Father Andrew White, a leading Jesuit and esteemed promoter of the Maryland colony, kept a journal of his voyage to Maryland, which was subsequently published as Relatio Iteneris in Marylandiam. White also composed Declaratio Coloniae Domini Baronis de Balltimore, a document that masterfully marketed the colonial venture to lay English Catholics. The Relatio is an engaging account of the voyage to and initial settlement of Maryland; the Declaratio is a promotional tract written to ensure the successful creation of the new (...) colony. Together the documents promoted the enterprise to the Jesuit Order, but also provide valuable economic, religious, and legal data about English Catholics. White’s promotion of the colony to the Jesuit Order and the elite British Catholic community reveals underlying patterns of religious and material consumption. Interactions between British Catholics, the Jesuit Order, and non-Catholics both in England and in the Americas form a secondary focus in order to contextualize the English Catholic experience in the Early Modern Atlantic. The analysis of White’s texts exposes the means by which English Catholic identity was constructed in the trans-Atlantic world during the seventeenth century and elucidates the schisms within the English Catholic community that ultimately led to the loss of Catholic power and religious liberty in Maryland. (shrink)

The processes of computation and automation that produce digitized objects have displaced the concept of an image once conceived through optical devices such as a photographic plate or a camera mirror that were invented to accommodate the human eye. Computational images exist as information within networks mediated by machines. They are increasingly less about what art history understands as representation or photography considers indexing and more an operational product of data processing. Through genealogical, theoretical, and practice-based investigation, this dissertation project (...) traces a lineage of computation through images from early cybernetics to contemporary machine learning under algorithmic capitalist conditions of political economy. Objects include mundane examples such as smartphone cameras to sublime examples such as the imaging of black holes. It articulates new conditions and forms of perception and surveillance that result from contemporary technological development in computation. The project builds on theorists of computational media such as Friedrich Kittler, Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Jussi Parikka, Shane Denson, and Alexander Galloway to examine the interplay between perception, computation, and epistemology. Further theoretical contribution builds on the work of Luciana Parisi and Jacques Ranciére’s articulation of aesthetics, and Michel Foucault’s gesture towards a heterotopia. Finally, it draws from Donna Haraway’s metaphors of the cyborg and sympoiesis to frame the capacity of art to transfigure the limitations of digital network culture into new possibilities for being. Here, it curates practices by Danielle Brathwaite-Shirley, Harun Farocki, Morehshin Allahyari, and Pierre Huyghe. (shrink)

How did Mathematics arise? Who created it? Why is it subject to Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems? And what does all this have to do with Coleridge’s poem, “Kubla Khan”, and “The Person from Porlock”? Here is a complete mythology of Mathematics set in an epic poetry format, fusing thoughts and verses from Western religions and Eastern mysticism… Those with immense patience and careful reading shall reap the fruit… (best read on a large screen or in printed form).

According to a widely held view, mathematical proofs are essentially (indications of) formal derivations, and thus in principle mechanically checkable (this view is defended, for example, by Azzouni [3]). This should in particular hold for the kind of simple proof exercises typically given to students of mathematics learning to write proofs. If that is so, then automated proof checking should be an attractive option for math education at the undergraduate level. An opposing view would be that mathematical proofs are social (...) objects and that what constitutes a mathematical proof can thus not be separated from the social context in which it arises. In particular, such “sociomathematical norms” play a role in teaching situations, see, for example, Stephan [37]. There thus seems to be a tension between the inherent social nature of “natural” mathematical proofs and attempts at their automated verification. In this paper, we explore this tension both theoretically and on the basis of our experiences with developing the Diproche system, a program for the automated verification of natural language proofs in college-level introduction to proof classes (modelled after the example of the Naproche system by Cramer, Koepke et al. [14]) and its use at the Europa-Universität Flensburg during the winter term 2020/2021. (shrink)

This thesis evaluates claims of theft and plagiarism in AI art. It draws primarily on Goetze’s 2024 article “AI Art is Theft”. Here, I aim to examine and evaluate topics of theft and consent violations in AI art with specific attention to modern practices of training data management. A common complaint from working artists is that the developers behind products like Midjourney or DALL-E steal their art in the process of training the art generation models. However, as artists are left (...) with no less than before they commit the crime, it is difficult to pin down exactly where the theft occurs. Here, I explore several arguments for different ways AI commits some form of theft against artists, such as labor theft, plagiarism, and traditional heist. Ultimately, I conclude that modern practices in AI development do generally violate artists’ consent. However, I argue that distinctions are often more blurry than Goetze acknowledges. Additionally, I include other notions of theft that may help strengthen Goetze’s argument and help him reach his goal of defending artists. (shrink)

On one hand Auden appears the most cerebral of poets. It is said that when he arrived at school, aged eight, he professed himself excited to study the different psychological types, and the cryptic verse that was to emerge over a decade later bears the scars of his reading, psychological or otherwise, as clearly as the relentlessly analytical Dichtung und Wahrheit and other late works.Absorbing and repurposing philosophical, psychological, religious, and scientific works was an essential part of his artistic strategy, (...) and led to credible accusations of plagiarism on a number of occasions.And just as his collaborators and friends mocked the speed with which he integrated ideas— C. Day Lewis said the dogmas of one year were the heresies of the next—they also downplayed his access to the non-intellectual side of life. Robert Craft, for example, Stravinsky’s biographer and close friend, said the senses “seemed to be of negligible importance” to Auden, whose eating and drinking habits appeared barbaric next to the composer’s fastidious and urbane manners. To Craft he also seemed “purblind to painting,” and “more concerned with the virtues of gardening than with the beauty of flowers.”Such was the poet’s indifference to physical works of art that Anthony Hecht has speculated that Auden’s much-anthologized poem, “Musee des Beaux Arts,” was based on reading about the poem in an art guidebook rather than actually seeing it in person. At the same time, however, Auden became one of the staunchest defenders of the importance of the body, and the necessity of accounting for its existence in any philosophical or religious scheme. Not since Augustine has anyone written so consistently and vehemently against the Manicheans and their dualist conception of the cosmos, which Auden saw prefigured in Plato. These attacks puzzled contemporaries and commentators who, with some sense, wondered who identified as a Manichean in the twentieth century. Used to either the exalted magnification of the body in Lawrence or the scrupulous distaste of Eliot, Auden’s propensity to uncritically celebrate the mundane existence of the body only added to the notion that after his Christian conversion made him more accessible but less relevant. The poet who seemed to have retreated into himself intellectually, abandoning the rhetorically eccentric and politically flamboyant elements of his work in favor of a moderate, gently humorous tone best suited to the verse essay or personal ode, also seemed to have retreated physically into himself, exchanging trenchant diagnoses of “England, this country of ours where nobody is well” for the creature comforts of poems like “About the House” and “Talking to Myself. My thesis explores this change in Auden's work, and his developing conception of the body/mind relationship. (shrink)

Rage has a bad reputation. When we think of rage, we think of a hot, violent and all-consuming fury. That’s how philosophy sees rage, at least—philosophical tradition insists that anger comes attached with a desire of retaliation that seeks the pain of offenders in order to compensate for the pain that has been inflicted onto victims. For that reason, rage is, more often than not, discouraged in favor of forgiveness or any other more ‘positive’ emotion. Even in arguments that attempt (...) to redeem anger, such as those found in Myisha Cherry’s “The Case for Rage: Why Anger is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle,” anger’s redemption comes stipulations: for Cherry, anger must be instrumentally valuable to social movements. This thesis sees rage as more than both of these conceptualizations: rage is not revenge-centered nor does it need to assist a grander movement in order to be valuable—rage is valuable within itself. This thesis contends that rage is advantageous to the individual that feels it on the basis that it reveals and affirms hurt, restores dignity, and can prevent transgressions from recurring. This thesis does not just defend rage–it recommends it. (shrink)

American psychologist Carol Gilligan's work reveals that the socialization of women often emphasizes an ethics of care, which is largely overlooked in traditional theories of moral development that prioritize justice and universal moral principles. This gendered distinction in socialization not only enables women to develop a service-based identity—where their self-value is intertwined with serving others—but also exposes them to exploitation. Such identities risk subordinating personal needs to the needs of others, making individuals susceptible to neglecting their own legitimate interests. These (...) individuals have a service-based identity, as they value service to others so highly that their personal needs are often overlooked. Despite feminist advancements in recognizing and addressing these issues, like Jean Hampton's contract test, effective use of these tools requires a robust sense of self-worth and an understanding of one's legitimate interests as distinct from their service to others. Using Gilligan's three stages of moral development, this thesis contends that achieving a mature ethics of care, shielded from exploitation, demands a profound acknowledgment of individual legitimate interests; the proposed solutions emphasize fortifying one's psychological empowerment and transforming surrounding environments, enabling those with service-based identities to voice their needs within personal relationships and societal contexts, ultimately striving for an equilibrium that values the needs of oneself and others equitably. (shrink)

There is a wealth of philosophical literature on love. The two main camps of literature are descriptive and analytical. The former aims to best synthesize and describe how people manifest love in real life, while the latter takes the normative position of evaluating how people should be loving, which normally blends love with a hint of ethical or justice related principles. One hidden theme that underlies many of the debates on love is the relation to the lover’s self. As this (...) paper will gradually unfold, there are many self-interested reasons disguised behind the philosophical definition of love and the reason to fall in love and to sustain loving relationships. Beyond critiquing some of the overly self-centered descriptive definitions of love, this paper seeks to highlight the conflict between descriptive camp’s ego-leaning, and analytical camp’s ego-abstaining account of love. The conflict, at first sight, appears to render it impossible for a person to demonstrate both forms of love simultaneously. To address this challenge, this paper will explore three possible arguments supporting the compatibility of Buddhist love and personal love. Specifically, it will examine how prioritizing a select group of individuals can coexist with the commitment of practicing compassion for all. (shrink)

In her book, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice, Martha Nussbaum argues that anger is inherently flawed because it fundamentally contains the desire for payback. To support her argument, she posits specific metaphysical claims about the nature of emotions like anger. This thesis is an extended critique of her metaphysical foundation from the perspective of empirical research in the neuroscience of emotion. The first reason to dispute this picture is descriptive; this view of anger is based on an outdated version (...) of cognitive appraisal theory, which sees emotions as triggered directly by static moments of cognitive appraisal. The second reason is prescriptive; this description of anger suggests for its gradual elimination through the widespread adoption of emotional regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal. However, studies in neuroscience question the effectiveness of these strategies in promoting healthy emotional lives, especially in complex epistemic environments and for victims of injustice. Alongside this critique, I demonstrate how an alternative picture avoids these fundamental errors and aligns itself more closely with empirical findings. (shrink)

Despite insurance being a deciding factor in whether liability is found in tort cases, it is not always reflected in tort theories and court opinions. In this paper, I offer a framework for reconceiving the role of insurance in tort law. To achieve this, I outline where insurance falls into instrumental and non-instrumental theories and why non-instrumental theories are more persuasive. After establishing this, I move to Goldberg and Zipursky’s civil recourse theory and delineate how similarities between the right to (...) vote and right of action indicate parallel problems with failures to comprehend lack of access to the political process and tort system. By drawing on the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, I separate what tort law demands of insurance in unjust versus ideal conditions. Finally, drawing on Stephen and Julian Darwall’s theory of civil recourse as mutual accountability, I argue for an expansion of insurance, such as in cases of domestic violence, given the present environment of injustice and offer additional remedies to complement it. (shrink)

Love, a concept revered across cultures and time, holds multifaceted meanings and roles in human experience. Plato, in his dialogues Symposium and Phaedrus, offers profound insights into the nature of love. However, Plato’s conception of love has been subject to criticism, with many viewing it as selfish, objectifying, and lacking in interpersonal connections. Central to these criticisms is the question of whether the lover’s affection for the beloved persists after grasping the concept of true beauty. In this thesis, I delve (...) into Plato’s idea of love as presented in the Symposium and Phaedrus, aiming to demonstrate that Platonic love transcends mere self-interest, encompasses interpersonal love, and the lover’s love for the beloved endures even after grasping the true form of beauty. (shrink)

The “Reasonable Woman Standard” was first used in the 1991 case of Ellison v. Brady and has been central in shaping legal responses to sexual harassment. However, as societal norms and understandings of gender dynamics continue to evolve, as we experienced with the #MeToo movement, this “Reasonable Woman” often fails to grow with the times. I argue that this “Reasonable Woman” fails to encapsulate the complexities of sexual harassment experiences across different genders and cultural backgrounds. In this thesis, I deconstruct (...) the historical development of the “Reasonable Woman Standard,” analyzing its roots in the “Reasonable Person Standard.” Through a combination of legal analysis, case studies, and feminist legal theory, this thesis exposes the standard’s limitations in providing equitable justice and suggests reevaluating how harassment is adjudicated. Systemic barriers—financial, emotional, and institutional— discourage engagement with the legal system. Drawing on John Rawls’ concept of the “worth of legal standards,” I advocate for making legal rights accessible for all individuals. Key to this analysis is the intersectional approach, drawing from Kimberlé Crenshaw’s critique of single-axis frameworks in antidiscrimination law. Moreover, this thesis discusses the issue of underlitigation in sexual harassment cases, where serious misconduct is often misrepresented as negligence to fit within the confines of insurance coverage, trivializing the severity of harm and obstructing justice. The crux of the argument is that the current system often obstructs the right to action for tort victims, leading to a situation where one might have a legal claim against those causing harm but lack financial means, which renders this claim effectively powerless. In response, I present the concept of workplace harassment insurance, exploring three implementation routes: company-level insurance, individual-level insurance, and publicly funded compensation. Through a comparison with New Zealand, where legal responses differ in addressing similar issues, this thesis identifies best practices and areas of reform that could lead to a more just legal system in the United States. The overarching goal is to transform sexual harassment law to be inclusive and responsive to the diverse needs of society, drawing lessons from a comprehensive array of legal perspectives. (shrink)

A system of civil recourse is a precondition for a just society. In this paper, I outline the ideal version of a system of civil recourse and analyze the accounts of various liberal philosophers to explain how a non-instrumental and mutual accountability theory of civil recourse best encapsulates its stated purpose. I analyze the American system of civil recourse, specifically tort law, and argue that it bypasses the threshold of tolerable injustice for marginalized people in the United States. Using Tommie (...) Shelby’s framework in Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform, I argue that marginalized people are not obligated by the conditions of the tort system, because the tenets of reciprocity have been violated. Marginalized people are not required to follow a social scheme that does not intrinsically value them or respect their claims. To respond to the state of intolerable injustice that marginalized people operate in, I articulate a framework of controlled instrumentalism. Controlled instrumentalism can be deployed within a non-instrumentalist framework to reform a system of tort law that fails to achieve the threshold of tolerable injustice. Controlled instrumentalism aspires to achieve non-instrumental conditions but also constrains how individuals pursue non-instrumentalism because the tenets of non-instrumentalism cannot be violated during reform efforts. I then study prominent frameworks of tort reform and clarify how controlled instrumentalism either fits in, accommodates, or improves said frameworks. Finally, I tease out an important implication in the controlled instrumentalist project and explain how it provides greater avenues for marginalized people to operate within the law by clarifying how and when marginalized people are justified in pursuing alternate cases and setting aside precedents and procedures. (shrink)

Love and shame, on its face, are at odds with one another. Love tends to foster connection while shame makes one want to hide and isolate oneself. This thesis aims to resolve this tension, particularly in cases of mistaken shame, where the ashamed agent need not feel ashamed, such as in cases of internalized racism, sexism, etc. To do so, this thesis begins by exploring similar cases of love driving people away, looking at (1) love under conditions of oppression and (...) (2) love as seen in Vida Yao’s “Grace and Alienation,” where she is also concerned with ashamed beloveds. It then explores theories of love, showing that love requires epistemological improvement. Gabriele Taylor’s Pride, Shame and Guilt is integral to understanding how self-assessment emotions can complicate love. This thesis argues that shame is the most powerful self-assessment emotion in complicating love and explores cases of false shame, where the ashamed agent does not endorse the critical view that makes them ashamed, and genuine shame, where the beloved internalizes the critical view. It concludes by arguing that love’s nature to incentivize epistemological and moral improvements in both the lover and the ashamed beloved can be the answer to overcoming feelings of mistaken shame in a loving relationship. (shrink)

The individual right to bear arms for self-defence has been grounded by the modern Supreme Court in the Second Amendment and incorporated against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, a close examination of both the majority and dissenting opinions in each of the three landmark gun-rights cases decided by the Supreme Court this century- DC v. Heller, McDonald v. Chicago, and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen- reveal how difficult is to (...) determine the original meaning of the Second Amendment, and expose weaknesses in the Court’s current substantive due process jurisprudence. Subsequently, the right in question stands on precarious legal grounds. This thesis seeks to re-orient our understanding of the individual right to bear arms for self-defence by treating it as an unalienable natural right retained by the people upon entering civil society, protected by the Ninth Amendment, and incorporated against the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. In doing so, this thesis will shed light on the natural rights philosophy cherished by the Founding Fathers, explain why the Constitution must be read in light of that philosophy, provide a standard by which natural rights may be enforced by courts, and examine permissible gun legislation under that standard. Considerations of natural rights have been eschewed by the modern Court, but this thesis will hopefully serve as a blueprint for a constitutional jurisprudence rooted in natural rights and spark an important dialogue about the significance of natural rights in our constitutional republic. (shrink)

Liberalism has become a focal point for criticism on the Global Right. Among the strongest critics are the "post-liberals," primarily Catholic intellectuals who decry extreme individualism and the damaging impact of the market economy on community ties and the environment. While the post-liberals recycle some compelling arguments against liberalism, I contend that their proposed alternative is fundamentally flawed. Before presenting post-liberal arguments, I briefly unpack the roots of liberalism and some of its important right-wing critics to create a context for (...) understanding the current post-liberal movement. Then I examine Patrick Deneen’s and Adrian Vermeule’s manipulations of history and philosophy. Finally, I present philosophical responses to Deneen and Vermeule’s critiques of liberalism. My delineation of the flaws in the work of these two prominent and influential right-wing intellectuals is meant to stand as a critique of the post-liberal approach more generally. (shrink)

The establishment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as federal law was a pivotal moment in the pursuit of workplace equality and eradication of discrimination. Unfortunately, the application of Title VII in sexual harassment cases has fallen short of the statute’s noble intentions. In this paper, I argue that the judicial treatment of Title VII has been disloyal to its original purpose, perpetuating systemic inequalities and hindering progress towards gender equality in the workplace. I first establish (...) a framework for the reasonable construction of a statute, drawing on work from various legal theorists to establish three dimensions of interpretation: purpose, legislative awareness, and updated understanding. As I explore the evolution of Title VII jurisprudence through the lens of my interpretive framework, it becomes evident that Title VII was meant to serve as a robust tool to combat workplace discrimination and promote a culture of inclusivity. However, subsequent analysis reveals a stark misalignment between the objective intent of Title VII and its interpretation in sexual harassment cases. Restrictions placed on vicarious liability impede the statute’s effectiveness, allowing patriarchal power structures within the workplace to endure. Thus, despite progress made in women’s educational attainment and Title VII’s impetus for an increase in women’s workforce participation, discriminatory behaviors persist and continue to undermine the realization of true gender equity. Through an examination of case law and legal precedent, I uncover the phenomenon of sexual exceptionalism in Title VII interpretation, leading to a characterization of Title VII’s misinterpretation as a case of preservation through transformation. By critically engaging with existing legal frameworks and challenging prevailing interpretations, I seek to shed light on the systemic barriers to workplace equality and advocate for a more equitable interpretation of Title VII, helping us to envision pathways towards genuine progress and meaningful change. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine ways to progress towards gender justice and more equitable representations of gender and gender expressions through two case studies: representations of gender in English pronouns and in embodiments of robots. For the pronouns case, I argue that we transition towards using a universal “they” for all modes of communication by adopting the universal “they” in spoken communications and maintaining a variety of pronouns in written communication. “They/them” would serve as a category that does not denote (...) any gender, and 1) weaken the influence and presence of gender in daily conversations and 2) provide the same level of recognition and distinction for people’s gender identities to advance gender justice while we have gender categories. For the robot case, I argue that we should add robots that possess a mix of feminine and masculine features to our current array of robots. This is because we cannot achieve full gender (expression) neutrality in robot appearance like we could for pronouns. We are empirically found to attribute gender to robots even if they are designed to be neutral. So, creating robots that would proliferate the representation of gender (expressions) would be the next best strategy for weakening the role of binary gender norms and for recognizing individuals of nonbinary genders and non-conforming expressions equally with others. I hope these two proposals can serve as a starting point to other facets of gender (expression) representations. We would apply the neutralizing approach for pronouns to cases where undermining gender through the elimination of gender from the conversation is possible. We would apply the mixed-approach for robots to proliferate the representations we have for gender (expression) beyond the binary and weaken the influence of gender in cases where taking gender out altogether is difficult. (shrink)

Ante rem structuralism is a version of mathematical structuralism presented by Shapiro (1997) that asserts the existence of mathematical objects. It stands out amongst other structuralist views in that it secures a face value semantics for mathematical statements. In this paper, I propose an alternative ontology where structures are fully explained by relations. I argue that this alternative ontology avoids arguments against ante rem structuralism’s endorsement of indiscernible entities while retaining the convenience of a face value semantics for mathematical expressions. (...) This ontology is based on mereological nihilism and the Huayan Buddhist argument that an object can be fully described by its relations to other objects. With this metaphysical backdrop, I provide rules that configure an infinite set of successor relations into a structure that is functionally equivalent to Shapiro’s natural number structure. To show that the natural number structure of my ontology is functionally equivalent to Shapiro’s, I explain how the same mathematical expressions of Shapiro’s ontology are understood in my ontology and show that the natural number structure of my ontology is compatible with both addition and multiplication. This allows two equally valid semantics for mathematical expressions such that my ultimate semantics justifies the structures rejection of the PII while the conventional semantics of mathematical practice can treat numbers as bona fide objects. (shrink)

This autoethnographic thesis exploration captures how my positionality as an Afro-Latinx first-generation college (FGC) student pursuing a Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree in Environment, Economics, and Politics (EEP) at a predominately white institution (PWI) has led me to experience curricular injustices. Through the theoretical lenses of standpoint epistemology, critical pedagogy, epistemological, testimonial and hermeneutical injustices and the methodologies of autoethnography I am able to investigate my positionality within higher education and how the visible curriculum is an instrument that perpetuates an (...) ontology grounded in oppression and injustices. In providing an analysis of autoethnographic methodology and theoretical concepts in the name of critical inquiry, I critique my navigation through the EEP curriculum in higher education. (shrink)

Data science can contribute valuable predictions in diverse fields. But I write to express some concerns and red flags. I suggest that data science is being oversold. This article contains three questions that I believe data science must address as this new discipline matures. Is data science significantly different from statistics? This is a question that has haunted the field since the term first was introduced. By creating algorithms based on current societal decision rules that may be biased, even bigoted, (...) does data science lock in and exacerbate inequality? Scholars have identified a continuum from data to information to knowledge to wisdom, with the ultimate goal being wisdom. Data scientists seem to be acting as though data alone are enough. The big data systems are mathematically complex and have predictive power, but can data science contribute significantly to our body of knowledge? (shrink)

Hegel radically changed this idealist landscape by proposing a journey/movement based philosophy that remained presuppositionless, beginning simply by sparking our immediate concept of being. From his beginning there, he advocated for a system of philosophy that focused on the journey, but also gave an account of progress. Hegel claimed that contradictions within our concepts push them towards the absolute, despite us not necessarily knowing what the absolute is. His system begins with an account of how the concepts of being and (...) nothing immediately vanish into each other. The truth of their relationship, Hegel claims, is this movement, which he calls becoming. However in Zen Buddhism, contrary to Hegel, Nishida argues through his theory of basho that reality is actually conditioned by an absolute nothing that does not fall back into being like Hegel claims. The focus of my thesis is a defense of Hegel’s system from Nishida’s basho. I argue that Hegel’s argument on the ground and the grounded causes Nishida’s system to internally contradict itself on account of its hierarchical nature. This allows Hegel to rule out Nishida’s concept of nothing, and maintain the truth of becoming. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of Buddhist inner peace by delving into the intricacies of attachment, desire, and suffering. It makes a metaphysical argument for the ultimate non-existence of the self, which informs inner peace as the superior good. Furthermore, it makes a juxtaposition with Nietzschean striving and his notion of will to power. Ultimately, inner peace is demonstrated to be the superior good given its amplificative properties.

Homeless women have been forgotten subject matter in the study and practice of feminist consciousness and consciousness-raising efforts. However, they grapple with the compounded challenges of both gender and homelessness within an oppressive societal structure. This thesis therefore seeks to conceptualize the consciousness of women, and particularly homeless women, in a feminist lens. Specifically, this thesis explores the Othering of women’s consciousness through the intellectual lineage of Simone de Beauvoir and Hegel, and emphasizes the role of material circumstances in shaping (...) consciousness-raising efforts. Then, this thesis examines two unique struggles faced by homeless women – survival sex and homeless motherhood. This thesis asserts that an oppressive gender structure has firmly entrenched women in an intrapsychic conflict, where the tension between their autonomous self and societal expectations of womanhood is exacerbated for homeless women. These individuals face the added burden of navigating the pressures of survival, often necessitating compromises on their independent consciousness for the sake of sustaining themselves. Finally, this thesis presents a preliminary framework for consciousness-raising among homeless women. It proposes structural changes and a consciousness of victimization to address the intricate interplay between gender norms and unique challenges faced by homeless women in pursuit of their self-realization. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop a strong account of recognition. It begins with a Hegel-inspired account of recognition as a fundamental desire that drives humanity. This account establishes recognition as fundamental to the initial subject formation of independent self-consciousnesses as agents. I offer the lord-bondsman dualism to provide a critique of domination as oppositional to securing the means for recognition. This entails that, as history progresses the world ought to move towards universally adopting mutual recognition relationships without domination. I adopt (...) this goal as an ideal form of recognition. In Chapter 2, I apply this recognitional framework to gender. Through analyzing four theories of gender, I find the recognition of identity has a significant role in shaping the self-consciousness’ self-determination. Recognitional dialogue can enable one to learn new parts of the self, but often forms of recognition dominate and constrain what identity can be. Thus, I explore three prominent methods of harmful recognition in Chapter 3: domination, intelligibility, and misrecognition. I view these harmful recognition methods as undermining mutual recognition relationships through examples such as recognizing deprecating self-images of minority groups and overwriting self-determinations through wrongful or lack of recognition. Despite these difficulties, I propose solutions such as an unintelligibility account which focuses on enabling mutual recognition relationships within group identities rather than society. In Chapter 4 I apply this robust recognitional framework to technology, which I understand as a locus for contemporary problems with recognition. I discuss technologies’ recognitional role as mirrors for humans, that often reflect yet threaten to replace us. I turn to understanding data as a technology that enables harmful recognition in the present day. I find technology is not neutral regarding recognition relationships, but can uphold mutual or harmful recognition depending on how it is used. With my account of recognition developed, I return to the goal of universally achieving mutual recognition relationships. I employ Halberstam’s account of failure to offer hope for achieving mutual recognition despite the many forms of harmful recognition. (shrink)

Within the literature of Standpoint Epistemology, there is a pervasive tendency to neglect to discuss whether a dominantly situated knower can achieve a standpoint of a social group they are not a part of. Emily Tilton argues that socially dominant individuals do not face strong, substantive limits on what they can know. If Emily Tilton is correct, the theses of Standpoint Epistemology that entail otherwise are implausible. The remaining theses within Standpoint Epistemology are applications of trivially true theses to issues (...) of social location and social marginalization. However, even though the plausible theses of Standpoint Epistemology are trivially true, the field itself is not. Standpoint epistemologists who neglect to discuss the controversial theses within the field often present arguments which do not require the truth of implausible theses. Despite being made of trivially true theses, Standpoint Epistemology is still responsible for interesting, important contributions. (shrink)

The goal of this thesis is to act as a defense of empathy in the face of critiques from both Jesse Prinz and Paul Bloom. They both hold the view that empathy is far too flawed to be held up in society the way that it is and that we should look to other strategies. We will look at their arguments against empathy and then move into the critique of them. Despite their arguments, and with other philosophers' input, I ultimately (...) conclude that with some edits to how we use it and some changes to how we think about it, empathy can remain an important and irreplaceable part of how we function in society. (shrink)

The Holocaust shook the core assumptions many held regarding human progress and human nature. This paper seeks to track how the ideas of modernist philosophers may have laid the fundamental political and moral assumptions that allowed the Holocaust to occur. I will offer an analysis of 20th century German-American political scientist and philosopher Eric Voegelin’s theory of Political Religions to assess whether philosophy emerging from the Modern era led Germany to eschew Christianity, a world-transcendent religion as the source of the (...) West’s “first principles,” and adopt the world-imminent religion of Nazism in its place. If this proves to be the case, with Nazism showing the problem of rights derived from the State, then Voegelin’s work can help us understand the shortcomings of modern thought through a novel philosophical and anthropological lens. (shrink)

Property law treats intellectual property (IP) differently than physical property. This paper draws upon John Locke’s labor mixing theory of property to explain why we have different moral expectations for IP. In particular, this paper aims to demonstrate that a Lockean account leads to the conclusion that intellectual property rights must be limited by a policy of expiration although we have no such expectations for physical property. In so doing, this paper begins with an explanation of Locke’s original justification for (...) physical property, conducts a modest exploration of what a Lockean theory of IP might look like, and ends by arguing that expiration is a way to reconcile the warring interests within such a theory of IP. In addition to labor mixing, Locke’s two restrictions of property acquisition, the enough and as good proviso and the waste condition, critically affect how we must balance the rights of original IP inventors, subsequent inventors, and the general public. (shrink)

I argue that there are (defeasible) in-principle epistemic advantages pre-consciousness raising to being marginalized. That is, by virtue of social location alone, marginalization confers epistemic advantages. According to a standard presentation of standpoint epistemology (Toole 2023), there is an inverse relationship between social situatedness and knowledge. That is, since the marginalized are socially disadvantaged, they have epistemic advantages. As a result, marginalization helps to gain access to these advantages. In this paper I argue for a stronger position. I argue that (...) unique features of the social ontology of marginalized social locations not only cultivate these advantages, but that marginalized social location alone can confer these advantages. My argument evades many of the critical contentions that plague standpoint epistemology such as the ability of non-marginalized to also gain epistemic advantages. The in-principle ­pre-consciousness raised epistemic advantages, I am concerned with do not preclude non-marginalized actors from gaining epistemic advantages. Further, while I consider important implications for deference, ultimately the epistemic advantages I argue for are not primarily concerned with deference. More importantly, they act as signposts to tell us where knowledge generation about marginalization should start, with the marginalized layperson. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue against Karen Frost-Arnold’s claim that internet anonymity has more epistemic benefit than epistemic harm for online communities. I will first outline her arguments that anonymity poses epistemic benefits for speakers of marginalized communities, who often rely on anonymity to share their experience and testimony without fear of repercussions, such as testimonial injustice, backlash, and even physical harm. I will then consider objections to Frost-Arnold’s account made by others, including the idea that anonymous testimony is (...) not reliable. I will show how this objection alone is insufficient against Frost-Arnold’s claim. Then, I will offer my own objections to Frost-Arnold’s argument, highlighting how she severely understates the physical harms that anonymity poses off of the internet, and how these physical harms lead to epistemic harm. I will also argue that transparency may make society on and off the internet more inclusive. Finally, I will consider counter-arguments to my own argument, and offer my replies. (shrink)

In an interview aired over the Public Broadcasting System in 1980, aircraft manufacturer John K. Northrop made a stunning charge. Referring to the Air Force's 1949 cancellation of his Flying Wing aircraft, Mr. Northrop alleged that the cancellation was not the result of any valid concerns about the aircraft itself, but rather was a retaliation for his refusal to agree to an improper demand by the Air Force. Specifically, Mr. Northrop charged that then-Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington ordered (...) him to merge his firm with Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation, and that when he refused, an 88 million dollar contract for the Flying Wings was cancelled. Mr. Northrop also admitted that in 1949 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, he had perjured himself by denying that Mr. Symington had ever threatened or retaliated against Northrop Aircraft, Incorporated. This dissertation began as a study of ethics and decision- making in the military procurement process. However, in-depth research revealed no improprieties in the Air Force's Flying Wing acquisition program. Research techniques included careful study of voluminous Air Force records, most housed at Edwards Air Force Base, California, and at the Air Force Historical Research Center in Montgomery, Alabama. These documents, once secret but now declassified, showed that military decision- makers were never satisfied with the Northrop plane, and regularly made their position clear to Northrop. The author's document searches were augmented by a series of interviews held with as many of the surviving participants as possible: Senator Symington, who vehemently denied any impropriety; Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, then Commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), who readily admitted that he never wanted the Northrop plane and argued against it (and for the competing B-36 bomber) before a board of senior Air Force officers just before the cancellation; Gen. Lauris O. Norstad, the sole surviving member of that senior officer's board, who vigorously rejected any suggestion of improper behavior by Senator Symington in this or any other procurement decision. An interview with the current Chairman of the Board of Northrop corporation, Thomas V. Jones, generally supported Senator Symington, and clarified the stand of today's Northrop management. In addition, the author interviewed and corresponded with the two Air Force chief test pilots on the Flying Wing; both men gave valuable insights into the technical performance of the Northrop aircraft. If political manipulation was not the cause of the 1949 cancellation, what was? The research uncovered four factors that were involved. First was the substantial improvement in the competing B- 36, which made great strides in late 1948. Second was the assignment of General LeMay as SAC commander in October 1948; unlike his predecessor, General LeMay was a strong backer of the B-36, and was willing to give up other weapon systems (like the Flying Wings) to get more of the Consolidated-Vultee B-36s. Third was President Truman's cuts in the Fiscal Year 1950 defense budget, which caused the Air Force to not only defer the addition of eleven planned combat units, but also to eliminate eleven others (of a total of fifty-nine) already in existence. Finally, the shortcomings of the Flying Wing were certainly numerous and significant enough to argue against its production and procurement. After refuting a number of the allegations made in the 1980 broadcast, the dissertation concludes with some implicationsfor management. Chief among these is the need to maintain a marketing orientation, that is, the requirement to emphasize what the customer requires, rather than what the producer wants to build. The Flying Wing was Mr. Northrop's lifelong dream, and the author argues that its production was more related to what Mr. Northrop wanted to build than to what the Air Force needed to acquire. (shrink)

In order to maintain a structure of oppression that we still observe today with police shootings and premature death, theories of the “inferior” Black race and “superior” White race rest on the ideology of White supremacy. A unique and often overlooked premise of White supremacy is founded in the conception of the difference between a thing and a human. This thesis argues that the foundation of White supremacy is paradoxical in so far as it facilitates and perpetuates contradictions rooted in (...) the desire to reconcile an object/human duality to subjugate Black individuals. This view, on the one hand, assumes that the Black body can be conceived as and through an object, i.e., ontological reduction to the body, while also, on the other hand, identifying specific instances where a sense of human agency is attributed to Black people, but only to further subjugate them. To develop this argument, this paper will examine the contradictory nature of White Supremacy and Anti-Blackness, trace the historical formation of racialization, and outline how these structures impose burdens and inhumane limitations on the reproductive freedom and self-constructed identities of Black women. (shrink)

Because science as it exists today is a cultural construction of the West, studies of neuroscience have often been limited by Western perspectives. In particular, the Western proclivity towards individualism has led to a field of neuroscience which has historically focused on studying single individuals, as opposed to social or collective neuroscience. For the most part, it has just been assumed that collective phenomena such as interpersonal emotions must be able to be reduced in terms of individual phenomena such as (...) individual emotions. However, closer review reveals that interpersonal emotions have emergent properties that individual emotions alone do not account for. In other words, there is more to the emotions within interpersonal relationships than the simple transmission of individual emotions from one individual to another. Rather, there appear to be unique emotions associated with the abstract interpersonal relationships between individuals. These interpersonal emotions are neuroscientifically and qualitatively different from individual emotions. This could have huge ramifications for any field involving human interaction, from economics, to international relations, to mobilization for causes like climate change. In order to better understand these complex phenomena, a greater diversity of thought is needed in neuroscience. (shrink)

My major argument in this dissertation is that Hegelian spiritual subjectivity can and should serve as a philosophical basis for envisioning a new conception of human subjectivity for the age of globalization. Why, then, does globalization demand a new conception of human subjectivity at all? What constitutes the Hegelian spiritual subjectivity such that it is not only relevant and but also necessary to the contemporary, postmodern context of globalization? My dissertation largely addresses these two questions. As for the first question, (...) it requires my critical analysis of the context in which we are living. We are living in an era of globalization whose primary driving force is globalizing capitalism. Among many challenges posed by capitalist globalization today, I claim, it most importantly challenges us to reflect deeply upon the anthropological question of “what it means to be authentically human.” The human being that capitalist globalization is eager to promote and produce is none other than a faithful global consumer who, without critical thinking, simply succumbs to one’s sensuous inclinations or desires in their sheer particularity, contingency, and arbitrariness, who is easily attracted to the external appearances and sensible images of commodities endlessly released onto the market, and who thus is always ready to buy them both online and offline. And I suspect that this anthropology of capitalist globalization seems to be justified philosophically by the contemporary intellectual movement known as postmodernism, particularly by its thesis of the “death of the subject” which argues that human subjectivity is merely an after-effect of the pre-subjective, extrinsic processes of language, culture, power, ideology, the unconscious, etc. In other words, postmodernist anthropology (the death of the subject), regardless of its real intent, may function as a philosophical basis and ideological justification for capitalist globalization’s disgraceful reduction of human beings to mere consumers who are, without subjectivity, subjected to the imperialism of a globalizing market. And this erosion of human subjectivity is all the more serious given that the contemporary globalizing world imperatively calls for our more ethical and political thoughts, sensibilities, and actions than ever before to orient it toward peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity for all. In this regard, I insist that we need a new conception of human subjectivity for this postmodern context of globalization, which includes following three important elements in their internal relations: self-transcending drive toward universality, self-determined or autonomous action, and solidaristic relationship with others—that is, a sort of cosmopolitan or global citizen who is constantly universalizing oneself through self-transcending, self-determined ethico-political actions in solidarity with others to advance the common good for all members of the global community. I argue that this new perspective and conception of human subjectivity for the age of globalization finds its philosophical archetype par excellence in Hegel’s philosophy of subjectivity as spiritual subjectivity. Here my second question is addressed: What constitutes the Hegelian spiritual subjectivity? Historically, Hegel’s philosophy of spiritual subjectivity is his critical response to the so-called modern turn to the subject. In opposition to the post-Cartesian tendency to characterize subjectivity as a self-identical, self-sufficient substance, defining itself from itself without reference to things other than itself, which is already given once and for all, Hegel puts forth a developmental view on the human subject that could, in turn, transcend the dualism of subjectivity and objectivity operative in the modern project. Namely, for Hegel, the human subject must be conceived not just as a substance but essentially as a “spirit,” i.e., as a dialectical movement of being-for-itself (self-conscious identity with itself; substantiality) and being-for-others (socio-historical relation to others; relationality) toward the Absolute (absolute universality; telos). And I find paradigmatically in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit how such Hegelian spiritual subjectivity actually emerges and develops gradually—from subjectivity-in-itself (subjectivity in the womb) through subjectivity-for-itself (the birth of subjectivity) to subjectivity-in-and-for-itself (the growth of subjectivity with its ultimate culmination in absolute subjectivity). By “absolute subjectivity” here Hegel means precisely the final stage in which the implicit, immanent telos of human subjectivity that has been present throughout all developmental forms of human consciousness becomes explicit and fulfilled, namely, in which the human subject becomes fully broadened or universalized and sees all beings as intrinsically interrelated in their distinctive otherness. Importantly, according to Hegel, this can be made possible only when the human subject conceives of God as Absolute Spirit, as absolute universality per se and thereby conceives of all beings as self-expressive moments of God in his trinitarian movement. In short, the Hegelian spiritual subjectivity can be defined as the dialectical movement of its three constitutive moments, i.e., the Absolute or God as absolute universality (the immanent telos), self-conscious identity (being-for-itself), and concrete historical relatedness (being-for-others), each of which is homologous with the above-mentioned three constitutive elements of my proposed new conception of subjectivity for the age of globalization respectively, i.e., self-transcending drive toward universality, self-determined or autonomous action, and solidaristic relationship with others. It is in this sense that I argue the current context of globalization crucially needs as a new anthropological vision the Hegelian spiritual subject that intrinsically thinks, wills, and acts for something greater than itself as it constantly relates itself to others not in a monological way but in a dialectical way. (shrink)

“The medium is the message:” theological reflections on the idea that God is love. I am proposing that the idea of the self-revelational nature of God’s being functions, among other ways, rhetorically, such that the content of revelation (God’s love) determines the rhetorical mode of its communication (giving orders, inviting, begging, etc.). The three aspects of rhetoric that Kenneth Burke emphasizes in A Rhetoric of Motives—the use of identification, that it is addressed and, as such, is convincing (persuasive)—are examined in (...) terms of revelation. Chapter one seeks to clear the way for what is commonly understood as special revelation by arguing that theology does not argue for the existence of God; rather, what are mistakenly understood as arguments for existence in Anselm and Aquinas are actually arguments for fixing the referent of the term ‘God.’ The second step in the chapter is to then recognize the possibility of revelation (phenomenally) in discussion with Jean-Luc Marion. Chapter two will consider rhetoric as persuasive and intrinsically concerned with both form and content. The goal in this chapter is to show that rhetoric is an expression of a form of life. The role this plays in my larger argument is one of suggesting that, since in Christian theology revelation has to do with the living God, God Himself expresses the form of His life (Ch. 3). Two themes are in focus: 1) rhetoric as the art of persuasion will require an understanding of persuasion—what and how do we persuade? Formally, what is required? In expressing a form of life, one is always at least implicitly (unthematically) persuasive—it is an expression of an orientation and understanding of life and an invitation to the other to orient oneself in this way as well. As will be shown, persuasion, and thus rhetoric, are concerned with what is right, what is true, what is possible, and how to discover this together (relationally and intersubjectively). Therefore, I will seek to show that rhetoric as the art of persuasion (and thus about identification and address) is confessional, linguistic, contextual, and concerned with agency. Chapter three addresses the concept of revelation specifically and theologically and this is accomplished by exploring the concept of revelation, the trinity, and Christology in discussion with Karl Barth. I show how Barth’s Church Dogmatics are systematically concerned with the identification of form and content, and that they are likewise exhaustively rhetorical and hermeneutical. Eberhard Jüngel interprets this metaphysically, as an issue about thinkability and the being of God, interpreting the Christological and trinitarian moves as locating God in his coming. I attempt to replicate this move while building on his work; I want to push this understanding in a rhetorical direction and thus point to the ethical implications particularly in relation to love and witness. Chapter four seeks to clarify and understand what it means that God has revealed Himself as love, again in conversation with Barth, Jüngel, and Luther. Chapter five begins to consider the ethical implications of self-revelation as rhetoric in terms of the rhetoric of witness. The conclusion is that form and content are identical in God. The way that God communicates is identical with who God is. The revealing love of God is understood rhetorically as God’s self-revelation. As such, the content of God’s self-revelation, namely that God is love, must be communicated as love and thus lovingly. From this we understand that love creates freedom and freedom (can and should, in order to be free) acts in love—this is in fact how and what is to be understood from the resurrection, death, and life of Jesus Christ. The final thesis is that, because God’s self-revelation is rhetorical (an expression of the divine form of life), and He creates the new possibility of being in correspondence to Him, then our human witness to the work and act of God is also rhetorical (an expression of a new openness to that divine life). Importantly, it is a corresponding witness not simply when it is reported that God is love (content), but only when it is reported that God is love in a loving way (form). When there is a failure in the means of this communication, it is a least questionable if the content is the same. (shrink)

In the present dissertation, I examine, critically reflect on, and evaluate D. Z. Phillips’ view of philosophy, religious language, religious truth, and God. One of the focuses is given to his attempts to overcome the dichotomy between the view of religious language as fact-asserting (realist) and as attitude-expressive (anti-realist), and between the understanding of religious truth as propositional truth and as personal truth. However, my focus is not limited to that issue alone. I attempt to grasp Phillips’ view of religious (...) language, religious truth, and God as thoroughly as possible, since his view has been—too frequently—grossly misunderstood, and has attracted—often undue—criticisms from various sides. After that, on the basis of my understanding of Phillips, I make some suggestions for a more illuminating view of religious language, religious truth, and God. Phillips’ philosophical method, or way of doing philosophy is known as descriptive and contemplative. I examine central notions in his philosophy, such as description, contemplation, grammar, neutrality, and possibility. I also discuss scholarly debates on the relation between description and contemplation and the alleged shift in Phillips’ way of doing philosophy. In terms of religious language, Phillips’ several contentions are examined. He attempts to maintain the balance between the distinctiveness of religious language and its relation to other, non-religious aspects of human life. One of his central contentions regarding religious language is that the meaning of language is determined in the context of its use. For Phillips, the distinctiveness of religious language is shown in its specific characters, such as absolute (regulative), pictorial, grammatical, and expressive (confessional). While his view is often accused of attitude-expressivist, Phillips strongly rejects it. His position on the inexpressibility of God and the limits of human language and on the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical is also investigated. In regard to Phillips’ notion of religious truth, I explore its two major features. First, truth is context-dependent: not only the meaning but also the criteria of truth are to be found within the context in question. Second, religious truth is personal in the sense that it is a matter of personal decision and that it regulates a believer’s whole life. Despite the charge of relativism, his view does not necessarily lead to individualistic relativism, by virtue of the criteria of community and what we already know. Also, in terms of the charge of arbitrariness, Phillips’ account of our shared reactions to the world reveals not the arbitrariness but the contingency of our epistemic framework. For the reality of God, Phillips provides two kinds of analysis. First, in terms of the negative analysis—what the reality of God does not mean—he persistently emphasizes the difference between the reality of God and the reality of physical objects, and rejects metaphysical conceptions of God. Second, in terms of the positive analysis—what the reality of God does mean—Phillips argues that the existence of God is necessary existence; that God’s reality is synonymous with God’s divinity; and that the reality of God is spiritual reality. Also, Phillips rejects the charge of being Feuerbachian reductionist and attempts to go beyond the dichotomy between realism and nonrealism. The final chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, I address common criticisms of Phillips’ notion of the neutrality of contemplative philosophy. First, he has been criticized that despite his claim to neutrality, he is in reality a revisionist or a reformer who prescribes rather than describes. However, Wittgensteinian description, which Phillips employs, does have prescriptive force and thus the charge of revision or prescription could be less serious than is often thought. In terms of Phillips’ allegedly “one-sided diet,” I suggest, his Kierkegaardian-Weilian reading of Christianity needs not be taken as the grammar of religious beliefs; rather, Phillips offers it as an alternative account in his positive task of showing what religious belief does or may mean. Nevertheless, Phillips’ relying too much on that form of spirituality sometimes makes his accounts of religious beliefs less persuasive. Second, in terms of the question of whether neutrality is as attainable, desirable, or essential to philosophy as Phillips thinks it to be, his critics tend to take his notion of neutrality as a view from nowhere. However, I argue, the neutrality of contemplative philosophy is better understood as “trying to go nowhere.” Insofar as “a perch above the fray” of contemplative philosophy is construed as a third perspective from which a philosopher is looking for a way of describing the pros and cons of both the affirmation and the rejection of a position, contemplative philosophy is still a usable way of doing philosophy. In the second part, I suggest in what direction Phillips’ view can be further developed. First, a view of religious language based upon Phillips’ philosophy needs to involve more philosophical reflections on the structural inadequacies of human language, the ways in which language works in our talk of God, and, in this regard, the metaphorical character of religious language. Second, in terms of religious truth, I suggest two ways of deciding on the truth or rationality of a whole framework or worldview as such, despite the radical contingency of our epistemic framework: first, we can criticize or reject a framework by means of our context-internal criteria; second, the verification of the truth of a given worldview is experiential or practical. Finally, in terms of God, I argue that we need to pay more careful attention to and elucidate the grammar of the trinitarian conception of God, which is central to Christian religion. (shrink)

This study aims to clarify Aristotle’s practical reason and how his flexible but, nonetheless nonarbitrary ethical teaching works. By doing so, I hope to provide an alternative way of understanding practical reason in contradistinction to a modern view of practical reason and its assumptions about thinking through moral and political issues. In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle’s discussion of practical reason shows that any attempts to formalize morality in the abstract are limited by the complexity of each particular situation, (...) the variability in perception/cognition of the agent as well as a human longing that is inextricably linked to practical reasoning. While Aristotelian practical reasoning is not a rule-bound morality, it is neither simply relative for it is guided by the concern for the noble through the education of the citizens as well as by the natural longing towards human excellence and beauty. I also argue that practical reasoning in the political context is uniquely challenging because it must always presuppose the demands of justice. Lastly, I conclude with the limitations of practical reasoning and how philosophy is indispensable in not only sharpening practical reason but also transcending its limitations. (shrink)

Genes are functional cell segments of DNA within an organism, as well as basic physical units of biological inheritance, which have consequences for human dignity and public interest. Genes and genetic material (DNA strands of nucleotides, genetically altered plants and animals e.g., see Appendix B) are patentable. In the US and around the globe, governments grant genetic patents for new, non-obvious, and useful gene inventions. A wide range of interest groups such as religious leaders, scientists, biotech pharmaceuticals, medical practitioners, health (...) care providers, venture capitalists, medical patients and persons have interests in defining what is subject to patents. Yet, it is at least questionable that genetic inventions, and the ownership of discoveries of gene mutations leading to possible diseases, should be subject to influence by interest groups. Although some genes (cDNA) are currently legally patentable, the question in this examination is whether gene patents should be legally and morally justified. In this work I examine whether gene patents should legally and morally be justified, given the principles of biomedical ethics such as human Beneficence /Autonomy and Justice. I argue that gene patenting is not justifiable, and I consider what can be done to create a system that delivers access to genetic information in the current genetic Intellectual Patent system. This interdisciplinary work is more complex than whether bio-science researchers and corporate entities should hold gene patents, or differentiating the legal question of whether genes are an invention or a discovery in the human genome. Mere responses to these questions would not ultimately solve the genetic justice problem. The justification for genetic appropriation is more complexity, since it is grounded in axiological claims about human dignity and public interest set in an ever changing biomedical/biogenetic technology. To address this complexity, I will draw upon the ideas of “the capability approach” to genetic justice found in the work of Nussbaum and Sen. This work is an interdisciplinary examination of the proper appropriation of natural genetic material and its impact on human dignity. It is argued that genetic material and information should be accessible to all, via heath care, for example. We must look to new ways to achieve genetic justice that promote human flourishing as a public good. (shrink)

There is some question about how to understand Thomas Aquinas’s five ways of demonstrating that God exists. Often philosophers and theologians portray Thomas as a strict Aristotelian rationalist with a strong emphasis on syllogistic epistemology. Against this view a competing existential, metaphysical, and theological understanding of the five ways has been gradually gaining ground, beginning in the early 20th century, due to the work of existential Thomists such as Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Joseph Owen. This understanding has been expanded (...) more recently in the work of John Wippel and others. The rise of the existential view has led to the question of whether Thomas meant for the five ways to be strict epistemic proofs or whether they are instead a way to talk about God that presumes faith and metaphysics. This dissertation will present the five ways within a full range of contextual issues. These include epistemic, metaphysical, theological, historical, anthropological, and literary contexts. When all contexts are taken into account, the conclusion is that the ways are primarily metaphysical-theological yet they produce epistemic scientia resulting in knowledge that God exists. The five ways are primarily examples of how to properly talk about God in light of revelation, metaphysics, and the proper mode of the human knower, yet also syllogistic demonstrations that God exists. Such an understanding holds the potential to answer some of the arguments of the critics of the five ways, such as Anthony Kenny. Thomas shows himself to be thoroughly grounded in both faith and reason in such a way that there is a healthy balance between them that does proper justice to both faith and reason. The significance of this dissertation comes in two places. The first is the weaving together of a wide range of contextual interpretive factors that are not usually applied specifically and explicitly to the five ways in one unified work. The second is in the unification of the epistemic and theological interpretations of the ways, under a synthesis that accounts for both manners of interpreting the five ways. (shrink)

Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism admits of certain observed inconsistencies that have long troubled Spinoza scholars. The scholarship over the last one hundred and thirty years or so has offered three dominant interpretations of Spinoza’s metaphysics as a result of the deficiencies with the doctrine of parallelism. These are 1) the subjective/objective distinction according to which the attribute of thought is understood as subjective and the attribute of extension is understood as objective, 2) materialism according to which the attribute of thought (...) is claimed to depend on the attribute of extension, and 3) idealism according to which the attribute of extension is claimed to depend on the attribute of thought. A tension between materialism and idealism is addressed by each of these approaches. And the question of Spinozist idealism is of great concern to contemporary Spinoza scholarship. However, none of these interpretations succeed as they each fail to properly locate Spinoza’s problems with parallelism in a deeper attribute problem. Interpretations 1 and 2 fail more severely for also clashing with other central themes of Spinoza’s project such as his ethics which prioritizes thought at the expense of extension. This dissertation observes that the interpretive trends in the literature not only do not succeed but cannot succeed as Spinoza’s system admits of certain contradictions. Of primary consideration, and beyond the problems with parallelism, conflation of attribute with substance and conflation of attribute with mode. It being the case that Spinoza’s theory of attributes is deficient, I propose a revisionist approach to what I have termed Spinoza’s “deep attribute problem” according to which the attributes are disassociated from the active/passive distinction. The active/passive distinction is shown to be instrumental in tying Spinoza’s metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics together as well as being erroneously applied to the attributes. The proposed revision is that the attributes be disassociated from the active/passive distinction which is to be understood now in terms of a vertical and horizontal association. The vertical association identifies substance-mode relations and the horizontal association identifies mode-mode relations. An important consequence of this revision is that substance is recast as absolutely infinite intellectual substance. As such, Spinoza’s revised system is ontological idealism and it is suggested but left for future research that the revision may entail un understanding of Spinoza’s system too as modal existentialism and ethical mysticism. (shrink)

Structuralist theories of properties state that properties are individuated by their nomological or causal roles. It has previously been suggested that structuralism is incompatible with robust conceptions of qualia. In this paper, I argue that structuralism should be taken as a theory of de re representation, and under this formulation it is able to accommodate qualia as intrinsic, introspectable properties of experiences. I then turn to various thought experiments used by qualia theorists to expand the notion of qualia, and find (...) the majority of these compatible with structuralism as well. I conclude that the structuralists and qualia theorists need not be at odds with each other. (shrink)

In order to judge how behavior caused by the positivity effect should be considered, comparisons were made between the positivity effect and two mental disorders. These disorders, Tourette’s syndrome and psychopathy, were selected due to their extreme differences in what Strawsonian attitudes they inspire and how they are perceived relative to disordered patients’ will. Disorder-affected behavior of Tourette’s patients inspires the objective attitude and is seen as a condition affecting an individual’s will, while disorder-affected behavior of psychopaths inspires the interpersonal (...) attitude and is seen as a character trait. Relevant distinctions between psychopathy and Tourette’s syndrome were found to include their neurological causes, the obviousness of the suffering they caused, and how easily their disorder-affected behavior could be mapped onto goal-seeking behavior. These considerations suggest the positivity effect should be viewed similarly to psychopathy in terms of responsibility, although this is complicated by its time of development and other factors. (shrink)

This is a personal account of an intersection of the schools of research in foundations of geometry founded by Alfred Tarski and Friedrich Bachmann. Their academic lineages and the origins of the schools are also described, as well as the mathematics that resulted from this intersection.

Traditional approaches to philosophical theories of tort law have systematically undermined the individual worth and security interests of women. However, torts also provide a particularly powerful avenue for reform, in that they embody the public power of private law and offer individuals the opportunity to seek recourse and accountability for wrongs. In this paper, I offer a framework for such reformist approaches to tort philosophy, predominantly inspired by Jean Hampton’s “Feminist Contractarianism,” which requires that women be recognized as individuals with (...) intrinsic worth who are deserving of respect. To accomplish this, I first note the particular relevance of social contract theory to tort philosophy, in the sense that both fields aim to establish and uphold fair terms of just and reasonable interaction among individuals. I then engage with the various deficiencies, both in classical social contract theory and in instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist theories of tort law, to adequately recognize women as individuals and to protect their corresponding security interests. I utilize scholarship by Martha Chamallas & Jennifer Wriggins to examine the relevance of these deficiencies in torts regarding domestic violence and sexual harassment cases, and assert that although non-instrumentalist theories provide the best framework for affirming individual worth, they have still historically failed to do so in the case of harms against women. Finally, I provide a framework for reform, based in respect for individual worth, dignity, and self-mastery consistent with the aims of non-instrumentalist approaches, that explicitly upholds protections for women – potentially with broader implications for other marginalized groups. (shrink)

Caste and gender oppression are two systems of domination that continue to affect the lives of lower-caste women living in India. Both the caste system and the patriarchy were created to rationalize a hierarchical division of labor in which lower-caste women are subordinated. The best way to understand the reasoning behind these systems of oppression, as well as the impact of them, is through an intersectional historical materialist perspective. This perspective can be utilized when analyzing the evolution of caste and (...) women’s rights in India, specifically focusing on the changes brought on by British Imperialism. This analysis reveals that decisions made by those in places of power – whether that be men, upper-caste individuals, or British imperialists – are made in an effort to preserve their modes of production and keep the set division of labor intact. In India, Dalit women find themselves at the intersection of caste and gender oppression, and thus, at the bottom of the hierarchical division of labor, being both of low-caste status (predominantly Untouchables) and women. The most effective way to improve Dalit women’s well-being is by improving their material conditions. In doing this, the division of labor is impacted and Dalit women gain greater agency, making them more capable of pursuing social and political change. (shrink)

Gianni Vattimo is often regarded as a purely negative, eliminativist thinker, defined by the weak thought that he articulated over the course of his storied career. Our temptation to read him in this way is encouraged, not only by an extensive and growing body of secondary literature in the Anglophone world, but by Vattimo’s own consistent focus on weakening as represent an alternative to the strong and violent metaphysical systems that have defined much of the philosophical legacy of the Christian (...) West. What often go unacknowledged, therefore, are the positive elements in Vattimo’s work. Indeed, weakening is, from the start, a politically motivated project, tied up in an effort to reduce (not to say eliminate) violence. This political motivation, in turn, is not merely about reduction but is instead tied to an ethico-aesthetic-religious complex, a vision of the world in which the barriers to community are broken down, in which the previously silenced might call for justice and organize against injustice, and in which we are no longer chained to the necessities of a harsh and repressive metaphysical order but are instead free to pursue voluntary associations in the spirit of love and charity. At stake in this alternative reading of Vattimo is, naturally enough, his utility as a social, political, and religious thinker and his resistance to the concern that his thought leads to a counterproductive quietism, at best, and to a destructive relativism, at worst. Once we have engaged with both the temptation to read Vattimo in a purely negative way and with the reasons to resist this temptation in favor of a more positive reading, it is important to reckon with the never-unproblematic character of the latter effort. Indeed, we cannot simply integrate the positive and negative moves we identify into a coherent and solid whole without reinstantiating the sort of totalizing and violent metaphysics that Vattimo critiques. Rather than succumbing to the temptation to seek such closure, we instead can recognize the (productive and interesting) tensions between the positive and negative elements in Vattimo’s thought and, in so doing, recognize that there is no radical escape from metaphysics or from violence offered here. Metaphysics is weakened, and yet persists, and violence is reduced and reconfigured, but not banished altogether. Part of the project of weakening, perhaps the most vital part, is precisely this willingness to occupy positions of discomfort or, put another way, a willingness to proceed speculatively and to take risks in confronting the problems that face our shared world. In the spirit of this sort of willingness to proceed speculatively, we advance, at last, to the final section of the work, which seeks to take Vattimo beyond his own limits. We examine, firstly, the implications of the positive reading of Vattimo for religious thought, putting Vattimo into discourse with his mentor Luigi Pareyson to examine what role religious institutions and religious practices have to play in a world defined by a weakened metaphysics. Proceeding from that particularity, we confront Vattimo’s own situatedness in a particular cultural position and attempt to address the question of the utility of his thought for cross-cultural discourse and, relatedly, for resistance to systems of oppression. Finally, we place our speculative reading of Vattimo’s thought into discourse with thinkers such as Donna Haraway, Catherine Keller, and Michael Marder to consider the implications weak thought holds for the discourse of the more-than-human world. (shrink)

Throughout its history, the evaluation field has developed numerous theories. These theories, or evaluation theory as they are collectively known, are integral to the knowledge of the discipline and represent the field’s collective understanding of how evaluation can and should be practiced. Yet, research suggests that the influence of evaluation theory on evaluation practice is minimal. This finding has left the field questioning what knowledge, if not evaluation theory, guides practitioners? Some theorists propose that evaluation practice is influenced by practical (...) knowledge, a diverse knowledge base inherent to the doing of evaluation. Practical knowledge is a blend of explicit procedural knowledge and tacit ways of knowing that inform practitioners’ perceptions and guide their practice. It is developed through practitioner’s interactions with and theorizing of practical problems as well as insights drawn from experience. Despite its perceived importance to evaluation practice, limited research has been conducted on practical knowledge in evaluation. Consequently, the field lacks an understanding of the underlying knowledge, or epistemology, of evaluation practice. The current study addressed this research gap by investigating practical knowledge in evaluation with a specific focus on the ways of knowing that underlie and guide practitioners. A multiple methods research design, consisting of two studies, was implemented. The first study used a convergent mixed methods design to analyze qualitative and quantitative data collected through document review (N=3) and the repertory grid technique (N=22). The findings presented a holistic epistemology of evaluation practice grounded in four inter-related ways of knowing: knowing self, knowing others, knowing the discipline, and knowing the common good and equity. Important insights into the underlying dimensions of the ways of knowing, including creative processes that actuate knowing (i.e., knowing in action) and methods evaluators use to express what has become known through their practice (i.e., expressions of knowing) were also interpreted from the findings. The second study examined how the epistemology of evaluation practice identified in the first study is integrated into graduate programs in evaluation. Qualitative data were collected through semi-structured interviews with evaluation faculty (N=11) as well as alumni and advanced students (N=16) from six graduate programs in evaluation based in the United States. The findings suggest that the epistemology is reflected in the evaluation educational programs, albeit to varying degrees. Knowing the discipline was the most evident among the programs while knowing others and expressions of knowing were moderately evident. Knowing the common good and equity, knowing self, and knowing in action were less apparent, suggesting that these may be areas for further development. This research advances the scholarship on evaluation practice and provides valuable insights into the relationship between evaluation theory and practice. Additionally, the findings present a holistic representation of the epistemology of evaluation practice that challenges existing assumptions about how the field conceptualizes practice and knowledge construction. Last, the findings provide valuable information that can further professionalize evaluation by refining the field’s understanding of the unique nature of evaluation practice and informing evaluator education, reflective practice, and professional development. (shrink)

This short poem is inspired by Robert Langlands, recipient of the 2018 Abel Prize. The poem tries to sum up in poetic language, as brief but substantial as it can be, the philosophical and rhetorical connotation of his contributions to mathematics, from automorphic forms to number theory, and the famous Langlands programme, among others. Also partly inspired by Edward Frenkel's tribute to Langlands, the book Love and Mathematics, the poem seeks to capture the philosophical beauty of mathematics that privileges the (...) importance of 'functions' over 'passions', consistent with Langlands' purely mathematical side. (shrink)

Psychedelics have the power to induce in us an altered state of consciousness—a psychological experience radically different from our normal waking state of consciousness. Notable differences include changes in one’s perception of time, their sense of self, and the meaning and significance they attribute to things in their life. Across a broad range of testimonies, many people have reported characteristics of their psychedelic experience that bear a close resemblance to metaphysical accounts of ultimate reality from various cultures and time periods. (...) In this paper, I explore the question of whether one can acquire knowledge of ultimate reality through psychedelic experience. Using an application of Bertrand Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance argument, I demonstrate that one’s perceptual experience in the altered state of consciousness, in combination with post-experience reflection, provides justification for knowledge of ultimate reality. (shrink)

The U.S. law has a weak conception of the right to privacy– one that fails to adequately protect consumers in the technological age. This project draws primarily upon Locke, Kant, and Ripstein to articulate and apply a reorientation of the right to privacy and defend that reorientation as constitutionally sound. Specifically, Locke’s property theory and Kant’s innate right suggest that the right to privacy is derived from an exclusive right to control one’s person, which is one’s most fundamental property. In (...) applying this understanding of privacy, there is a case for a robust protection of consumer data. Further, Ripstein’s analysis of public provisions highlights that the state has a positive duty to secure the conditions for the effective exercise of the right to privacy. Doing so entails state regulation of what I argue are illegitimate business-to-consumer consent agreements. In short, this reorientation provides grounds for a protection and maintenance of a morally robust right to privacy in the technological age that can pass constitutional muster. (shrink)

In my paper, I thoroughly detail the characters, A and B, and their relationship to the double movement, despair, and actuality that appear in Kierkegaard’s works Either/Or and The Sickness Unto Death. I claim that the characters are not isolated characters, but two sides of one psychology in dialogue with each other. The realization of this makes the reading of Kierkegaard’s work more interesting and primes it for deeper engagement for the reader. The parallel of psychological concepts such as the (...) id, ego, and superego allows one to recognize the same dialogue that exists in their own inner life and connect more deeply to Kierkegaard’s task. I show how his religious upbringing and familiarity with tragedy inform his understanding of his own existential questions and provide my interpretation of his solution to the double movement as well as an attempt of my own. Kierkegaard advocates for the leap of faith based on his understanding of the eternal self created in God’s image, with a responsibility to embrace the task of strengthening the self in alignment with God and in rejection of sin and despair. I build on this by including the importance of love and the following passion. I agree that the “true self” cannot be known and it is essential to place your faith in something greater than yourself, such as love or God, to remain in an active relationship with the existential task of strengthening your self through choices. (shrink)

The American national identity is built upon a dream of assimilation commonly referred to as the American Dream. The American Dream speaks to and attracts millions of people from diverse backgrounds and cultures, seeking to assimilate into an identity that would fulfill a good life. Though many people have different interpretations of what defines a good life derived from the American Dream, it is generally associated with two key features: upward mobility and economic success. These features, as the American Dream (...) promises, are the key to obtaining a good life. Yet, for many Americans, these features are difficult to obtain and utilize because of contemporary issues that stem from a lack of equitable opportunities and a deep economic inequality in the United States. This paper will address the difficulties that many Americans face in their journey of assimilation due to contemporary issues that lead to challenges with the people and traits of themselves that they hold dearest. (shrink)

This dissertation provides a sustained theoretical articulation of core Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts situated within the standing difficulties in the practice and theory of museums. Drawing upon research gathered from site visits, informational interviews, textual analysis, and an extensive engagement with the seminars of Jacques Lacan, I enumerate here a first attempt at what a Lacanian theoretical formation can contribute to museum studies scholarship. Through this research this dissertation shows psychoanalysis to be especially useful for museum studies owing to how the (...) troubles immediately encountered in the everyday material practices of museological work are structurally analogous to the impossibilities experienced on the couch. This work is, additionally, performed with an eye sensitive to the ways in which the use of digital technology within museological spaces is increasingly imagined as the best means for solving, avoiding, or otherwise filling-in the lack, separation, or non-relation that exists between visitors and museums. Through the parallel analyses of a collage of examples curated from new media (virtual reality, 3d printing, videogames, augmented reality applications, and online streaming services) and the interrogation of existing theories within museum studies scholarship (such as participatory and Foucaultian theory) this research pursues a direct confrontation with how the extant theory of the museum cannot speak to what are the increasingly heightened contradictions emergent in the discourses determining museums.Rather than interpret obstacles in museological work as impediments to the successful transmission of knowledge between visitors and museums, I seek to show instead how these barriers are, according to a psychoanalytically informed museum studies, both the bedrock and the object-cause of all museological work. The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to provoke a desire for psychoanalytic theory among those working in museums and a desire for museum studies scholarship among those working in psychoanalysis and media studies. (shrink)

While some might consider epistolary novels of the long-eighteenth century as the sentimental purview of women readers, this research proposes that many of these epistolary novels serve as powerful markers in the gender wars of this era. While an overall sense of optimism pervaded Britain’s long-eighteenth century, people still grappled with foundational moral questions. These questions came to be addressed in increasingly secular ways by moral philosophy. As these philosophers occupied influential government, law, and publishing positions, their ideas and works (...) greatly influenced the public imagination. The publications of moral philosophers—such as John Locke, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Joseph Butler, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Jeremy Bentham—sparked the imaginations of some of the era’s top epistolary novelists who dramatized their philosophical theories in fictional moral experiments. This project investigates how and why the novelists Aphra Behn, Samuel Richardson, Sarah Fielding, Frances Burney, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley literalized the dialectics of certain moral philosophers. This research asserts that the novelists adopted the structure of the three-stage moral dialectic found in moral sentiment theories and patterned their novels and their characters’ psychological processes to be a literalization of the moral-philosophical dialectics. As the novelists use the realist epistolary genre, they capture real-world settings and complex psychologies with startling accuracy, prompting interpretive questions regarding character ethics and credibility. Literary analysis reveals that the novelists designed fictional plotlines that facilitate inevitable moral dilemmas for the characters to contemplate and determine their moral actions. These plotlines and character dilemmas follow a three-stage moral dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. While no one to one pairing of novelist and moral philosopher is identified or argued for, the literary analysis reveals undeniable mutual influences and metatextual responses across the works chosen for this project. In the thesis stage, novelists have their characters literalize the philosopher’s process of contemplation. For example, Aphra Behn designs her characters to dramatize John Locke’s focus on applying experience-based knowledge in the process of refuting received social customs. This novelist-philosopher connection also appears in Samuel Richardson’s characters who emulate Shaftesburean principles when they depend upon their innate moral sense to ascertain the virtuous path in a precarious situation. After the contemplative thesis stage is played out, the novelists move to the antithesis stage, which expresses a state of skepticism wherein the characters are unwilling or unable to bridge the gap from moral knowledge to moral behavior. The novelists then dramatize the synthesis stage, which resolves the unstable condition of the antithesis state, through some external regulatory structure. The specifics of the resolution vary across the novels depending on which moral philosopher’s stance is adopted. For instance, Frances Burney’s warning novel of The Wanderer; or, Female Difficulties (1814), literalizes the importance of everyone adhering to David Hume’s General Rule and of respecting class boundaries. This project uses narratology focused on diegetic framing levels and voice styles to analyze how the novelists shift first-person epistolary voices and third-person omniscient voices to convey their perspectives regarding the social benefits of living out these moral philosophies. Specifically, the novelists assert how the external regulatory structures impact women, eliciting praise or criticism from the various authors. In these designed fictional worlds, this research asserts that several novelists develop narrators who emulate a moral philosopher’s specific concept of an “imagined internal entity.” This entity functions as a self-reflexive tool for thinking and assessing a situation’s holistic moral implications and potential actions. For example, this entity refers to Shaftesbury’s “critical self,” Butler’s “conscience,” and Smith’s “Impartial Spectator.” This project ultimately asserts that the stage three synthesis presents the most significant social commentary posed by the novelists. In this stage three turn to external regulatory structures, such as marriage in particular or the law in general, some of the novelists—such as Samuel Richardson, Sarah Fielding, and Frances Burney—applaud the philosopher’s proposal for regulating social harmony. However, other novelists—such as Aphra Behn, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley—use their fictional works to dramatize how this turn to external regulatory structures led to gender and class discrimination, to the point of women experiencing social condemnation, unjust imprisonment, and capital punishment. (shrink)

In this project I investigate and develop a theory of desire primarily focused on the metaphysics of desire. Since my theory of desire is an evaluative theory, I address discussions concerning value and goodness, and its relation to the ethics and metaphysics of desire. Defining a desire is a complex endeavor and so is determining how desires fit within our mental economy. To locate my position, I begin with an investigation of various, often opposing, theories of desire. I examine motivational (...) theories, pleasure-based theories, reward/learning accounts, and evaluative models. Ultimately, I argue that none of these theories provides adequate explanation for the metaphysics or phenomenology of desire. After providing arguments against these approaches, I develop my position called the “agent relative” model. I argue that desire is affective and that all affect requires an attachment to the object. Attachments are essentially self-regarding; therefore, desire is essentially self-regarding. I argue that for S to desire P, is for S to see P as good-for S. It may be that for S to desire P, is for S to experience P as good rather than experiencing P as good for S’s own wellbeing. Nevertheless, I argue for the latter and hold that the former can be true of hope, but that hope and desire are different. Finally, I argue that given my evaluative theory of desire, a modified desire satisfaction account of well-being can connect the truths found in standard desire satisfaction models with an objective list model of well-being. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I develop a convict epistemology that interweaves two elements: 1) a deep engagement with the works of particular philosophers and scholars investigating questions of punishment, violence, biopolitics and political philosophy 2) with some specific, publicly-reported incidents within California prisons in the late 20th and 21st centuries and my own detailed narration of events and the structural and quotidian dynamics of the prison yard as I experienced them as inmate #K73299 from 1997 to 2005. Diverging from Foucauldian theories (...) of disciplinarity, I argue that under neoliberalism, the primary punishments that any inmate is subjected to within the carceral thresher are in excess of what they were sentenced to endure by the court. Taken together, these extrajuridical punishments constitute a thanatopolitical machinery of forms of state-organized violence that are delegated to inmates and are therefore disavowed and have utterly subsumed the carceral interior. Because this violence is directed at particular, largely racialized populations – the majority of the prison population being Black and Brown - abandonment to the contemporary prison and its thanatopolitical machinery is proto-genocidal. The primary function of the contemporary prison, then, is to actively abandon a largely racialized, rendered superfluous population within a forcefully bounded and statetotalized space to a steered machinery of delegated, proto-genocidal death production. As this thanatopolitical machinery of inmate-on-inmate violence has subsumed the prison yard, I argue that the contemporary prison is the carceral state’s manufacture of an artificial Hobbesian-style state of nature, an always potential war of all-against-all or prison race riot, through the interaction of the four following carceral logics: 1) The imposition of scarcity, 2) atop a forcefully undifferentiated population, 3) that is barred the capacity to flee, or, the state enjoying a monopoly over inmate movement, and 4) within conditions of functional lawlessness. Resultantly, through carceral inscription, each and every inmate is rendered as a “savage,” a less-than-fully-human ontological type, and it is this concept that does sufficient ideological work to anchor normative subjectivity within neoliberalized social space through negation. It is also the prison as artificial state of nature and constitutive boundary that civil society comes to define itself against, both materially and ideologically. Further, as a result of these four foundational carceral logics, inmates are forced to enact or endure daily forms of lesser violence, often as conscious means of forestalling more lethal and larger-scale entropic violence. As disease infects the individual body and undermines it, this violent “savagery” at the gates (prison race riot and lesser forms of violence meant to prevent it) is perceived within the whitesupremacist Hobbesian fantasy anchoring normative subjectivity as threatening the “body politic” with annihilation. Through Roberto Esposito’s immunitarian paradigm, the contemporary prison should be read as a series of recursive quarantines called forth to inoculate civil society from the perceived contagious threat of “violence disease” materialized as largely racialized, inmate bodies. The concept of the less-than-fully-human inmate is thus semantically overloaded with notions of both savagery and contamination then, and daily life within prison for inmates is largely organized by “prison-politics” as prophylactic, epidemiological strategy that guarantees social distance between racialized groupings that stalls out a race riot’s transmissibility as the prison’s very condition of being, And as inmates are articulated as a less-than-fully-human savage/contaminant threats, they are through René Girard’s framework of sacrificial violence to be read as being marginalized from civil society; a sacrificial category of less-than-full-humanness functioning as lightning rod or attractor for all the varied hostilities and insecurities roiling a violently restructured, neoliberalized social space. It is the contemporary prison that allows white supremacist community to cohere through time through the regular displacement of internal antagonisms generated under neoliberalism towards the inmate as sacrificial subject. The prison is a sacrificial stone. (shrink)

Almost exactly fifty years ago, Friedrich Kambartel, in his classic essay “Ethics and Mathematics,” did pioneering work in an intellectual environment that almost self-evidently assumed a strict separation of the two fields. In our first section we summarize and discuss that classical paper. The following two sections are devoted to complement and contrast Kambartel’s picture. In particular, the second section is devoted to ethical aspects of the indirect and direct mathematization of modern societies. The final section gives a short categorization (...) of various philosophical positions with respect to the rationality of ethics and the mutual relation between ethics and mathematics. (shrink)

Both Spinoza and Buddhism raise objection to the existence of the self as independent. This work presents Spinoza’s and early Buddhism’s account of the non-self respectively, namely, that the self does not have independent existence. Starting from the non-self, I look into the metaphysical pictures outlined by Spinoza and Buddhism and argue that despite their agreement on the non-self, they differ in regard to their metaphysical views in general. In comparing and contrasting the two, I shall conclude that both fall (...) short in some regards, and the two should be combined and complement each other. This will lead us to a denial of any independent existent thing. Thus, a comparative study of Spinoza and early Buddhism will end up with a view held by later Buddhism, emptiness, such that all things lack independent existence. (shrink)

This paper is a critique on ideology critique. In this paper, I argue that, even though ideology critique is often conceived as the means to unmask oppressive relations, it can also mask and further perpetuate those relations. First, I introduce the concept of discourse by discussing its implications for social activities. Then, I draw a parallel between discourse and games to offer a way of accounting for the mechanism of discourse–how it is structured and how it may be changed. With (...) this understanding of discourse, I analyze some case studies of ideology critique, which I identify as a type of discourse. In those case studies, I demonstrate how an ideology critique can assume problematic rules, so that it no longer plays a liberation game but an oppression game. I propose some ways to avoid constructing an oppressive ideology critique and anticipate some possible objections. In the end, I show how this lesson learned from ideology critique can be applied to self-examination and raise some interesting questions for further exploration. (shrink)