푸코가 ‘지식의 의지’ 개념을 주조해내는 과정은 푸코의 니체 독서의 고유한 면을 보여준다. 필자는 이 글에서 한편으로 ‘충실한’ 니체주의자로서 푸코가 자신의 과제 수행을 위해 어떻게 니체의 특정 통찰을 채택·활용하는가를 보여주고, 다른 한편으로 필자의 관점에서 중요한, 하지만 푸코의 사상 형성에서는 누락된 또 다른 통찰이 니체의 사상 전개 과정에서 어떻게 중요한 역할을 하는지 보여주고자 한다. 이를 위해 필자는 우선 푸코가 고고학으로부터 계보학으로 이행하는 과정에서 어떻게 니체의 계보학적 통찰을 프랑스 인식론의 전통으로부터 주조해낸 ‘지식’의 개념과 결합하여 ‘지식의 의지’라는 개념을 만들어내었는가를 살펴볼 것이다(2∼4절). 그 다음으로 필자는 (...) 이 과정에서 니체의 계보학적 통찰이 비중 있게 채택되는 반면 그의 인간학적 통찰은 채택의 문턱을 넘지 못함을 밝히고, 니체가 인간학적 통찰을 출발점으로 삼아 어떻게 서양 형이상학의 자기지양의 논리 속에서 자신의 길을 찾는지를 제시하고자 한다(5∼6절). 마지막으로, 인간학적인 사유를 극복하는, 니체와 푸코 각자의 방식을 종합적으로 검토함으로써 이 글을 끝맺을 것이다(7절). (shrink)

A step-by-step guide to Foucault's History of Sexuality Volume I, The Will to KnowledgeIn the first volume of his History of Sexuality, The Will to Knowledge, Foucault weaves together the most influential theoretical account of sexuality since Freud. Mark Kelly systematically unpacks the intricacies of Foucault's dense and sometimes confusing exposition, in a straightforward way, putting it in its historical and theoretical context.This is both a guide for the reader new to the text and one that offers (...) new insights to those already familiar with Foucault's work. (shrink)

In this provocative book, Randall Havas articulates an approach to Nietzsche which demonstrates that the authentic individual need not stand apart from his or her culture in order to resist the demands of conformism. On Havas's reading, the task of the Nietzschean individual is instead to replace the illusion of culture - "herd morality" - with real community, and in this way to avoid nihilism. It is such community that Nietzsche aspires to establish with his readers - a claim that, (...) in the author's view, suggests that Nietzsche's conception of the nature of community and, hence, of individuality must be understood in terms of his theory of reading and interpretation. Nietzsche holds that the category of the individual is itself a historical construct. Havas's interpretation of this view dissolves the threat it appears to pose to individualism. By treating genealogical method as a response to this threat, he shows how Nietzsche's defense of individualism, his conception of history, and his commitment to truth reinforce one another. On this reading, Nietzsche's more properly ethical concerns lie at the heart of his understanding of the will to knowledge. Havas argues that, for Nietzsche, ostensibly epistemological questions can be assessed only in the light of an understanding of the interdependence between individual and community. (shrink)

Purpose of the paper is to establish the emergence and evolution of a gender problematics from the foundations of classical philosophy, namely, from the phenomenon of will-to-truth as the spontaneous desire of man to understand the life. To achieve this purpose, the following tasks are solved: 1) to investigate the way in which philosophy constitutes itself; 2) to establish how the category of "sex" manifests, both in the natural and in the social contexts; 3) to determine the correlation of (...) gender studies and philosophy. Theoretical basis. If for the methodology of gender studies it is inherent to proceed from the contextuality and value foundations of knowledge, then in this paper gender is considered directly from the being-in-world, human presence. Originality. The distinction between will-to-truth and will-to-knowledge, conducted for the first time by Michel Foucault, is used as a method by which the ontological demand of sex is revealed. Conclusions. As a result of the study, it was found that scientific developments in the field of gender issues in their subject matter are not mainly descended from subject sphere of classical philosophy. Sex is not substantiated metaphysically, and it is ontical, not ontological attribute of the human kind; its presentation as the determining factor of the cultural history in context of femininity/masculinity dichotomy is biased. This quality is similar to Nietzsche’s will to power, i.e., determination of definite knowledge that is later used in legal, socio-political discourse, corrects language practice, determines scientific researches making them dependant on axiological component of culture. As the social justice problem is solved, gender as the subject of social study loses its actuality. (shrink)

Better known as a poet and dramatist, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was also a learned philosopher and natural scientist. Astrida Orle Tantillo offers the first comprehensive analysis of his natural philosophy, which she contends is rooted in creativity. Tantillo analyzes Goethe’s main scientific texts, including his work on physics, botany, comparative anatomy, and metereology. She critically examines his attempts to challenge the basic tenets of Newtonian and Cartesian science and to found a new natural philosophy. In individual chapters devoted to (...) different key principles, she reveals how this natural philosophy—which questions rationalism, the quantitative approach to scientific inquiry, strict gender categories, and the possibility of scientific objectivity—illuminates Goethe’s standing as both a precursor and critic of modernity. Tantillo does not presuppose prior knowledge of Goethe or science, and carefully avoids an overreliance on specialized jargon. This makes _The Will to Create_ accessible to a wide audience, including philosophers, historians of science, and literary theorists, as well as general readers. (shrink)

Research on computational models of scientific discovery investigates both the induction of descriptive laws and the construction of explanatory models. Although the work in law discovery centers on knowledge‐lean approaches to searching a problem space, research on deeper modeling tasks emphasizes the pivotal role of domain knowledge. As an example, our own research on inductive process modeling uses information about candidate processes to explain why variables change over time. However, our experience with IPM, an artificial intelligence system that (...) implements this approach, suggests that process knowledge is insufficient to avoid consideration of implausible models. To this end, the discovery system needs additional knowledge that constrains the model structures. We report on an extended system, SC‐IPM, that uses such information to reduce its search through the space of candidates and to produce models that human scientists find more plausible. We also argue that although people carry out less extensive search than SC‐IPM, they rely on the same forms of knowledge—processes and constraints—when constructing explanatory models. (shrink)

This article locates Hegel’s understanding of the nature of knowledge in various contexts (Hegel’s logical system, Kantian idealism, the Enlightenment ideal of encyclopaedia) and applies it specifically to his systematic classification of histories. Here Hegel labels Herodotus an “original” historian, and hence incapable of the broader vision and self-reflexive method of a “philosophical” historian like Hegel himself. This theoretical classification is not quite in accord with Hegel’s actual appropriation of material from Herodotus’s narrative for his own purposes. These appropriations (...) point in complex ways to dimensions of the “Father of History” which are proto-Hegelian, as well as to other dimensions which are not. (shrink)

Combining knowledge of social policy and practice with insights from poststructural and feminist theory, the text demonstrates how democratic citizens and the political are continually recreated.

The objective of this article is to show Augustine’s originality in ascribing a key role to will in the cognitive activity. For him, knowledge is influenced by both will and love, and cannot be grasped without will. Grounded primarily on De trinitate, the article focuses on three kinds of knowledge that shed light on his peculiar view on will: self-knowledge, knowledge of God, and the knowledge of bodies.L’objectif de cet article est (...) de montrer que l’originalité d’Augustin est d’attribuer un rôle clé à la volonté dans l’activité cognitive. Pour lui, la connaissance est influencée tant par la volonté que par l’amour et ne peut être appréhenéee sans volonté. Se basant principalement sur De trinitate, cet article se concentre sur trois genres de connaissance qui mettent en lumière sa conception particulière de la volonté : la connaissance de soi, la connaissance de Dieu et la connaissance des corps. (shrink)

“The will to truth,” says Nietzsche, “is merely a form of the will to illusion”; it’s not the opposite of “the will to ignorance, to the uncertain, to the untrue,” but instead “its refinement.” What can this mean? How could a quest for knowledge ever serve a desire to remain in the dark? I answer this question by means of an example in Proust, whose protagonist expends huge quantities of energy apparently trying to find out whether (...) his love partner is faithful. The efforts, it turns out, are designed not to yield any concrete information but only to give him the impression that he’s left no stone unturned. So they serve what we might call a second-order will to ignorance: a drive to remain unaware of just how much we don’t know. This, too, is what Nietzsche’s “Wissenschaftler” are up to—and maybe, in some contexts, it’s what we should all be up to. (shrink)

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta (...) Pavese and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

I argue that there is a cognition condition on intention and intentional action. If an agent is doing A intentionally, she has knowledge in intention that he is doing A. If an agent intends to do A, she has knowledge in intention that she is going to do A. In both cases, the agent has knowledge of eventual success, in this sense: she knows that it will be no accident if she ends up having done A. (...) In both cases, the agent’s knowledge is of what is happening, or what is going to happen, in the world; it is not knowledge merely of her state of mind. This knowledge is practical: it the cause of what it understands; without it what is happening, or what is going to happen, is not an intentional action, and any practical thought of the agent’s about what is happening, or what is going to happen, does not hit the heights of intention. I demonstrate that famous examples (from Davidson and Bratman) purporting to show that the cognition condition should be rejected (or its content or scope weakened) are ineffective, because they trade on confusions about the different kinds of failure to which intentional action may be susceptible, confusions remedied via reflection on the structure of intentional action. I show that the cognition condition is grounded not in reflection about the directions of fit and guidance of different kinds of mental states, nor in the indicative content of linguistic expressions of intention, but in the calculative and temporal structure of intentional action itself. (shrink)

The author examines the relation between Michel Foucault's corpus and Freudian psychoanalysis. He argues that Foucault had a complex and changing relationship to psychoanalysis for two primary reasons: his own psychopathology, personal experience, and expressed desire, and due to an ineluctable contradiction at the heart of psychoanalysis itself. The author examines the history of Foucault's personal and scholarly interest in psychology and psychiatry, tracing the emergence, development, and shift in his thought and work. He then argues that Foucault's critique of (...) psychoanalysis can be extended to the constitution of the Western educated subject, and that Foucault ultimately resolved his personal dilemma in relation to psychoanalysis by rejecting the ‘will to knowledge’ and refusing the notion of a stable and fixed identity. (shrink)

Education aims at more than supplying learners with information, or knowledge of facts. Even when the transmission of information is at stake, abilities relevant to using that information are among the things that teachers aim, or ought to aim, to inculcate. We may think that abilities for critical reflection on knowledge, and critical thinking more generally, are central to what teachers should cultivate in their students. Moreover, we may hope that students acquire not merely the ability to (e.g.) (...) think critically, but the propensity or habit of doing so. We hope that critical thinking will be something they *do* do, not something they merely *can* do; that they will become, not merely capable of inquiry, but inquisitive; and so on. If education aims at more than the inculcation of propositional knowledge, are these other aims non-cognitive, or non-epistemic? This essay aims to make progress on this question by critically examining Gilbert Ryle's conceptions of skill and habit. (shrink)

When historians of philosophy turn to the work of distinguished philosopher Frederick L. Will, Pragmatism and Realism will be an important part of the ...

This article investigates the history of the relation between idealism and pragmatism by examining the importance of the French idealist Charles Renouvier for the development of William James's ‘Will to Believe’. By focusing on French idealism, we obtain a broader understanding of the kinds of idealism on offer in the nineteenth century. First, I show that Renouvier's unique methodological idealism led to distinctively pragmatist doctrines and that his theory of certitude and its connection to freedom is worthy of reconsideration. (...) Second, I argue that the technical vocabulary and main structure of the argument from the ‘Will to Believe’ depend upon Renouvier's idealist theory of knowledge and psychology of belief, and that taking account of this line of influence is of crucial importance for establishing the correct interpretation of James's work. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the (...) public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Contemporary discussions of knowledge how typically focus on the question whether or not knowing how to do ϕ consists in propositional knowledge, and divide the field between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists. This way of framing the issue is said to derive from Gilbert Ryle. I argue that this is a misreading of Ryle, whose primary interest in discussing knowledge how was not epistemological but rather action-theoretical, whose argument against intellectualism has for this reason been misunderstood and underestimated, and (...) whose positive view aims to chart a middle course between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in philosophy of action that there is and must be teleologically basic action: something done on an occasion without doing it by means of doing anything else. It is widely believed that basic actions are exercises of skill. As the source of the need for basic action is the structure of practical reasoning, this yields a conception of skill and practical reasoning as complementary but mutually exclusive. On this view, practical reasoning and complex intentional action depend (...) on skill and basic action, but the latter pair are not themselves rationally structured: the movements a basic action comprises are not intentional actions, and they are not structured as means to an end. However, Michael Thompson and Douglas Lavin have argued that action that bears no inner rational structure is not intentional action at all, and that therefore there can be no such thing as basic action. In this paper, I argue that their critique shows that standard conceptions of basic action are indeed untenable, but not that we can do without an alternative. I develop an alternative conception of skill and basic action on which their basicness is not to be equated with simplicity: like deliberation and non-basic action, they are teleologically complex, but their complexity takes a different form. On this view, skill contrasts with deliberation—not because it is not a manifestation of practical reason, but because the two are specifically different manifestations of practical reason. (shrink)

We know facts, but we also know how to do things. To know a fact is to know that a proposition is true. But does knowing how to ride a bike amount to knowledge of propositions? This is a challenging question and one that deeply divides the contemporary landscape. A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How introduces, outlines, and critically evaluates various contemporary debates surrounding the nature of knowledge-how. Carter and Poston show that situating the debate over the nature (...) of knowledge-how in other epistemological debates provides new ways to make progress. In particular, Carter and Poston explore the question of what knowledge-how involves, and how it might come apart from propositional knowledge, by engaging with key epistemological topics including epistemic luck, knowledge of language, epistemic value, virtue epistemology and social epistemology. New frontiers for research on knowledge-how are also explored relating to the internalism - externalism debate as well as embodied and extended knowledge. A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How provides an accessible introduction to the main arguments in this important and thriving debate suited for undergraduates and postgraduates in philosophy and related areas. A strength of the book is its methodology which places a premium on placing the debates over knowledge-how in a broader conversation over the nature of knowledge. This book also offers an opinionated discussion of various lines of argument which will be of interest to professional philosophers as well. (shrink)

NAIRN S. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 6–17 A critical realist approach to knowledge: implications for evidence‐based practice in and beyond nursingThis paper will identify some of the key conceptual tools of a critical realist approach to knowledge. I will then apply these principles to some of the competing epistemologies that are prevalent within nursing. There are broadly two approaches which are sometimes distinct from each other and sometimes inter‐related. On one side, there is the view that (...) all healthcare interventions should be judged on the principles of randomised controlled trials and the other is a preoccupation with language in which healthcare interventions are subjected to a discursive interrogation. These debates are configured through the idea of a hierarchy of knowledge that is accorded uncritical acceptance by some and virulent distaste by others. I will argue that the notion of hierarchy is problematic and is largely argued for in unproductive epistemological terms. What is required is a shift towards a theory that emphasises the contextual nature of the ways that knowledge is produced and disseminated. In other words, there is no single hierarchy of knowledge, but there are multiple hierarchies of knowledge. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the (...) public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Accompanying the decline of empiricism in the theory of knowledge has been an increased interest in the social determinants of knowledge and an increased recognition of the fundamental place in the constitution of knowledge occupied by accepted cognitive practices. The principal aim of this paper is to show how a view of knowledge that fully recognizes the role of these practices can adequately treat a topic that is widely considered to be an insuperable obstacle to such (...) a view. The topic is that of scientific realism, of the independence with respect to cognitive practices of certain objects of knowledge. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of, and thematic justification for, the special issue of the journal of Artificial Intelligence and Law entitled “E-Discovery”. In attempting to define a characteristic “AI & Law” approach to e-discovery, and since a central theme of AI & Law involves computationally modeling legal knowledge, reasoning and decision making, we focus on the theme of representing and reasoning with litigators’ theories or hypotheses about document relevance through a variety of techniques including machine learning. We also (...) identify two emerging techniques for enabling users’ document queries to better express the theories of relevance and connect them to documents: social network analysis and a hypothesis ontology. (shrink)

The book has so far shown that Thomas Aquinas had plenty to say about what we need to affirm of God from a philosophical viewpoint and without explicit reference to, or dependence Christian revelation. According to him, there are good philosophical grounds for saying that God is the creator of the world, and that he is perfect, good, ubiquitous, eternal, unique, powerful, and knowledgeable. This chapter turns to his philosophical treatment of God's will, God's love, and God's justice and (...) mercy, for what he has to say presupposes, and connects with, much that he teaches concerning God's changelessness, power, and knowledge. His philosophical case for ascribing will to God rests, for example, on his view of God's knowledge or understanding, and he develops it by drawing on the conclusion that God is wholly immutable. (shrink)

This paper summarizes the results from the first European Advanced Seminar in the Philosophy of the Life Sciences, which was held at the Brocher Foundation in Hermance (Switzerland) 6-10 September 2011. The Advanced Seminar brought together philosophers of the life sciences to discuss the topic of "Causation and Disease." The search for causes of disease in the biomedical sciences, we argue on the basis of the contributions to this conference, has not resulted in a simplification and unification of biomedical (...) class='Hi'>knowledge, as once hoped for by philosophers of science, but rather in its "complexification.". (shrink)

No philistine, Thorstein Veblen thought humankind's innate impulse to imbue experience with aesthetic unity advanced all knowledge, and that the most beautiful objects, ideas, and actions met a standard of communal benefit reflecting humanity's naturally selected sociability. Though German idealism was an early influence, it clashed with Veblen's historicist critique of Western institutions, and it was William James's psychology that refined his ideas into a coherent aesthetics with ethical and political applications, by clarifying how instinct, habit, and environment could (...) interact to institutionalize standards of beauty subverting the native altruism of the aesthetic impulse. Over years of association with John Dewey, Veblen concluded that a redeemed and reflective will to behold and create beauty in and through selfless activity could advance a more efficient and egalitarian society, and that humans cooperatively shaping their environments for the common good could approximate the German tradition's ideal of harmonizing personal freedom and external reality. (shrink)

Introduction -- Overview -- Theism, simplicity, and properly anthropocentric metaphysics -- Materialism and dualism -- The power, knowledge, and motives of the primordial God -- The existence of the primordial God -- God changes -- Understanding evil -- The Trinity -- The Incarnation -- Concluding remarks.

Statistical fairness criteria are widely used for diagnosing and ameliorating algorithmic bias. However, these fairness criteria are controversial as their use raises several difficult questions. I argue that the major problems for statistical algorithmic fairness criteria stem from an incorrect understanding of their nature. These criteria are primarily used for two purposes: first, evaluating AI systems for bias, and second constraining machine learning optimization problems in order to ameliorate such bias. The first purpose typically involves treating each criterion as a (...) necessary condition for fairness. The second use involves treating criteria as sufficient conditions for fairness. Since the criteria are used for both roles, some researchers have treated them as both necessary and sufficient conditions, i.e., as definitions of algorithmic fairness. However, serious problems have been raised for the use of these fairness criteria. Under ordinary circumstances, it is impossible to satisfy multiple criteria at the same time. Moreover, there are counterexamples to both the sufficiency and necessity for fairness of each criterion. I argue that we should instead understand fairness criteria as merely providing evidence of fairness. In other words, satisfaction (or violation) of these criteria should be understood as potential evidence of fairness (or bias). Whether a criterion counts as evidence in a particular case will depend on stakeholders' background knowledge and the specific features of the system's task. This evidence account of fairness conditions provides guidance for recognizing both the appropriate uses and the limitations of fairness criteria. (shrink)

Recent work on testimony has raised questions about the extent to which testimony is a distinctively second-personal phenomenon and the possible epistemic significance of its second-personal aspects. However, testimony, in the sense primarily investigated in recent epistemology, is far from the only way in which we acquire knowledge from others. My goal is to distinguish knowledge acquired from testimony (learning from being told) from knowledge acquired from teaching (learning from being taught), and to investigate the similarities and (...) differences between the two with respect to the interpersonal dimensions of their structures. (shrink)

In this paper we take a fresh look at the information retrieval problem of balancing recall with precision in electronic document extraction. We examine the IR constructs of uncertainty, context and relevance, proposing a new process model for context learning, and introducing a new IT artifact designed to support user driven learning by leveraging explicit knowledge to discover implicit knowledge within a corpus of documents. The IT artifact is a prototype designed to present a small set of extracted (...) documents from a targeted corpus based upon user inputted criteria. The prototype provides the user with the opportunity to balance exploration and exploitation, via iterative relevance feedback to address the problem of imprecision resulting from uncertainty. We model the problem as an exploration–exploitation dilemma and apply it to a specific case of IR called eDiscovery. We conduct a series of behavioral experiments to evaluate the model and the artifact. Our initial findings indicate that the proposed model and the artifact improve performance in the IR result. (shrink)

This paper presents the epistemic practices account, a theory about the nature of epistemic normativity. The account aims to explain how the pursuit of epistemic values such as truth and knowledge can give rise to epistemic norms. On this account, epistemic norms are the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The account explains four crucial features of epistemic normativity while dissolving some apparent tensions between them. The account also provides a unified theory of epistemic and zetetic normativity.

Though philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Sartre have dismissed imagination as epistemically irrelevant, this chapter argues that there are numerous cases in which imagining can help to justify our contingent beliefs about the world. The argument proceeds by the consideration of case studies involving two particularly gifted imaginers, Nikola Tesla and Temple Grandin. Importantly, the lessons that we learn from these case studies are applicable to cases involving less gifted imaginers as well. Though not all imaginings will have justificatory (...) power, the chapter shows how the sorts of cases in which imagining plays an epistemic role can be easily distinguished from the sorts of cases in which it does not. (shrink)

The traditional structure of medical school curriculum in the United States consists of 2 years of pre-clinical study followed by 2 years of clinical rotations. In this essay, I propose that this curricular approach stems from the understanding that medicine is both a science, or a body of knowledge, as well as an art, or a craft that is practiced. I then argue that this distinction between science and art is also relevant to the field of medical ethics, and (...) that this should be reflected in ethics curriculum in medical education. I introduce and argue for virtue ethics as the best opportunity for introducing practical ethical knowledge to medical trainees. (shrink)

Summary A famous debate between John Ray, Joseph Pitton de Tournefort and Augustus Quirinus Rivinus at the end of the seventeenth century has often been referred to as signalling the beginning of a rift between classificatory methods relying on logical division and classificatory methods relying on empirical grouping. Interestingly, a couple of decades later, Linnaeus showed very little excitement in reviewing this debate, and this although he was the first to introduce the terminological distinction of artificial vs. natural methods. In (...) this paper, I will explain Linnaeus's indifference by the fact that earlier debates were revolving around problems of plant diagnosis rather than classification. From Linnaeus's perspective, they were therefore concerned with what he called artificial methods alone ? diagnostic tools, that is, which were artificial no matter which characters were taken into account. The natural method Linnaeus proposed, on the other hand, was not about diagnosis, but about relations of equivalence which played a vital, although largely implicit role in the practices of specimen exchange on which naturalists relied to acquire knowledge of the natural world. (shrink)

Joining the ongoing academic debates around medical students’ alternative career choices, this research examines the role of family in medical school attendees’ entrepreneurial intention. Specifically, this study decomposes the multidimensionality of family embeddedness and highlights the mediated nature of the family–EI relationship. The empirical analysis relied on data from graduation year medical students from diverse geographical locations and from different institution types in China. These data were collected from a total of 687 questionnaires covering the basic information of individual, parents, (...) and family composition, as well as the measuring scale of EI. Examining medical students’ EI and its antecedents provide a dual-missing-link in the extant knowledge, i.e., it adds the medical school piece to the overall picture of university students’ EI, and equally important, it de-trivializes entrepreneurship from the extant theorizations of medical students’ career choices. This study also bears implications for educators, practitioners, and policymakers interested in better understanding EI of medical school attendees and family embeddedness. (shrink)

The opening chapter familiarises students with the aims and methods of political philosophy. It explains the tools required to practice the discipline, and discusses how to apply these to political arguments. Each of the fifteen subsequent chapters focuses on a distinct area of public policy, such as affirmative action, humanitarian intervention, immigration, and parental leave. The authors introduce students to the moral questions that lie at the heart of these political disputes, as well as to some of the relevant academic (...) literature. The authors believe that the best way to learn about political philosophy is to see it in action. By arguing for a position in each chapter and defending it against criticisms, they demonstrate to students how political philosophy can inform our analysis of public policy. Introducing Political Philosophy is available for students and institutions to purchase in a variety of formats, and is supported by online resources. The e-book offers a mobile experience and convenient access along with hyperlinks a list of web-links, and self-test questions, helping to test your knowledge and understanding of policy areas, and the philosophical arguments that influence them: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/ebooks. · Student resources: a curated list of websites help you to deepen your knowledge of policy areas, and self-test questions help you to critically evaluate key points from each chapter. · Lecturer resources include: seminar activities to encourage student engagement, discussion and debate; guidance on using the teaching activities; a teaching guide explaining how to get the most out of the book's inside-out approach; and customisable PowerPoint slides on key topics, thinkers, and concepts to aid effective teaching preparation. (shrink)

The contention of the above comment, as I understand it, is that there is, analogously to the problem of trisecting an arbitrary angle in mathematics, a sound demonstration, along the lines employed by Hume and Russell, of skeptical conclusions concerning our inductive knowledge of the future, and that hence one is mistaken in imputing to that argument, as I have done, a logical slip arising from a confusion in the use of ‘future’ and other similar words. I am indebted (...) to Mr. Wang for the stimulation, and to the Editor of Philosophy of Science for the opportunity, to try to make my points clearer.The proponents of these skeptical arguments maintain that, apart from some supporting postulates which we must make in inductions about the future, we have no evidence concerning the future of any given moment. If we restrict ourselves to the evidence we have from the present and the past, and do not bolster this evidence with some Principle of Induction, like that of Hume to the effect that the future will be like the past, “we have no theoretical assurance,” as Mr. Wang puts it, “that the practice of guiding our activities by what we learn from... [the past] will lead to success on the whole and in the long run.”. (shrink)

Do you believe you think independently? Do you alone control your actions? Stoic philosophy asserts that your mind, thoughts, and actions are traces of a world which shapes you, and everyone else, together. Our personal nature is part of a system, not independent. This book studies how a Stoic thinks and acts as part of a community and in service of a world, rather than separately or for themselves alone. This is not just another book about Stoic philosophy. Stoicism has (...) been popularized as a way to primarily serve personal benefits, promising mental resilience in an uncontrollable world of people and events. This book instead explores how for the Stoics we only benefit personally by being aware of how we are entangled with our fellow humans and the world. This perspective reveals anti-individualistic conditions for the well-being that individuals seek from the philosophy. By studying features that might seem to define us as separate individuals--our mind, body, self-preserving instinct, knowledge, and happiness--we find that everything about each of us is interconnected and shared. The theoretical analysis, suitable for general and academic readers, involves all ancient Stoic eras, comparisons with pre-Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian positions, and modern Stoic debates. (shrink)