Originally published in 1985, this distinguished and constructive critique of modern culture introduced into our language a brand-new term, ‘PN’, standing for ‘psychic nutrition’, which at the time promised to become a household expression. Drawing on his first-hand knowledge of oriental civilizations; on discoveries of Jung, especially his concept of psychic energy; on the ideas of the cultural anthropologists; and not least on the New Science implicit in microphysics and microbiology, E.W.F. Tomlin, whose philosophical books have been translated into several (...) languages, shows how the human psyche requires its own kind of nourishment just as urgently as the body needs food. In the industrial societies of the West, this need has often been ignored. Reformers, in their earnest though sometimes inept endeavours to create a better world, have too often exposed us to the dangers of psychic starvation and the noxious effects of what may be called ‘neg-PN’. Here lie the roots of violence and the lack of direction so conspicuously afflicting modern man and woman. Examples of PN, positive and negative, are given, lending the book an immediacy and practical character often lacking in studies of this kind. In the new scientific approach here adopted, the divisions between matter and life, and life and mind, are discarded, and the old conflict between science and religion shown to belong to an out-of-date world view. The result is a radical reappraisal of the nature and function of religion and art, the two great psychic forces in history. Indeed, the present crisis is shown to originate in the psychic sphere rather than in the political and economic order. Deeply felt and elegantly written, yet not lacking in wit and humour, the book ends with some concrete ideas on how a more balanced culture may be achieved. (shrink)

We readily recognize the concept of an inner life as a moral category. We struggle to say what an inner life is, though. This essay examines and rejects naturalistic attempts to either dismiss the idea of an inner life or make it a matter of brain states, a sort of efficient causality to behaviour. Relying on Simone Weil's distinction between “the language of the market place and the language of the nuptial chamber,” it distinguishes, as she did, between levels of (...) value. The inner life is a life of dealing with values that demand some kind of personal and intimate response. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that a particular war is just or unjust, that terrorism is always wrong, or that torture can sometimes be morally justified? What are the moral bases for the possession or use of nuclear weapons, intervening in other nations' civil wars, or being a bystander to genocide? Such questions take us to the heart of what is morally right and wrong behaviour in our world. Global Violence: Ethical and Political Issues provides readers with the analytical (...) tools to better understand the suppositions that underlie the debates about such questions, as well as equipping them to advance their own reasoned and informed moral analyses of these topics. The book engages different normative approaches from the fields of ethics, international relations and political philosophy and uses them to examine a set of case studies on the subjects of inter-state and civil war, nuclear weapons, terrorism, torture and genocide. (shrink)

En 1857, Franz Pfeiffer a édité un ensemble de traités et de sermons dont certains ont été écrits par Maître Eckhart. Cet article propose une traduction en français du Sermon Pf. n. 104 sur la souffrance et présente ce texte en montrant comment il s’inscrit dans une perspective théologique classique. Pourtant, il est difficile d’attribuer ce sermon à Eckhart dans la mesure où le Livre de la Consolation divine exprime une toute autre conception distinguant très nettement souffrance et péché.

Hobbes établit une distinction entre signes certains et signes incertains, qui correspond à la distinction entre science et prudence. Mais il précise toutefois que les signes de la science ne sont pas tous certains, ni infaillibles. Cette recommandation n’est pas tant une critique de la science, qu’une mise en garde adressée à ceux qui renoncent à leur jugement naturel et s’en remettent aveuglément à l’autorité des livres. La certitude dépend donc d’un bon usage des signes de la part du sujet (...) qui connaît ou interprète. Hobbes affirme ainsi le primat du sujet ou de l’esprit dans la constitution du signe et sa manipulation. La différence entre signes certains et signes incertains ne dépend pas seulement du type de signes, mais également des conditions de l’interprétation. Cette solution s’impose si l’on comprend la définition de Hobbes selon laquelle il n’y a de signe que pour et par un sujet, comme une définition générale s’appliquant à tout type de signe. On pourra alors rendre compte de la certitude ou de l’incertitude des signes à partir de la manière dont le sujet fait usage des signes dans le calcul des conséquences. À cet égard, la distinction entre consécutions de l’imagination et consécutions de la raison joue un rôle au moins aussi essentiel que la distinction entre signes naturels et signes d’institution : s’il est vrai que l’imagination dépend de l’ordre aléatoire des perceptions, alors que les calculs de la raison se fondent sur des signes arbitraires, la notion de consécution apparaît comme le fondement de toute activité portant sur les signes, puisque tout signe, qu’il soit naturel ou conventionnel, suppose un rapport posé ou effectué par l’esprit. L’originalité de Hobbes consiste notamment à envisager le signe comme un rapport entre deux événements, entre un conséquent et un antécédent : plutôt que le rapport entre une présence et une absence, c’est la notion d’ordre qui est au cœur de la pensée hobbesienne du signe. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to argue against the idea that there needs to be a polar opposition between "biological" and "humanistic" psychiatry. The basis for this idea lies in the philosophical tradition-the view that "mind" and "brain" must be conceived either as two separate "substances" or as one and the same. It is argued that this ontological conception of the problem should be replaced with a phenomenological description of what is actually meant by talk of human mental life. (...) In particular, Merleau-Ponty's account of human beings as "body-subjects" enables us to explain some aspects of some mental disorders as manifestations of neurological dysfunction, others as human responses to traumatic situations, and others as both. (shrink)

This collection of previously unpublished papers discusses a number of related ethical and philosophical issues in health care. The papers range widely, from problems in dealing with embryos, foetuses and neonates, through our treatment of the dying and newly-dead and the issue of fair resource allocation in health care, to our response to mental illness. Throughout, the aim is to combine detached philosophical analysis with a sense of medical realities and a sensitivity to human values.

It is surely not coincidental that the term "soul" should mean not only the center of a creature's life and consciousness, but also a thing or action characterized by intense vivacity ("that bike's got soul!"). It also seems far from coincidental that the same contemporary academic discussions that have largely cast aside the language of "soul" in their quest to define the character of human mental life should themselves be so--how to say it?--bloodless, so lacking in soul. This volume arises (...) from the opposite premise, namely that the task of understanding human nature is bound up with and in important respects dependent upon the more critical task of learning to be fully human, of learning to have soul. The papers collected here are derived from a conference in Oxford sponsored by the Centre of Theology and Philosophy and together explore the often surprising landscape that emerges when human consciousness is approached from this angle. Drawing upon literary, philosophical, theological, historical, and musical modes of analysis, the essays of this volume vividly remind the reader of the power of the ancient language of soul over against contemporary impulses to reduce, fragment, and overly determine human selfhood. (shrink)

The primary goal of this article is to analyze Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law concerning humanitarian law violations and its relationship to global governance norms. When discussing the notion of universal jurisdiction, there are relatively few empirical situations that scholars can draw on to illuminate the debate. In general, there is a very theoretical orientation to the universal human rights debate. Belgium’s 1993 universal jurisdiction law brings a greater degree of empirical clarity to this debate. This law allowed Belgium to hear (...) cases concerning violations of humanitarian law, including genocide and other crimes against humanity, which happened anywhere, without any connection to Belgium. In essence, this was an attempt at the protection of human rights on a universal basis and may be the way forward in the prevention of mass atrocities. (shrink)

L’accroissement continu du suicide est un puissant révélateur de l’ethos d’une société, du malaise observé dans les structures de sa vie quotidienne et de la violence mortifère qui y est à l’œuvre. L’urgence de la situation est ressentie par la communauté comme un appel à la responsabilité collective et à son autocritique en s’interrogeant sur ses critères de la vie bonne. Pourquoi une société se croit-elle autorisée de prévenir le suicide de ses membres? Jusqu’où peut-elle aller dans cette voie? Quels (...) moyens sont justifiés pour s’acquitter de cette obligation? Après avoir examiné les raisons qui fondent la légitimité de la prévention du suicide et ses limites, nous proposerons des politiques ou des stratégies de santé publique pour une saine gestion du risque suicidaire. (shrink)

This article draws on the past and present work of the Society of Philosophers in America, Inc. to consider eight challenges for growing communities of philosophical conversation in ways that pragmatism encourages and calls for, in terms of engaged public philosophy. The essay then proposes ways of addressing the eight challenges with solutions or outlooks for overcoming or diminishing obstacles to engaged, public philosophical and conversational community-building. The author argues that it is vital especially for pragmatists, but also for philosophers (...) in general, not only to appreciate and work to address these challenges, but also to affirmatively support and recognize the publicly conversational and community-building philosophy that is an implication of pragmatist philosophy and scholars’ supreme intellectual obligation. (shrink)