development, the analysis examines the notion of advanced groups—such as the biblical Watchers and Sumerian Anunnaki—who shared forbidden knowledge with humanity, often at great cost. The narrative delves into the parallels between Prometheus’s defiance in Greek mythology and the serpent’s role in the Edenic narrative, suggesting (...) that these stories may echo a deeper historical truth about humanity’s sudden leap in societal complexity. Further, the essay analyzes the Minoan serpent goddess and considers Eve as a potential historical figure deified over time. Ultimately, the essay reflects on the persistent theme of enlightenment and the consequences of seeking hidden truths, inviting readers to question who holds knowledge and what sacrifices are made in its pursuit. (shrink)

Many people consider Nietzsche to be a philosopher who is fundamentally anti-theoretical. According to Bernard Williams, Nietzsche is so far from being a theorist that his writing "is booby-trapped not only against recovering theory from it but, in many cases, against any systematic exegesis that assimilates it to theory." Many people would specifically relate this viewpoint to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. They would contend that his arguments lack the structure and substance of ethical theory, even when he is making positive normative (...) assertions rather than merely criticizing accepted morality. In my opinion, this widely held belief is the antithesis of illuminating. In my opinion, Nietzsche's positive moral beliefs are uncontroversial since they come under the broad category of what is now known as perfectionism. They are based on an idea of the good that they praise actions for bringing about or advancing, but this idea does not associate the good with pleasure or the fulfillment of desires; rather, it locates the good in objective human excellences that, according to Nietzsche, are centered on the ideas of strength and power. Perfectionism can be constructed as a systematic theory, just like other moral beliefs, and when it is, several issues regarding its composition and structure come up. When reading Nietzsche with these problems in mind, it is remarkable how frequently he offers solutions to them without stating them directly. Combining those responses yields a perfectionist philosophy with a distinctly Nietzschean undertone. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hegel, Marx, Bradley, Brentano, Rashdall, and Moore are just a few of the thinkers who have embraced perfectionism. Before Brentano, for example, Nietzsche was, in my opinion, the most theoretical perfectionist; that is, he was more prone to identify and respond to theoretical queries. There is also a distinctive worth to his responses. Moral philosophers and philosophers are often tempted to sidestep challenging theoretical issues by asserting positive facts about the universe that allow for the compatibility of opposing solutions. Nietzsche is known for rejecting such hopeful assertions and demanding that the issues be addressed head-on. He does this, for instance, when he disputes the idea that the ideas that are most beneficial to us are also the most likely to be accurate, as well as numerous times throughout his presentation of perfectionism. The end effect is a rendition of the perspective that particularly highlights its unique characteristics and hazards. This paper will examine three facets of Nietzsche's perfectionism: his most basic explanation of human perfection, the moral framework he uses to support it, and the more particular human states he uses to define perfection. (shrink)

The study has focused on the views of Fārābī regarding the essence and foundations of the two concepts of "political philosophy" and "political jurisprudence". By elucidating and then analyzing the opinions of Fārābī, it has sought to answer the question of whether "political philosophy and political jurisprudence in Farabi's philosophy are the same". By examining what Fārābī has discussed in his works Kitāb al-Millah, Siāsat al-Madania, and Al-Madinah Fāzel'a regarding political philosophy and political jurisprudence, it can be understood that both (...) concepts exist in Fārābī's civil philosophy, and even their theoretical foundation is present in his theoretical wisdom. However, it should be noted that it is not possible to consider the essence of these two to be the same, but in terms of the foundations that include the foundations and the purpose, these two concepts can be considered as two parts of a single whole. The foundation and purpose of Fārābī's political philosophy and political jurisprudence, since they are part of the civil philosophy of Fārābī, is the same as the foundations and purpose of civil wisdom. The distinguishing feature of Fārābī's philosophical school with other philosophical schools is his emphasis on happiness, and this key concept is the foundations and purpose of civil wisdom first and then political philosophy and political jurisprudence. (shrink)

Reconciling the many “faces” of Peirce – the Scientist, Philosopher, and Metaphysician - helps to make sense of the open-endedness and versatility of semiotics. Semiosis, for Peirce, knows no rigid hermeneutic or disciplinary bounds. It thus forces us to be open to interdisciplinary and holistic inquiries. The pragmatic maxim sets limits on metaphysical speculation, but it also legitimates the extension of the experimentalist method into cosmological, metaphysical, and even religious domains. Although Peirce's religious speculations are ultimately unsatisfactory, understanding why Peirce (...) expanded his thinking to such domains reveals the expansionist logic of Peircean semiotics beyond the mere idiosyncracies of the man. The triadic, dynamic logic of pragmatist inquiry seeks to expand to all social processes of fixing belief and forming habits, however quixotic; but it remains dubious whether such expansion can fully comport to the scientific, experimentalist method that Peirce preferred. (shrink)

Whitehead's project comes out as a cosmology from the writings that were published until recently, before the availability of the course notes at Harvard. It also comes out as a meditation on cosmic solidarity, beyond the breakdown of syntheses around their submission to “perpetual perishing.” Whitehead always maintained that his philosophy was a “philosophy of organism.” The ethical aspects and the connections that are possible between Whitehead's philosophy and an environmental issues context, with the science of ecology being the best (...) symbol of a science once referred to as “postmodern”, are sent to the background when one understands how Whitehead's system is centered around satisfaction, and how this involves every entity finding its right balance in a universe of divine satisfaction. I rely on these to question and even challenge the idea that, at least in the lectures of HL1, Whitehead would have undergone a "biological" turn. Crucial to this is the very notion of an organism. I reread D. Sölch’s essay chapter from Whitehead at Harvard 1924-25, built on the references to HL1, in order to attempt to show that, for all his speaking of a “biological” age, and his relations to Henderson or Haldane, Whitehead never had a biological turn, in particular due to the cosmological orientation of his effort. (shrink)

I am Me and not someone else. This might just be a spur of the moment type of statement; however, it weighs more than it seems. Moreover, it delves into an individual’s understanding of the self-amidst different factors revolving one’s identity. Personal identity can be deemed as a puzzle of distinct characteristics, experiences, understanding, and values in which when put together define who a person is. It involves different aspects in life such as self-perception, cultural background, beliefs, traditions, and even (...) societal roles, which contribute bit by bit on how individuals view themselves and are perceived by others. Identity and sameness over time are related to one another. Understanding sameness over time—how a person remains essentially “the same” amidst changes in physical appearance, experiences and, or beliefs—remains significant as it helps maintain a rational sense of the self. The continuity of the interplay of changes in different aspects of an individual’s self is essential in fostering self-awareness, personal growth, and formation of stable relationship among others. This also underpins moral and legal accountability to ensure that individuals are treated as themselves throughout time. What constitutes the “self” that remains the same person over time, despite changes in experiences, physical form, and beliefs? This paper aims to explore major theories of identity and argue for the most coherent view or propose an integrated approach. (shrink)

प्रस्तावित शोध-पत्र सत् या निरपेक्ष तथा आभास या जगत संबंधित अवधारणा की शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले के परिप्रेक्ष्य में दार्शनिक विवेचना है। इस शोध-पत्र का प्रमुख उद्देश्य भारतीय एवं पाश्चात्य दार्शनिक जगत के प्रख्यात विद्वानों विशेषतः शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले के सत् एवं आभास संबंधी विचारों में समाविष्ट समानताओं एवं विषमताओं का व्यापक रूप से विश्लेषण प्रस्तुत करना है। इस कारण शोध-पत्र के अंतर्गत सर्वप्रथम, यह प्रदर्शित किया गया है कि क्यों उक्त दोनों दार्शनिकों के संदर्भ में ही सत् एवं आभास की (...) अवधारणा का विवेचन किया गया है। द्वितीयतः, शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले दोनों के सत् या निरपेक्ष संबंधी विचारों की गवेषणा की गई है। तृतीयतः, उक्त दोनों दार्शनिकों के दर्शन में व्याप्त सत् एवं आभास के स्वरूप को विवेचित करते हुए समीक्षात्मक अध्ययन किया गया है और तदुपरांत, अंत में उपर्युक्त सभी पक्षों का गहन मूल्यांकन करते हुए निष्कर्ष को प्रस्तुत करने का प्रयत्न किया गया है।. (shrink)

When examining the relationship of Ricoeur’s philosophy to the field of ontology and metaphysics, a text entitled “Discourse, Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Self” may attract attention as it provides useful and meaningful insights. This text is a reworking of a better-known text, “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993), but remains different by focusing on analyses relating to an ontology and metaphysics of human action and agency, and considers the speculative structure of a hermeneutics of the self constituted since (...) Oneself as Another (1990). Originating from a conference held at the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela (Spain) in 1993 and 1995, this text was first published in 1998 in the proceedings of that conference; the present version aims at making it accessible again and improving its editorial form. (shrink)

When examining the relationship of Ricoeur’s philosophy to the field of ontology and metaphysics, a text entitled “Discourse, Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Self” may attract attention as it provides useful and meaningful insights. This text is a reworking of a better-known text, “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993), but remains different by focusing on analyses relating to an ontology and metaphysics of human action and agency, and considers the speculative structure of a hermeneutics of the self constituted since (...) Oneself as Another (1990). Originating from a conference held at the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela (Spain) in 1993 and 1995, this text was first published in 1998 in the proceedings of that conference; the present version aims at making it accessible again and improving its editorial form. (shrink)